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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

FY 1992



FEBRUARY 1991

AD-A232 840



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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FY 1992

Prepared by
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense



(Force Management & Personnel)
(Health Affairs)
(Reserve Affairs)

Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force

Defense Agencies

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FY 1992 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1992 in compliance with Section 115a of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.). This report should be read and used along with the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1992-1993 Budget.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT.

This report explains the Department of Defense manpower program incorporated in the President's Budget FY 1992-1993. The report is organized into eight chapters, three appendices, and three annexes. The annexes are bound and provided separately.

Defense Manpower Program (Chapters I through VIII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1992-1993 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain details on manpower programs for each of the military Services and the Defense Agencies. Chapter VIII summarizes manpower costs.

Unit Annex. As requested by Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.

Officer Flow Annex. Section 115a(e) of Title 10, U.S.C., requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in the Officer Flow Annex.

Medical Manpower Annex. Section 115a(g)(1) of Title 10, U.S.C., requires the submission of detailed information on medical manpower. This information is contained in the Medical Manpower Annex.

II. THE TOTAL FORCE.

The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components, the civilian workforce, retired military, host nation support, and DoD contractors.

A. Active Component Military

The active component military are those full-time military men and women who serve in units that engage enemy forces, provide support in the combat theater, provide other support, and who are in special accounts (transients, student, etc.). These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay.

B. Reserve Component Military.

Reserve component military manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It has two principal elements: the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve includes three groups divided into Training and Retirement Categories (TRC): (1) units organized, equipped, and trained to perform wartime missions (TRC A); (2) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), who provide wartime augmentation on or shortly after M-day (TRC B), and (3) those members of the Selected Reserve who have not completed sufficient training to be awarded a military skill designation (TRC C). Training pipeline personnel may not deploy overseas upon mobilization until minimum training is completed (12 weeks or its equivalent.) Selected Reservists assigned to units, and IMAs, train throughout the year and participate annually in active training. As many as 200,000 Selected Reservists may be involuntarily recalled by the President for up to 90 days, with an option for a 90 day extension, to augment active forces. The Reserve Component manpower requested by the Department of Defense (for the purpose of this report) is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) consist of those Ready Reservists who are not in the Selected Reserve. Members of the IRR and ING have served recently in the active force or the Selected Reserve and have some portion of their military service obligation remaining or have volunteered to remain beyond their statutory obligation. The majority of IRR and ING members do not participate regularly in organized training. All members of the IRR and ING are subject to being ordered to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress. An IRR screening program commenced during FY 1987, calls IRR members to duty for one day to allow a review of their personal military records and physical condition.

The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who maintain their military affiliation, but are unable to remain in a Ready Reserve status, or who have been classified as being more essential in their civilian jobs. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of the active and reserve and do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. Those Retired Reservists who have served 20 or more years on active duty may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the military department concerned at any time. Those Retired Reservists who do not have 20 or more years on active duty can be ordered to active duty only after Congress declares war or national emergency.

C. Civilian Component

Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1 million of the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes,

ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical support; and operates and maintains military installations. Civilians contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces by providing continuity and expertise and by freeing uniformed personnel to perform military-specific tasks.

D. Retirees.

Retired military manpower is a major portion of the Total Force. There are over 800,000 physically able retirees under age 60. These individuals are trained, highly motivated, and can be rapidly recalled at any time by the service secretaries to perform a wide variety of jobs. There are also large numbers of retirees age 60 and over who can make major contributions to our defense effort.

III. MANPOWER MIX.

The Department's policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit. National military strategy dictates which missions must be performed by military persons. Department policy is to employ civilian employees and contractors wherever possible to free our military forces to perform military-specific functions.

Often the most cost-effective way to meet overseas peacetime and wartime requirements in non-combat activities is to use host nation support (HNS). The agreements we have with the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Italy, and the BENELUX countries to provide port operations, surface transportation and many other support functions are examples of this support. The same type of arrangements also exist with Japan and Korea. Increased reliance on HNS makes strategic warning and allied response even more important. It also allows our strategic lift to focus on the transport of reinforcements and sustainment to the theater of operations.

In considering the most appropriate force mix, focus must be placed on the need for forces to (1) provide peacetime presence, (2) maintain rapid crisis response capabilities, and (3) hedge against a need to reconstitute forces. Peacetime presence is provided by forward-deployed forces. These forces generally are in the active component, and require a rotation base of active duty personnel to permit members of deployed units to shift from overseas assignments to stateside duty. The question of whether to place early-deploying combat capability for response to crises in the reserve components depends principally on the immediate readiness of the reserve units that would perform the early deploying missions, the probability that they would be available when needed, and the general desirability of shifting greater responsibility to the reserve components.

Since the Total Force Policy was announced in 1973 the Department has greatly increased its reliance on Reserve Component units. The Army relies heavily on reserve units to provide essential combat and combat service support. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of most mission areas, including surface combatants, carrier air wings, maritime

patrol, airlift, and medical support. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces similar to active force counterpart units. Air Force Reserve Component units have demonstrated their capability to maintain high readiness levels. In general, however, high readiness levels increase the cost of maintaining these units due to the additional training and full time support required.

The Department is developing guidelines that will establish the general criteria and procedures for determining and evaluating force mix options. At the direction of Congress, the Department conducted a major review of its Total Force Policy. The final report was submitted to the Congress in January 1991.

IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER.

Mobilization manpower is the time-phased build-up of manpower needed above our current peacetime strength to prepare for and conduct wartime military operations. Additional military and civilian personnel are necessary to bring our current peacetime forces up to their full wartime strengths; to man activated units, ships, and squadrons; and to replace casualties. The individual Service chapters describe the wartime manpower requirements and the overall mobilization manpower situation in more detail.

V. MANPOWER COUNTING.

The discussion of manpower and personnel readiness in this report requires that the reader understand the terms describing manpower counting categories. For that reason, a glossary of defense manpower terms is provided in Appendix B. The basic distinction between "spaces", that is billets or positions, and "faces", people to fill the positions, must be understood. Our forces are made up of a variety of different types of units. Each unit has associated with it a collection of positions that must be filled by qualified people in order for the unit to perform its mission.

During peacetime, it is neither necessary nor desirable to fill all positions in all units. Some units may not be staffed at all, due to a lack of funding or because we can fill them in an expeditious manner following mobilization. Some units may be staffed with a combination of active and reserve people. As a unit is tasked to perform more in peacetime, the proportion of full-time people, whether active, reserve, or civilian, may be expected to increase.

The Department's manning does not change overnight to match changes in the programmed force structure. As the force structure is changed, the programmed manning must be adjusted to best balance the requirements of force changes, available inventory, accession and separation predictions, fiscal constraints, manpower ceilings, etc. The collection of positions authorized to be filled with trained personnel is called the authorized or programmed manning.

The Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) entitled "Undistributed" appears in active component DPPC tables throughout this Report.

Negative entries project temporary undermanning at the end of a fiscal year; positive entries project temporary overmanning at the end of a fiscal year. Budgeted manpower cannot be completely distributed to DPPC mission categories because of transient phenomena primarily resulting from cyclic variations in the "Individuals" category. The Individuals category is comprised of several dynamic components which vary throughout the year, e.g., the number of trainees and students varies daily because most courses of instruction are less than one year. In consonance with the congressional practice of authorizing military manpower end strength, all DPPC categories, including Individuals, are portrayed as of September 30th.

VI. DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES.

Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain the Department's manpower resources. All three types of defense manpower are allocated to specific DPPCs, no position being counted more than once.

DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the eleven Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber program, but also the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, personnel support is given separate visibility. The DPPC structure used in this year's report remains the same as was displayed in the FY 1991 Defense Manpower Requirements Report. Definition of the categories is provided in Appendix C.

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER

PROGRAM

SUMMARY

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.

The Department's basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international climate in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs and deter aggression and coercion across the conflict spectrum. Should deterrence fail, our forces must be capable of defeating armed aggression and ending hostilities on terms favorable to the U.S. To achieve those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American national security policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1992.

Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civil service personnel, contractor, and host nation support personnel. Manpower requirements are developed based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The composition of Defense forces is based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to deterrence and success in wartime. In structuring our military forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve, whenever feasible, to maintain as small an active component peacetime force as national security considerations permit. Service planning assumes that Selected Reserve units and Individual Mobilization Augmentees will be made available for any contingency for which they are required to bring the total force to its required combat capability. Active component units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization, for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed, and for peacetime deterrence. To supplement the active component units some reserve component units must be maintained in a combat ready state for immediate call up for limited periods.

Civilians are the third essential component of the Total Force. In addition to managing critical defense resources, civil servants repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communications systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analysis; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not specifically require military personnel. Overseas, foreign nationals provide important host nation support at many U.S. installations.

The Department also employs a large number of contractors to provide important support services. Work is contracted out when it is cost effective to do so except when activities are inherently governmental, such as contract management, or a function is closely tied to mobilization.

For all types of activities the Department assigns a high priority to increasing productivity. Productivity improvement initiatives apply to both the military and the civilian work force and are reflected in the Department's programmed manpower structure.

Total quality management (TQM) has evolved as the primary strategy for achieving improvements in the quality of goods and services provided by external sources to DoD. This approach requires top management leadership and commitment, a focus on the customer, and the involvement of all employees. Application of TQM to Departmental operations continues to expand.

The Secretary of Defense Management Review (DMR) process has resulted in achieving significant productivity improvements to DoD's internal operations. The major thrust of the initial DMR recommendations was on acquisition reform. However, the DMR process continues to expand as well. The second round of DMR recommendations, incorporated into the Department's FY 1992/1993 budget and programmed manpower structure, included several new initiatives that focused on DoD internal management processes, including implementation of an electronic data interchange, consolidation of DoD printing, consolidation of dependent's education, consolidation of base engineering services, and consolidation of DoD correctional facilities. In addition, the savings associated with consolidation initiatives that were deferred in the initial DMR review, pending further study, were also effected during this cycle. These include savings resulting from the consolidation of DoD accounting and finance operations, consolidation of ADP operations and design centers, and consolidation of commissary operations.

In addition, the Department continues to employ a variety of tools and techniques to encourage work force motivation and effect internal productivity improvement. These include the use of efficiency reviews, commercial activities studies, productivity gainsharing, and labor-capital substitution investments.

The following table is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1991, FY 1992 and FY 1993.

Table II-1
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FORCE ELEMENTS

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Strategic</u>				
ICBMs	1,000	1,000	920	842
Bombers (PAA) <u>1/</u>	301	261	242	204
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) <u>1/</u>				
Active	446	436	392	358
Guard/Reserve	148	158	188	222

Strategic

Interceptor Squadrons/PAA	/02	/02	/02	/02
Active	2/36	1/18	0	0
Guard/Reserve	12/216	12/216	12/216	12/216
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)	33	34	29	24
Mobile Logistics Ships	4	4	3	3
Support Ships	2	2	2	2

Tactical/Mobility

Land Forces

Army Divisions

Active	18	16	14	14
Guard	10	10	10	8

Army Separate Brigades & Regiments

Active <u>2</u> /	10	11	9	9
Guard/Reserve <u>3</u> /	19	18	18	13

Marine Corps Divisions

Active	3	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1	1

Tactical Air Forces

Air Force

Ground Launched

Cruise Missile (GLCM)

Flights/Missiles	14/224	7/112	0	0
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Air Force Squadrons/PAA 4

Active	85/1840	76/1659	60/1288	59/1216
Guard/Reserve	51/1020	51/1008	49/990	45/936

Navy Squadrons/PAA

Active	94/1049	91/970	91/976	84/904
Reserve	14/168	14/168	14/168	14/168

Carriers (active only)

13	12	13	13
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Marine Corps Squadrons/PAA

Active	33/454	33/454	33/454	33/442
Reserve	10/118	10/120	10/120	10/120

Naval Forces

Attack Submarines

(active only)	93	87	88	90
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Surface Combatants

Active	175	153	135	128
Reserve	28	34	16	16

Amphibious Assault Ships

Active	60	62	59	55
Reserve	3	3	3	3

Patrol Ships (active only)

6	6	6	6
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Mine Warfare Ships

6	10	13	16
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ASW and FAD Squadrons/PAA				
Active	77/683	74/624	73/626	66/596
Reserve	20/150	20/124	20/124	16/118
Mobility Forces				
Airlift Squadrons/PAA <u>5</u> /				
Active	36/476	36/476	37/464	36/449
Guard/Reserve	18/345	18/347	19/328	17/335
Sealift Ships				
Nucleus Fleet <u>6</u> /	75	72	70	72
Chartered Fleet <u>7</u> /	26	28	23	21

1/Primary aerospace vehicle authorized (PAA).

2/Includes the armored cavalry regiments, armored brigades, ranger regiment, and infantry brigades.

3/Includes theater defense brigades, armored brigades, infantry brigades, one infantry group, and armored cavalry regiments.

4/Includes combat coded tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and tactical air control squadrons, combat/combat support coded special operations and tactical electronic warfare squadrons; and combat support coded tactical tanker/cargo (KC-10) and airborne warning and control squadrons.

5/Includes C-17, C-130, C-141, C-5 and C-9s. Excludes rescue and weather.

6/Includes naval fleet auxiliary force. (Underway replenishment ships and support ships).

7/Military Sealift Command Ships

II. Manpower Request. The Department's request for manpower is summarized in this section.

A. Active Component Military Strength

Active Component Military Personnel
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL*</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Army	750.6	702.2	660.2	618.2
Navy	582.9	569.7	551.4	536.0
Marine Corps	196.7	193.7	188.0	182.2
Air Force	539.3	508.6	486.8	458.1
Total	2069.4	1974.2	1886.4	1794.5

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

*Includes 25,652 Selected Reserves called to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C., Section 673b.

B. Selected Reserve Strength.

The following table shows the manpower request for the Selected Reserve, expressed in end strengths. These figures include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and full-time Active Guard/Reserve members.

Selected Reserve Military Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	ACTUAL*	BUDGET		
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Army National Guard	437.0	457.3	410.9	366.3
Army Reserve	299.1	318.7	282.7	254.5
Naval Reserve	149.4	153.4	134.6	127.1
Marine Corps Reserve	44.5	43.9	40.9	38.9
Air National Guard	117.0	117.0	118.1	119.4
Air Force Reserve	80.6	85.6	81.2	82.4
DoD Total	1127.6	1175.9	1068.4	988.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

All years include AGR/TARs and Cat. 'B' IMAs.

*Excludes 25,652 Selected Reserves called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b.

The following table shows the number of personnel involved in full time support of the Reserve Components. The Guard and Reserve military technicians, who are also DoD civilians, are included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report.

Full-Time Support to the Selected Reserve^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Army National Guard				
Active Guard/Reserve	25.8	26.2	23.3	21.6
Military Technicians	24.1	26.2	24.9	23.1
Civilians ^{2/}	3.2	2.6	2.6	2.5
Active Component	.6	.6	.6	.6
Total	53.7	55.6	51.4	47.8
Army Reserve				
Active Guard/Reserve	13.7	13.3	12.7	12.0
Military Technicians	8.5	8.5	7.0	6.2
Civilians	4.1	4.1	3.7	3.6
Active Component	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1
Total	27.3	27.0	24.5	22.9
Naval Reserve				
Active Guard/Reserve (TAR)	22.7	23.0	22.0	21.1
Civilians	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.7
Active Component	7.4	8.4	5.7	5.8
Total	33.1	34.4	30.5	29.6
Marine Corps Reserve				
Active Guard/Reserve	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.1
Civilians	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Active Component	5.0	5.0	4.7	4.7
Total	7.7	7.8	7.3	7.2

Air National Guard				
Active Guard/Reserve	8.6	8.5	9.1	9.1
Military Technicians <u>3/</u>	24.1	24.5	24.6	25.4
Civilians <u>2/</u>	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.9
Active Component	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Total	35.2	35.6	36.2	37.0
Air Force Reserve				
Active Guard/Reserve	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6
Military Technicians	9.6	10.3	10.4	10.4
Civilians	4.5	4.4	4.8	5.2
Active Component	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7
Total	15.3	16.0	16.4	16.9
DoD Total				
Active Guard/Reserve	73.8	74.1	69.9	66.5
Military Technicians	66.3	69.5	66.8	65.1
Civilians	17.1	16.5	16.2	16.3
Active Component	15.1	16.3	13.4	13.5
Total	172.3	176.4	166.3	161.4

1/Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are included in Selected Reserve strength throughout the report.

2/Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians and Army Reserve and Air National Guard status quo technicians.

3/Includes reimbursable military technicians.

C. Civilian Component Strength

Civilian Manpower^{1/} (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Army	380.4	363.1	329.3	314.7
Navy	320.5	309.7	292.4	285.3
Marine Corps	20.5	20.2	18.9	18.5
Air Force	248.9	239.0	222.9	220.6
Defense Agencies	102.5	119.7	139.4	136.5
Total DoD	1072.8	1051.7	1002.9	975.7

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the requested civilian strength includes U.S. direct and foreign national direct and indirect hire employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian personnel:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth.

Included under this category are: Stay-in-School, Temporary Summer Aid, Federal Junior Fellowship, and Worker Trainee Opportunity programs. Employment in these categories is estimated at 5,200 in FY 1992.

2. National Security Agency.

NSA personnel are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions Personnel.

Civil functions, administered by DoD, include the Army's Corps of Engineers, Arlington National Cemetery, and the Air Force's Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil employment in FY 1992 is estimated at approximately 30,000 employees.

III. MANPOWER OVERVIEW

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military				
Active	2069.4	1974.2	1886.4	1794.5
Officer	299.0	285.1	276.1	262.2
Enlisted	1756.9	1675.6	1597.1	1519.4
Cadets/Midship-				
men	13.6	13.5	13.2	12.9
Selected Reserve	1127.6	1175.9	1068.4	988.6
Civilian ^{1/}	1072.8	1051.7	1002.9	975.7

^{1/} Full time equivalent (FTE) end strength.

A. Military Manpower.

The FY 1992 authorization request for active component military personnel is 1,886,400. The Selected Reserve authorization request is 1,068,400. Ongoing Operation DESERT STORM requirements, and the uncertainty around the intensity and duration of these requirements, make the end strength estimates very fragile. The ability to meet FY 1991 end strength ceilings is already in question and will not be resolved until a resolution to the mid-East crisis is reached or at least agreed upon. Highlights of the military manpower programs by Service follow.

ARMY

Recent changes in the international environment, notwithstanding the operational requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD, will enable the Army to shape its future. This represents the first step of a transition from a Cold War posture, primarily oriented on the Soviet Union, to a more versatile posture shaped to meet the requirements of the 1990s and beyond. This change in focus, coupled with recent and projected long range resource reductions has caused the shaping of both the Active and Reserve Components into a force which will be smaller but highly trained and ready to discharge the missions assigned to it.

The Army's plan envisions an end-state in the mid-1990's in which our active force structure and overseas presence (given the completion of appropriate international agreements and the successful resolution of Operation DESERT STORM) are substantially reduced, our reserve component forces are reduced and upgraded in warfighting capability, and a greater emphasis is placed on the contingency capability of a more "U.S.-based" force.

The Army plans to inactivate four active and two reserve divisions and one corps by the end of FY 1993. Heavy divisions will continue conversion to Army of Excellence design as light divisions continue transition to objective designs. Emphasis will be on a largely CONUS-based force which is readily deployable and structured for a flexible response to global contingencies.

NAVY

In FY 1991 total Battle Force ships will decrease from 545 to 528 and in FY 1992 to 477. Total Battle Force ships will decrease to 464 in FY 1993. The end strength requested for FY 1991 is 569,721; for FY 1992 and FY 1993 the requested end strength is 551,400 and 536,000. Navy forces will continue to be employed in regional/world conflicts and as instruments of foreign policy throughout the 1990's and into the next century. Sustaining readiness to meet ongoing and emergent operational commitments is the Navy's challenge for the 1990's. Navy will prepare battle forces for future requirements by replacing older ships with more economical, efficient, and capable units.

Navy's FY 1991-1993 manpower request continues the trend toward a lean sea-going Navy, while pursuing every economy for necessary shore support. The achievement of end strength cuts by reducing accessions and protecting career personnel where possible is a goal. A fundamental element of Navy manpower strategy is to maintain sufficient numbers of recruits to avoid future "hollow year groups".

Navy Reserve end strength will increase 4,000 in FY 1991, decrease 19,000 in FY 1992 and 7,000 in FY 1993.

MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps end strength goal for FY 1991 is 193,735 and for FY 1992 and FY 1993 is 188,000 and 182,200 and reflects a balance between existing resource constraints and the dynamics of the international security environment. With the world in flux, naval expeditionary forces, with their inherent flexibility and power projection and strategic reach, remain indispensable. Their capabilities have been most recently demonstrated by Marine deployments and operations in the Persian Gulf, Panama, Southwest Asia, and in support of counter-narcotics operations.

The Marine Corps employs a "bottom-up" approach to restructuring the active duty Fleet Marine Force (FMF). The central aim is the development of an optimal, light, active force that is tailored for expeditionary missions. While the Corps retains the capability to field powerful Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) to fulfill the CINC's warfighting plans, it has

shaped and enhanced its active FMF into a rapidly deployable and capable expeditionary force. This force is considerably more responsive to the entire range of threat scenarios while retaining the ability to respond rapidly to global war.

Key changes to active force structure have been the reduction by 10 percent of two Force Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific. The activation of the third Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG), the deactivation of the Truck Company in each Division (in FY 1990), the FY 1992 deactivation of a Reconnaissance Battalion, the transition of tank battalions to the M1A1 (by FY 1992), and the deactivation of an Infantry Regiment Headquarters, an Assault Amphibian Battalion, and the 1st Tank Battalion in FY 1992. Two F/A-18 squadrons will be deactivated by FY 1993. One landing support company will be deactivated in FY 1991 and two more in FY 1992.

Marine Corps Reserve FY 1992 end strength request is for 40,900. This represents a decrease of 3000 from the FY 1991 authorization and reflects the FY 1992 deactivation of two A-4 squadrons and an electronic warfare squadron and the transition of armor units to the M1A1 (by FY 1993).

AIR FORCE

In the FY 1992 President's Budget (PB), the Air Force programmed a decrease of over 21,000 military authorizations between the FY 1991 level and the FY 1992 request. This 40-year low brings end strengths down to 52 percent and 56 percent respectively of peaks during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The major actions causing this decrease are: Transfer of active forces to the Air Reserve Components (ARC), European drawdown, reduction to management headquarters and associated units, productivity improvement initiatives, notional base closures, restructuring and streamlining initiatives, retirement of weapon systems, military-to-civilian conversions, and reduction in training requirements driven by lower accessions.

Programmed active-duty military end strength for FY 1991 is 508,558 and 486,800 in FY 1992. An additional reduction of nearly 28,000 is programmed for FY 1993 (458,100).

B. Civilian Manpower

1. Civilian Manpower Management:

A major Defense goal is to use civilian manpower resources in the most economical and efficient manner possible. The Department encourages the efficient and effective use of overtime and temporary employees to fill seasonable jobs, to handle peak work periods, and to augment current full-time staff working in areas subject to possible contracting out. In addition, DoD managers have other alternatives for meeting work load requirements. These include increasing the number of shifts, revising workweeks, staggering arrival and departure times for extended office coverage, and detailing employees from one work area to another.

The Congress removed civilian end strength ceilings from the Department in FY 1985, following a two-year trial of ceiling-free

management by DoD industrially-funded activities. Since FY 1985, Congress has closely monitored DoD's execution of civilian manpower against budgetary targets. In addition, the Department has implemented its own internal control system for reviewing civilian manpower execution data (obligations, workyears, and end strength) on a monthly and quarterly basis. Current data demonstrate that DoD has been more effective in planning for and executing the civilian manpower budget without statutory controls.

DoD is opposed to any statutory controls on the civilian work force. This includes end strength, workyear, and/or funding constraints and floors. Arbitrary reductions, statutory ceilings, and legislatively-imposed employment floors are inefficient and counterproductive. The current overseas workyear ceiling may impede DoD's ability to hire spouses who accompany service members to locations outside the continental United States. Moreover, the FY 1991 employment floor on the civilian work force at Army communications-electronics depots, requires that these facilities maintain employment above September 30, 1985 levels. Consequently, these kinds of employment floors hinder the Department's flexibility to balance properly resources against fluctuations in work load and changes in functions and mission priorities.

The Department continues to maintain that the civilian work force is a resource that must be managed based on mission requirements and funded work load. This resource must be allowed to expand or contract to accommodate mission or work load changes. This is the same flexibility afforded all of private industry in using funded work load to determine the size and composition of their staffs. Emphasis should be on sound management practices, not on managing to arbitrary ceilings or floors. Further, the legislation of specific employment levels within overall resource amounts is duplicative. The flexibility of operating managers to use appropriation authority to meet unanticipated program requirements has allowed DoD to achieve the maximum defense capability within the total resources available.

The focus of DoD managers has shifted from ensuring (and trying to preserve) personnel levels to monitoring (and more closely scrutinizing) personnel costs. Quality and cost have become our measures of success; Efficiency, not ceilings, is our primary goal. The Department will continue to promote and support a manpower environment that is permanently free from specific civilian employment controls.

2. Civilian Manpower Levels:

The Department began FY 1990 at a civilian manpower level of 1,116,803--1.5 percent (or approximately 16,000 spaces) above the FY 1990 civilian end strength target of 1,100,737. Approximately one quarter into FY 1990, the Department implemented a DoD-wide civilian hiring freeze. The freeze, coupled with appropriate authority to grant exceptions, is the vehicle the Department used to help it achieve DoD's FY 1990 civilian end strength target and to begin a long-term process of reducing the size of the Department's civilian work force. The provisions of the freeze provide management with the necessary flexibility to grant exceptions and fill positions deemed essential to maintain an important national defense capability. The Department ended FY 1990 at an end strength level of 1,072,820--2.5 percent (or approximately 28,000 spaces) below the FY 1990

end strength target and 3.9 percent (or 44,000 spaces) below the starting FY 1990 civilian manpower level.

The Department's FY 1991 civilian manpower target is 1,051,720--2 percent (or approximately 21,000 spaces) below the FY 1990 end strength level. The Department has extended the DoD-wide civilian hiring freeze through the second quarter of FY 1991 in anticipation of further civilian manpower reductions expected to occur as a result of a declining DoD budget, implementation of additional Defense Management Review initiatives, approved base closure actions, and reduced military force structure. An evaluation of the freeze will be conducted at the end of the second quarter to determine the applicability of the freeze through the remainder of FY 1991.

The Department's FY 1992 civilian manpower estimate is 1,002,859--4.6 percent (or approximately 49,000 spaces) below the FY 1991 end strength projection. The Department's FY 1993 civilian manpower estimate is 975,722--2.7 percent (or approximately 27,000 spaces) below the FY 1992 estimate and 7.2 percent (or approximately 76,000 spaces) below the FY 1991 civilian end strength target. It has been more than a decade (since FY 1980) that the Department executed a civilian manpower level that was less than 1 million end strength.

The Department has a number of programs in place to assist it in managing work force reductions. DoD's Priority Placement Program is the primary vehicle for assisting surplus employees in locating alternative employment.

3. Civilian Manpower Mix.

Civilian manpower mix can refer to DoD occupation, grade, citizenship, employment, and/or pay category. Civilians are managed in a variety of ways including categories relating to how they are employed, how they are paid, and the kinds of work they perform. Although DoD manages civilian manpower in a number of ways, civilian end strength estimates are justified primarily to Congress in terms of how civilians are paid with particular interest in the hire of foreign nationals.

DoD civilians receive either a payroll check "directly" by the Department or they are paid "indirectly" by foreign governments who receive reimbursement from DoD for the cost of their salaries and benefits. All U.S. citizens and some foreign nationals employed by the Department are paid directly by DoD. Approximately 65 percent of foreign nationals are paid indirectly by DoD.

Between FY 1991 and FY 1993, the Department's civilian manpower estimates reflect a 6.7 percent decrease in direct hire compared to a 14 percent decrease in "indirect" hire employment. Between FY 1991 and FY 1993, the Department's has projected a 6.7 percent decrease in the hire of U.S. citizens compared to a 11.5 percent decrease in the hire of foreign nationals. Consequently, the composition of DoD's civilian work force in FY 1993 compared to FY 1991 reflects increased reliance on U.S. citizens hired directly by the Department to execute assigned missions.

C. Improved Oversight Process

In the FY 1989 Defense Officer Requirements Report the Department of Defense committed itself to improving oversight of manpower management. That commitment is being met. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel) analyzed programmed manpower changes during development of the FY 1992/1993 Budget and the FY 1992-1997 Future Years Defense Program. This Report provides the foundation for more detailed analysis and oversight of the Department's manpower. The information compiled in this report becomes the basis for analysis which improves our insight into manpower demand and the linkage of manpower budgets, billet-level manpower distribution plans, and personnel inventories. These ongoing oversight efforts will identify potential problems, audit compliance with congressional directives, and allow aggressive managerial involvement to improve stewardship of the Department's manpower resources.

IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

A. Requirements Determination.

Wartime manpower requirements are based on estimated requirements to fight a specified scenario. DoD has, for many years, used a worldwide war scenario which has as a primary component, a European conflict. With the changing world environment, such a scenario is no longer particularly plausible. The Joint Staff and the Services have worked to construct a new series of scenarios which fit the changing world environment. It was planned that a Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) data call would be based on one or more of these scenarios. However, Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM intervened and DoD will use the lessons learned from it to construct future estimates of wartime manpower requirements.

B. Military Manpower.

Military manpower requirements are based on the total manpower required to field the mobilized force structure, additional personnel required to replace estimated combat casualties and necessary increases in other personnel accounts. Peak demand occurs when the size and configuration of the force has stabilized and when cumulative replacement demand is at its highest point. This will depend upon the scenario and may occur at different times in different Services. As the lessons from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM are interpreted and force reductions evaluated, wartime manpower requirements will be revised.

C. Civilian Manpower.

The peacetime civilian manpower program is changing commensurate with the military force structure changes of the individual Services, Defense Management Review initiatives, and FY 1991 congressional actions. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM is providing us with real world estimates of our wartime demand for civilian employees. DoD is deploying significant numbers of civilian employees and contractors to the theater and the CONUS workforce is surging to provide deployment and sustainment support. Operation DESERT STORM will enable DoD to assess its use of civilian employees in wartime and to revalidate its estimates of workyear requirements.

V. MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY.

The following tables summarize the FY 1990-1993 Defense manpower programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

TABLE II-2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL*</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND</u> <u>PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>				
STRATEGIC	<u>88.8</u>	<u>81.7</u>	<u>76.3</u>	<u>68.1</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	<u>72.0</u>	<u>65.0</u>	<u>61.0</u>	<u>54.0</u>
Defensive Strategic Forces	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.0</u>
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	<u>13.5</u>	<u>13.6</u>	<u>13.2</u>	<u>12.1</u>
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	<u>1035.1</u>	<u>952.2</u>	<u>904.1</u>	<u>864.1</u>
Land Forces	<u>583.9</u>	<u>526.0</u>	<u>495.8</u>	<u>469.3</u>
Tactical Air Forces	<u>203.1</u>	<u>176.7</u>	<u>167.8</u>	<u>161.5</u>
Naval Forces	<u>212.3</u>	<u>214.2</u>	<u>205.8</u>	<u>198.9</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>35.8</u>	<u>35.3</u>	<u>34.7</u>	<u>34.4</u>
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	<u>66.1</u>	<u>65.7</u>	<u>60.1</u>	<u>57.7</u>
Intelligence	<u>36.6</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>34.1</u>	<u>33.1</u>
Centrally Managed Comms	<u>29.5</u>	<u>29.3</u>	<u>26.0</u>	<u>24.6</u>
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	<u>153.0</u>	<u>151.3</u>	<u>144.0</u>	<u>130.0</u>
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	<u>51.6</u>	<u>48.7</u>	<u>46.2</u>	<u>45.1</u>
MEDICAL SUPPORT	<u>100.5</u>	<u>100.7</u>	<u>100.6</u>	<u>96.7</u>
JOINT ACTIVITIES	<u>33.9</u>	<u>44.7</u>	<u>47.1</u>	<u>47.7</u>
Int'l Military Org	<u>9.1</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>8.7</u>
Unified Commands	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.2</u>
Federal Agency Support	<u>2.8</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.2</u>
Joint Staff	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>
OSD/Defense Agencies/ Activities	<u>15.2</u>	<u>26.3</u>	<u>28.5</u>	<u>29.5</u>
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	<u>19.4</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>16.8</u>
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	<u>25.9</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>22.3</u>
Combat Commands	<u>12.8</u>	<u>12.5</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>10.3</u>
Support Commands	<u>13.1</u>	<u>12.5</u>	<u>12.3</u>	<u>12.0</u>
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	<u>26.6</u>	<u>26.8</u>	<u>25.4</u>	<u>24.3</u>
Research and Development	<u>17.3</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>16.5</u>	<u>15.7</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>8.6</u>

TABLE II-2 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	<u>124.3</u>	<u>124.1</u>	<u>121.0</u>	<u>116.8</u>
Personnel Support	31.1	30.2	30.1	30.1
Individual Training	93.2	93.9	90.9	86.7
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	<u>106.2</u>	<u>105.8</u>	<u>97.9</u>	<u>92.3</u>
Support Installations	70.8	70.1	64.7	60.8
Centralized Support Act'y	35.4	35.7	33.2	31.5
PROGRAMMED MANNING	<u>1831.4</u>	<u>1745.5</u>	<u>1664.0</u>	<u>1582.0</u>
UNDISTRIBUTED		-4.9	-5.0	-11.6
INDIVIDUALS	<u>237.6</u>	<u>233.3</u>	<u>227.7</u>	<u>224.7</u>
Transients	42.8	50.5	50.2	49.6
PPH	9.8	11.5	10.4	10.6
Trainees and Students	171.4	157.8	153.9	151.6
Cadets and Midshipman	13.6	13.5	13.2	12.9
END STRENGTH	<u>2069.4</u>	<u>1974.2</u>	<u>1886.4</u>	<u>1794.5</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*FY 1990 end strengths include 25,652 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C. Section 673b, for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE II-3
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL*</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES				
STRATEGIC	<u>21.5</u>	<u>20.9</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>25.7</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	11.5	11.6	14.2	16.5
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.5	8.8	8.7	8.7
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	<u>836.1</u>	<u>885.2</u>	<u>801.4</u>	<u>672.6</u>
Land Forces	626.1	663.4	595.1	533.4
Tactical Air Forces	78.8	81.5	79.1	77.8
Naval Forces	71.0	77.9	67.0	61.4
Mobility Forces	60.2	62.4	60.2	61.2

TABLE II-3 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL*</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	<u>17.5</u>	<u>18.2</u>	<u>18.1</u>	<u>17.7</u>
Intelligence	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.3</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>12.2</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>12.5</u>	<u>12.4</u>
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	<u>25.0</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>22.3</u>	<u>21.9</u>
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	<u>1.1</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
MEDICAL SUPPORT	<u>34.7</u>	<u>34.8</u>	<u>30.8</u>	<u>29.6</u>
JOINT ACTIVITIES	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.3</u>
Int'l Military Org	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Unified Commands	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Federal Agency Support	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	<u>8.2</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>7.1</u>
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	<u>4.2</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.8</u>
Combat Commands	<u>2.3</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>
Support Commands	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Research and Development	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	<u>54.7</u>	<u>58.4</u>	<u>51.3</u>	<u>46.4</u>
Personnel Support	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Individual Training	<u>52.1</u>	<u>55.4</u>	<u>49.1</u>	<u>44.1</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	<u>61.3</u>	<u>63.0</u>	<u>56.9</u>	<u>51.4</u>
Support Installations	<u>34.9</u>	<u>35.7</u>	<u>33.0</u>	<u>29.8</u>
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>26.4</u>	<u>27.3</u>	<u>23.9</u>	<u>21.6</u>
TOTAL UNIT STRENGTH	<u>1067.6</u>	<u>1119.7</u>	<u>1019.8</u>	<u>941.9</u>
INDIVIDUALS	<u>13.8</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>9.5</u>
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	<u>31.4</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>24.5</u>
AGR	<u>14.4</u>	<u>14.0</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>12.6</u>
END STRENGTH	<u>1127.6</u>	<u>1175.9</u>	<u>1068.4</u>	<u>988.6</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*FY 1990 end strength does not include 25,652 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C. Section 673b, for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE II-4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND</u>				
<u>PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>				
STRATEGIC	<u>14.2</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>15.7</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	7.8	8.1	8.8	9.5
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance Force	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	<u>64.8</u>	<u>58.9</u>	<u>109.8</u>	<u>106.2</u>
Land Forces	23.6	17.9	12.9	11.0
Tactical Air Forces	15.9	15.2	15.3	15.2
Naval Forces	2.9	3.0	10.0	10.0
Mobility Forces	22.4	22.8	71.6	70.0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	<u>21.1</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>24.1</u>	<u>24.6</u>
Intelligence	7.8	8.9	9.5	9.3
Centrally Managed Comms	13.3	14.7	14.6	15.3
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	<u>146.2</u>	<u>141.2</u>	<u>128.5</u>	<u>125.6</u>
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	<u>11.8</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>9.3</u>
MEDICAL SUPPORT	<u>45.9</u>	<u>46.8</u>	<u>47.3</u>	<u>47.4</u>
JOINT ACTIVITIES	<u>11.2</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>17.5</u>
Int'l Military Org	3.9	4.9	4.6	4.5
Unified Commands	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Joint Staff	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
OSD and Defense Activity	6.2	9.1	12.0	12.0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	<u>351.0</u>	<u>335.1</u>	<u>285.5</u>	<u>272.6</u>
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	<u>29.9</u>	<u>28.7</u>	<u>26.6</u>	<u>26.2</u>
Combat Commands	5.7	5.9	5.3	5.0
Support Commands	24.2	22.8	21.3	21.2
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	<u>78.4</u>	<u>77.8</u>	<u>75.3</u>	<u>73.0</u>
Research and Development	68.5	67.0	64.9	62.5
Geophysical Activities	9.9	10.8	10.4	10.5
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	<u>50.4</u>	<u>55.8</u>	<u>61.5</u>	<u>60.8</u>
Personnel Support	26.2	33.5	39.4	38.6
Individual Training	24.2	22.3	22.1	22.2

TABLE II-4 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	<u>248.6</u>	<u>244.3</u>	<u>200.2</u>	<u>196.7</u>
Support Installations	<u>157.4</u>	<u>153.8</u>	<u>116.8</u>	<u>112.9</u>
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>91.2</u>	<u>90.5</u>	<u>83.4</u>	<u>83.8</u>
END STRENGTH	<u>1072.8</u>	<u>1051.7</u>	<u>1002.9</u>	<u>975.7</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER III

ARMY

MANPOWER

PROGRAM

CHAPTER III

ARMY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. General.

The Army's manpower program provides support for the active military, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and civilian workforce for Army forces to meet our national security requirements. As the Army and the nation enter a new decade, they are witness to a world in the midst of historic changes to the international framework. Europe witnesses and experiences the collapse of communism, quests for autonomy in Soviet Republics, German unification, and major breakthroughs in arms control, while in other parts of the world clear and present challenges to the vital interests of the United States and many other nations rise in importance. As a consequence, U.S. national security strategy is evolving to adapt to the new circumstances. For its part, the Army will shape its forces to meet U.S. security requirements for the 1990s and beyond. In general terms, the Army will be:

- Smaller - reflecting the projected requirements after the termination of Operation DESERT STORM.
- Less forward deployed - reflecting the reduced requirement for forces abroad, particularly in Europe.
- Versatile - able to rapidly tailor force packages and meet foreseeable and unforeseeable peace and war requirements anywhere.
- Deployable - able to deploy the necessary tailored force packages rapidly from CONUS or areas abroad to any area of operations on little or no warning.
- Lethal - able to accomplish its assigned tasks and defeat any challenger in ground combat operations in conjunction with its sister services and U.S. allies.

The role of the U.S. Army continues to be one of service to our nation in a broad range of endeavors. However, the Army's primary objective of providing trained and ready forces for U.S. national security needs now and in the decades ahead will remain unchanged.

The Army has demonstrated its commitment to maintain readiness and make appropriate use of its Total Force through many cooperative efforts of both active and reserve component forces in fighting fires in the American West; in assisting in the recovery from the California earthquake and Hurricane Hugo; in deterring aggression with forward deployed forces in Asia and Europe, executing Operation JUST CAUSE and follow on support functions in Panama, and conducting the current Operation DESERT STORM. The Army's roles in support of our national security strategy, thus, require it to deploy packages of forces representing all components, Active and Reserve, around the world. These forces provide theater commanders the capability to conduct continuous joint operations that synchronize the contributions

of the Army's combat and support forces with those of the other services and allies. As the Army shapes itself to provide the required capabilities in the future, it will maintain near-term readiness to be able to act in unforeseeable contingencies of importance to our nation.

The Army continues to focus on three vectors: provide all necessary support for Operation DESERT STORM, maintain a trained and ready force to meet other requirements and contingencies worldwide, and continue to shape the Total Force the nation will need in the future. While Operation DESERT STORM is a current vital point of focus, the Army is also continuing to make prudent steps to achieve the smaller strength and structure needed for the future. However, some of the build down is necessarily being held in abeyance pending completion of Operation DESERT STORM. Project Vanguard, an Army initiative, and the Army Management Review have identified areas in which the Army's infrastructure of bases, facilities, and general support forces may be streamlined and reduced in line with the projected future force needs. In sum, the Army has approached the shaping of its Total Force for the future in a way that assures the appropriate mix of forces of all types and components, supported by an appropriate infrastructure.

The Army, with a smaller Total Force, will nevertheless maintain sufficient capabilities to meet projected requirements. Large force projection operations, such as Operation DESERT STORM, may require earlier and more extensive mobilization of the Reserve Components, whereas for rapid deployment contingencies the force must have a greater degree of active component capability. In adopting the Total Force for the future, the Army will take into account lessons to be learned from Operation DESERT STORM.

As the Army downsizes, a concurrent reduction in the number of civilians will be required. Consistent with the Army's decentralized personnel management philosophy, commanders will decide where and how to cut expenditures for civilians, taking the most severe actions (e.g., reductions in force and furloughs) as a last resort. When civilians must be separated, priority placement programs are available to assist in finding continued employment.

As the Army evolves, it will adhere to six fundamental imperatives that will allow it to make the best use of its size and resources:

- Quality: Attract and retain high quality soldiers and civilians who will enable the Army to fulfill its roles worldwide in spite of its relatively small size.
- Doctrine: Maintain forward-looking warfighting doctrine that guides combat operations, provides the basis for exploiting American human and technological advantages, and shapes the Army's organizational structures and weapon system designs.
- Force Structure: Maintain the force size and mix of armored, light, and special operations units required by national strategy; with the appropriate proportions and types of combat and support capabilities in both Active and Reserve Component elements.

- Training: Conduct tough, realistic training which is the basis for maintaining the readiness of the smaller Total Force.
- Modernization: Modernize continuously to ensure Army forces have needed warfighting capabilities.
- Leader Development: Develop competent, confident military and civilian leaders.

As the Army advances toward the 21st Century, it will adhere to the six fundamental imperatives in order to assure the capabilities and readiness of the Total Force as it builds down and restructures. The Army will be prepared to meet foreseen as well as unforeseeable requirements such as Operation DESERT STORM, and deliver the versatile, deployable, and lethal force, needed to meet U.S. national security needs whenever and wherever they may arise.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements.

Wartime manpower requirements are based on the mobilized force structure, additional personnel required to replace estimated combat casualties and necessary increases in other personnel accounts. Total wartime manpower requirements, last developed during FY 1988, were based on a world-wide, three-theater war scenario. Total requirements have not been recalculated pending an updated Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) containing an Illustrative Planning Scenario (IPS).

1. Military Manpower.

The current Mobilization Personnel Structure and Composition System (MOBPERSACS) documents a wartime required force structure of approximately 1.47 million soldiers for FY 1991 and 1.36 million for FY 1995. The most recent projection of the total demand for trained military manpower (developed during calendar year 1988) at M+180 is shown below:

Wartime Military Manpower Peak Demand (Trained Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 95</u>
Peak demand	2,050.7	2,036.2

2. Civilian Manpower.

Army civilians provide overseas and U.S. based support to prepare, deploy and sustain military forces worldwide. With the sudden workload increases that occur in wartime, the number of Army civilians must grow immediately in order to provide that support. The total estimated peak demand for U.S. Direct Hire and Indirect Hire civilian manpower is about 513,377 upon full mobilization.

C. Strength Request.

Requested strengths for the Active and Reserve Components and the Civilian Employment Plan are shown below:

Army Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Active Military	750.6	702.2	660.2	618.2
Active	(732.4)			
Reserve	(18.2)			
Selected Reserve	736.1	776.0	693.6	620.9
Army Reserve*	299.1	318.7	282.7	254.5
Army National Guard*	437.0	457.3	410.9	366.3
Civilians**	380.4	363.1	329.3	314.7

(*Includes IMAs. Does not include 10.9K USAR and 7.3K ARNG soldiers mobilized in FY 1990 for Operation DESERT SHIELD.)

(**Includes Civilian Technicians)

Strengths requested for active forces are based primarily on peacetime missions and budgetary constraints, and do not include the significant increase in manpower which would be needed under full mobilization. FY 1990 AC and RC strengths have been adjusted to reflect Operation DESERT SHIELD. No adjustments have been made for other fiscal years.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program.

1. Overview.

a. Public Law 100-526, "Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act" which was signed into law on 24 October 1988 has been implemented by Headquarters Department of the Army and Army major commands and both are working towards the end state previously reflected in DMRR 1991. Many of the mandated decreases in military force structure and other resource constraints are being held in abeyance pending completion of Operation DESERT STORM. The civilian manpower program is reduced commensurate with force structure changes, Defense Management Report (DMR) initiatives, and FY 1991 congressional actions.

b. Due to the major restructuring of Army programs, an initiative to centralize several manpower functions at Headquarters, Department of the Army has been approved. In accordance with Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 945I, the Army will centrally manage and perform manpower documentation, standards and surveys, effective FY 1992. In addition to saving resources, this initiative will allow the Army to enhance unit documentation, and provide more responsive support to the force integration process. Other objectives include accelerated manpower standards development and an expanded manpower survey program in support of on-going restructuring efforts. Achieving this will enable the Army to more effectively implement the fundamental force structure changes planned during the next several years. Resources and capability will be

retained at both the installations and Major Army Commands to ensure the manpower supportability of guidance and decisions. Regional teams will be utilized to support the process.

c. Although the Army manpower program includes both military and civilian strengths associated with Special Operations Forces missions, these strengths are controlled by the joint command, USSOCOM, in accordance with congressional directives. Therefore, all justification of both strengths and variances are included in the "Defense Agencies" portion of this report under USSOCOM.

d. Force structure/manpower plans for FY 1992 - FY 1993 will maintain the Total Army's deterrent capability by continued emphasis on CONUS-based combat unit readiness and training, continuing and sustaining modernization, improving the equipment posture of the Total Army, and increasing productivity programs. These actions work toward an end state in the mid-1990's in which CONUS force structure and overseas presence are substantially reduced. Reserve component forces are reduced in number but upgraded in warfighting capability. The Army continues to balance and mix its active and reserve component forces and mission assignments to provide the optimum blend of wartime/crisis capability and cost effectiveness consistent with both the projected and current threat. In addition, the Army continues planning and programming efforts to implement the military and civilian end strength estimates reflected in the FY 1992 - 1993 President's Budget for Base Realignments and Closures while maintaining effective and sufficient warfighting capabilities. The following tables display the strength changes by major Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), for the Active, Selected Reserve, and Civilian components. (Note: Due to rounding, data in the tables may not add to the totals shown.)

Army Active Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Strategic	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.5
Tactical/Mobility	484.7	424.7	400.1	376.3
Commun/Intel	16.6	17.1	12.8	11.9
Combat Installation	15.7	13.1	12.2	10.2
Force Spt Tng	7.4	9.4	9.1	9.1
Medical Spt	33.4	33.8	33.8	32.8
Joint Activities	19.0	22.7	23.2	23.4
Central Logistics	2.3	2.7	2.7	2.6
Svc Mgt Hdqtrs	6.7	6.0	5.9	5.8
Research/Devel	4.0	4.2	4.0	3.7
Tng/Personnel	51.2	51.4	50.5	47.2
Spt Activities	29.8	30.5	26.4	25.5
Total Programmed Manning	671.1	616.1	581.2	549.0
Force Structure Deviation	0.0	6.1	5.5	-2.1
Individuals	79.5	79.9	73.4	71.4
TOTALS	<u>750.6</u>	<u>702.2</u>	<u>660.2</u>	<u>618.2</u>
Active	(732.4)			
Reserve	(18.2)			

U.S. Army Reserve Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Tactical/Mobility	191.3	208.6	185.2	165.8
Communications/Intell	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8
Medical Support	10.4	9.0	8.0	7.2
Joint Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Service Mgt Hqtrs	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Tng & Personnel	47.2	50.6	44.9	40.2
Spt Activities	20.9	21.7	19.3	17.3
Active Guard/Reserve	13.7	13.3	12.7	12.0
Individuals**	(28.9)	(26.5)	(20.8)	(19.1)
Indiv Mob Aug	14.2	14.0	11.4	10.9
TOTALS*	299.1	318.7	282.7	254.5

*Does not include 10.9K Selected Reserves called to active duty in FY 1990 for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

**Parenthetical entry for Individuals is not additive to total end strength--Individuals end strength is allocated among the appropriate DPPCs.

Army National Guard Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Tactical/Mobility	405.9	425.3	382.1	340.6
Support Activities	29.7	30.6	27.5	24.5
Trng & Personnel	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1
Individuals**	(27.7)	(28.3)	(20.6)	(19.6)
TOTALS*	437.0	457.3	410.9	366.3

*Does not include 7.3K Selected Reserves called to active duty in FY 1990 for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

**Parenthetical entry for Individuals is not additive to total end strength--Individuals end strength is allocated among the appropriate DPPCs.

Army Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)
Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Strategic	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Tactical/Mobility	25.7	20.2	15.0	13.1
Commun/Intel	4.6	5.8	5.4	5.4
Combat Installation	69.7	66.2	58.4	54.1
Force Spt Tng	8.0	6.3	8.0	5.6
Medical Spt	26.4	27.1	28.7	28.9
Joint Activities	2.1	4.4	4.4	4.4
Central Logistics	67.9	61.8	58.3	54.7

Svc Mgt Hqtrs	11.9	12.3	11.0	10.9
Research/Devel	21.8	21.3	20.6	20.1
Tng/Personnel	20.2	20.3	24.9	24.9
Spt Activities	<u>121.9</u>	<u>117.2</u>	<u>94.5</u>	<u>92.3</u>
TOTALS	380.4	363.1	329.3	314.7

2. The FY 1992 and FY 1993 Programs.

In addition to two active divisions eliminated in FY 1991, the FY 1992 and FY 1993 program adjustments eliminated two Active Component divisions, one corps, and two divisions of the ARNG commensurate with reduction in the threat. The Reserve Components will continue modernization. Armored and mechanized infantry divisions will continue conversions to a streamlined Army of Excellence (AOE) design as they field modern, more effective equipment. Modernization and structural changes will enhance the capability of the remaining force despite the reduction in combat divisions. Light divisions continue transition to objective designs. The resulting force structure will be smaller, better manned, and better equipped.

As a result of congressional direction, structural downsizing and manpower budget constraints, the Army's end strength will be reduced from a high of 780.8K at FY 1987 to 618.2K by FY 1993. The 162.6K reduction over the period represents two thirds of the total reduction needed to reach the 535K FY 1995 end strength currently projected as the Army's steady-state level. Half of the 162.6K reduction will occur in FY 1992 and FY 1993 alone. Structure reductions will closely match the end strength reductions in order to minimize the readiness impact on the Army as it downsizes.

The FY 1991 Authorization and Appropriation Acts prohibit the reduction of Army Medical Department (AMEDD) authorizations or end strengths below the number of personnel serving on 30 September 1989. AMEDD reductions in FY 1992 and beyond will be in consonance with the overall Army drawdown, subject to the certification of the Secretary of Defense that there are no requirements for these resources and that CHAMPUS costs will not grow.

Enlisted end strength will meet structural demands by grade in FY 1992. The Army will reduce NCOs from a level of 279.9K at FY 1989 to 239.5K by FY 1993, a 40.4K reduction. To accomplish this, accessions will be reduced, retirements increased, promotions will be slowed, and retention standards will be raised. These actions will permit needed reductions to occur while at the same time increasing the quality of the enlisted force.

Officer reductions for FY 1990 were accomplished through lower accessions, the forcing out of officers passed over for promotion, the selective early retirement of some senior officers, and the use of a selected retention board for junior officers with less than five years of service. Reductions for FY 1991 and beyond will, to the maximum extent possible, be achieved by voluntary means. However, the reductions will require the use of involuntary separations if the force is to be reduced in a balanced and equitable manner. As a result, the Army received congressional approval for increased officer management flexibility to shape the force. Legislative actions are discussed further in paragraph I.E.3.

The Reserve Components (RC) program continues to provide significant contributions to the Total Army in spite of substantial planned reductions, which correlate to doctrinal reductions in the TOTAL FORCE based on reduced strategic requirements. The primary thrust is toward improving the readiness of existing RC units. In addition, modernization efforts continue in both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

The FY 1992 and FY 1993 program reflects civilian strength adjustments associated with approved funding levels and force structure actions. The FY 1990 actual civilian employment level of 380.4 thousand was 11.6 thousand below the planned level of 392.0 thousand. This decrease is attributed to the DoD-wide hiring freeze that has been in effect since January 1990. The estimated level for FY 1991 of 363.1 reflects the extension of the FY 1990 hire freeze into FY 1991, congressionally mandated funding reductions that affected civilian strength, force structure downsizing and DMR initiatives. Strength levels continue to decline in FY 1992 and 1993 as DMR initiatives, base closures and realignments, reduced funding levels, additional structure reductions, and more efficient methods of operation are put into effect.

3. Active Component.

In FY 1992 and FY 1993 active force structure changes will continue in the Continental United States (CONUS), Europe, and the Pacific under the Army's force reduction plan, and other resource constraints.

a. North America. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) will complete downsizing a motorized division to a motorized brigade and will downsize one separate armor brigade to a task force. FORSCOM will transfer one infantry battalion, one field artillery battalion, and one field artillery battery based at Fort Sill, OK to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Further, TRADOC, Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC), Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and other commands continue to downsize and merge organizations and functions to meet mandated reductions.

b. Europe. USAREUR has experienced tremendous pressures for change as a result of the rapidly evolving political situation in the region. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty established equipment ceilings which, coupled with Army downsizing actions, will significantly reduce the European troop strength. A decision on the USAREUR Force structure of the future will be made once the crisis in the Persian Gulf is resolved.

c. Pacific.

(1) Korea. In FY 1990 the 2d Infantry Division converted its Division Support Command to the modernized Army of Excellence (AOE) design; two infantry battalions were converted to air assault configuration; and one infantry battalion was inactivated. In addition, the two tank battalions have been modernized with Abrams tanks. In FY 1991 the 8 inch/MLRS composite battalion will convert and transfer to Echelons Above Division.

(2) USARPAC. The 6th Infantry Division (L) in Alaska, activated in FY 1986 and in 1989 became a part of WESTCOM and subsequently USARPAC. As a result, it is no longer under the control of FORSCOM.

4. Reserve Component.

a. Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Mix.

The Army position on AC/RC mix was submitted to the Joint Staff on 20 November 1990. An overall drawdown in force structure is distributed throughout the Active Component, Army Reserve and the Army National Guard and reflects a balanced mix of the remaining forces. A synopsis of the position is that the Army of the future will focus more on CONUS-based contingency forces, tailored to mission, rapid deployability, and capability of forced entry. In order to achieve this, the mix of AC/RC in the Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) base of contingency force's will need to be more heavily weighed to the AC. This will enhance the contingency force's ability to deploy rapidly and project power.

Force structure changes are based on the following considerations: maintaining a forward-deployed force presence; maintaining the capability to deploy contingency forces; maintaining the capability to reinforce forward-deployed forces; and maintaining an appropriate force mix of Active Army, Reserve Component, and heavy/light or special design. The active force reductions include the reduction of two divisions to brigade-size elements.

The end state will be a smaller Total Army that, with high-quality people and facilities, is modernized and ready to meet all types of threats. The force will be versatile, deployable and lethal, with capabilities to support national security objectives, execute the National Military Strategy, provide a full range of military options and support domestic civil authorities.

b. Directed Training Associations (DTA). To improve readiness and warfight capabilities, the majority of RC units (at a minimum, all battalion-size and above) have a Roundout, Affiliation, or Partnership association with an AC unit.

c. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

Budget and program reductions and strategic assessments affecting FY 1992-1993 require force structure build-down. The plan to accomplish these reductions is based on a reduced global threat and a responsive strategy to meet regional contingencies. The Army will be better balanced, more versatile, more lethal, and smaller. Both readiness and capabilities will improve in the USAR by selectively eliminating difficult to resource units. Fewer support units will be required in the force because of the decrease in Army combat force structure. However, modernization to Army of Excellence designs will continue at a somewhat reduced pace tailored to reduced funding.

d. Army National Guard (ARNG).

ARNG units continue conversion to Army of Excellence design as the total Army standardizes its organizational structure and equipment. Within this context, ARNG will reduce force structure by eliminating two divisions in CONUS and possibly converting one or more divisions to cadre status to reflect the effect of resource reductions and changes in the international environment. These inactivations will permit realignment of unit personnel, full-time support cadre, and equipment which will improve wartime capability.

5. Army Civilians

a. The projected civilian strength levels for FY 1991 of 363.1, 329.3 thousand in FY 1992, and 314.7 thousand for FY 1993 reflect significant reductions from the FY 1991 Amended Budget Submission. These reduced program levels are consistent with the reduced funding and force structure levels. The Army's goal continues to be to maintain optimum civilian force levels to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness. These reductions offset any flexibility gained by the elimination of end strength ceilings. Hiring freezes, reductions in temporary employees, and reductions in force have caused skill and location imbalances.

b. New programs have been added to the Army's civilian manpower levels where the funding source is external to the Army or operating Army appropriation. These new reimbursing programs are:

	<u>Manpower Estimate</u>
(1) Special Operation Forces	1.2K
(2) Counter Narcotics	1.5K

E. Key Manpower Issues.

FY 1991 Army manpower initiatives seek to improve the quality and stability of the Army's force.

1. Quality:

The quality of the Total Army is based on enlisting and retaining quality soldiers. The last decade has fostered substantial increases in the quality of the soldiers enlisted in the Army: from the low of 54.3 percent High School Graduate accessions in FY 1980 to the high of 95.2 percent High School Graduates in FY 1990, 26 percent AFQT I-III A in FY 1980 to 67 percent for FY 1990, and 52 percent CAT IV in FY 1980 to less than 2 percent in FY 1990. These levels of accession quality can only be maintained with competitive compensation, attractive educational incentives, and adequate enlistment bonuses. Army quality goals for FY 1992 and FY 1993 are 95 percent High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG), 67 percent I-III A, and less than 2 percent Category IV. Retention, in turn, requires appropriate Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and quality of life programs that support the needs of the soldiers and their families. Operation JUST CAUSE has shown, as Operation DESERT STORM will show, the capabilities of such a high quality force.

2. Stability: FY 1992 and FY 1993 will witness a continuation of force reductions. The result of this "building-down" process will be increased turbulence and reduced stability. The disruptive effect of these force reductions will be exacerbated by the Army's commitment to Operation DESERT STORM. Although the Army has taken actions to mitigate the impact, sustaining Operation DESERT STORM will have a significant affect on the stability of the force. It is imperative that the Army maintain strong leader development programs and constantly focus on personnel readiness.

3. Officer Reduction Management:

a. The Army will use all the reduction measures available under current statutes while continuing to encourage a "volunteer first" policy. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 gave the Army increased DOPMA management flexibility for the building down of the force for a five year period. The Act authorizes the use of involuntary reduction measures (Selective Early Retirement and Regular Army Reduction-in-Force (RA RIF) authority) should they become necessary in order to meet the end strength goals for fiscal years 1991 through 1995. The FY 1991 implementation of these provisions has been held in abeyance pending the conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM, because it would not be prudent to implement these measures concurrent with "stop loss" initiatives. The Army anticipates executing planned FY 1991 involuntary reductions in FY 1992.

b. In addition to the commissioned officer management flexibility granted by Congress for FY 1991-1995, additional legislation is needed if the officer corps (commissioned and warrant) is to be reduced in a manner that ensures a force that will meet future force structure requirements. The proposed Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) would enable the implementation of personnel management programs needed to maintain a viable warrant officer force. Without WOMA, a reduction of the warrant officer force to projected levels will "break" the force and jeopardize readiness.

4. Enlisted Reduction Management: The legislation cited in paragraph 3a, above, also applies to enlisted reductions. Stop loss could preclude meeting FY 1991 legislated end strength; however, by end FY 1992, the active enlisted force will have returned to the Army's planned reduction ramp. Required levels of reduction can be attained provided separation boards are convened early enough for due process and separations to occur by the end of FY 1992. Other variables, such as enlisted retention rates following Operation DESERT STORM and the eventual phase out of stop loss, will affect the scope of reductions.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS.

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General.

The active Army ended FY 1989 with an authorized strength of 769.7K and finished FY 1990 with an actual end strength of 732.4K. The Operation DESERT SHIELD callup of 18.2K Reserves resulted in an actual active-duty strength of 750.6K. Active Army military end strength is

programmed for 702.2K in FY 1991, 660.2K in FY 1992 and 618.2K in FY 1993, down from 771.8K at the beginning of FY 1989.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

Section III of this chapter explains in detail Tables III-1, III-1A, and III-1B.

3. Skill and Grade.

The data in Table III-2 outline the alignment of the Army by skill and grade.

a. Enlisted.

An integrated Enlisted Force Alignment Plan implemented in January 1985 significantly improved the balance of the enlisted force, particularly of non-commissioned officers, by reducing overages and shortages into FY 1990. The Army has focused at the MOS and grade level to satisfy authorizations by better synchronizing and integrating the major force alignment tools: recruiting accesses soldiers in the right skills at the right time; promotion motivates them to more productive service based on potential and past performance; reclassification encourages soldiers to move to understrength MOS from overstrength MOS following retraining; and reenlistment, influenced by use of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB) targeted at shortage, high replacement cost skills, ensures career force needs are met. To meet new challenges in structure reductions, the Army is more intensively utilizing all these force alignment tools to minimize the negative impact on readiness.

Continuous progress has been made in aligning critical imbalances; however, critical imbalances will increase as force structure cuts are implemented and MOS/Grade cells adjust to new manning levels. By increasing NCO fill to 100.0 percent in FY 1992, imbalance increases will be dampened but not eliminated. Structure reduction timing and lead time for execution will determine the severity of increases in imbalance of grade/MOS cells and will be closely managed to minimize readiness impacts. Imbalance problems will not be significantly reduced until structure turbulence abates and full manning by grade is achieved.

TABLE III-1
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
STRATEGIC Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.6	0.3		0.6	0.6	100.0	0.6	0.5	87.2	0.6	0.5	87.0
TACTICAL/MOBILITY Land Forces	463.1	484.7		458.1	424.7	92.7	435.8	400.1	91.8	418.6	376.3	89.9
Division Forces	462.8	484.5		457.8	424.5	92.7	435.5	399.9	91.8	418.3	376.0	89.9
Theater Forces	394.7	403.3		388.1	359.8	92.7	365.8	332.4	90.9	349.9	312.2	89.2
Mobility Forces	53.1	65.5		54.7	49.4	90.3	54.7	52.8	96.4	53.4	50.0	93.6
	0.3	0.2		0.3	0.2	81.7	0.3	0.2	80.0	0.3	0.2	78.0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL Intelligence	17.7	16.6		20.5	17.1	83.3	14.0	12.8	91.4	13.4	11.9	88.6
Centrally Managed Comm	10.0	9.8		10.9	9.9	91.2	9.5	8.5	89.0	9.1	8.0	88.2
	7.7	6.8		9.6	7.1	74.3	4.5	4.3	96.3	4.3	3.8	89.4
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	16.1	15.7		14.3	13.1	91.8	13.4	12.2	91.1	12.2	10.2	83.3
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	8.0	7.4		10.1	9.4	93.3	9.9	9.1	91.6	9.9	9.1	92.1
MEDICAL SUPPORT	34.1	33.4		43.7	33.8	77.3	36.5	33.8	92.6	35.7	32.8	91.9
JOINT ACTIVITIES Int'l Military Org	17.9	19.0		25.5	22.7	88.9	24.6	23.2	94.3	24.5	23.4	95.5
Unified Commands	4.3	4.8		4.6	4.2	91.6	4.6	4.6	98.9	4.6	4.4	96.7
Federal Agency Support	1.8	1.3		1.6	1.6	97.0	1.6	1.6	99.3	1.6	1.6	99.3
Spt to JCS	0.2	0.1		0.3	0.3	100.0	0.4	0.4	91.3	0.3	0.3	100.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	0.4	0.5		0.9	0.4	39.0	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0
	11.2	12.3		18.1	16.2	89.7	17.7	16.4	92.6	17.7	16.8	94.6
CENTRAL LOGISTICS Supply Operations	3.0	2.3		3.3	2.7	82.5	3.2	2.7	84.3	2.9	2.6	91.2
Maintenance Operations	0.7	0.6		0.4	0.3	82.8	0.4	0.3	75.0	0.3	0.3	100.0
Logistics Support Operations	1.0	0.8		1.3	1.1	81.2	1.2	1.0	87.4	1.2	1.0	85.7
	1.3	0.9		1.6	1.3	83.6	1.6	1.4	84.4	1.4	1.3	94.0

TOTAL AC MILITARY	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS												
Combat Commands	6.1	6.7		6.8	6.0	88.1	6.8	5.9	86.5	6.5	5.8	88.9
	1.8	2.5		2.3	1.8	79.5	2.3	1.8	79.3	2.1	1.8	85.7
Support Commands	4.3	4.2		4.5	4.2	92.6	4.5	4.1	90.2	4.4	4.0	90.4
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES												
Research and Development	4.9	4.0		4.8	4.2	86.9	4.7	4.0	84.2	4.1	3.7	90.3
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Personnel Support	53.9	51.2		53.7	51.4	95.7	52.1	50.5	97.0	52.1	47.2	90.6
	11.3	11.0		12.0	11.1	92.5	11.7	11.5	98.3	11.7	11.3	96.6
Individual Training	42.6	40.2		41.7	40.3	96.6	40.4	39.0	96.6	40.4	35.9	88.8
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	33.8	29.8		34.3	30.5	88.8	29.4	26.4	89.8	29.8	25.5	85.6
	13.0	13.2		13.5	12.5	92.7	11.2	10.3	92.3	11.2	10.0	89.0
Centralized Support Act'y	20.8	16.6		20.8	17.9	86.2	18.6	16.1	86.3	18.6	15.5	83.6
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	659.3	671.1		675.7	616.1	91.2	631.0	581.2	92.1	610.3	548.9	89.9
Undistributed Manning					6.1			5.5			-2.1	
INDIVIDUALS												
Transients		79.5			79.9			73.4			71.4	
		13.1			14.7			13.6			13.6	
Holdees		5.2			5.7			5.2			5.4	
Trainees/Students		56.8			55.0			50.3			48.2	
Cadets		4.4			4.5			4.3			4.2	
END STRENGTH		750.6			702.2			660.2			618.2	
Reservists on Active Duty		(18.2)										

Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

The total requirements and requirements by DPPC are subject to change as individual unit decisions are determined.

FY 1990 end strength includes 18.2K USAR and ARNG soldiers activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE III-1A
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC OFFICERS	FY 90		FY 91		FY 92		FY 93	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES								
STRATEGIC								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0
TACTICAL/MOBILITY								
Land Forces	44.9	45.9	46.9	40.3	85.8	43.6	37.9	87.0
Division Forces	44.8	45.8	46.8	40.2	85.8	43.5	37.8	87.0
Theater Forces	38.6	39.2	42.0	36.0	85.7	38.7	33.7	87.0
Mobility Forces	6.2	6.6	4.8	4.2	87.0	4.8	4.2	87.3
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL								
Intelligence	3.0	2.6	3.5	2.9	82.9	2.8	2.5	89.2
Centrally Managed Comm	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.1	99.2	2.1	1.9	90.5
	0.8	0.7	1.4	0.8	58.4	0.7	0.6	85.4
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	1.7	1.0	1.9	1.3	66.3	1.5	1.2	80.6
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	1.4	1.1	1.6	1.6	100.0	1.6	1.6	100.0
MEDICAL SUPPORT	12.0	11.9	17.9	12.0	67.1	13.5	12.0	89.1
JOINT ACTIVITIES								
Int'l Military Org	3.6	4.7	6.6	6.0	90.4	6.2	6.0	96.7
Unified Commands	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	93.4	1.2	1.2	98.8
Federal Agency Support	1.0	0.5	0.8	0.8	100.0	0.8	0.8	100.0
Spt to JCS	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	88.3	0.3	0.3	87.3
	1.0	2.6	4.1	3.6	87.3	3.7	3.5	94.1
CENTRAL LOGISTICS								
Supply Operations	1.5	1.0	1.4	1.4	98.6	1.3	1.3	100.0
Maintenance Operations	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	90.0	0.2	0.2	87.0
Logistics Support Operations	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	100.0	0.4	0.4	100.0
	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.8	100.0	0.7	0.7	100.0

AC OFFICERS	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		INV	%		RQMT	%		RQMT	%		MNG
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	MNG		AUTH	MNG		AUTH	MNG	
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	4.4	4.3		4.3	100.0	4.3	4.3	99.2	4.2	4.2	100.0	
Combat Commands	1.2	1.3		1.2	100.0	1.2	1.2	99.0	1.2	1.2	100.0	
Support Commands	3.2	3.0		3.1	100.0	3.1	3.1	99.3	3.0	3.0	100.0	
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES												
Research and Development	1.7	1.6		1.5	91.6	1.6	1.4	87.0	1.4	1.4	100.0	
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	10.4	8.9		9.9	95.1	9.8	9.6	97.9	9.8	8.9	91.0	
Personnel Support	1.0	0.9		1.0	71.4	1.4	1.4	100.0	1.4	1.3	93.3	
Individual Training	9.4	8.0		8.9	98.8	8.4	8.2	97.5	8.4	7.6	90.7	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	8.8	7.4		8.3	88.0	8.1	7.6	94.1	8.2	7.3	89.0	
Support Installations	1.3	1.3		1.2	100.0	1.6	1.1	93.5	1.2	1.1	91.9	
Centralized Support Act'y	7.5	6.1		7.1	86.3	6.5	6.5	100.0	7.0	6.2	88.5	
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	93.5	90.4		89.4	84.7	99.0	85.5	90.9	92.6	81.6	88.1	
Undistributed Manning				-5.7			-4.0			-6.3		
INDIVIDUALS												
Transients		14.4		15.6			14.3			14.1		
Holdees		1.7		2.3			1.7			1.9		
Trainees/Students		0.7		1.2			0.8			1.0		
		12.0		12.1			11.8			11.2		
TOTAL END STRENGTH		104.9		99.3			95.5			89.5		
RESERVISTS ON ACTIVE DUTY		0.4										

Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

The total requirements and requirements by DPPC are subject to change as individual unit decisions are determined.

FY 1990 includes 0.4K USAR and ARNG officers activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE III-1B
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC ENLISTED	FY 90		FY 91		FY 92		FY 93	
	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES								
STRATEGIC								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.5	90.4	0.5	0.4	80.0
TACTICAL/MOBILITY								
Land Forces	418.2	439.0	411.1	384.5	93.5	392.0	362.2	92.4
Division Forces	418.0	438.9	410.9	384.3	93.5	391.8	362.0	92.4
Theater Forces	371.1	379.9	361.0	339.1	93.9	341.9	313.5	91.7
Mobility Forces	46.9	59.0	49.9	45.2	90.6	49.9	48.6	97.3
	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	72.5	0.2	0.1	70.5
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL								
Intelligence	14.8	13.9	17.0	14.2	83.3	11.2	10.2	91.5
Centrally Managed Comm	6.9	6.0	8.2	6.3	77.0	3.8	3.7	97.4
	7.9	7.9	8.8	7.9	89.3	7.4	6.5	88.4
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS								
	14.4	14.7	12.4	11.9	95.8	11.9	11.0	92.4
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING								
	6.6	6.3	8.5	7.8	91.8	8.3	7.4	89.7
MEDICAL SUPPORT								
	22.0	21.5	25.8	21.8	84.6	23.0	21.8	94.6
JOINT ACTIVITIES								
Int'l Military Org	14.3	14.2	18.4	16.7	90.6	18.4	17.3	93.8
Unified Commands	3.1	3.6	3.4	3.1	91.0	3.4	3.4	99.0
Federal Agency Support	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	89.6	0.8	0.7	93.3
Spt to JCS	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0
	10.2	9.6	14.0	12.7	90.5	14.0	12.9	92.2
CENTRAL LOGISTICS								
Supply Operations	1.5	1.3	1.9	1.4	74.5	1.7	1.5	85.8
Maintenance Operations	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	76.0
Logistics Support Operations	0.7	0.5	0.9	0.7	75.7	0.8	0.7	85.3
	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.5	66.9	0.7	0.6	89.1
						0.7	0.6	87.0

The Army is tightening reenlistment standards and imposing some early retirements of NCO in FY 1992-1993. The Army will meet congressional criteria on reducing accessions, executing early retirements, and tightening retention standards YOS 2-6 to meet FY 1995 end state requirements. A more gradual reduction in strength (35K in total end strength per year) would reduce or eliminate the need for enlisted involuntary losses without risking a flight of high-quality soldiers, minimize imbalances, and temporarily reduce personnel readiness.

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

Since FY 1987 the Army has undergone mandated reductions in officer end-strength. Further reductions are planned through FY 1995. In an Army of reduced size, the most significant problem to contend with is the inadequate planning lead time and management tools to shape the force prudently. In a rapidly changing environment, the Army is obliged to reduce the officer corps in selected year groups. Inventory imbalances will worsen as the force continues to be reduced. This problem will be especially prevalent in the field grades.

To stay within reduced end-strengths, tighter personnel budgets, and the DOPMA field grade ceilings, the Army has had to lower promotion opportunity and increase the time between promotions, in addition to reducing accessions. In the case of majors and lieutenant colonels, promotion opportunity and timing are outside DOPMA objectives. Reductions planned for FY 1992 and beyond will require the continued use of the relief from DOPMA legislation granted by Congress in FY 1991. Additionally, a Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) is needed to reduce the impact on readiness in the warrant officer fields. With this legislation, the Army will be able to properly construct warrant officer year groups during future force reductions.

PROMOTION POINTS (FY 1990)

<u>RANK</u>	<u>DOPMA GOAL (YEARS)</u>	<u>AVERAGE (YEARS/MONTHS)</u>
Colonel	22 ± 1	22/7
Lieutenant Colonel	16 ± 1	17/6
Major	10 ± 1	11/9
Captain	4	4/6

The Army will continue to closely monitor and manage grade/MOS cells in an attempt to minimize readiness impacts. However, imbalance problems will not be reduced until inventory and structure turbulence have abated.

4. Experience.

The Army will continue to retain productive, progressive soldiers, while taking a more aggressive approach to the identification and separation of less productive and progressive soldiers. Notwithstanding these actions, as the Army builds down in size, experience levels will temporarily increase until FY 1995. It is estimated that experience levels will decrease again to FY 1990 levels after FY 1996.

TABLE III-2
Active Army Skill and Grade
Actual and Projected Inventory Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
MOSLS ALT M900992P

	ACTUAL				PROGRAMMED				PROGRAMMED				PROGRAMMED			
	FY 1990				FY 1991				FY 1992				FY 1993			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4																
Number of Skills	100	91	64	255	72	103	76	251	61	115	68	244	59	135	50	244
PMI	103,765	175,852	64,525	344,142	126,923	120,386	66,040	313,349	112,137	123,006	57,816	292,959	85,444	135,589	58,211	279,244
Inventory	115,883	174,114	57,147	347,144	149,429	121,377	59,609	330,414	129,764	123,914	51,538	305,216	97,464	135,894	51,216	284,574
Over/Short	12,118	-1,738	-7,378	3,002	22,506	990	-6,431	17,065	17,627	908	-6,278	12,257	12,020	304	-6,994	5,330
E5 - E9																
Number of Skills	62	182	63	307	39	222	47	308	52	195	61	308	55	153	100	308
PMI	21,650	201,049	61,037	283,736	33,282	206,870	31,299	271,451	60,380	162,895	31,898	255,173	66,291	120,262	53,397	239,950
Inventory	24,435	198,084	53,853	276,372	37,099	203,739	27,161	267,999	64,891	162,396	27,886	255,173	71,964	121,199	46,787	239,950
Over/Short	2,785	-2,965	-7,184	-7,364	3,817	-3,131	-4,138	-3,452	4,511	-499	-4,012	0	5,673	937	-6,610	0
Total E1 - E9																
Number of Skills	64	179	66	309	60	173	75	308	56	175	77	308	53	172	83	308
PMI	58,917	478,698	90,263	627,878	181,277	311,843	91,680	584,800	196,439	254,107	97,586	548,132	134,461	297,383	87,350	519,194
Inventory	66,435	475,282	81,799	623,516	205,061	310,278	83,074	598,413	218,051	254,031	88,307	560,389	149,263	298,102	77,159	524,524
Over/Short	7,518	-3,416	-8,464	-4,362	23,784	-1,565	-8,606	13,613	21,612	-76	-9,279	12,257	14,802	719	-10,191	5,330

TABLE III-2
Active Army Skill and Grade
Actual and Projected Inventory Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
OPALS ALT SEP904

	ACTUAL			PROGRAMMED			PROGRAMMED			PROGRAMMED					
	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993					
OVER*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
12	20	10	42	11	21	10	42	10	22	10	42	10	23	9	42
2885	6861	5711	15557	2898	6662	5545	15105	2790	6414	5339	14543	2670	6137	5108	13915
3470	6852	4815	15137	3383	6681	4695	14759	3153	6227	4376	13756	3000	5923	4162	13085
485	-9	-896	-420	485	19	850	346	363	-187	-963	-787	330	-214	-946	-830
<u>Commissioned Officer</u>															
01 - 03															
20	10	15	45	22	12	11	45	22	14	9	45	21	15	9	45
16052	28896	10590	55538	14718	26495	9710	50923	13829	24855	9124	47848	12996	23394	8574	44964
19228	29321	8577	57126	18152	27680	8097	53929	17567	26788	7836	52191	16419	25037	7324	48780
3176	425	-2013	-1588	+1986	-49	-627	1310	3738	1893	-1288	4343	3423	1643	-1250	3816
04 - 06															
8	6	31	45	6	7	32	45	6	7	32	45	6	6	33	45
7403	4412	24671	36486	7220	4303	24060	35383	6942	4137	23133	34212	6617	3944	22053	32614
8575	4354	19209	32138	8048	4087	18029	30164	7783	3952	17434	29169	7273	3693	16292	27258
1172	-58	-5462	-4348	828	-216	-6031	-5419	841	-185	-5699	-5043	656	-251	-5761	-5356
Total 01 - 06															
8	15	22	45	10	10	25	45	11	10	24	45	10	15	20	45
18370	40816	32838	92024	21938	30798	33770	86506	20771	29032	32257	82060	19613	27338	30627	77578
20971	40452	27841	89264	26200	31767	26126	84093	25350	30740	25270	81360	23692	28730	23616	76038
2601	-364	-4997	-2760	4262	969	-7644	-2413	4579	1708	-6987	-700	4079	1392	-7011	-1540

* See definitions in appendix B.

**** Excludes cadets**

**Excludes cadets
Does not include 18.2K USAR and ARNG soldiers activated in FY 1990 for Operation Desert Shield**

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSLS ALTERNATIVE: M900992P

	ACTUAL FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991			PROGRAMMED FY 1992			PROGRAMMED FY 1993		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
<u>E1-E4</u>												
<u>PHI</u>	344,142			313,349			292,959			279,244		
Inventory	347,144	61,664	2.535	330,414	62,576	2.596	305,216	57,011	2.548	284,574	51,716	2.426
<u>E5-E9</u>												
<u>PHI</u>	283,736			271,451			255,173			239,950		
Inventory	276,372	265,836	11.583	267,999	258,721	11.894	255,173	243,170	11.89	239,950	230,059	11.972
<u>TOTAL E1-E9</u>												
<u>PHI</u>	627,878			584,800			548,132			519,194		
Inventory	623,516	327,500	6.545	598,413	321,296	6.759	560,389	300,181	6.791	524,524	281,775	6.782

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSLS ALTERNATIVE: SEP 90H

	ACTUAL FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991			PROGRAMMED FY 1992			PROGRAMMED FY 1993		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>												
PMI	15.6			15.1			14.5			13.9		
Inventory*	15.1	11.0	11.3	14.8	10.8	11.0	13.8	10.1	11.0	13.1	9.9	10.9
<u>01-03</u>												
PMI	55.5			50.9			47.8			45.0		
Inventory**	57.1	37.4	5.5	54.0	29.7	5.2	52.2	28.7	5.0	48.8	26.8	4.9
<u>04-06</u>												
PMI	36.5			35.6			34.2			32.6		
Inventory**	32.1	31.9	17.4	30.2	30.0	17.1	29.2	29.0	17.0	27.3	27.1	16.8
<u>TOTAL 01-06</u>												
PMI	92.0			86.5			82.0			77.6		
Inventory**	89.2	69.3	9.7	84.2	59.7	9.5	81.4	57.7	9.2	76.1	53.9	9.1

*Active Federal Service (AFS)

**Active Federal Commissioned Service (AFCS)

NOTE: FY 1990 does not include 18.2K USAR and ARNG soldiers activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD

5. Personnel Management.

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting.

(a) Overview. The Army exceeded the FY 1990 recruiting objective of 87,000 with accessions of 89,617. The quality was the highest yet achieved, with 95.2 percent high school graduates, 66.9 percent scoring in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Test Category I-III A, and only 1.8 percent scoring in Category IV. Accession requirements for the next three years average 83,105, compared to an average of 108,520 for FY 1988 through FY 1990. Army strategy for the 1990s and beyond is predicated on enlisting and retaining high-quality soldiers to provide the core of capable, dedicated noncommissioned officers that ultimately enhances the strength of Army preparedness. Competitive compensation, educational incentives, and appropriate enlistment bonuses are critical to reaching this objective.

Enlisted Accession Plan

<u>Category</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Prior Service	5268	3000	2000	2000
Non-Prior Service	84349	81163	80135	81017
Male	71736	66782	67515	69504
(Male I-III A)	46921	43678	44157	45458
(HSDG)	67720	63039	63731	65608
(HSDG I-III A)	42997	40025	40464	41656
Female	12613	14381	12620	11513
(Female I-III A)	9506	10838	9511	8677
(HSDG)	12602	14368	12609	11503
(HSDG I-III A)	9495	10826	9500	8667

(b) Quality. High-quality enlisted soldiers are the key building block for the foundation of capable, innovative noncommissioned leaders of the Army of the future. Quality soldiers are easier to train and retain their skills longer. As a group, they enjoy a higher first term completion rate with a lower incidence of disciplinary action. In recognition of the increasing body of compelling research which clearly shows that quality soldiers perform better coupled with the outstanding success achieved by our soldiers in Operation JUST CAUSE, the Army leadership has directed that quality objectives be increased from those stated in last year's report. The Army accession goals for FY 1991 through FY 1993 are to recruit 67 percent or more AFQT Test Category I-III A soldiers each year, to recruit at least 95 percent high school diploma graduates (HSDG), and to limit Category IV accessions to 2 percent or less.

(2) Retention. The Army achieved all reenlistment targets in FY 1990 and continued to improve enlisted force alignment. FY 1991 will be affected by actions taken in support of Operation DESERT STORM to "Stop Loss" the force. It is anticipated that the reenlistment rate for

initial term soldiers will most likely be well below normal levels until "Stop Loss" is reversed due to deferral of a decision to reenlist. FY 1992 will refocus on the Army build-down, which will require fewer soldier reenlistments, but will require a major effort to maintain the quality force recruited in the recent past, and place additional emphasis on alignment of the force. Incentive funding for retention is reduced for FY 1991 and will drop again in FY 1992, thus requiring that only the most critical skills be targeted for support by Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB).

Reenlistments
(In thousands)

	<u>Target</u>	<u>FY 90</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 91</u> <u>Target</u>	<u>FY 92</u> <u>Target</u>	<u>FY 93</u> <u>Target</u>
Initial Term	27.0	28.6	25.0	23.9	24.5
Mid Term	20.0	31.6	27.0	25.7	25.4
Career	20.0	30.9	29.0	25.6	26.5
Total	67.0	91.1	81.0	75.2	76.4

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

(1) Accessions.

(a) Accession Program. In FY 1990, the Army accessed 8,002 commissioned and warrant officers into the active component to maintain a budgeted end strength objective of 104,277. This represents an accession reduction of 1,551 officers from FY 1989. The accession goals and achievements by fiscal year are shown below:

Active Component Officer/Warrant Officer Accession Goals

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Programmed	8,054	7,150	6,987	6,847
Actual	8,002	---	---	---

(b) Accession Trends.

[1] To achieve officer end strength reductions, accessions have been reduced to the minimum level required to sustain the smaller projected force. For FY 1991 and beyond, USMA will reduce admissions by 100 to comply with congressional direction. By the end of FY 1991, the Army will close ROTC programs in 62 schools to adjust to the lower accession requirements. The Army expects to commission no more than 5,800 officers from ROTC in FY 1991.

[2] Congressional guidelines preclude any reductions to the AMEDD professional officer corps. Despite increased efforts and resources directed toward physician recruiting, the Army has been able to attract only a modest number of qualified, unobligated physicians and other selected health care professionals into the active force for the past several years. The Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP) will allow the Army to have a more predictable and continuous flow

of physicians and other health professionals into the service. The HPSP is critical to the staffing of an all-volunteer AMEDD.

[3] Recruitment of Army nurses has become especially difficult, in part because of the national nurse shortage. Several strategies to increase nurse recruitment have been or are being implemented. For example, the Army has implemented a nurse accession bonus, incentive pay for nurse anesthetists, more nurse recruiters, expanded ROTC scholarship marketing effort for student nurses, relaxed age restrictions for new officers, and educational guarantees for nurse specialties. Additional incentives may be required to meet nurse recruitment needs in the future.

(2) Retention. The Army must establish extraordinary "loss management" programs through FY 1995 to achieve the officer end strengths established by Congress. The Army's retention policy through FY 1995 is described as:

(a) Continue the flow of new officer accessions, at levels required to sustain the projected force, with emphasis on enhanced quality.

(b) Retirement with immediate recall to active duty for commissioned officers in critical specialties will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Special consideration will be given to officers with expertise in procurement and acquisition management and to selected health care professionals. Recall of retired Regular Army (RA) warrant officers in critical military occupational specialties on a case-by-case basis will also be considered.

(c) The selective continuation program for captains twice nonselected for promotion will be limited to officers in medical and other professional branches. Regular and Reserve majors who are not selected for promotion who are within six years of retirement, normally will be selected for continuation until completion of 20 years of service. With the exception of extraordinary "loss management" programs required to accomplish congressionally mandated end strength cuts, it is anticipated that officer retention (except for selected AMEDD officers) in FY 1991 and FY 1992 will continue to be high.

(d) The difficulty in recruiting health professionals has underscored the importance of retaining AMEDD officers. The Army has been an active participant in a Tri-Service study of retention and compensation for health professionals. The Army will continue to seek congressional action as necessary to achieve retention goals.

6. Stability

a. Aggregate Population Stability

This measure reflects the percentage of personnel who remain in service over the period of a year. Lower attrition, higher overall personnel quality, and greater job satisfaction have contributed to relatively constant measures of officer and enlisted stability.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officer	91.9	91.0	91.2	91.2	90.3
Enlisted	80.8	82.0	82.9	82.9	82.2

b. Unit Personnel Stability

This measure reflects the percentage of personnel who remain in the same unit over the course of a year.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officer	42.6	42.1	44.0	42.7	41.9
Enlisted	40.4	42.2	44.8	45.6	42.8

7. Readiness Assessment

a. During FY 1990, the Army continued to develop and sustain a strong, combat-ready force while simultaneously accommodating force structure changes. Although the NCO shortfall continued, an improvement in force alignment, coupled with improved distribution management, enabled the Army to maintain personnel readiness at high levels.

b. In FY 1991, the Army has focused efforts on three vectors: sustainment of the forces deployed in support of Operation DESERT STORM, execution of the congressionally mandated force reductions, and maintenance of the readiness posture of the remainder of the Army. Sustaining personnel readiness will be a continual challenge.

c. The FY 1991 Authorizations Act significantly reduces both total Army end strength and that which can be forward deployed in the European theater. FY 1991 will require the deployment and sustainment of the force in Southwest Asia. Thus, there is potential for a degradation in personnel readiness in non-deploying units.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve:

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

(a) General. The USAR Selected Reserve achieved an end strength of 310.1K in FY 1990. This end strength includes 10.9K soldiers mobilized for Operation DESERT SHIELD, Drill Strength of 282.2K, Active Guard Reserve of 13.7K and Individual Mobilization Augmentees of

14.2K. High school graduates comprised 91 percent of the non-prior service accessions in FY 1990. This achievement was a result of continued congressional support of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program and a lot of hard work by our commanders, recruiters and retention personnel.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. Both the programmed manning and requirements shown in Tables III-4 decline in FY 1992 and FY 1993, but manning declines at a faster rate than requirements. However, all of the specifics of the anticipated reductions in force structure have not yet been finalized. Consequently, the distribution of the wartime requirements and the manpower authorizations in the tables have been estimated and are subject to change. There are a series of inter-related studies addressing national strategy and the long term view of the forces needed to achieve those objectives including Total Force Policy, Flexible Readiness, Dual Basing Implementation and Evaluation of the Cadre Concept. Since the studies and reports will not be completed until the March/April 1991 time frame, specific force structure decisions will not be made until much later in FY 1991.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Trained in unit strength, shown in Table III-5, will improve in the current year as a result of the strength increase directed by Congress. While end strength decisions have been finalized, decisions on force structure, the number of AC support soldiers, and the distribution of AGRs have not. The percentage of trained manpower in units versus requirements declines in the budget years because strength declines at a faster rate than force structure. Additional reductions in force structure may be identified during the Total Army Analysis process which will be completed later this year.

TABLE III-4
U.S. ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

TOTAL ARMY RESERVE MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90		FY 91		FY 92		FY 93	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
				%		%		%
				MNG		MNG		MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>								
Land Forces	208.2	191.3	219.1	208.6	204.6	185.2	194.4	165.8
Division Forces	206.3	189.5	217.2	206.8	202.8	183.6	192.7	164.4
Theater Forces	188.2	173.1	199.1	189.5	185.9	168.3	176.7	150.7
Mobility Forces	18.1	16.4	18.1	17.2	16.9	15.3	16.1	13.7
	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.4
				95.2		90.5		85.3
				95.2		90.5		85.3
				95.2		90.5		85.3
				95.2		90.5		85.3
				95.2		90.5		85.3
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>								
Intelligence	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.7
				95.2		90.5		85.3
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>								
	9.5	10.4	10.3	9.0	8.9	8.0	8.4	7.2
				87.4		90.5		85.3
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS</u>								
Support Cmts	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
				95.2		90.5		85.3
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
				100.0		100.0		100.0
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>								
Individual Training	53.1	47.2	53.1	50.6	49.6	44.9	47.1	40.2
				95.2		90.5		85.3
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Support Installations	22.8	20.9	22.9	21.7	21.3	19.3	20.2	17.3
Centralized Support Act'y	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.1	3.1	2.8	2.9	2.5
	19.5	17.4	19.5	18.6	18.2	16.5	17.3	14.8
				95.2		90.5		85.3
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	295.1	271.3	306.9	291.3	285.7	258.7	271.5	231.6
				94.9		90.5		85.3
<u>ACTIVE GUARD/RESERVE</u>								
Individuals	13.7	13.7		13.3		12.7		12.0
				(26.5)		(20.8)		(19.1)
<u>Individual Mobilization</u>								
Augmentees	14.2	14.2		14.0		11.4		10.9

TOTAL ARMY RESERVE MILITARY

FY 90

FY 91

FY 92

FY 93

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

AUTH

INV

RQMT

AUTH

MINC
%

RQMT

AUTH

%
MING

RQMT

AUTH

MING
%

END STRENGTH

299.1

318.7

282.7

254.5

NOTES:

- o The term Authorization is synonymous with Programmed Manning.
- o The term Requirement is synonymous with Wartime Required.
- o Totals may not add due to rounding. FY 1992 and FY 1993 distribution shown are estimates only as final force structure decisions are pending.
- o FY 1990 inventory does not include 10.9K soldiers mobilized for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE III-4A
U.S. ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

OFFICERS	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	
DPPC												
TACTICAL/MOBILITY												
Land Forces	32.5	29.5	32.7	29.7	90.9	30.5	29.4	96.5	30.0	26.5	84.7	
Division Forces	31.9	29.0	32.1	29.2	91.0	29.9	28.9	96.5	29.5	26.0	84.7	
Theater Forces	30.2	27.6	30.4	27.8	91.4	28.3	27.3	96.5	27.9	24.6	84.7	
Mobility Forces	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.4	82.4	1.6	1.5	96.5	1.6	1.4	84.7	
	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	85.0	0.5	0.5	96.5	0.5	0.5	84.7	
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL												
Intelligence	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	83.7	0.3	0.3	96.5	0.3	0.2	84.7	
MEDICAL SUPPORT												
	2.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	100.0	2.4	2.3	96.5	2.4	2.1	84.7	
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS												
Support Cnds	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	96.5	0.1	0.1	84.7	
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Individual Training	10.8	9.5	10.8	9.5	88.0	10.1	9.7	96.5	9.9	8.7	84.7	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	4.7	4.0	4.8	4.0	83.3	4.4	4.2	96.5	4.3	3.8	84.7	
Centralized Support Act'y	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	100.0	0.7	0.6	96.5	0.6	0.6	84.7	
	4.0	3.2	4.0	3.2	80.0	3.7	3.6	96.5	3.7	3.2	84.7	
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	51.0	47.0	52.1	47.0	90.2	47.7	46.0	96.5	47.0	41.5	84.7	
ACTIVE GUARD/RESERVE												
		3.9		3.7			3.6			3.4		
Individuals		0.0		0.0			0.0			0.0		
Individual Mobilization												
Augmentees		10.9		10.4			8.5			8.2		

FY 90

FY 91

FY 92

FY 93

AUTH

INV

RQMT

AUTH

AGING

RQMT

AUTH

ING	%
1	100
2	100
3	100
4	100
5	100
6	100
7	100
8	100
9	100
10	100
11	100
12	100
13	100
14	100
15	100
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17	100
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87	100
88	100
89	100
90	100
91	100
92	100
93	100
94	100
95	100
96	100
97	100
98	100
99	100
100	100

RQMT

AUTH

WING
%

61.5

61.2

58.1

53.0

o The term Authorization is synonymous with Programmed Manning.

- o The term Authorization is synonymous with Programmed Manning.
- o The term Requirement is synonymous with Wartime Required.
- o Totals may not add due to rounding. FY 1992 and FY 1993 distribution and Wartime Required shown are estimates only as final force structure decisions are pending.
- o FY 1990 inventory does not include .2K USAR officers mobilized for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE III-4B
U.S. ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

ENLISTED	FY 90		FY 91		FY 92		FY 93	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
<u>DPPC</u>								
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>								
Land Forces	175.7	161.8	186.4	178.7	174.1	155.5	164.2	139.1
Division Forces	174.4	160.5	185.1	177.5	172.9	154.5	163.1	138.1
Theater Forces	158.0	145.5	168.7	161.8	157.6	140.8	148.7	125.9
Mobility Forces	16.4	15.0	16.4	15.7	15.3	13.7	14.4	12.2
	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	0.9
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>								
Intelligence	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>								
	6.8	7.0	6.8	6.6	6.4	5.7	6.0	5.1
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS¹</u>								
Support Cmds ¹	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>								
Individual Training	42.3	37.7	42.3	40.6	39.5	35.3	37.3	31.6
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Support Installations	18.1	17.0	18.1	17.4	17.0	15.1	16.0	13.5
Centralized Support Act'y	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.0
	15.5	14.2	15.5	14.9	14.5	13.0	13.7	11.6
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	244.1	224.5	254.8	244.3	238.0	212.6	224.5	190.2
<u>ACTIVE GUARD/RESERVE</u>								
Individuals		9.8		9.6		9.1		8.6
		(28.9)		(26.5)		(20.8)		(19.1)

ENLISTED	FY 90		FY 91		FY 92		FY 93	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
DDPC				% MNG		% MNG		% MNG
Individual Mobilization Augmentees		3.3		3.6		2.9		2.8
<u>END STRENGTH</u>		<u>237.6</u>		<u>257.5</u>		<u>224.6</u>		<u>201.5</u>

NOTES:¹ Less than 50

- o The term Authorization is synonymous with Programmed Manning.
- o The term Requirement is synonymous with Wartime Required.
- o Totals may not add due to rounding. FY 1992 and FY 1993 distribution shown are estimates as final force structure decisions are pending.
- o FY 1990 inventory does not include 10.7K USAR enlisted soldiers mobilized for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE III-5

U.S. ARMY RESERVE
Trained in Unit Strength
(THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
End Strength	299.1	318.7	282.7	254.5
- Training Pipeline	28.9	26.5	20.8	19.1
- IMA	14.2	14.0	11.4	10.9
Operating Strength	256.0	278.2	250.5	224.5
- Non Unit AGR	6.2	4.7	4.1	3.8
+ Unit AC Personnel	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1
Trained Unit Strength	250.7	274.6	247.5	221.8
Structure Requirements (Wartime) (Programmed Structure)	295.1	306.9	285.7	271.5
% Trained/Requirements	85.0	89.5	86.6	81.7

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding. FY 1990 end strength does not include 10.9K soldiers mobilized for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

(d) Skill and Grade. The USAR skill and grade, actual and projected inventories are displayed in Table III-6. The principal shortages of trained noncommissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers continue in the medical, aviation, maintenance, and transportation specialties. Significant progress has been made in resolving the Troop Program Unit (TPU) nurse shortfall. This progress can be attributed to increased recruiting emphasis and Reserve Component Incentive programs. Final force structure decisions for FY 1992 and 1993 are pending. The decrease in authorizations shown may be larger which would reduce the shortages of senior enlisted, officers, and warrant officers. Progress has been made in reducing the critical shortage of surgeons in the Reserve. Recruiting is being aimed at the surgical specialties and incentive programs are currently in place. No new incentives for medical professionals are now planned for FY 1992 and FY 1993.

(e) Experience. USAR actual and projected experience is shown in Table III-7. While the inventory numbers reflect planned reductions in end strength for FY 1992 and FY 1993, the reductions in PMI are expected to be much larger once final force structure decisions are made.

TABLE III-6
U.S. ARMY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED DRILL STRENGTH INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING
(Strength in 000s)***

	FY 1990				FY 1991				FY 1992				FY 1993			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4																
Number of Skills	88	60	194	342	88	60	194	342	88	60	194	342	88	60	194	342
PHI	78.7	24.4	15.8	118.8	78.7	24.4	15.8	118.8	73.8	22.9	14.8	111.5	65.0	25.7	13.9	104.6
Inventory	98.3	24.9	17.5	140.7	101.5	25.7	18.0	145.2	90.1	22.8	16.0	128.9	71.6	29.6	14.2	115.5
Over/Short	19.6	0.5	1.7	21.9	22.8	1.3	2.3	26.4	16.3	-0.1	1.2	17.4	6.6	3.9	0.3	10.8
E5 - E9																
Number of Skills	17	39	327	383	17	39	327	383	17	39	327	383	17	39	327	383
PHI	1.2	4.4	118.3	123.9	1.2	4.4	118.3	123.9	1.1	4.2	111.0	116.3	1.0	8.8	104.2	114.0
Inventory	2.0	4.3	88.2	94.5	2.0	4.4	91.1	97.6	1.8	3.9	80.9	86.6	1.4	4.3	71.8	77.5
Over/Short	0.8	-0.2	-30.1	-29.4	0.8	-0.0	-27.2	-26.4	0.7	-0.2	-30.2	-29.7	0.4	-4.5	-32.4	-36.5
TOTAL E1 - E9																
Number of Skills	41	94	286	421	45	103	312	460	45	103	312	460	45	66	341	452
PHI	42.8	88.9	111.0	242.8	42.8	88.9	111.0	242.8	40.2	76.6	111.0	227.8	37.0	75.3	111.0	223
Inventory	49.2	88.2	97.8	235.2	50.8	91.0	100.9	242.8	46.6	64.8	104.2	215.5	38.2	47.2	107.6	193
Over/Short	6.4	-0.8	-13.2	-7.6	8.0	2.1	-10.1	0.0	6.4	-11.9	-6.8	-12.3	1.3	-28.1	-3.4	-30.3
Warrant Officer																
Number of Skills	4	4	151	159	4	4	145	153	4	4	145	153	4	12	140	156
Auth	0.0	0.2	5.1	5.4	0.0	0.2	5.1	5.4	0.0	0.2	4.8	5.0	0.0	0.4	4.5	4.9
Inventory	0.0	0.2	3.3	3.6	0.0	0.2	3.4	3.7	0.0	0.2	3.0	3.3	0.0	0.2	2.7	2.9
Over/Short	0.0	-0.0	-1.8	-1.8	0.0	-0.0	-1.7	-1.7	0.0	-0.0	-1.8	-1.8	0.0	-0.2	-1.8	-2.0
01 - 03																
Number of Skills	31	46	191	268	31	46	191	268	31	46	191	268	31	46	191	268
Auth	1.8	6.7	18.5	27.0	1.8	6.7	18.5	27.0	1.7	6.3	17.4	25.3	1.5	7.0	16.3	24.8
Inventory	2.9	6.6	15.0	24.5	2.9	6.8	15.5	25.3	2.6	6.1	13.8	22.5	2.1	5.8	12.2	20.1
Over/Short	1.1	-0.1	-3.5	-2.5	1.2	0.2	-3.0	-1.7	0.9	-0.2	-3.6	-2.9	0.5	-1.2	-4.1	-4.7

TABLE III-7
USAR EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Strength in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991			PROGRAMMED FY 1992			PROGRAMMED FY 1993		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS
<u>E1-E4</u>												
PMI	150.4			146.2			128.3			125.4		
Inventory	139.3	61.2	2.5	145.6	63.9	2.5	126.7	55.6	2.5	113.3	49.8	2.5
<u>E5-E9</u>												
PMI	121.5			121.6			116.9			112.5		
Inventory	94.4	92.0	17.7	98.7	96.1	17.7	85.9	83.6	17.7	76.8	74.8	17.7
<u>TOTAL E1-E9</u>												
PMI	271.9			267.8			245.2			237.9		
Inventory	233.7	153.1	8.0	244.3	160.1	8.0	212.6	139.3	8.0	190.1	124.6	8.0
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>												
PMI	5.2			5.1			4.8			4.7		
Inventory	3.6	3.4	19.6	3.5	3.4	19.6	3.1	3.0	19.6	2.8	2.7	19.6
<u>01 - 03</u>												
PMI	26.5			25.9			23.7			23.4		
Inventory	24.5	19.4	6.8	24.0	19.0	6.8	21.6	17.1	6.8	19.6	15.5	6.8
<u>04 - 06</u>												
PMI	18.8			18.4			17.6			17.7		
Inventory	18.9	18.6	21.8	18.5	18.3	21.8	16.7	16.5	21.8	15.1	14.9	21.8
<u>TOTAL 01 - 06</u>												
PMI	45.3			44.3			41.3			41.0		
Inventory	43.4	38.1	13.9	42.5	37.3	13.9	38.3	33.6	13.9	34.6	30.4	13.9

NOTE: Does not include IMA. PMI equals MTOE/TDA authorized positions plus training pipeline.
Authorized for FY 1992 and FY 1993 are estimates only as final decisions have not been
made on force structure. FY 1990 includes 10.9K mobilized for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Accessions.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR recruiting performance and projected goals are shown in the following table. The significant reductions are a result of end strength reductions in those years. The reductions are being achieved by reducing accessions rather than increasing attrition.

USAR Enlisted Accessions

	<u>FY 90</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 91</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 92</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 93</u> <u>GOAL</u>
Prior Service (PS)	38,466	42,893	26,153	22,164
Non Prior Service (NPS)	29,041	32,348	24,166	22,107
Male	20,944	23,302	17,158	15,696
(HSDG)	18,690	22,137	16,300	14,911
(I-IIIA)	13,620	15,612	11,496	10,516
Female	8,097	9,046	7,008	6,411
(HSDG)	8,097	9,046	7,008	6,411
(I-IIIA)	4,626	6,061	4,695	4,295
TOTAL	67,507	75,241	50,319	44,271

*NOTE: Includes equivalency certificate and diploma graduates as well as students who enlisted prior to graduation and were expected to graduate.

[b] Officer. Officer accessions for the USAR come primarily from ROTC and transfers from the Active Component. ROTC production and USAR performance and goals from all sources are shown in the following tables. ROTC production declines significantly because of reduced accession requirements in both the active and reserve components.

ROTC PRODUCTION

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
AC	2951	2300	2300	2300
ARNG	1200	500	500	500
USAR	4066	3000	2400	2400
TOTAL	8217	5800	5200	5200

USAR Officer Troop Unit Accessions

	<u>FY 90</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 90</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 91</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 92</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 93</u> <u>GOAL</u>
	7,945	8,015	7,631	6,693	2,666

[2] Retention. Actual USAR enlisted retention performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table. Reenlistments are projected to decline in proportion to the planned reductions in USAR troop unit strength.

USAR Troop Unit Reenlistments

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
First Term	5,221	7,321	5,390	6,734	7,233
Career	20,248	19,417	15,590	11,998	10,271
TOTAL	25,469	26,738	20,980	18,732	17,504

[3] Losses. Because of "stop-loss" actions, FY 1991 losses are lower than normal and FY 1992 losses are higher than normal. Additionally, the 9500 strength increase approved by Congress for FY 1991 was not carried forward into FY 1992 and beyond. Consequently, FY 1993 losses had to be increased by 9500 to meet already planned reduced end strength in FY 1992 and FY 1993.

[a] Enlisted

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Troop Program Enlisted Losses	78,662	66,109	82,155	66,882
Losses as a percentage of average enlisted troop program strength	32.8	27.7	36.5	33.3
Non-ETS Losses	69,932	58,535	74,042	59,968
Losses as a percentage of average enlisted strength	29.2	24.5	32.9	29.8

[b] Officer. Losses from the USAR may not be losses to the Army overall, as some USAR officers transfer to the active component or Army National Guard. However, these losses do create USAR vacancies which must be filled to maintain readiness. The actual and projected unit losses for the USAR are shown below.

USAR Unit Officer Losses

<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
8,327	7,647	7,710	7,269

[4] Inventory Stability. Both USAR aggregate population stability and unit personnel stability were evaluated in the same manner as for the active force.

Aggregate Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officers	86.9	87.7	88.6	86.9
Enlisted	75.9	75.1	77.5	76.2

Unit Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officers	67.7	68.1	68.4	66.1
Enlisted	62.2	60.3	61.1	59.6

(g) Readiness Assessment. The personnel readiness of the USAR improved in FY 1990 as trained in unit strength percentage increased slightly to 84.6 percent of wartime required. Efforts will continue in FY 1991 and the budget years to acquire and retain quality personnel with the skills needed through continued use of incentives such as bonuses, loan repayment and other special programs.

(h) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program. The purpose of the IMA program is to preassign individual selected reservists in peacetime to active component units, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to train for their wartime duties. The IMA program gives the active Army the necessary manpower resources to expand rapidly in periods of national emergency. Since its inception, approximately 17,000 positions have been identified in response to increased requirements to support the Active Army. Funding is required to support two weeks of annual training by each soldier assigned to the IMA program and those soldiers designated for drilling positions (24 paid drills per year). Actual and projected strength is shown below:

	<u>IMAs</u>			
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
(Actual)				
	14,165	14,038	11,392	10,913

(i) Full Time Support Program. The Full Time Support Program assists Reserve Component units in achieving higher levels of readiness by providing drilling reservists the maximum available training time to prepare for the wartime mission. Full-time support personnel (Active Guard/Reserve personnel, civil service personnel, active Army members, and Military Technicians) improve readiness by assisting in training, supply, maintenance, administration, and mobilization planning. In accordance with congressional direction, the full time Active Guard and Reserve Strength request has been reduced in FY 1992 and FY 1993 by five percent of the FY 1991 levels. The FY 1991 Authorization Act also directed that active component members be assigned to reserve units to meet valid reserve component requirements. Because of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM and recent USAR strength reduction initiatives, force structure decisions which determine full time support requirements have not yet been made. Consequently,

the need to assign additional active component members cannot be determined at this time. Force structure decisions for FY 1992 and beyond will be made during the Total Army Analysis process to be conducted in October 1991.

USAR Full-time Support

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
AGR	13,703	13,344	12,683	12,003
Army Reserve Techs*	8,587	8,529	7,082	6,161
Active Army with USAR units	906	1,080	1,080	1,080
DA Civilians	<u>4,106</u>	<u>4,164</u>	<u>3,731</u>	<u>3,614</u>
TOTAL	27,302	27,117	24,576	22,858

* Includes technicians for Special Operations Forces and non-dual status civilian technicians. Active Army with USAR units are expected to change for FY 1992 and FY 1993. Final decisions were not available for this report but will be included in the USAR justification of estimates to be submitted in late February.

(2) Army National Guard.

(a) General. The ARNG FY 1990 Selected Reserve Personnel Inventory decreased 12.7K from 457.0K to 444.2K or 2.3 percent (this includes 7.3K activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD). This was a result of a directed budgeted end strength reduction of 10K paid end strength. The FY 1991 ARNG personnel inventory was originally programmed to remain at the FY 1990 program level. However, the ARNG objective is to increase the personnel inventory to 457.3K during FY 1991 based on the defense authorization act restoration of the 10K end strength lost in FY 1990.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength. The percent of inventory versus programmed manning requirements dropped due to the reduction of personnel inventory in FY 1990 without a corresponding reduction in wartime requirements.

TABLE III-8
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

TOTAL ARNG MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90		FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	REQ	INV	PROG		% MNG	PROG		% MNG	PROG		% MNG
			MNPWR REQ	AUTH		MNPWR REQ	AUTH		MNPWR REQ	AUTH	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>											
Land Forces	445.5	405.9	439.9	425.3	97	408.8	382.1	93	364.9	340.6	93
Division Forces	445.5	405.9	439.9	425.3	97	408.8	382.1	93	364.9	340.6	93
(Divisional Increment)	431.2	392.9	425.3	411.8	97	395.4	370.1	94	352.5	329.9	94
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	182.8	166.8	177.2	171.7	97	164.7	154.3	94	147.8	137.5	93
(Tactical Spt Increment)	130.6	118.5	134.1	129.5	97	124.4	116.4	94	110.9	103.7	94
Theater Forces	117.8	107.5	114.3	110.6	97	106.3	99.4	94	93.8	88.6	94
	14.3	13.0	14.3	13.4	94	13.4	12.1	90	12.4	10.8	87
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>											
Support Installations	32.6	29.7	29.9	30.6	93	30.6	27.5	90	28.2	24.5	87
Centralized Support Act'y	27.8	25.4	28.1	26.1	93	26.1	23.5	90	24.0	20.9	87
	4.8	4.4	4.8	4.5	94	4.5	4.1	91	4.2	3.6	86
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>											
Individual Training	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	100	1.3	1.2	92	1.2	1.1	92
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	486.9	437.0	474.1	457.3	96		410.9	93	394.3	366.3	93
<u>OPERATING STRENGTH</u>		409.3		429.0			390.3			346.7	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</u>		27.7		28.3			20.6			19.6	
<u>END-STRENGTH*</u>		437.0		457.3			410.9			366.3	

*Does not include 7.3K soldiers on active duty in FY 1990 as a result of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE III-8A
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Thousands)

OFFICER DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	REQ		INV	PROG		%	PROG		%	PROG		%
	REQ			MNPWR REQ	AUTH	MNG	MNPWR REQ	AUTH	MNG	MNPWR REQ	AUTH	MNG
TACTICAL/MOBILITY												
Land Forces	46.4		46.5	51.3	48.1	94	44.7	41.0	92	38.3	36.4	95
Division Forces	46.4		46.5	51.3	48.1	94	44.7	41.0	92	38.3	36.4	95
(Divisional Increment)	44.9		45.0	49.6	46.6	94	43.2	39.7	92	37.1	35.2	95
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	18.8		18.8	20.6	19.4	94	17.9	16.6	93	15.5	14.7	95
(Tactical Spt Increment)	14.0		14.0	15.8	14.6	92	13.7	12.5	93	11.7	11.1	95
Theater Forces	12.1		12.1	13.2	12.5	95	11.6	10.7	91	9.9	9.5	95
	1.5		1.5	1.7	1.5	88	1.5	1.3	87	1.2	1.1	92
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	3.4		3.4	4.1	3.5	85	3.5	3.0	86	2.7	2.6	96
Centralized Support Act'y	2.9		2.9	3.5	3.0	86	3.0	2.5	84	2.3	2.2	96
	0.5		0.5	0.6	0.5	84	0.5	0.4	80	0.4	0.4	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Individual Training	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	49.9		50.0	55.5	51.7	93	48.3	44.1	91	41.1	39.1	95
OPERATING STRENGTH			50.0		51.7			44.1			39.1	
INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)			0.0		0.0			0.0			0.0	
END-STRENGTH*			50.0		51.7			44.1			39.1	

*Does not include 0.2K officers called to active duty in FY 1990 for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE III-8B
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90		FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	REQ	INV	PROG		% MNG	PROG		% MNG	PROG		% MNG
			MNPWR REQ	AUTH		MNPWR REQ	AUTH		MNPWR REQ	AUTH	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>											
Land Forces	399.1	359.4	388.6	377.2	97	364.1	341.1	94	326.6	304.3	93
Division Forces	399.1	359.4	388.6	377.2	97	364.1	341.1	94	326.6	304.3	93
(Divisional Increment)	386.3	347.8	376.0	365.3	97	352.2	330.3	94	315.4	294.7	93
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	164.0	148.0	156.6	152.3	97	146.8	137.7	94	132.3	122.8	93
(Tactical Spt Increment)	116.6	104.5	118.3	114.9	97	110.7	103.9	94	99.2	92.7	93
Theater Forces	105.7	95.3	101.1	98.1	97	94.7	88.7	94	83.9	79.2	94
	12.8	11.6	12.6	11.9	94	11.9	10.8	91	11.2	9.6	86
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>											
Support Installations	29.2	26.4	28.8	27.2	94	27.1	24.6	91	25.5	21.9	86
Centralized Support Act'y	24.9	22.5	24.6	23.2	94	23.1	20.9	90	21.7	18.7	86
	4.3	3.9	4.2	4.0	95	4.0	3.6	90	3.8	3.2	84
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>											
Individual Training	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2	100	1.2	1.1	92	1.1	0.9	82
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>429.8</u>	<u>387.0</u>	<u>418.6</u>	<u>405.6</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>392.4</u>	<u>366.8</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>353.2</u>	<u>327.2</u>	<u>93</u>
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING</u>		0.0		0.0			0.0			0.0	
<u>OPERATING STRENGTH</u>		364.6		377.3			346.2			307.6	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</u>		22.4		28.3			20.6			19.6	
<u>END-STRENGTH*</u>		<u>387.0</u>		<u>405.6</u>			<u>366.8</u>			<u>327.2</u>	

*Does not include 7.1K soldiers called to active duty in FY 1990 for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table III-8C reflects the trained personnel assigned to units compared to the wartime unit structure. The percent trained units lowers as budget end strength does not grow in relationship with structure.

TABLE III-8C
ARNG Trained In Unit Strength

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
End Strength	437.0	457.3	410.9	366.3
-Training Pipeline	27.7	28.3	20.6	19.6
Operating Strength	409.3	429.0	390.3	346.7
-Non Unit AGR	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Trained Unit Strength	404.3	424.0	385.3	341.7
Structure Requirements (Wartime) (Proposed structure)	479.6	474.1	440.7	394.3
% Trained in Units	84.3	89.4	87.4	86.7

Note: FY 1990 does not include 7.3K ARNG soldiers activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

(d) Skill and Grade.

[1] The data on actual and projected inventory by skill and grade in Table III-9 show that the mismatch of NCO skill improved through FY 1990. A key contributor to this continuing mismatch is the location of existing ARNG structure compared with availability of personnel. The ongoing restructuring of the ARNG will provide for continued reduction of MOS mismatch.

[2] Critical shortages in the current fiscal year include Captains in all basic branches as well as the traditional shortages of medical doctors, nurses, and chaplains. Structure modernization continues to aggravate this problem. Efforts for improving all shortages include continued screening of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to fill all basic branch company grade officer vacancies.

(e) Experience. The average years of service of ARNG soldiers shown in Table III-10 increased slightly in FY 1990. Even though the strength of the ARNG dramatically decreased, prior service accessions were 116 percent of program which caused the years of service to slightly rise. The ARNG will be required to rely even more heavily on prior service accessions in the near future which will cause a continued aging of the force.

TABLE III-9
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PHI)

	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
ENLISTED												
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	104	18	138	260	63	13	177	253	53	7	192	252
Authorized	37,673	33,040	171,973	242,686	13,041	3,809	222,030	238,880	10,192	593	212,692	223,477
Inventory	45,049	30,727	128,919	204,695	15,927	3,573	168,694	188,194	12,585	562	127,079	140,226
Over/Short	7,376	-2,313	-43,054	-37,991	2,886	-236	-53,336	-50,686	2,393	-31	-85,613	-83,251
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	153	59	123	335	217	47	61	325	238	25	66	329
Authorized	85,835	35,026	54,080	174,941	145,934	10,092	19,982	176,008	135,299	13,497	19,652	168,448
Inventory	112,248	33,752	43,365	189,365	191,679	9,583	16,104	217,366	198,991	13,145	14,418	226,554
Over/Short	26,413	-1,274	-10,715	14,424	45,745	-509	-3,878	41,358	63,692	-352	-5,234	58,106
TOTAL E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	131	56	150	337	145	82	102	329	137	63	131	331
Authorized	99,894	95,155	222,578	417,627	113,057	176,355	125,476	414,888	94,855	162,343	134,727	391,925
Inventory	124,703	91,246	178,111	394,060	133,451	166,022	106,087	405,560	109,169	149,820	107,991	366,780
Over/Short	24,809	-3,909	-44,467	-23,567	20,394	-10,333	-19,389	-9,328	14,314	-12,723	-26,736	-25,145
Warrant Officer												
Number of Skills	19	10	41	70	10	14	47	71	14	5	52	71
Authorized	2,849	1,362	6,432	10,643	385	2,116	9,065	11,566	389	1,792	8,848	11,029
Inventory	3,656	1,311	4,652	9,619	546	2,095	7,173	9,814	559	1,747	6,487	8,793
Over/Short	807	-51	-1,780	-1,024	161	-21	-1,892	-1,752	170	-45	-2,361	-2,236
OFFICER												
O1 - O3												
Number of Skills	114	17	39	170	133	7	28	168	68	47	45	160
Authorized	14,884	7,752	4,498	27,134	22,963	36	3,949	26,948	654	18,125	6,844	25,623
Inventory	18,703	7,404	2,937	29,044	26,198	36	2,551	28,785	1,789	16,917	4,813	23,519
Over/Short	3,819	-348	-1,561	1,910	3,235	0	-1,398	1,837	1,135	-1,208	-2,031	-2,104
O4 - O6												
Number of Skills	100	31	54	185	150	12	21	183	99	58	26	183
Authorized	4,250	2,184	4,826	11,260	10,471	109	890	11,470	2,780	7,571	1,011	11,362
Inventory	5,505	2,085	3,634	11,324	12,207	106	580	12,893	3,713	7,212	678	11,603
Over/Short	1,355	-99	-1,192	64	1,736	-3	-310	1,423	933	-359	-333	241
TOTAL O1 - O6												
Number of Skills	133	19	53	205	161	15	26	202	96	63	38	197
Authorized	23,231	8,651	6,512	38,394	32,728	3,085	2,605	38,418	1,651	28,949	6,385	36,985
Inventory	27,427	8,334	4,607	40,368	37,053	2,896	1,729	41,678	3,088	27,208	4,826	35,122
Over/Short	4,196	-317	-1,905	-1,974	4,325	-189	-876	-3,260	1,437	-1,741	-1,559	-1,863

FY 1990 numbers include 7.3K soldiers activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

TABLE III-10

ARNG EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY*

	ACTUAL FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991			PROGRAMMED FY 1992			PROGRAMMED FY 1993		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS
E1-E4												
Authorized Inventory	244,632	--	--	238,880	--	--	224,012	--	--	208,606	--	--
	204,632	89,375	4.3	188,194	82,196	4.3	140,226	64,185	4.4	110,819	47,965	4.3
E5-E9												
Authorized Inventory	176,974	--	--	176,008	--	--	167,559	--	--	157,010	--	--
	189,316	183,516	14.5	217,366	210,707	14.5	226,554	218,356	14.4	216,381	209,071	13.8
TOTAL E1-E9												
Authorized Inventory	421,606	--	--	414,888	--	--	391,571	--	--	365,616	--	--
	393,948	272,891	9.2	405,560	280,935	9.2	366,780	291,941	9.2	327,200	257,036	9.1
WARRANT OFFICER												
Authorized Inventory	11,611	--	--	11,566	--	--	11,029	--	--	10,224	--	--
	9,619	9,563	22.1	9,814	9,757	22.1	8,793	8,742	22.0	7,753	7,708	22.0
01 - 03												
Authorized Inventory	27,242	--	--	26,948	--	--	25,623	--	--	24,017	--	--
	29,036	22,681	8.8	28,785	22,485	8.8	23,519	18,371	9.1	20,781	16,233	9.0
04 - 06												
Authorized Inventory	11,341	--	--	11,470	--	--	11,362	--	--	10,932	--	--
	11,324	11,281	21.9	12,893	12,844	21.9	11,603	11,559	21.9	10,389	10,350	21.9
TOTAL 01 - 06												
Authorized Inventory	38,583	--	--	38,418	--	--	36,985	--	--	34,949	--	--
	40,360	33,962	12.5	41,678	35,071	12.5	35,122	29,554	12	31,170	26,229	12.4

Note: FY 1990 includes 7.3K soldiers activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Accessions.

[a] Enlisted. The ARNG exceeded the FY 1990 recruiting objective, both NPS and PS accessions were above program. The quality of NPS enlistments finished the year at an all time high (53.1 percent - CAT I-IIIA, 38.0 percent - CAT IIIB, and 8.9 percent CAT IV). The ARNG expects to continue at the same level of quality recruiting performance.

	<u>FY 90</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 91</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 92</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 93</u> <u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	40,845	47,072	27,639	22,440
Non-Prior	36,931	39,298	27,739	22,540
Male	69,644	76,370	45,378	34,980
NPS				
Male I-IIIA	17,017	16,505	10,599	7,941
HDSG	28,391	29,068	18,665	13,986
HDSG I-IIIA	14,149	14,196	9,116	6,830
Female	8,132	10,000	10,000	10,000
NPS				
Female I-IIIA	2,607	4,200	6,300	6,300
HDSG	4,587	6,300	7,000	7,000
HDSG I-IIIA	2,607	3,780	4,200	4,200

Note: HDSG includes equivalency certificate and diploma graduates as well as students who enlisted prior to graduation and were expected to graduate.

[b] Officer/Warrant Officer Accessions.

Total FY 1990 Officer strength remained virtually unchanged from that of FY 1989, which was consistent with the FY 1990 Officer Strength Program. Officer strength was to remain at 50,112 and finished the FY at 50,164; only 52 above program. To meet the Officer end strength requirement officer accessions were restricted from April through August. These restrictions were required even though officer attrition increased from 8.7 percent to 11.2 percent. Shortages of combat arms Captains and selected Medical Corps Officers continue to exist in the ARNG. Achievement of the FY 1991 objective of 7,300 will require continued emphasis on accession goals from all sources.

	<u>FY 90</u> <u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 91</u> <u>Programmed</u>	<u>FY 92</u> <u>Programmed</u>	<u>FY 93</u> <u>Programmed</u>
Commissioned	3,455	5,273	6,217	2,500	2,300
Warrant	1,000	664	1,126	1,000	800

[2] Retention

[a] Officer. Total Officer losses were 5,885 and were 132 percent of the programmed losses of 4,445. The resulting 11.2 percent loss rate was higher than past years primarily due to

efforts to draw down the overall ARNG strength. During the period FY 1991 through FY 1993 emphasis will continue to focus on specific tailored recruiting and retention programs including support of the full-time recruiting force for AMEDD shortages; waivers of age, temporary over-strength positions for operating room nurses and nurse anesthetists in states without large medical units; and enrollment of full-time seminary or theological graduate students in the ARNG Chaplain Candidates Program to alleviate chaplain shortages. Officer retention problems continue to exist at the grade of captain in the basic branches and in all ranks of selected Army Medical Department personnel and chaplains. Actual and projected loss goals for total officers follow:

ARNG Officer/Warrant Officer Losses

<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Programmed</u>
4,445	5,885	5,622	11,500	8,500

[b] Enlisted. Actual ARNG retention performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table. Extensions will decline if ARNG strength is reduced.

ARNG Extensions/Reenlistments (Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
First Term	22.4	24.2	22.3	16.6	14.6
Career	33.8	40.5	26.3	24.3	26.3
TOTAL	56.3	64.7	48.6	40.9	40.9

Losses in FY 1990 were higher than normal due to required strength reductions. FY 1991 may be below normal due to "stop loss" actions. Additional reductions in ARNG will require loss rates to be programmed at record highs.

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Total losses	90.6	75.5	90.1	88.2
% of Average Str	22%	19%	25%	25%

[3] Inventory Stability. The decrease in unit and personnel stability will continue. The restructuring and continued reassignment of ARNG soldiers displaced due to the FY 1990 strength reduction will have a significant affect on personnel stability. Additionally, considerable cross-leveling of soldiers into units involved in Operation DESERT STORM will lower overall unit population stability.

ARNG Aggregate Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Enlisted	84.1	82.9	83.5	85.7	88.5	83.7	82.1
Officer	90.7	89.2	91.0	94.2	95.4	90.7	90.1

ARNG Unit Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Enlisted	75.6	71.5	72.2	69.1	72.5	67.1	66.9
Officer	69.4	66.6	68.0	64.3	68.2	60.7	60.0

(g) Readiness Assessment. ARNG personnel readiness is affected by available strength and MOS qualification. Ongoing recruiting and retention programs are dealing effectively with the available strength shortfall. MOS qualification (MOSQ) remains the primary readiness inhibitor. To address this problem, the ARNG is involved in an effort to improve MOSQ through command emphasis and increased management of available school seats to ensure best use of training resources. However, recent ARNG force modernization has had a significantly negative impact on MOSQ. As MOSs are changed to match new equipment, personnel first undergo new equipment training and become MOS-qualified to support the new modernized equipment. During the transition period from old to new requirements, personnel are not MOS-qualified according to new document requirements. Highly technical and professional skill areas (e.g. medical, chemical) requiring lengthy schooling are also a major problem. M-day soldiers frequently experience difficulty obtaining leave from their civilian jobs commensurate with school seat availability.

(h) Full-time Support Program. The goal of the Full-time support program is to contribute to the operational readiness of Reserve Component units prior to mobilization. In order to accomplish this, sufficient full time manpower must be available to train, supply, maintain, administer, recruit and manage the force. As there is not sufficient time between mobilization and deployment to correct significant deficiencies, the units must be ready before mobilization. Full time support for ARNG units consists primarily of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program and the military technician program; active component soldiers and civil service personnel are also involved.

ARNG Full-time Support

	<u>FY 90</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
AGR	25,788	26,199	23,341	21,580
Dual Status Military Technicians	24,123	26,181	24,937	23,122
Non Dual Status ARNG Civilians	2,838	2,276	2,168	2,011
Active Army with ARNG	546	546	546	546
Army Civilians	419	391	439	439

* Congressional floor total 26,629

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

(1) With a FY 1990 end strength of 284.2K the IRR is the second largest pool of pretrained individual manpower available during mobilization. It will provide filler personnel for both active component and reserve component units.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
284.2	413.5	433.2	458.4

(2) The Army plans on approximately 70 percent of the enlisted IRR and 90 percent of the officer IRR being available for use during mobilization.

(3) In FY 1990, the Army IRR Screening program was conducted at over 2,000 recruiting stations nationwide. Approximately 24,200 members of the IRR participated in the one-day recall during their birth months to check personnel data, medical fitness, and some basic military skills and knowledge in selected MOSs. A significant number of corrections were made to the personnel records and mobilization data base. Further, a number of leads were developed for recruiting. The screening process will continue in FY 1991 and FY 1992.

c. Inactive National Guard (ING). The ING consists of those ARNG members who are unable to participate in peacetime training (training assemblies and/or annual training), but who wish to retain their Guard affiliation. They will join and deploy with their units when called to active duty. The ING are not members of the Selected Reserve; therefore, they are not available for mobilization unless a national emergency or a war is declared. ING members muster for one training session each year and are qualified in a military skill. Actual and projected strengths for the ING are shown below:

Inactive National Guard
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 90</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
11,036	10,500	10,500	10,500

2. Retirees. Regular Army and Reserve retirees with 20 years or more of active duty, who are receiving retirement pay, can be recalled to active duty at any time in the interest of national defense. The Army's retiree recall program preassigns retirees to appropriate mobilization positions throughout the CONUS support base. Exercises are conducted periodically to test mobilization procedures for retirees. The total number of retirees with high mobilization potential is shown below:

Retirees
Mobilization Potential
(Strengths in Thousands)

Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Under Age 60	195.9	189.1	188.3	187.2
Other Retired Reserves				
Under Age 60	31.2	33.4	34.2	34.6

3. RC Personnel on Active Duty. The FY 1990 (Actual) figures are for those individuals serving on active duty as of the last day of FY 1990 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days.

USAR and ARNG Personnel on
Active Duty for Training and Special Work in
Excess of 180 Days

	<u>USAR FY 90</u> (Actual)		<u>ARNG FY 90</u> (Actual)	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	14	596	28	1246
Flight Training	34	62	23	184
Professional Training at				
Military Institutions	2	5	6	19
Professional Training at				
Civilian Institutions	0	81	3	71
Active Duty Special Work	18	40	7	14
Total	68	784	67	1534

Note: Table does not include RC soldiers on active duty for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

C. Civilian Manpower.

1. General.

a. Role of Civilians.

Army civilians provide a major contribution in support to the Army's mission. Army civilians, paid from appropriated funds (less those in support of civil works functions) comprise about one-third of the active Army. Civilians help manage and operate bases, depots and laboratories. They support the Army mission by performing a full range of logistics functions, including depot maintenance, supply, transportation and acquisition management. Civilians also provide essential support in training, medical care, research and development, engineering, and facilities management. Most recently, through DMR initiatives, the Army has sought to streamline these missions and processes by consolidating functions and operations, improving the performance of the defense acquisition system and more effectively managing the Army's resources. The majority

of the Army's manpower resource savings brought about through DMR are civilian. It is critical that, once streamlined, we have the capability to recruit and retain the high-quality civilian force needed to accomplish these critical missions. Nearly 25 percent of the Army's appropriated fund civilian force is stationed overseas and provides a critical mobilization base needed for transition to wartime operations.

The Army has experienced increasing difficulty in recruiting and retaining civilian employees with required skills in a number of areas. Noticeable shortages or unusual recruitment and retention difficulties have occurred in the health, science and other professional occupations. The difficulty is attributable to the inability of the Army to compete with the private sector through competitive pay and benefits. Reform of the General Schedule pay system to provide greater market sensitivity, along with other recent initiatives designed to streamline management of the civilian labor force, will increase the Army's competitive posture for recruiting and retaining critical skills.

The Army is committed to "Managing Civilians to Budget (MCB)" as the cornerstone of its plan for operating in a resource constrained environment. The Army's objective is to give commanders and managers greater flexibility for accomplishing their missions while managing civilian pay expenditures effectively. (See paragraph IIE.3.)

b. Civilian End Strength Ceilings

(1) Since FY 1985, annual authorization and appropriation legislation has prohibited the management of civilian employees on the basis of end strength ceilings. The FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act has continued the prohibition into FY 1991 and FY 1992. This allows the Army to match employment level to funded workloads. However, since FY 1987, annual appropriation legislation has limited civilian workyears expended outside the 50 states to levels achieved in the previous year. In addition, FY 1991 congressional appropriation action reduced the foreign national payroll by 25 percent.

(2) The Army strongly favors continuing the end strength ceiling prohibition and prefers to eliminate the overseas workyear limitation. Experience from FY 1986 to FY 1990 shows that commanders are able to manage civilian employment levels responsibly, without arbitrary limitations on the number of civilians employed. Some of the benefits of operating without ceilings include avoidance of administrative costs associated with hiring and releasing employees to meet ceiling levels; greater ability to respond to emergency or unplanned workload; more cost-effective use of civilian appointment categories; and enhanced ability to recruit civilians in light of the difficult recruiting environment discussed previously.

2. Major Program Changes. The FY 1992 and FY 1993 civilian strength requests reflect reductions of 51,100 and 65,700 from the FY 1990 actual levels. Major changes include reductions to logistics support, Base Operations, and support to force structure. Other adjustments include savings from Base Closures and DMR actions, functional transfers to include commissary operation and finance and accounting, and civilianization of

military positions. Table III-11 shows the civilian employment estimate by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower.

The peak trained military manpower demand occurs late in the scenario (at M+180) when the expanded size and composition of the force has stabilized and the cumulative demand for casualty replacements is near its peak. Although increased manning of the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) has eliminated aggregate shortfalls beyond M+20, shortfall still exist in a number of essential skills, especially combat arms and medical. These peak trained manpower shortfalls normally occur in the middle of the scenario (at about M+90) because early battle losses are high; sizable returns to duty of wounded personnel previously evacuated have not yet occurred; and newly trained personnel are not yet available in significant quantities from the mobilized training base (not until M+113).

Early military manpower demand can only be filled, therefore, from manpower assets already under military control (mobilized early in the scenario). Such resources include:

- o Non-Unit Trained Individuals: Transients, holdees (primarily prisoners and patients), and students.

- o Pretrained individual manpower: Individual Ready Reservists (IRR), Inactive National Guardsmen (ING), Standby Reservists, and retirees. We estimate these resources will be fully mobilized by M+50.

- o Training Output: Accelerated output of active and reserve personnel already in the training base on M-Day.

It should be noted that the major factor determining shortfalls and overages, especially after M+40, is the model-derived estimate of casualty replacements required to maintain the fighting force in wartime. However, in a future war, these casualty estimates and thus Army personnel shortfalls may actually be significantly different. In addition, the demand is limited to requirements to fill and sustain the existing force structure. It does not include personnel requirements that would be needed if the force structure is expanded, as is likely for a war that extends beyond 180 days.

2. Army Civilians.

Before M-Day, the requirement for Army civilians is that required to accomplish peacetime workload. On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for employment/deployment. A total of about 133,000 additional civilian requirements are created at that time. At M-Day, 42,000 civilian employees will be called up for military duty (ready reservists and retirees). The combination of new positions and losses to military duties causes an M-Day shortfall of about 175,000 civilians.

TABLE III-11
ARMY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in thousands)

CIVILIANS	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	AUTH		MNG	RQMT		%	RQMT		%	RQMT		%
	AUTH	MNG		RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>												
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	77.0	0.2	0.2	76.5
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Land Forces	27.3	25.7		29.5	20.2	68.3	29.5	15.0	50.8	29.5	13.1	44.6
Division Forces	25.0	23.6		27.1	17.9	66.2	27.1	12.9	47.6	27.1	11.0	40.6
Theater Forces	18.3	17.1		20.3	12.4	61.3	20.3	7.6	37.4	20.3	6.5	32.3
Mobility Forces	6.7	6.5		6.8	5.5	80.9	6.8	5.4	79.4	6.8	4.4	65.4
	2.2	2.1		2.4	2.2	92.0	2.4	2.2	91.7	2.4	2.2	89.8
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Intelligence	6.0	4.6		6.8	5.8	86.0	6.8	5.4	79.4	6.8	5.4	79.7
Centrally Managed Comm	3.3	2.3		3.6	3.3	91.4	3.6	3.3	91.7	3.6	3.2	90.1
	2.6	2.3		3.2	2.6	79.8	3.2	2.1	65.6	3.2	2.2	68.1
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	71.4	69.7		85.3	66.2	77.6	83.3	58.4	70.1	83.3	54.1	64.9
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	7.4	8.0		7.4	6.3	85.2	9.4	8.0	85.1	9.4	5.6	59.7
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	26.9	26.4		31.9	27.1	85.0	33.2	28.7	86.4	33.2	28.9	86.9
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Int'l Military Org	3.3	2.1		4.4	4.4	100.0	4.4	4.4	100.0	4.3	4.3	100.0
Unified Commands	2.9	1.9		2.9	2.9	100.0	2.9	2.8	96.6	2.8	2.8	100.0
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.2		0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	0.1	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	0.0	0.0		1.2	1.2	100.0	1.2	1.2	100.0	1.2	1.2	100.0

CIVILIANS	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	AUTH	MNG		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
CENTRAL LOGISTICS												
Supply Operations	70.3	67.9		92.1	61.8	67.1	92.1	58.3	63.3	92.1	54.7	59.4
Maintenance Operations	20.5	20.6		25.2	6.5	25.7	25.2	10.3	40.9	25.2	9.0	35.6
Logistics Support Operations	30.1	29.5		33.2	29.0	87.2	33.2	27.9	84.0	33.2	26.7	80.3
	19.7	17.8		33.7	26.4	78.2	33.7	20.1	59.6	33.7	19.1	56.6
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS												
Combat Commands	12.6	11.9		14.1	12.3	87.0	14.1	11.0	78.0	14.1	10.9	77.4
Support Commands	2.5	2.4		2.9	2.5	84.9	2.9	2.2	75.9	2.9	2.2	74.7
	10.1	9.5		11.2	9.8	87.6	11.2	8.8	78.6	11.2	8.8	78.1
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES												
Research and Development	21.8	21.8		24.3	21.3	87.8	24.3	20.6	84.8	24.3	20.1	82.8
Geophysical Activities*	21.8	21.8		24.3	21.3	87.8	24.3	20.6	84.8	24.3	20.1	82.8
	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Personnel Support	21.7	20.2		28.7	20.3	70.7	32.4	24.9	76.9	32.4	24.9	77.0
Individual Training	8.4	7.2		10.5	8.8	83.5	14.2	13.4	94.4	14.2	13.4	94.4
	13.3	13.0		18.2	11.5	63.3	18.2	11.5	63.2	18.2	11.5	63.4
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	123.3	121.9		138.0	117.2	84.9	124.0	94.5	76.2	124.0	92.3	74.5
Centralized Support Act'y	58.4	57.4		74.2	57.8	77.9	60.2	42.0	69.8	60.2	39.9	66.3
	64.9	64.5		63.8	59.4	93.0	63.8	52.5	82.3	63.8	52.4	82.1
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	392.3	380.4		462.7	363.1	78.5	453.7	329.3	72.6	453.6	314.7	69.4
(Military Technicians)					37.0			34.2			31.3	

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

Includes Military Technicians

E. New Manpower Management Improvements.

The Army has restructured or implemented many programs to improve both personnel and manpower management as part of its concerted effort to become more efficient using available resources. Some of these programs are described below.

1. Army Acquisition Corps.

The Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) is the Army's program to develop a dedicated corps of military and civilian acquisition specialists and leaders. The challenges of developing, producing, and fielding new systems demand the focused attention of knowledgeable professionals. This initiative is the next logical step in the Army's efforts to streamline acquisition management and improve efficiency. The AAC will build on the success we have achieved thus far in implementing Packard Commission recommendations and the Goldwaters-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and will address the concerns and recommendations contained in the DMR.

The Army Acquisition Corps will enhance and sustain the acquisition skills of a select group of officers with a solid foundation of operational experience and civilian specialists with proven technical experience. The program will integrate education, training, assignments and promotion for military and civilian members of the AAC.

2. MANPRINT.

MANPRINT is the Army initiative that renews emphasis on the soldier as a key element of man-machine weapon systems performance. The MANPRINT program makes the following six domains imperative in the materiel acquisition process: human factors engineering, manpower, personnel, training, system safety, and health hazard assessments. The MANPRINT philosophy is that soldiers are the Army's most important resource. Emphasis throughout the Army on MANPRINT will ensure that soldiers are considered during materiel development from before concept exploration to final product improvement.

Recent initiatives undertaken to enhance soldier-machine interface through system design have been extensive. Efforts include technical tool and MANPRINT data base development, human performance research, and training of government and industry personnel involved in the acquisition process.

Verifiable improvements have been identified as a by-product of the MANPRINT program. Personnel savings have been realized on the Howitzer Improvement Program; significant cost avoidance has been achieved on the Avenger and the Airborne Target Handoff System.

3. Managing Civilians to Budget.

Managing Civilians to Budget (MCB) is a major initiative of the Army Civilian Personnel Modernization Project. MCB provides for delegation of the authority, responsibility, and accountability for the approved Army budget for civilian personnel resources and for position

classification to the lowest practical level of management. Its purpose is three-fold: give commanders and supervisors increased flexibility by replacing some control mechanisms (e.g., employment and high grade controls) with a more flexible civilian pay ceiling; strengthen the accountability of supervisors for the cost of their personnel decisions; and build the foundation of fiscal accountability prerequisite to substantive legislative change in the civilian personnel system (for example, simplified classification). The Army is implementing MCB CONUS-wide in FY 1991 with overseas areas to follow in FY 1992.

III. ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC):

Since March 1988, the Army's manpower accounting, force structure, and Planning/Programming/Budgeting systems have been subjected to a massive review and restructure under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel). This effort identified many cases of DPPC misclassifications of existing Army tactical units, as well as differences in information for the units contained in the three major Army manpower information systems. This report contains DPPC structure adjustments necessary to correct the classification of existing tactical units, with battlefield missions, as well as the adjustments to strength levels for Active Army units reflecting the approved budget position in all management systems. Additional work in this area remains to be done.

A. Strategic Forces.

1. Defense Strategic Forces.
2. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.3	.6	.5	.5
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.2	.2	.2

This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems; resources specifically identified and measurable to strategic control and surveillance systems, including crews, organizational and field maintenance, weapon system security, operational systems development, and procurement of equipment for these forces; and research and development elements for strategic control and surveillance systems programmed for procurement during the five year FYDP projection.

The increase of (+280) military strength in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+283) and reduction to WWMCCS information system (-3).

B. Tactical/Mobility Forces.

1. Land Forces.

a. Division Forces.

Division Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	419.0	375.1	347.1	326.0
Reserve Component				
USAR	173.1	189.5	168.3	150.7
ARNG	392.9	411.8	370.1	329.9
<u>Civilian</u>	17.1	12.4	7.6	6.5

Manpower in this category represent support for Army divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces; also included are procurement and stockpiling of Army war reserve material and Army resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC).

The decrease of (-43,895) to military manpower in FY 1991 reflects overmanning (-9,159), (-34,736) resulting from ongoing force structure initiatives to reduce the size of the Active Army. Note: Overmanning includes -18,186 Reservists called to active duty in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The decrease of (-27,938) to military manpower in FY 1992 and (-21,091) in FY 1993 reflect the continuation of the ongoing initiative to reduce the size of the Active Army.

The decrease of (-4,662) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+1,200), congressional directive to extend the FY 1990 hire freeze into FY 1991 (-732), civilian strength associated with reduced force structure downsizing initiatives (-5,152), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+22).

The decrease of (-4,852) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 reflects program decrements to tactical support-logistical units (-4,792) and miscellaneous reprogramming (-60).

The decrease of (-1,048) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects program decrements to tactical support-logistical units.

The increase (+16,400) in USAR and (+18,900) in ARNG manpower for FY 1991 reflects the congressionally approved strength increase for that year and soldiers on active duty in FY 1990 for Operation DESERT SHIELD. The decreases in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect planned reductions in USAR and ARNG end strength for those years.

b. Theater Forces.

Theater Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	65.6	49.4	52.8	50.0
Reserve Component				
USAR	16.4	17.2	15.3	13.7
ARNG	13.0	13.4	12.1	10.8
<u>Civilian</u>	6.5	5.5	5.4	4.4

This category contains Army programs for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Berlin and Panama; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other Services; and theater psychological operations, civil affairs; and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar reinforcing units in Army Forces Command. (Special Operations Forces are carried under OSD/Defense Agency Support).

The decrease of (-16,129) to military manpower in FY 1991 results from overmanning of theater units (-14,394), implementation of INF treaty (-3274), reductions to the Berlin Brigade (-452), increased support to NATO FC Air Defense (+1,825) and miscellaneous reprogramming (+66).

The increase of (+3,352) to military manpower in FY 1992 supports, air defense forces (+3,341), and miscellaneous reprogramming actions (+11).

The decrease of (-2,757) to military manpower in FY 1993 reflects decreases in force structure associated with Europe forces (-1,806), Panama Defense Forces (-116), Forces Command supply and maintenance (-323), signal support (-179), air defense support (-294), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+39).

The decrease of (-955) to civilian strength in FY 1991 reflects undermanning (+244), congressional directive to extend the FY 1990 hire freeze into FY 1991 (-268), civilian strength associated with reduced force structure downsizing initiatives (-635), special operations forces transfer to Defense Agencies (-512), tactical support-DCS network (+237), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-21).

The decrease of (-144) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 includes tactical support-DCS network (+111), maintenance of tactical equipment (-788), communication support (+575), theater defense forces (-36), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-6).

The decrease of (-909) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 includes maintenance of tactical equipment (-509), communication support (-389), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-11).

The changes in USAR and ARNG manpower in FY 1991-FY 1993 reflect congressionally approved strength increases for FY 1991 and planned reductions in FY 1992 and FY 1993.

2. Mobility Forces.

<u>Mobility Forces Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.2	.2	.2	.2
Reserve Component				
USAR	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2

Manpower in the category represents strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift; sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships; and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange fleet. Also contains program elements for air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, and integral command and control systems.

The decrease in USAR manpower represents planned end strength reductions in FY 1992 and FY 1993.

C. Communications/Intelligence.

1. Intelligence.

<u>Intelligence Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.8	9.9	8.5	8.0
Reserve Component				
USAR	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	3.3	3.3	3.2

Manpower in this category supports the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

The increase in military manpower (+227) in FY 1991 is due to undermanning.

The decreases in military manpower (-1,483) in FY 1992 and (-435) in FY 1993 reflect force structure adjustment made to intelligence programs.

The increase of (+951) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+1,007) and force structure adjustments made to intelligence programs (-56).

The USAR decreases in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect planned end strength reductions.

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	6.8	7.1	4.3	3.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.2

Manpower in this category represents the long-haul Defense Communications Systems, the Army's communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center.

The increase of (+344) in military manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+933), strategic communications (-212), long-haul communications (-416), SATCOM ground environment (+136), communication security (-192), and Army support to the Defense Communication Agency (+95).

The decrease of (-2,794) in military manpower in FY 1992 is attributed to strategic communications (-1,256), long-haul communications (-1,409), SATCOM ground environment (-197), communication security (+1), and Army support to the Defense Communication Agency (+67).

The decrease of (-490) in military manpower in FY 1993 is attributed to strategic communications (-262), long-haul communications (-134), SATCOM ground environment (-70), communication security (-1), and Army support to the Defense Communication Agency (-23).

The increase of (+227) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+309), congressional direction to extend the FY 1990 hire freeze into FY 1991 (-105), long-haul communications (-157), SATCOM ground environment (+44), communications security (+169), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-33).

The decrease of (-486) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 is attributed to strategic Army communications (-151), long-haul communications (-253), communications security (-62), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-20).

The increase of (+109) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects program adjustments to strategic Army communications (+169), long-haul communications (-69), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+9).

D. Combat Installations.

Combat Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	15.7	13.1	12.2	10.2
<u>Civilian</u>	69.7	66.2	58.4	54.1

Manpower in this category supports operation and maintenance of installations of U.S. Army Europe, Eighth U.S. Army-Korea, U.S. Forces Command, U.S. Army Pacific Command, and U.S. Army South, including real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, air traffic control, installation headquarters administration and installation operation, housekeeping, and service functions.

The decrease of (-2,946) to military manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+342) and ongoing initiatives to reduce the size of the Active Army (-3,288).

The decreases to military manpower in FY 1992 (-925) and (-2,046) in FY 1993 reflect ongoing initiatives to reduce the size of the Active Army.

The decrease of (-3,526) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 reflects undermanning (+1,696), congressional reduction of 25 percent of foreign national pay accounts was implemented, based on assumption foreign governments would contribute more to the costs of these functions (-4,040), and civilian strength reductions associated with force structure drawdowns (-1,182).

The decrease of (-7,825) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 reflects base operations downsizing in support to reduced force structure.

The decrease of (-4,260) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects base operations downsizing in support of reduced force structure.

E. Force Support Training.

Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.4	9.4	9.1	9.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.0	6.3	8.0	5.6

Manpower in this category supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Battle Command Training Program, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany, and JCS directed/coordinated exercises.

The increase of (+2,043) in military manpower in FY 1991 reflects undermanning (+633) and program adjustments to support range training operations (+957), the Joint Readiness Training Center (+125), the 7th Army Training Center (+250), flying hour program (+52), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+26).

The decrease of (-350) to military manpower in FY 1992 is attributed to range training operations (-117), the 7th Army Training Center (-57), training support to units (-31); offset by an increase to the Joint Readiness Training Center (+276).

The decrease of (-1,642) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to overmanning (-509), training support to units (-75), congressional direction to extend the FY 1990 hire freeze into FY 1991 (-298), and strength adjustment to meet training workload requirements (-760).

The increase of (+1,713) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 supports projected training workload.

The decrease of (-2,407) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 supports projected training workload.

F. Medical Support.

Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	33.4	33.8	33.8	32.8
Reserve Component				
USAR	10.4	9.0	8.0	7.2
<u>Civilian</u>	26.4	27.1	28.7	28.9

Manpower in this category support care in DoD regional medical facilities, including medical centers and laboratories; station hospitals and medical clinics; medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities; research and development in support of medical research, medical equipment and systems, and health care in station hospitals and medical clinics.

The increase of (+443) to military manpower in FY 1991 reflects undermanning (+673), increased support to hospitals and clinics (+272), medical research and development (+19); offset by decreases to dental activities (-133), care in Regional Defense Facilities (-23), and other medical activities (-365).

The decrease of (-1,007) to military manpower in FY 1993 includes medical reductions associated with the ongoing action to reduce the size of the Active Army. These include (-864) to station hospitals and clinics, (-64) to dental activities, (-38) to care in Regional Defense Facilities, and (-41) to other medical activities.

The increase of (+718) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+516), care in Regional Defense Facilities (+134), station hospitals and clinics (+283), dental activities (-75), medical research and development (+31), and other medical activities (-171).

The increase of (+1,591) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 includes the transfer of Brooke Medical Center from the Air Force (+1,230), increased support to care in Regional Defense Facilities (+137), station hospitals and clinics (+209), and miscellaneous reprogramming.

The increase of (+136) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 includes support to care in Regional Defense Facilities (+617), station hospitals and clinics (-375), dental activities (-77), and other medical activities (-29).

The changes in USAR manpower reflect planned end strength reductions.

G. Joint Activities.

1. International Military Organizations.

International Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.8	4.2	4.6	4.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	2.9	2.8	2.8

Manpower in this category includes support for the military Services' headquarters of international military organizations (i.e., NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.)

The decrease of (-633) to military manpower in FY 1991 includes overmanning (-566), international military headquarters (-69), international activities (-8) and (+10) in foreign military sales.

The increase of (+336) to military manpower in FY 1992 reflects increased support to foreign military sales (+225), international activities-Korea (+211), Army support to DSA (+1), offset by (-101) in international military headquarters.

The decrease of (-101) to military manpower in FY 1993 includes international activities-Korea (-100) and support to foreign military sales (-1).

The increase of (+1,020) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+1,008) and increased support to international military activities (+12).

2. Unified Commands.

Unified Commands Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.3	.3	.3

Manpower in this category is assigned to Management Headquarters in unified commands (i.e., European Command, Pacific Command, etc.).

The increase of (+225) to military manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+491); offset by reductions to the following: SOF (-153), NORAD (-2), Space Command (-10), EUCOM (-2), PACOM (-24), Readiness Command (-6), CENTCOM (-1), LANTCOM (-10) and other unified command activities (-58).

3. Federal Agency Support.

Federal Agency Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.1	.3	.4	.3

Manpower in this category reflects military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

The increase of (+260) to military manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+161), support to non-DoD agencies on a non-reimbursable basis (+96), and reimbursable support to non-DoD agencies (+3).

4. Joint Staff.

Joint Staff Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.5	.4	.3	.3

Manpower in this category supports the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The decrease of (-141) to military manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to overmanning.

5. OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities.

OSD/Defense Agencies & Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	12.3	16.2	16.4	16.8
<u>Civilian</u>	.0	1.2	1.2	1.2

Manpower in this category supports the staffs of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Agencies and Activities, to include Special Operations Forces and new agencies established as part of the Defense Management Report process.

Strength adjustment identified in this category will be explained under the Defense Agency section.

H. Central Logistics.

1. Supply Operations

Supply Operations Manpower (End strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.5	.3	.3	.3
<u>Civilian</u>	20.6	6.5	10.3	9.0

Manpower in this category serve in central procurement operations and conventional ammunition support.

The decrease of (-221) to military manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+126) and management initiatives to improve unit efficiency (-347).

The decrease of (-14,100) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 includes overmanning (-88), transfer of Sharpe and New Cumberland Depots to Defense Agencies (-2,325), procurement operations (-1,681), reprogramming to logistic support operations (-7,339), congressional direction to extend the FY 1990 hire freeze into FY 1991 (-820), and strength reductions associated with streamlining functional operations within the logistics supply system (-1,847).

The increase of (+3,808) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 includes reprogramming for the end item procurement operations (-199), end item inventory control point (-143), stock fund operations (+4,916), procurement (-783), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+17).

The decrease of (-1,317) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects adjustment to the Army Stock Fund (-500), procurement (-439), end item procurement operations (-374) and miscellaneous reprogramming (-4).

2. Maintenance Operations

Maintenance Operations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.8	1.1	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	29.5	29.0	27.9	26.7

Manpower in this category support centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, and reprocessing facilities and logistic centers.

The increase of (+299) to military manpower in FY 1991 includes changes associated with undermanning (+262), munition facilities (-5), depot maintenance (industrial fund) (+72), depot maintenance (non-industrial fund) (-37), maintenance support activities (-41), and the disposable cost account (+48).

The decrease of (-588) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+576), management efficiencies in the maintenance support activities (-803), depot maintenance (-195), and munition facilities (-166).

The decrease of (-1,067) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 reflects reprogramming to support Army Stock operations.

The decrease of (-1,218) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects management improvement initiatives to streamline operations.

3. Logistics Support Operations

Logistics Support Operations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.9	1.3	1.4	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	17.8	26.4	20.1	19.1

Manpower in this category supports programs for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are industrial preparedness, second destination transportation, property disposal, production engineering and testing, construction planning and design, operation of printing plants, storage and disposal of inactive equipment, logistics administrative support, and other centrally managed logistics support services.

The increase of (+400) to military manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning.

The increase of (+8,596) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+1,903), construction planning (-646), and reprogramming from supply operations (+7,339).

The decrease of (-6,305) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 is attributed to maintenance activities (-1,373), logistics administration (-520), real estate and construction (+1,860), construction planning (-531), logistic support activities (-5,549), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-93).

The decrease of (-993) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 includes changes to management activities (-918), logistics administration (-72), logistics support activities (+159), construction planning (-147), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-15).

I. Service Management Headquarters.

1. Combat Commands Management Headquarters

Combat Commands Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.5	1.8	1.8	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.2

Manpower in this category is assigned to the headquarters of the Army combat commands.

The decrease of (-635) to military manpower in FY 1991 results from overmanning.

The decrease of (-296) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 results from management initiative to improve current operations.

2. Support Commands Management Headquarters

Support Commands Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.0
<u>Civilian</u>	9.5	9.8	8.8	8.8

Manpower in this category is assigned to the headquarters of the Army support commands, to include Department of the Army (Office of the Secretary and Office of the Chief of Staff).

The decrease of (-107) to military manpower in FY 1992 results from management initiatives to streamline management headquarters activities.

The increase of (+280) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 results from undermanning (+568) and management initiatives to streamline management headquarters activities (-288).

The decrease of (-1,050) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 results from management initiatives to streamline management headquarters activities.

J. Research and Development.

Research and Development Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.0	4.2	4.0	3.7
<u>Civilian</u>	21.8	21.3	20.6	20.1

Manpower in this category reflects all research and development resources except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the five year defense plan (FYDP) and those identifiable to a support activity such as medical or personnel support.

The increase of (+173) to military manpower in FY 1991 represents undermanning (+948), reprogramming of special forces operations to Defense Agencies (-350), support of operational testing (-230), command, control and communication technology (-214), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-154).

The decrease of (-216) to military manpower in FY 1992 reflects decreased support to Army test ranges (-110), support to operational testing (-29), program-wide activities (-14) and miscellaneous reprogramming (-63).

The decrease of (-255) to military manpower in FY 1993 reflects decreased support to Army test ranges (-218), support of operational testing (-16), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-21).

The decrease of (-468) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 reflects undermanning (+31), special operations forces transfer to defense (-91), Army test ranges (-159), support of operational testing (-135), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-114).

The decrease of (-751) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 includes missile technology (-346), Army test ranges (-164), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-241).

The decrease of (-473) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 represents reprogramming between various Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) activities and units.

K. Training and Personnel.

1. Personnel Support.

Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	11.0	11.1	11.5	11.3
<u>Civilian</u>	7.2	8.8	13.4	13.4

Manpower in this category supports varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the American Forces Information Program, civilian career training and intern programs, and the Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP) program. It also includes research and development for human factors and personnel development research.

The increase of (+421) to military manpower in FY 1992 reflects reprogramming from the centralized support activity.

The decrease of (-204) to military manpower in FY 1993 represents decreased support to the recruiting and examining functions.

The increase of (+1,614) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+1,209), examining activities (+209), and other personnel activities (+196).

The increase of (+4,623) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 includes examining activities (-206), other personnel activities (-145), civilian training and education (-587), child development services (+2,669), family centers (+953), youth development (+463), personnel management (+1,492), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-16).

2. Individual Training.

Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	40.2	40.3	39.0	35.9
Reserve Component				
ARNG	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1
USAR	47.2	50.6	44.9	40.2
<u>Civilian</u>	13.0	11.5	11.5	11.5

Manpower in this category contains the staff and faculty for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of Service training commands. This includes recruit training, officer acquisition training, general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, training support activities, and research and development in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

The increase of (+125) to military manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+2,437), transfer of resources to Defense agencies for SOF (-1,015), recruit training units (-656), general skill training (-483), training developments (-183), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+25).

The decrease of (-1,277) to military manpower in FY 1992 reflects support adjustment for recruit training units (-303), general skill training (-854), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-120).

The decrease of (-3,132) to military manpower in FY 1993 reflects support adjustments for Reserve Officer Training Corps (-169), general skill training (-1,139), crypto related skills (-112), support of training establishments (-108), training development (-1,506), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-98).

The decrease of (-1,486) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 is attributed to undermanning (+306), transfer of special operation forces

to Defense Agencies (-389), congressional direction to extend the FY 1990 hire freeze into FY 1991 (-532), general skills training (-273), training developments (-106), flight training (-166), service academies (-72), general intelligence skills (-88), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-166).

The increase in USAR manpower in FY 1991 reflects the congressionally approved end strength increase. The decreases in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect planned end strength reductions for both ARNG and USAR.

L. Support Activities.

1. Support Installations.

Support Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	13.2	12.5	10.3	10.0
Reserve Component				
ARNG	25.4	26.1	23.5	20.9
USAR	3.5	3.1	2.8	2.5
<u>Civilian</u>	57.4	57.8	42.0	39.9

The manpower in this category supports the operation and maintenance of installations of the communications, intelligence forces, research and development, logistics, training, and administrative commands, including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. It also includes installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

The decrease of (-647) to military manpower in FY 1991 includes overmanning (-124), RDTE base operations (-78), training base operations (-256), communications base operations (-103), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-86).

The decrease of (-2,179) to military manpower in FY 1992 includes adjustments to support for training base operations (-232), communications base operations (-1,518), commissaries (-196), logistics real property maintenance (-115), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-118).

The decrease of (-372) to military manpower in FY 1993 reflects changes in support for communications base operations (-143), training base operations (-89), training real property maintenance (-51) and miscellaneous reprogramming (-89).

The increase of (+458) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+1,015), offset by transfer of Sharpe and New Cumberland depots to Defense Agencies (-557).

The decrease of (-15,822) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 includes the transfer of commissaries to Defense Activities (-8,807), base operations communications (-561), base operations-logistics (-2,559), base operations-training (-3,297), base operations-service academies (-155), base operations-health services (-155), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-108).

The decrease of (-2,077) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects base operations-logistics (-292), base communications (-235), base operations RDTE (-91), base operations-training (-848), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-365).

The USAR and ARNG decreases reflect the congressionally authorized end strength and a reduction of overstrengths.

2. Centralized Support Activities.

Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	16.6	17.9	16.1	15.5
Reserve Component				
ARNG	4.4	4.5	4.1	3.6
USAR	17.4	18.6	16.5	14.8
<u>Civilian</u>	64.5	59.4	52.5	52.4

Manpower in this category supports miscellaneous Army programs that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that are not included elsewhere within this report. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for combat developments, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, audiovisual activities, claims, and service-wide support.

The increase of (+1,310) to military manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+3,361); offset by reprogramming of SOF to Defense Agencies (-822), administrative support (-778), combat development activities (-143), personnel administration (-186), criminal investigations (-165), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+43).

The decrease of (-1,881) to military manpower in FY 1992 reflects program adjustment to include combat development activities (-139), personnel administration (-1,461), security/investigations (-92), information management (-109), service-wide support (-59), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-31).

The decrease of (-509) to military manpower in FY 1993 reflects program adjustment to include combat development activities (-307), information management (-121), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-81).

The decrease of (-5,135) to civilian manpower in FY 1991 includes undermanning (+432), congressional direction to extend the FY 1990 hire freeze (-2,597), transfer of finance and accounting to Defense Agencies (-2,599), transfer of Sharpe and New Cumberland Depots to Defense Activities (-173), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-198).

The decrease of (-6,811) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 includes information management (-2,093), administrative theater support (-1,047), combat development (-164), reserve readiness (-1,733), personnel administration (-1,800), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+26).

The decrease of (-154) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 includes reprogramming for administrative theater support (+2,594), combat development (-194), reserve readiness (-2,050), information management (-373), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-131).

The increases in USAR and ARNG represent the congressionally approved strength increase. The decreases in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect planned end strength reductions.

M. Undistributed Manning.

Undistributed Manning
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.0	6.1	5.5	(-2.1)

Usually the total of all unit spaces (force structure) does not exactly match the total manpower available to fill them (the operating strength or force structure manning). This delta is termed "Undistributed Manning". A positive figure (overmanning) indicates that more trained personnel (faces) were available than the structure (spaces) required. A negative figure (undermanning) means that the structure (spaces) was larger than the available operating strength (faces).

These deviations from exact manning of the structure are a result of the seasonal distribution of gains and losses, total strength, and changes in the Individuals subaccounts. The projected figures above show the expected deltas for future year ends (FY 1991, FY 1992 and FY 1993).

For historical years, the DMRR distributes all personnel to either the operating strength or the individuals accounts. As always, though, the operating strength does not exactly match the total structure manning target. For a historical year, however, they should not be added to the preceding detailed breakouts of operating strength personnel, because they are already included there. End of year deviations are not necessarily representative of the remainder of the fiscal year.

N. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Reserve Component				
USAR	14.2	14.0	11.4	10.9

An IMA is an individual reservist (officer or enlisted) who is preassigned to an Active Component organization in peacetime to train for wartime duty with that organization.

O. Individuals.

The Individuals subaccounts include manpower in trainee, transient, holdee (patient, prisoner, separatee), student, officer accession student, and U.S. Military Academy cadet status.

1. Transients.

Transient Manpower
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	13.1	14.7	13.6	13.6

Transient strengths are based on the projected volumes of PCS moves for accessions, separations, and retirements, and on operational, rotational, and training move requirements. The changes in transient strengths are a result of changes in volume, timing, and duration of PCS moves. Moves are seasonally influenced.

2. Holdees (Patients, Prisoners, Controllees, and Pending Separations).

Holdee Manpower
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.2	5.7	5.2	5.4

Holdee numbers generally remain fairly stable over time.

3. Trainees, Students and Cadets.

<u>Trainees, Students, and Cadets</u> <u>(Strengths in Thousands)</u>				
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	61.2	59.5	54.6	52.4
Trainees/Students	56.8	55.0	50.3	48.2
Cadets	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.2
Reserve Component				
Trainees/Students (Pay categories F, P, Q, T)				
ARNG	27.7	28.3	20.6	19.6
USAR	28.9	26.5	20.8	19.1

The active component trainee data largely mirror the flow of non-prior service accessions. Both of these groups are particularly subject to change at end year as accessions are managed to meet the overall end strength.

The Reserve Component training pipeline consists of Troop Program Unit junior enlisted personnel who have not completed initial entry qualification training and are not deployable.

CHAPTER IV

NAVY

MANPOWER

PROGRAM

CHAPTER IV

NAVY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION:

A. General

This chapter outlines the Navy's manpower program for active, reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1991 through FY 1993. It addresses manpower trends from actual performance in FY 1990 to projections into FY 1993 and reflects changes contained in the President's Budget submission for FY 1991-93. Further, it reviews Navy initiatives and programs geared to meet the challenge of maintaining our readiness posture within the context of a more fiscally-constrained environment. The Navy manpower program supports the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions as defined by national, political, and military strategy.

In FY 1991, Navy will have a total of 528 Battle Force ships. In FY 1992 this number will decrease to 477, and will further decrease to 464 ships in FY 1993. The FY 1993 total represents a reduction of 81 ships from the FY 1990 level. Authorized Navy active military end strength in FY 1991 is 569,721 (71,016 officers and 498,705 enlisted), 551,400 in FY 1992 (69,468 officers and 481,932 enlisted) and in FY 1993 536,000 (67,557 officers and 468,443 enlisted). This represents a reduction of 5,531 officers and 41,323 enlisted personnel between FY 1990 and FY 1993.

Navy's manpower strategy is to retain high quality personnel, increase experience levels, maintain acceptable better sea/shore rotation, improve training levels and reduce overall manpower costs during the force drawdown. This strategy includes a continued effort to provide the quality of life for Navy personnel that will contribute to increased retention and readiness.

Navy must be able to fill key positions to perform its mission successfully and safely. Therefore, the recruiting and retention of high caliber officer and enlisted personnel to man our technologically-sophisticated Navy remains a top priority. Retention of experienced enlisted personnel during force drawdown will require stable levels of compensation, maintenance of advancement opportunity and the providing of an acceptable quality of life for both the sailor and his/her family. Declining numbers of potential male recruits magnify the importance of sound retention and recruiting programs.

The Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress on the FY 1992 Budget addresses plans for attracting and retaining to Naval Service our nation's best and brightest individuals. Included in the plans are prudent pay raises, retention bonuses for critical ratings, reasonable housing allowances, and adequate medical benefits.

The Navy chapter of the FY 1992 DMRR substantiates the President's FY 1992 budget figures, accounts for ongoing changes in the naval force structure, addresses manpower issues with potential long-term impact, and details present Navy manpower requirements.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The military Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) is a DoD directed manpower data report based upon the wartime scenario in the Defense Planning Guidance. It identifies the wartime manpower requirements and compares them against the resources available from the active component, selected reserve, training pipeline output, and pretrained individual manpower (PIM). The PIM consists of personnel from the individual ready reserve, standby reserve and retired military. Casualty replacements are estimated as well as number of personnel in trainee, transient, holdee, patient, or student status. The civilian WARMAPS report identifies civilian mobilization manpower demand and supply. The FY 1989 civilian WARMAPS report reflects a recent update of quantity and quality to the wartime manpower requirements. The military and civilian data in the table that follows indicate when peak demand for military and civilian personnel occurs.

Wartime Peak Demand For Trained Manpower (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
Time at which peak demand occurs	M+180	M+150	M+180
Peak Demand	1,064.8	937.4	351.1

C. Strength Request

The Navy requests resources for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1991 and FY 1992 as follows:

Navy Manpower Program (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990*</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	582.9	569.7	551.4	536.0
Selected Reserve/TAR	149.4	153.4	134.6	127.1
<u>Civilian</u>	320.5	309.7	292.4	285.3

*FY 1990 Active and Selected Reserve totals have been increased and decreased respectively by 3,400 to reflect Selected Reserves called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b.

The Navy manpower program shows only the authorized end strength required to effectively operate the Navy during peacetime, while wartime requirements, as indicated in paragraph B above, reflects end strength which would be needed during mobilization.

The Civilian Manpower requirements are for the manpower levels required to execute funded programs, and comply with concerted efforts to contain personnel costs through pursuit of economy, efficiency, and productivity improvement programs.

The Selected Reserve component is the difference between the trained manpower needed at the start of a protracted conventional war and the Active Navy we can afford and attain in peacetime.

Navy reassesses military billet assignments at shore establishments and considers substituting civilians or contractors for all non-military essential billets when more cost effective and consistent with sea-shore rotation requirements.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program

1. Manpower Program by Major DPPC

The distribution of military manpower from FY 1990 to FY 1993 reflects an end strength reduction tied to force structure reductions. Using programmed end strength for each Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) between FY 1990 and FY 1993, the following tables depict the Navy Active Strength distribution. The specific figures may change as a result of annual budget decisions; however, the general proportions should remain relatively stable.

Navy Active Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1990*</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Strategic	23.0	22.7	18.9	15.5
Tactical/Mobility	284.9	283.9	277.1	268.2
Communications/ Intelligence	15.8	16.6	15.7	15.3
Combat Installations	26.3	25.3	24.2	23.7
Force Support Training	15.7	15.2	14.6	14.3
Medical Support	26.8	26.3	26.1	26.0
Joint Activities	5.0	5.2	6.1	5.9
Central Logistics	6.5	6.5	5.9	5.5
Service Management Headquarters	5.5	5.3	5.2	5.1
Research and Development	7.3	7.7	7.3	7.0
Training and Personnel	36.0	38.1	36.0	35.5
Support Activities	30.7	30.1	27.8	27.2
Operating Strength				
Deviation	0.0	-5.8	-5.8	-5.8
Individuals**	99.4	92.5	92.2	92.5
TOTALS***	582.9†	569.7	551.4	536.0

†Includes 3,400 Selected Reserves called to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C., Section 673b.

Navy Selected Reserve Strength Distribution by DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1990*</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Strategic	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.3
Tactical/Mobility	82.4	90.5	77.7	72.1
Communications/				
Intelligence	5.8	6.2	6.3	6.0
Combat Installations	9.6	8.6	8.7	8.2
Force Support Training	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.5
Medical Support	16.2	16.7	13.7	13.3
Joint Activities	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.9
Central Logistics	8.2	7.4	7.2	7.1
Service Management				
Headquarters	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.6
Research and Development	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0
Training and Personnel	2.4	2.7	2.0	2.1
Support Activities	7.7	8.3	8.3	8.0
Individual Mobilization				
Augmentee	2.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
Individuals**	6.8	5.5	3.6	3.4
TOTALS***	149.4†	153.4	134.6	127.1

†Does not include 3,400 Selected Reserves called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b.

Navy Civilian Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1990*</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Strategic	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.3
Tactical/Mobility	8.7	8.9	15.6	16.8
Communications/				
Intelligence	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.7
Combat Installations	20.8	20.6	19.4	19.1
Force Support Training	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Medical Support	9.0	9.3	8.9	8.8
Joint Activities	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.3
Central Logistics	159.8	153.1	141.3	135.3
Service Management				
Headquarters	10.8	8.8	8.7	8.6
Research and Development	38.6	37.5	35.9	34.4
Training and Personnel	5.8	5.6	5.7	5.7
Support Activities	53.5	52.3	42.2	41.8
TOTALS**	320.5	309.7	292.4	285.3

* End Year Actuals

** Individuals includes students, transients, and trainees.

*** Totals may not add due to rounding.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The major force structure for the Navy includes three areas: Total Battle Forces, Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces and Naval Aviation Forces.

a. Total Battle Forces

Within Total Battle Forces there are five major subcategories: Strategic Forces (SSBN and their support ships), Tactical Air Forces (Carriers), Naval Forces (Surface Combatants, Attack Submarines, Amphibious Warfare Ships, Patrol and Mine Warfare Ships), Mobility Forces/ Sealift Forces (Combat Logistic and Mobile Logistic, Fleet Support Ships), and Mobilization Forces Category "A" (Reserve Surface Combatants and Amphibious Warfare Ships).

In FY 1991 the total ship battle forces decrease by seventeen to 528 ships. In FY 1992/FY 1993 the number will decrease to 477/464 respectively. Changes in each of the five categories are outlined in the following paragraphs.

(1) Strategic Forces

Strategic Forces increases from 33 to 34 in FY 1991 with the decommissioning of one Lafayette class SSBN and the commissioning of two Ohio SSBNs. In FY 1992 total Strategic Forces decreases to 29 with the decommissioning of two James Madison and four Benjamin Franklin class SSBNs and the commissioning of one Ohio class SSBN. In FY 1993 total Strategic Forces decreases to 24 with the decommissioning of two Lafayette class, one James Madison class, three Benjamin Franklin class SSBNs and the commissioning of one Ohio class SSBN.

Strategic Support Ships remain constant at six in FY 1991 and decreases to five in FY 1992 with the decommissioning of one Hunley class submarine tender. In FY 1993 Strategic Support Ships remain constant at five.

(2) Tactical Air Forces

In FY 1991 aircraft carriers decrease to 12 with the decommissioning of one Midway class and one Forrestal class. In addition USS Kitty Hawk returns to the active force from the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). In FY 1992 and 1993 aircraft carriers total thirteen with commissioning of one Nimitz class carrier in FY 1992.

(3) Naval Forces

Surface Combatant decreases by 22 to 153 in FY 1991, by 18 to 135 in FY 1992 and by seven to 128 in FY 1993. All Battleships will be decommissioned in FY 1991. Cruisers increase to 47 in FY 1991 with the commissioning of four Ticonderoga class cruisers, increase to 50 in FY 1992 with the commissioning of three Ticonderoga class cruisers and increase to 53 in FY 1993 with the addition of three more Ticonderoga class cruisers. Destroyers will decrease to 47 in FY 1991 as eight Adams

and three Farragut class destroyers are decommissioned and the commissioning of one Arleigh Burke class destroyer. In FY 1992 the number of destroyers decreases to 42 with the decommissioning of four Adams class and two Farragut class destroyers and the commissioning of one Arleigh Burke class destroyer. In FY 1993 the number of destroyers decreases to 40 with the decommissioning of three Adam class, one Farragut and the commissioning of two Arleigh Burke class destroyers. In FY 1991 frigates decrease by twelve to 59 with the decommissioning of two Bronstein class frigates and ten Knox class frigates. In FY 1992 the number of frigates decreases to 43 with the decommissioning of 16 Knox class frigates. In FY 1993 frigates further decrease to 35 with the decommissioning of eight Knox class frigates.

In FY 1991 attack submarines decrease to 87 with the decommissioning of one Earbel class SS five Permit class SSNs one Allen class SSN, two Sturgeon class SSNs and the commissioning of three Los Angeles class SSNs. In FY 1992 attack submarines increase to 88 with the decommissioning of one Permit class, one Allen class, three Sturgeon class and the conversion of two Benjamin Franklin class SSBNs to SSNs and the commissioning of four Los Angeles class SSNs. In FY 1993 attack submarines increase to 90 with the decommissioning of one Sturgeon class and the commissioning three Los Angeles class SSNs.

Pegasus class patrol combatants will remain constant at six through FY 1993.

In FY 1991 the total number of amphibious warfare ships will increase to 62 with the commissioning of two Whidbey Island class LSDs. In FY 1992 amphibious warfare decrease to 59 with the commissioning of one LHD-1 class ship, one Whidbey Island LSD and the decommissioning of one Charleston class LKA, two Raleigh class LPDs and two Newport class LSTs. In FY 1993 amphibious warfare decrease to 55 with the commissioning of one LHD-1 class ship, the decommissioning of one Charleston class LKA, two Iwo Jima class LPHs and two Newport class LSTs.

In FY 1991 mine warfare ships increase to ten with the commissioning of four Avenger class MCMs. In FY 1992 mine warfare ships increase to thirteen with the commissioning of two Avenger class MCMs and one MHC-51 class ship. In FY 1993 mine warfare ships increase to sixteen with the commissioning of three Avenger class MCMs.

(4) Mobility Forces/Sealift Forces

In FY 1991 combat logistics ships decrease to 55 with the decommissioning of two Mispillion class TAOs, one Neosho class and the commissioning of two Kaiser class TAOs. In FY 1992 combat logistics ships decrease to 53 with the decommissioning of five Neosho class TAO, one Mispillion class TAO, one Wichita class AOR and the commissioning of one AOE-6 class ship and four Kaiser class TAO. In FY 1993 combat logistic ships increase to 56 with the decommissioning of one Wichita class AOR and the commissioning of one AOE-6 and three Kaiser class TAOs.

In FY 1991 mobile logistics ships decrease to seventeen with the decommissioning of one Vulcan class AR and one Fulton class AS. In FY 1992 mobile logistic ships remain constant at seventeen with the commissioning of one Hunley class AD and the decommissioning of one Vulcan class AR. In FY 1993 mobile logistic ships decrease to sixteen with the decommissioning of one Fulton class AS.

In FY 1991 fleet support ships increase to 49 with the commissioning of two Victorious class TAGOSs. In FY 1992 fleet support ships decrease to 40 with the decommissioning of two Achomawi ATFs, three Powahattan TATFs, three Stalwart TAGOSs, one Furman TAK, two Chanticleer ASRs, three Stalwart TAGOSs, one Furman TAK, two Chanticleer ASRs and the commissioning of two Victorious class TAGOS. In FY 1993 fleet support ships decrease to 36 with the decommissioning of one Bolster class ARS, one Chanticleer ASR, three Stalwart TAGOSs and the commissioning of one Victorious class TAGOS.

(5) Mobilization Forces Category "A"

In FY 1991 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will increase to 37 with addition of six Knox class frigates. In FY 1992 and FY 1993 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will be nineteen with the deactivation of eighteen Knox class frigates.

b. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces

(1) Auxiliaries Sealift Forces

In FY 1991 auxiliaries and sealift forces will increase to 146 with the addition of two TAKRs and four TAOTs. In FY 1992 auxiliaries and sealift forces increase to 155 with the deletion of one TARC and the addition of one TACS, three TAKs, three TAKRs and three TAOTs. In FY 1993 auxiliaries and sealift forces increase to 166 with the deletion of two TAKS and the addition of one TACS, five TAKRs and seven TAOTs.

(2) Mobilization Forces Category "B"

In FY 1991 Mobilization Forces Category "B" decreases to seventeen with the deletion of two Aggressive class MSOs. In FY 1992 Category "B" ships increase to 21 with the deletion of three Aggressive class MSOs, one Escape class ARS and the addition of eight Knox class frigates. In FY 1993 Category "B" ships decrease to eighteen with the deletion of four aggressive class MSOs and the addition of one MHC-51 class ship.

c. Naval Aviation Forces

In FY 1991, active deployable tactical squadrons decrease to 91 while reserve squadrons remain at the FY 1990 level of 14. In FY 1992, active tactical squadrons remain at 91 and reserve squadrons remain at 14. In FY 1993, active tactical squadrons decrease to 84 and reserve squadrons remain constant at 14.

In FY 1991, ASW/FAD active squadrons decrease to 74 and reserves remain constant at 20. In FY 1992, the number of ASW/FAD active squadrons decrease to 73 and reserve squadrons remain at 20. In FY 1993, ASW/FAD active squadrons decrease to 66 and reserve squadrons decrease to 16.

Active direct-support squadrons remain constant at 21 from FY 1991 through FY 1993. Reserve direct-support squadrons remain constant at 17 from FY 1991 through FY 1993.

E. Key Manpower Issues

1. Force Reduction Strategy

The manpower strategy the Navy has adopted for the 1990s is centered on the premise that, as the Navy gets smaller, we have the opportunity to proactively shape the force in order to retain high quality personnel, increase experience levels, gain slightly better sea/shore rotation for our people, improve training levels, and reduce overall manpower costs. A key element of this strategy is a commitment to take care of the people who are in the Navy, and wish to stay, even as total strength decreases. We can accomplish all of these things while reducing the size of the Navy, as long as the reductions are consistent with the pace and magnitude of the reductions in force structure (ship/squadrons). Under present reduction plans, no enlisted personnel will be forced out of the Navy involuntarily who are otherwise fully qualified for retention.

While we plan to decrease the absolute number of petty officers, petty officers will increase as a percentage of the force. On average, active duty Navy billets are filled at 91.5 percent of our War-time Manpower Requirements. Of these authorized billets, 71 percent are for petty officers, our top six pay grades. In FY 1991, fiscal constraints allowed Navy to recruit and train no more than 67.5 percent of total peacetime billets with petty officers, vice the 71 percent required. The increased technological requirements which exist in virtually all the Navy's ratings (afloat and ashore) make the continued manning of petty officer billets with untrained, inexperienced apprentice seamen unacceptable. In FY 1992, the top six paygrade inventory will be increased to 69.8 peacetime. While this growth fails to achieve 100 percent manning of petty officer billets with petty officers, it enables Navy to incorporate the new, more complex technologies/systems needed for its ships and squadrons and maintain the current high level of fighting readiness.

In summary, Navy desires to protect force readiness in the near term by protecting quality people currently on board who wish to stay, maintain sufficient accession levels to preclude a "hollow force" in the future, manage officer accessions and retention to maintain the correct grade/quality mix, improve recruit quality to reduce attrition and ensure long term readiness, and rebalance the enlisted skill mix using existing force management tools.

2. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth

The FY 1988/89 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 100-456) established end strength target of 12,510 active duty health care

professionals in FY 1991. This represents a growth of 270 over FY 1990's planned authorized end strength. Navy achieved a growth of actual inventory of 277 health care professionals during FY 1990. The following table summarizes:

Health Care Professionals

	<u>FY 1989</u> <u>(Plan)</u>	<u>FY 1989</u> <u>(Act)</u>	<u>FY 1990</u> <u>(Plan)</u>	<u>FY 1990</u> <u>(Act)</u>	<u>FY 1991</u> <u>(Plan)</u>
Budgeted End Strength:	12,694	-	12,522	-	12,602
Authorized End Strength:	11,940	11,555	12,240	11,832	12,510

Reaching end strength targets for nurses and physicians continues to prove difficult due to the national nurse shortage and inability to recruit and retain physicians in certain specialties. Navy, with the support of Congress, has initiated a number of accession/retention programs:

- Increased armed forces health professions scholarships;
- Revised physician special pays program;
- Bonus/special pays for some nursing and other non-physician health care specialists included in the FY 1991 Authorization Act;
- Financial Assistance Program to assist in recruiting hard to fill specialties (physicians, dentists, optometrists);
- Instituted education/accession programs for nurses

These initiatives, in conjunction with congressionally approved programs should assist the Navy in reaching end strength target of 12,510 health care professionals in FY 1991.

3. Shortage of Experienced Nuclear Training Surface and Submarine Officers

Despite the planned reduction in numbers of nuclear ships, shortfalls will continue to exist of experienced nuclear trained officers in the grade of Lieutenant Commander through Captain. These officers are required to fill commanding officer, executive officer, and department head billets at sea as well as key fleet support billets ashore.

Nuclear officer incentive pay (NOIP) and submarine duty incentive pay (for submarine officers) have been invaluable in retaining these high quality officers. Retention of these officers is vital to ensuring continued safe reactor operation.

NOIP is the main tool used to retain nuclear trained officers and must continue to receive strong Navy and congressional support. Authority for this program was extended to 30 September 1995 by the FY 1990/1991 DoD Authorization Act.

4. Implementation of Title IV of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986

Over the next few years Navy will see the pool of Joint Service Officers (JSOs) decrease before leveling out primarily because 44 percent of the current pool of 04-06 JSOs are 06s. Today, 18 months after the transition has ended, there are 196 flag officers and 2848 04-06 officers designated as JSO. The June 1990 Navy JSO selection board found only 18 qualified officers to recommend to the Secretary of Defense for designation as JSO. Future JSO selection boards should see an increase in qualified officers as more officers have the opportunity to complete their joint duty requirements.

The dwindling pool of JSOs could also affect Navy's ability to fill the required 50 percent of its joint duty billets with JSO or JSO nominees (those who have completed their Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)). This is because of the requirement to complete two schooling phases to receive full JPME credit, and the limited number of JPME seats available. The void that is created by insufficient numbers of JPME JSO nominees is being filled from our dwindling pool of JSOs.

For nuclear-trained officers, the Title IV joint service prerequisite for flag promotion is a particularly severe problem because of the shortage of officers, sea-intensive nuclear career paths, and Navy's unique legal responsibility to ensure nuclear safety. Meeting this prerequisite will be extremely difficult. Therefore, Congress has allowed Navy to waive the joint duty requirement for nuclear-trained officers until 1 January 1994.

While Navy can meet current requirements for JPME graduates on a one for one basis, there is no pool of JPME graduates being built to give needed assignment flexibility in the future. The problem of having enough JPME graduates available to fill required joint duty billets is being accentuated by the continued growth of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). Any growth in the JDAL requires more JPME seats and officers to fill those seats. Navy has requested that additional JPME seats be added to accommodate not only future growth, but enable Navy to send additional officers through JPME to develop the needed pool of JPME graduates.

II. Significant Program Highlights

A. Active Component Military Manpower

1. General

Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and retention of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the modern Navy.

Maintaining military pay at fully competitive levels are essential in our efforts to recruit and retain manpower quality and to compensate Navy personnel for the demands of a mobile, arduous, and sometimes dangerous lifestyle.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

Navy's program in FY 1991 through FY 1993 is oriented toward ensuring that personnel manning is available to meet the requirements established by force structure. The active manpower shown in Table IV-1 reflects the decreasing manpower requirements in response to the reduction in force structure.

3. Skill and Grade

Navy's ability to match skill inventory to force structure requirements has been challenging in FY 1990 and is expected to remain so during the ensuing years of force reduction. Navy has gone from a position of growth in FY 1989 to one of reduction in FY 1990. In addition to this dramatic change in force planning, Operation DESERT SHIELD altered the decommissioning schedules of various units.

Navy ships and squadrons require 71 percent petty officer (E-4 to E-9) manning. In the past, fiscal constraints have permitted only a 67 percent top six paygrade level. While the absolute numbers of petty officers will decline significantly, Navy is committed to reducing this paygrade skill manning degradation, driving to 68.4 percent top six in FY 1991, 69.8 percent in FY 1992, and 69.9 percent in FY 1993 and beyond. "High tech" platforms replacing "low tech" ones and new, more complex technologies/systems mean that Navy can no longer man petty officer billets with untrained, inexperienced seamen without negative readiness consequence.

Table IV-2 is structured to compare Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI) quantities to inventory figures. It provides actual data for FY 1990 and projected data for FY 1991-1993. The table distinguishes the number of skills that are, or are projected to be, over-supplied ("over"), balanced, or under-supplied ("short") within ranges of officer and enlisted pay grades. Skills overlap ranges of pay grades; therefore, the total number of skills for the complete group of officer or enlisted pay grades cannot be obtained by adding the quantity of skills for individual ranges.

TABLE IV-I
ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	23.6	23.0		24.2	22.7	94	20.3	18.9	93	17.0	15.5	92
Offensive Strategic Forces	21.0	20.8		21.7	20.3	94	17.9	16.6	93	14.6	13.4	92
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	2.5	2.2		2.5	2.5	98	2.4	2.3	94	2.4	2.2	91
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	303.6	284.9		293.4	283.9	97	288.1	277.1	96	278.6	268.2	96
Land Forces	5.1	4.5		5.2	5.2	100	5.1	5.1	100	5.1	5.1	100
Tactical Air Forces	72.1	67.4		65.5	63.9	98	69.0	65.5	95	63.9	63.2	99
Naval Forces	225.2	211.7		221.5	213.7	96	212.6	205.3	97	208.0	198.4	95
Warships and ASW Forces	110.7	105.2		102.3	98.7	96	94.3	90.1	95	91.9	86.9	94
Amphibious Forces	37.9	34.9		39.6	38.7	98	39.3	38.7	98	39.4	37.5	95
Naval Support Forces	76.6	71.7		79.7	76.2	96	79.0	76.6	97	76.7	74.1	97
Mobility Forces	1.1	1.2		1.3	1.2	90	1.3	1.2	88	1.5	1.4	91
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	16.5	15.8		18.4	16.6	90	18.2	15.7	86	18.1	15.3	85
Intelligence	9.2	8.9		10.7	9.2	86	10.7	8.9	84	10.7	8.9	83
Centrally Managed Comm.	7.3	6.9		7.7	7.3	95	7.5	6.8	90	7.4	6.4	86
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	26.2	26.3		29.0	25.3	87	28.2	24.2	86	28.0	23.7	85
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	15.7	15.7		19.3	15.2	79	18.0	14.6	81	17.9	14.3	80
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	26.4	26.8		28.4	26.3	93	28.6	26.1	91	29.0	26.0	90
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	5.2	5.0		5.3	5.2	99	6.1	6.1	99	6.0	5.9	99
Int'l Military Org.	1.5	1.3		1.5	1.4	97	1.4	1.4	98	1.4	1.4	98
Unified Commands	1.5	1.5		1.3	1.3	99	1.3	1.2	97	1.3	1.2	97
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.0		1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100
Joint Staff	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
OSD/DEF AGY	0.9	0.8		1.1	1.1	100	2.0	2.0	100	1.9	1.9	100

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	6.6	6.5	7.6	6.5	86	7.2	5.9	82	6.9	5.5	80	
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	5.6	5.5	5.8	5.3	93	5.7	5.2	92	5.7	5.1	91	
Combat Commands	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.6	93	2.8	2.5	91	2.7	2.5	91	
Support Commands	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.7	93	3.0	2.7	92	2.9	2.7	91	
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	7.7	7.3	8.9	7.7	86	8.8	7.3	83	8.7	7.0	81	
Research and Development	5.7	5.3	6.5	5.6	86	6.5	5.4	84	6.4	5.3	83	
Geophysical Activities	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.0	86	2.4	1.9	80	2.3	1.8	76	
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	37.1	36.0	41.1	38.1	93	39.4	36.0	92	39.0	35.5	91	
Personnel Support	9.1	9.1	9.1	8.9	98	8.9	8.4	94	8.8	8.2	93	
Individual Training	28.0	26.9	32.0	29.2	91	30.5	27.7	91	30.2	27.3	91	
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	29.3	30.7	35.9	30.1	84	35.1	27.8	79	34.9	27.2	78	
Support Installations	24.1	25.1	29.6	25.1	85	28.8	22.9	79	28.7	22.3	78	
Centralized Support Act'y	5.2	5.6	6.2	5.1	81	6.3	4.9	79	6.3	4.9	78	
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED</u>	503.7	483.4	517.3	483.0	93	503.7	465.0	92	489.8	449.3	92	
<u>MANNING</u>												
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING</u> b/	-7.0			-5.8			-5.8			-5.8		
(Many years)												
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u> c/	93.8	99.4		92.5			92.2			92.5		
Transients	24.7	23.4		23.5			23.8			24.1		
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	4.4	3.4		4.2			3.7			3.7		
Students/Trainees	60.0	67.9		60.1			60.2			60.2		
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	4.8	4.8		4.7			4.6			4.5		
<u>END STRENGTH</u> **	590.5	582.9		569.7			551.4			536.0		

*End strength may not equal total of DPPC categories due to rounding. FY 1990 totals include 3,400 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b, for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

AC OFFICERS	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>												
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strategic Forces	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.2	96	2.1	2.0	94	1.9	1.8	94	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.8	95	1.7	1.6	94	1.5	1.4	94	
	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.4	94	0.4	0.4	94	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Land Forces	24.9	23.8	24.8	23.9	96	24.3	23.5	96	23.6	22.5	95	
Tactical Air Forces	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100	
Naval Forces	6.1	5.7	5.7	5.6	98	5.8	5.6	96	5.4	5.3	98	
Warships and ASW Forces	17.9	17.3	18.2	17.4	96	17.6	17.0	97	17.2	16.3	95	
Amphibious Forces	11.1	10.9	10.8	10.4	97	10.1	10.1	100	10.0	9.6	96	
Naval Support Forces	2.8	2.7	3.4	3.0	87	3.4	3.0	86	3.4	2.9	86	
Mobility Forces	3.9	3.7	4.0	4.0	99	4.0	4.0	98	3.9	3.8	97	
	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	89	0.3	0.2	89	0.3	0.2	90	
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Intelligence	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.6	93	1.7	1.5	92	1.7	1.5	91	
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	94	1.2	1.2	93	1.3	1.1	91	
	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	90	0.4	0.4	91	0.4	0.4	90	
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>												
	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	93	2.1	1.9	88	2.1	1.8	86	
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>												
	2.1	1.8	2.3	2.1	90	2.1	2.0	94	2.1	1.9	94	
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>												
	8.8	8.4	10.3	8.8	85	10.8	8.6	80	11.0	8.6	78	
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Int'l Military Org	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.4	98	2.4	2.4	98	2.3	2.3	98	
Unified Commands	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	94	0.5	0.5	94	0.5	0.5	94	
Federal Agency Support	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	99	0.6	0.6	98	0.6	0.6	98	
Joint Staff	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	98	0.3	0.3	98	
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	
	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	100	0.8	0.8	100	0.7	0.7	100	
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>												
	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.7	92	2.5	2.2	91	2.5	2.2	89	

AC OFFICERS	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	96	3.2	3.0	95	3.1	3.0	95	
Combat Commands	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	98	1.2	1.2	96	1.2	1.2	95	
Support Commands	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	95	1.9	1.9	95	1.9	1.8	95	
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	1.5	1.4	1.8	1.5	86	1.8	1.5	83	1.8	1.5	82	
Research and Development	1.2	1.0	1.4	1.2	85	1.4	1.1	83	1.4	1.1	82	
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	89	0.4	0.4	85	0.4	0.3	80	
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	5.2	4.9	5.5	5.2	94	5.3	5.1	97	5.3	5.0	95	
Personnel Support	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	100	0.8	0.8	99	0.8	0.8	97	
Individual Training	4.3	4.2	4.7	4.4	94	4.5	4.3	96	4.5	4.2	94	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	5.0	5.4	5.9	5.3	90	5.7	5.4	95	5.7	5.1	90	
Support Installations	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.3	104	3.1	3.5	113	3.0	3.1	105	
Centralized Support Act'y	2.1	2.2	2.7	1.9	73	2.7	2.0	74	2.6	2.0	74	
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	62.1	59.4	65.3	60.7	93	64.0	59.1	92	63.1	57.2	91	
UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/ (Many years)	-1.4			-0.9			-0.9			-0.9		
INDIVIDUALS c/	11.7	13.7		11.2			11.2			11.2		
Transients	4.0	3.8		3.5			3.5			3.5		
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	0.1	0.1		0.1			0.1			0.1		
Students/Trainees	7.6	9.9		7.6			7.6			7.6		
Midshipmen/NAVCADS												
END STRENGTH*	72.5	73.1		71.0			69.5			67.6		

*End strength may not equal total of DPPC categories due to rounding. FY 1990 totals include 961 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b, for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

AC ENLISTED	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
STRATEGIC												
Offensive Strategic Forces	21.3	20.8	21.9	20.5	94	18.2	16.9	93	15.1	13.8	91	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	19.2	19.0	19.8	18.5	93	16.2	15.1	93	13.1	12.0	91	
	2.1	1.8	2.0	2.0	98	2.0	1.9	94	2.0	1.8	90	
TACTICAL/MOBILITY												
Land Forces	278.7	261.0	268.6	260.1	97	263.8	253.6	96	255.0	245.6	96	
Tactical Air Forces	4.4	3.9	4.5	4.5	100	4.4	4.4	100	4.4	4.4	100	
Naval Forces	66.0	61.7	59.8	58.4	98	63.2	60.0	95	58.5	57.9	99	
Warships and ASW Forces	207.3	194.4	203.3	196.3	97	195.0	188.3	97	190.8	182.1	95	
Amphibious Forces	99.6	94.3	91.5	88.3	96	84.4	80.0	95	82.0	77.2	94	
Naval Support Forces	35.1	32.2	36.2	35.8	99	35.9	35.7	100	36.0	34.6	96	
Mobility Forces	72.7	68.0	75.6	72.3	96	74.9	72.6	97	72.8	70.3	97	
	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.9	90	1.1	0.9	88	1.3	1.2	92	
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL												
Intelligence	15.0	14.2	16.7	14.9	90	16.5	14.2	86	16.4	13.8	84	
Centrally Managed Comm.	8.0	7.7	9.4	8.0	85	9.4	7.8	83	9.4	7.7	82	
	7.0	6.6	7.2	6.9	96	7.1	6.4	90	7.0	6.1	86	
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	24.1	24.4	26.9	23.4	87	26.1	22.3	86	25.9	21.9	84	
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	13.5	13.9	17.0	13.1	77	15.9	12.6	79	15.8	12.4	78	
MEDICAL SUPPORT	17.6	18.4	18.1	17.6	97	17.8	17.5	99	18.1	17.4	97	
JOINT ACTIVITIES												
Int'l Military Org	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.9	99	3.7	3.7	99	3.6	3.6	99	
Unified Commands	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	99	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100	
Federal Agency Support	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	98	0.6	0.6	95	0.6	0.6	95	
Joint Staff	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100	
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	
	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	100	1.2	1.2	100	1.2	1.2	100	
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	3.8	3.9	4.7	3.8	82	4.7	3.7	78	4.4	3.3	75	

AC ENLISTED	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS												
Combat Commands	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.3	88	2.6	2.2	87	2.5	2.2	86	
Support Commands	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	89	1.5	1.3	88	1.5	1.3	87	
	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	88	1.0	0.9	86	1.0	0.9	84	
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT												
Research and Development	6.2	5.9	7.1	6.1	86	7.0	5.8	83	6.9	5.6	81	
Geophysical Activities	4.5	4.3	5.2	4.5	86	5.1	4.3	84	5.0	4.2	83	
	1.6	1.7	2.0	1.7	85	2.0	1.5	79	1.9	1.4	75	
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Personnel Support	32.0	31.1	35.5	32.8	92	34.1	30.9	91	33.7	30.5	90	
Individual Training	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.1	98	8.1	7.5	93	8.0	7.4	92	
	23.7	22.8	27.2	24.7	91	26.0	23.4	90	25.7	23.1	90	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	24.3	25.3	30.0	24.8	83	29.3	22.4	76	29.3	22.1	75	
Centralized Support Act'y	21.1	22.0	26.4	21.7	82	25.7	19.4	75	25.7	19.1	75	
	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.1	86	3.6	3.0	83	3.6	2.9	81	
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	441.5	424.0	452.0	422.3	93	439.7	405.8	92	426.7	392.1	92	
UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/ (Manyyears)	-5.6			-4.9			-4.9			-4.9		
INDIVIDUALS c/												
Transients	82.1	85.8		81.3			81.0			81.2		
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	20.7	19.6		20.0			20.2			20.6		
Students/Trainees	4.3	3.3		4.1			3.6			3.6		
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	52.3	58.0		52.4			52.6			52.6		
	4.8	4.8		4.7			4.6			4.5		
END STRENGTH*	518.0	509.8		498.7			481.9			468.4		

*End strength may not equal total of DPPC categories due to rounding. FY 1990 totals include 2,439 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b, for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Notes:

a/ Programmed Manpower Structure (RQMT) reflects Active Duty military resources and is defined as the aggregation of billets describing the full active manning requirements for all units and organizations in the program force, which is the table of organization structure (or its equivalent) for operational units, and the structure associated with full peacetime workload requirements for non-operational units. Operational units are those combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations with operational readiness reporting requirements under UNITREP.

Programmed Manning (AUTH) is defined as those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be staffed. The term "Programmed manning" recognizes that 100 percent staffing of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; the term is synonymous with Distributable Billets.

b/ Undistributed Manning shows the difference between distributable strength and distributable billets as of the end of the fiscal year.

c/ Individuals refers to the transients, trainees (for the Reserve Components, the training pipeline), patients, prisoners, cadets and students in "overhead" and not available for staffing programmed manning spaces.

Table IV-2
Active Navy
Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
Versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)

FY 1990
(Actual)

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	12.0	32.0	44.0	88.0
PMI	38.0	77.5	152.2	267.7
Inventory	38.3	77.0	150.6	265.9
Over/Short	+00.3	-0.5	-1.6	-1.8
<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	17.0	74.0	04.0	95.0
PMI	33.2	185.1	19.0	237.3
Inventory	33.4	183.6	18.7	235.7
Over/Short	+0.2	-1.5	-.3	-1.6
<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	23.0	62.0	14.0	99.0
PMI	113.6	315.5	75.9	505.0
Inventory	120.8	313.5	67.3	501.6
Over/Short	+7.2	-2.0	-8.6	-3.4
<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills	0.0	3.0	0.0	3.0
PMI	**	2.9	**	2.9
Inventory	**	2.8	**	2.8
Over/Short	**	-0.1	**	-0.1
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	5.0	13.0	7.0	25.0
PMI	14.2	23.8	5.3	43.3
Inventory	15.6	23.6	4.5	43.7
Over/Short	+1.4	-0.2	-0.8	+0.4
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	6.0	12.0	6.0	24.0
PMI	6.6	13.7	5.5	25.8
Inventory	7.3	13.8	4.5	25.6
Over/Short	+0.7	+0.1	-1.0	-0.2

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	3.0	20.0	2.0	25.0
PMI	18.2	50.6	0.5	69.2
Inventory	19.4	49.4	0.5	69.3
Over/Short	+1.2	-1.2	**	+0.1

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)

FY 1991
(Projected)

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	8.0	30.0	48.0	86.0
PMI	29.3	67.7	166.0	261.8
Inventory	28.7	71.0	161.7	261.4
Over/Short	+0.6	+3.3	-4.3	-0.4

<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	20.0	70.0	3.0	93.0
PMI	38.1	175.7	18.4	232.2
Inventory	39.5	175.0	18.1	232.6
Over/Short	+1.4	-0.7	-0.3	+0.4

<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	9.0	70.0	18.0	97.0
PMI	19.2	358.4	116.4	494.0
Inventory	31.8	358.0	104.2	494.0
Over/Short	+12.6	-0.4	-12.2	0.0

<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills	0.0	3.0	0.0	3.0
PMI	**	2.9	**	2.9
Inventory	**	2.9	**	2.9
Over/Short	**	0.0	**	0.0

<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	3.0	16.0	6.0	25.0
PMI	2.4	37.2	3.4	43.0
Inventory	2.8	37.0	3.0	42.8
Over/Short	+0.4	-0.2	-0.4	-0.2

04-06

Number of Skills	6.0	11.0	7.0	24.0
PMI	6.3	13.6	5.7	25.7
Inventory	7.2	13.3	4.5	25.0
Over/Short	+0.9	-0.3	-1.2	-0.6

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	0.0	23.0	2.0	25.0
PMI	**	67.9	0.8	68.7
Inventory	**	67.1	0.7	67.8
Over/Short	**	-0.8	-0.1	-0.9

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)

FY 1992
(Predicted)

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	9.0	34.0	43.0	86.0
PMI	24.8	71.2	157.2	253.2
Inventory	34.3	73.1	145.0	252.4
Over/Short	+9.5	+1.9	-12.2	-0.8

E5-E9

Number of Skills	12.0	68.0	13.0	93.0
PMI	32.8	169.0	22.4	224.2
Inventory	35.1	169.3	20.6	225.0
Over/Short	+2.3	+0.3	-1.8	+0.8

Total E1-E9

Number of Skills	14.0	65.0	18.0	97.0
PMI	26.7	338.2	112.5	477.4
Inventory	38.6	337.1	101.7	477.4
Over/Short	+11.9	-1.1	-10.8	0.0

WO

Number of Skills	0.0	3.0	0.0	3.0
PMI	**	2.9	**	2.9
Inventory	**	2.7	**	2.7
Over/Short	**	-0.2	**	-0.2

01-03

Number of Skills	4.0	16.0	5.0	25.0
PMI	9.7	29.3	2.8	41.7
Inventory	10.5	29.0	2.5	42.0
Over/Short	+0.8	-0.2	-0.3	+0.3

04-06

Number of Skills	6.0	11.0	7.0	24.0
PMI	6.2	13.4	5.6	25.2
Inventory	6.8	13.3	4.5	24.6
Over/Short	+0.6	-0.1	-1.1	-0.6

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	1.0	22.0	2.0	25.0
PMI	10.5	55.7	0.8	66.9
Inventory	11.1	54.7	0.7	66.5
Over/Short	+0.6	-1.0	-0.1	-0.4

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)

FY 1993
(Predicted)

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	8.0	37.0	41.0	86.0
PMI	23.1	67.0	159.3	240.4
Inventory	32.2	69.1	138.5	239.8
Over/Short	+9.1	+2.1	-11.8	+0.6

E5-E9

Number of Skills	14.0	67.0	12.0	93.0
PMI	37.3	164.2	22.1	223.6
Inventory	39.1	164.6	20.5	224.2
Over/Short	+1.8	+0.4	-1.6	+0.6

Total E1-E9

Number of Skills	13.0	65.0	19.0	97.0
PMI	114.1	329.6	20.3	464.0
Inventory	125.9	328.2	9.9	464.0
Over/Short	-11.8	-1.4	-10.4	0.0

WO

Number of Skills	0.0	3.0	0.0	3.0
PMI	**	2.8	**	2.8
Inventory	**	2.7	**	2.7
Over/Short	**	-0.1	**	-0.1

01-03

Number of Skills	5.0	16.0	4.0	25.0
PMI	9.7	28.7	2.7	41.0
Inventory	9.8	28.4	2.4	40.5
Over/Short	+0.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.5

04-06

Number of Skills	7.0	12.0	5.0	24.0
PMI	8.5	12.2	4.1	24.7
Inventory	9.0	12.0	3.2	24.1
Over/Short	+0.5	-0.2	-0.9	-0.6

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	2.0	22.0	1.0	25.0
PMI	11.7	53.6	0.4	65.8
Inventory	11.9	52.4	0.3	64.6
Over/Short	+0.2	-1.2	-0.1	-1.2

* Status is based on programmed manning + individuals (PMI) for each skill

Skills with PMI of 500 or more people (over if fill is 105 percent or more of PMI, balanced if between 95 percent and 105 percent, short if fill is less than 95 percent).

Skills with PMI of 100-499 people (over if fill is 110 percent of PMI balanced if 90 percent or greater and 110 percent or less, short if fill less than 90 percent).

Skills with PMI of 100 people (over if fill is 115 percent of PMI, balanced if 85 percent or greater and 115 percent or less, short if fill is less than 85 percent).

** Less than 50 people

4. Experience

Table IV-3 shows programmed versus actual experience level. The need for personnel (people with greater than 4 years of service (YOS)) continues to increase. A logical consequence of Navy's evolving force structure (more technical/less labor intensive) is an increase in the relative demand for experienced manpower. These sailors will be essential to the operation and maintenance of sophisticated and highly technical systems, and to provide the training and supervision necessary to effectively develop similar skill levels in our junior personnel. Navy will continue to have petty officer shortages in many of the sea intensive ratings, and will require the requested bonuses and recruiting resources.

TABLE IV-3
ACTIVE NAVY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Thousands)

FY 1990			
	<u>Total Billets/ People</u>	<u>People with greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
EPA	267.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	265.9	40.2	2.4
<u>E5-E9</u>			
EPA	237.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	235.7	220.7	11.2
<u>E1-E9</u>			
EPA	505.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	501.6	261.0	6.4
<u>WO</u>			
OPA	2.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.8	2.8	21.3
<u>01-03</u>			
OPA	43.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	43.7	20.9	4.8
<u>04-06</u>			
OPA	25.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.6	25.0	15.7
<u>01-06</u>			
OPA	69.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.3	45.9	8.8

FY 1991			
	<u>Total Billets/ People</u>	<u>People with Greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
EPA	261.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	261.4	44.2	2.5

E5-E9

EPA	232.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	232.6	230.2	11.2

E1-E9

EPA	494.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	494.0	260.2	6.6

WO

OPA	2.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.9	2.9	20.7

01-03

OPA	43.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	42.8	20.8	4.8

04-06

OPA	25.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.0	24.6	15.6

01-06

OPA	68.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	67.8	45.4	8.8

FY 1992Total Billets/
PeoplePeople with
Greater than
.4 YOSAVG-YOSE1-E4

EPA	253.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	252.4	44.3	2.5

E5-E9

EPA	224.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	225.0	213.6	11.2

E1-E9

EPA	477.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	477.4	257.9	6.7

WO

OPA	2.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.9	2.7	20.4

01-03

OPA	41.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	42.0	20.7	4.9

04-06

OPA	25.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	24.6	24.2	15.6

01-06

OPA	66.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	66.5	44.9	8.8

FY 1993

<u>Total Billets/ People</u>	<u>People with Greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>
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E1-E4

EPA	260.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	273.8	46.3	2.6

E5-E9

EPA	246.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	233.2	210.4	11.4

E1-E9

EPA	507.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	507.0	256.7	6.9

WO

OPA	2.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.7	2.7	20.3

01-03

OPA	41.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	40.5	20.4	4.9

04-06

OPA	24.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	24.1	23.7	15.6

01-06

OPA	65.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	64.6	44.1	8.9

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted

(1) Recruiting

(a) FY 1990 Successes

(1) Non-Prior Service. Navy attained 100 percent of its FY 1990 accession goal of 70,492 Non-Prior Service (NPS) men and women (compared to 95,186 in FY 1989). Of this total, 45,893 (63 percent) were in the Upper Mental Group (UMG) as defined by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and 67,018 (92 percent) were High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG) compared to 58 percent UMG and 90 percent HSDG's respectively in FY 1989. A total of 5,172 (7.1 percent) of the lowest acceptable mental group category (category IV) were accessed, compared to the congressional ceiling of 12 percent and Navy ceiling of 8 percent, and FY 1989 total of 10,566 (11.1 percent). These recruit quality achievements represent the highest attainment in the past decade. Navy achieved its FY 1990 New Contract Objective (NCO) of 80,550 (compared to 88,928 in FY 1989). The number of recruits in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) was 33,356 at the end of FY 1990 (compared to 25,652 at the end of FY 1989).

(2) Prior Service. In FY 1990 Navy goal for recruiting prior service personnel was achieved (2,354 as compared to 5,807 in FY 1989). Recruitment of prior service personnel in FY 1990 was targeted only to skills in short supply in the active duty Navy.

(b) FY 1992 - 1993 Challenge. Quality goals in FY 1992 increase to 95 percent HSDG (compared with 92 percent in FY 1989), and 60 percent UMG (compared with 58 percent in FY 1989), and 60 percent UMG (compared with 58 percent in FY 1989). Lowest mental group accessions will be held at 0 percent. While accession goals and improved recruit quality standards have been achieved in FY 1990, and DEP size and quality significantly improved, prognosis for success in FY 1992 and beyond is not good. Increasing unemployment rates and smaller accession goals favor the recruiting market; however, all other indices are negative. Current events in the Middle East, FY 1992 and 1993 decreases in recruiter end strength and advertising dollars, the demonstrated lack of Navy image in the 18-21 year old market, reduced numbers of male youths in the population, and increasing quality required to man complex platforms and weapons systems combine to raise the difficulty of recruiting and may lead to shortfalls in meeting future manpower requirements. FY 1990 increases in the number of recruiters and recruiter support personnel (382 enlisted recruiters, 127 recruiting support personnel, 7.8 percent increase in recruiter support funding, and improved public image through the initial stages of a long-range advertising and public relations campaign) were instrumental in the success of the FY 1990 recruiting program, but have been largely eliminated in FY 1992 and beyond.

(1) Production Recruiters. Authorized production recruiter end strength in FY 1992 is 3,845 (3,723 in FY 1993). End strength cuts will reduce the Navy recruiter complement from a peak of 4,114 in FY 1990 to a low of 3,447 in FY 1994.

(2) Advertising. The effects of recruiter end strength reductions have been compounded by reductions of 50 percent in advertising in FY 1991, 1992 and 1993. These reductions have eliminated all national television advertising, which in the past has proven effective in facilitating contacts with high quality applicants. To compensate for the losses, some reduction in DEP and recruit quality may be required.

(3) Productivity Goals. It has been demonstrated that high quality recruits (HSDG/Upper Mental Group) are from 3.5 to 4.5 times more difficult (i.e., manpower and advertising intensive) to recruit than the next most qualified applicant and demand 90 percent of the recruiting effort. End strength reductions drive individual recruiter production in FY 1992 up 11 percent over FY 1991 when increased high quality requirements are properly weighted in the workload. To supply the Navy's manpower needs, the goals identified in Table IV-4 must be met.

Active Navy Accession and Recruiter Productivity Plan

	FY 1990 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1991 <u>Goal</u>	FY 1992 <u>Goal</u>	FY 1993 <u>Goal</u>
End Strength	502,530	494,022	477,382	463,993
Accessions	72,846	81,623	71,481	70,636
Prior Service	2,354	1,200	0	0
Non-Prior Service	70,492	80,423	71,481	70,636
Male	62,518	71,079	62,368	63,084
AFQT I-III A	38,886	65,393	59,250	41,005
HSDG	56,891	42,647	40,539	59,930
Female	7,974	9,344	9,113	7,552
Percent (%)	11.3	11.6	12.7	10.7
AFQT I-III A	5,542	9,344	9,113	7,552
HSDG	7,974	7,974	9,113	7,552

(c) Summary. The challenge to the Navy Recruiting force in FYs 1992 and 1993 is significant. Operation DESERT STORM validated the need to maintain DEP at 40 percent in order to preserve our ability to meet crises; the current plan reduces our ability to respond and increases the risk associated with meeting future force needs. Reductions in recruiter end strength and advertising funds may place Navy recruiting in a position similar to that experienced in FY 1989 when recruit quality standards and DEP were reduced in order to make accession goals. Additionally, loss of recruiter quality of life improvements made in FY 1990 may be experienced.

(2) Retention

(a) FY 1990 Successes. FY 1990 was the most successful retention year since the post-Vietnam era, as Navy personnel benefited from stable personnel policies (SRB payments, advancements and

PCS moves on schedule, improving sea/shore rotation cycles, and no involuntary separations resulting from the force drawdown). Quality of life issues (child care, expansion of military housing) continue to receive high level attention and public visibility. Results of the Navy Retention/ Separation Questionnaire indicate Navy personnel are satisfied with available active duty and dependent services. Primary reasons for re-enlistment are job security, geographic location (homesteading), and improved family services. Family separation remains the number one reason for leaving the Navy, a factor which has been intensified by current events in the Middle East, followed by the perception of low basic pay. Continued development of positive initiatives must be pursued in the drawdown to a smaller Navy. The following table presents enlisted gross retention results for FY 1987 through FY 1990.

The following table presents gross retention results for FY 1990 and retention goals for FY 1991 through FY 1993.

	FY 1990 Actual	FY 1990 Goal	FY 1991 Goal	FY 1992 Goal	FY 1993 Goal
1st Term	38.3	37.4	37.4	37.4	37.4
2nd Term	55.7	56.0	56.0	56.0	56.0
3rd Term	70.6	67.0	67.0	67.0	67.0

(b) FY 1992 - FY 1995 Challenge. The FY 1991 congressional Appropriations Bill includes a six year plan which draws down the active duty Navy force from 579,417 in FY 1990 to 502,200 by the end of FY 1997. While the major emphasis will be placed on reduced accession goals and higher quality enlisted personnel, the desired end strength targets cannot be borne solely through reduced accessions. Personnel reductions in concert with a vertical cut in force structure will be borne by reduced enlisted and officer accessions and selected early retirements (SER) for officers. Creation of a hollow force (i.e., insufficient manning of junior enlisted/officer paygrades creating future deficiencies in mid-grade petty officer/officer manning) will be avoided. A new variable in the force mix is the accession of 20,000 two year obligor (2 YO) general detail (GENDET) personnel in FY 1991. Retention behavior of this cohort, which has been tentatively programmed to mirror current three year obligor behavior, requires close attention and may necessitate the development of specifically targeted retention incentives should the retention rate drop significantly.

(c) Summary. The challenge of meeting the Navy's commitments and maintaining the proper force balance and mix as Navy draws down in the 1990's requires careful attention to the balance of accessions and retention. Navy must maintain an adequate mix of new accessions and proven performers in the face of an uncertain future (events in the Middle East, increased OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO, lengthened deployment schedules, end of the cold war, declining male population in ages 18-22, perceptions of benefit erosion and declining viability of military careers.) It is vital that existing benefits be protected while other positive quality of life initiatives are pursued. Projections for FY 1991 and 1992 approximate the historical averages.

(3) Aggregate population stability. As shown, Navy has experienced fluctuations but shows a relatively level aggregate population stability (see stability definition in Appendix B).

Aggregate Population Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY1990</u>
Officer	91.9	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.7	90.8	90.5
Enlisted	84.8	84.8	85.1	85.4	83.6	83.8	84.9

(4) Unit personnel stability. The Navy also shows a relatively level unit personnel stability (defined in Appendix B).

Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
Officer	47.9	51.5	50.0	51.0	53.8	51.0	50.6
Enlisted	49.7	49.4	50.5	52.1	53.5	51.4	50.7

(3) Enlisted Attrition. First term attrition for FY 1990 was 11.59 percent (compared with 13.56 percent in FY 1989, a decrease of 1.97 percent). Improved attrition in FY 1990 is attributed to an across the board effort to reduce unnecessary losses during recruit training, skill training (A and C schools) and on board ships, squadrons and stations.

(4) Enlisted Desertion and Unauthorized Absence (UA). The FY 1990 desertion rate remained stable compared with FY 1989 (8.97 per 1,000). The UA rate also remained relatively stable at 17.41 per 1,000 (compared with 17.33 per 1,000 in FY 1989).

b. Officer/Warrant Officer

(1) Accessions. Accessions to the Navy officer corps come from both regular and reserve officer commissioning sources including the Limited Duty and Chief Warrant Officer programs. Of the 6,561 officers accessed in FY 1990, 3,294 (50.2 percent) received regular commissions; of these, 895 came from the U.S. Naval Academy and 1,412 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship program. Active officer procurement goals and attainment for FY 1990 through FY 1992 are:

Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals

<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
6,561	6,884	6,228	5,223	5,102

(a) Nuclear Power. Navy met 96 percent (720 of 750) of FY 1990 requirements for nuclear power officer accessions (compared to 98 percent (749 of 765) in FY 1989) in submarine, surface, instructor and Naval reactor areas. The decline is attributed to non-attainment of technical majors goal by Naval Academy.

(b) Physician. Attainment of physician accession goals continues to be a challenge. For FY 1990, the Navy achieved 62 percent (118 of 189) of total accession goal, up from 50 percent (120 of 241) in FY 1989. Improvements are attributable to the implementation of "one stop shopping" at Naval Hospital Bethesda, a procedure allowing physician accessions to perform all inprocessing without delay. Fifty-seven percent (78 of 137) of overall specialty goal was achieved, compared with 44 percent (105 of 241) in FY 1989. Specific accession goals were not met in 10 of 14 specialities.

(c) Nurse. Nurse recruiting is a critical problem area. FY 1990 nurse goal attainment was 63 percent (366 of 580), down from 71 percent (300 of 425) in FY 1989. Difficulties in this market are attributable to highly competitive civilian opportunities offering high salaries, benefits, flexible hours and job assignments. The nurse shortage is being felt in all areas of the country and is resulting in many job offers for each registered nurse. Navy initiatives to overcome nurse shortfalls include the Nurse Accession Bonus (171 participants), Incentive Special Pay for Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists (87 percent acceptance (99 of 114)), development of full time outservice educational specialty nurse training, advanced education in nurse anesthesia, critical care and family practice, and financial assistance programs to aid students in completion of baccalaureate degrees in nursing followed by Nurse Corps commissioning (Nurse Candidate Program, NROTC, and Nurse Corps Baccalaureate Degree Completion Program).

(d) Technical Nurse Warrant Officer (TNWO). The TNWO Program was approved in February 1990 to offer career opportunities to licensed nurses with an Associated Degree in nursing. Although started late in the recruiting year, 15 warrant officers were appointed against a goal in 75 (20 percent).

(e) Physician Assistant. The Navy has made a commitment to increase the number of Physician Assistants (PAs) to enhance access to medical care. In FY 1990 the inventory was 171, down from 205 in FY 1989. Navy attained 4 of 20 (20 percent) in FY 1990 compared with 4 of 25 (16 percent) in FY 1989. Revitalization of the Physician Assistant Training Program in FY 1989 will produce the first graduates in September 1991.

(f) Reserve. FY 1990 recruiting goals for reserve commission officer designators including surface, submarine, and aviation programs were attained with 104 percent (3,870 of 3,705) achievement of the accession target (compared with 102 percent (5,047 of 4,982) in FY 1989).

(2) Retention. Unrestricted Line/Restricted Line Officer retention is sufficient in the aggregate to meet operational contingency

requirements; however, Navy continues to experience mid-grade shortages in the pilot, submarine, physician and nurse communities as personnel are enticed by higher pay and family stability in the civilian sector. Various bonus programs, special pays and accession incentives are having the desired positive impact in retention of these skilled officers. Continued congressional support in maintaining these programs is critical to preclude further erosion in the mid-grade force. Continuation rates (3 through 12 years) for the selected communities are:

Officer Continuation Rates
(Percent)*

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
All Navy	89.4	88.7	88.2
Surface	88.3	86.6	84.9
Submarine (nuclear)	86.4	83.9	84.9
Pilot	89.4	90.8	89.9
NFO	94.7	93.1	92.3
Physician	74.1	87.2	88.5
Nurse	85.0	80.4	82.7
Dentist	59.1	88.1	85.2
General Unrestricted	87.4	86.2	86.4
Line			
Restricted Line	91.5	92.3	89.1

*Indicates probability to remain in the Service.

6. Readiness Assessment

The Navy experienced a high state of overall personnel readiness in FY 1990 and expects the trend to continue or improve in FY 1991. Most deployed units have maintained C1/C2. No deployed fleet units reported below the "safe to operate - ready for deployment" limit of C3.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

1. Ready Reserve

a. Selected Reserve Manpower

(1) General. Navy continues to review programs and initiatives that, in keeping with congressional guidance on Active/Reserve provide the Naval Reserve with new missions and greater integration with the Active Forces.

Several manpower sources exist to fill the gap between peacetime capability and wartime requirements. However, the Selected Reserve remains the principal source of trained units and personnel to augment active Navy forces during initial stages of mobilization. The Selected Reserve is therefore manned, equipped, and trained to a high state of readiness. To ensure effective training and integration of forces, the Naval Reserve provides "mutual support" to assist

active forces in performing their missions while concurrently fulfilling mobilization training requirements.

The Navy has programmed Selected Reserve manpower for FY 1990 through FY 1993 as follows:

Navy Selected Reserve Manpower Program
(Strength in 000s)

	(Actuals) FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
Total Selected Reserve	149.4	153.4	134.6	127.1
Unit Reservists and Trainees	124.2	129.8	112.0	105.4
SAM <u>1</u> /	(1.6)	(2.6)	(1.1)	(1.1)
OSAM <u>2</u> /	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Full Time Support	22.7	23.0	22.0	21.1
TARs	(21.1)	(21.5)	(20.9)	(19.7)
Canvasser/Recruiters (TEMACS)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.0)	(1.1)
Title 10 USC 265	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
IMAs <u>3</u> /	2.5	0.6	0.6	0.6

1/ Sea and Air Mariner Program

2/ Officer Sea and Air Mariner Program

3/ Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) perform up to 48 paid drills per year, plus two weeks of active duty.

The number of TARs increases to 21,620 in FY 1991, 21,640 in FY 1992, and 21,620 in FY 1993 to meet required NRF ship manning (TARs include TAR officers, TAR enlisted, and Title 10 USC 265s). The Selected Reserve (Categories A, B, F, Q, and P) increases to 130,692 in FY 1991, FY 1992, and FY 1993 in connection with proposed infrastructure reductions. Naval Reserve manpower is distributed throughout the DPPC structure, as shown in Table IV-5.

The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) program was inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements (E-4 and below). Since then, SAM accession plans have evolved to emphasize recruiting non-prior service personnel for those skills for which there are insufficient veterans available to fill Naval Reserve E-6 and below vacancies. SAMs make use of a variety of training opportunities to develop these critical skills, which are primarily in the medical field and construction force. SAM accession goals have steadily decreased over the past three years, with FY 1991 goal currently at 4,900.

(2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. The Naval Reserve is integral to the capabilities of the Total Force. The following is the Naval Reserve trained strength in units.

TABLE IV-4

Navy Reserve Trained in Unit Strength
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
End Strength	149.4	153.4	134.6	127.1
- Training Pipeline	6.7	5.5	3.6	3.4
- IMAs	2.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
Operating Strength	140.1	147.3	130.4	123.1
- NON Unit AGR	12.3	11.3	11.0	10.6
- Unit AC Personnel	6.3	7.1	3.6	3.3
Trained Unit Strength	134.1	143.2	123.0	115.8
Wartime Unit Structure	143.4	149.3	127.2	119.8
% Trained in Units	93.5%	95.9%	96.7%	96.7%

*IMAs include Sea College personnel, who are reported as RCCPDS Category B, MOD T. These individuals have zero drill obligation, but are required to perform Annual Training and are mobilizable assets.

Past and proposed changes in Selected Reserve manpower are distributed among the Defense Planning and Programming Categories as shown in Table IV-5.

(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Improvements in enlisted skill matches are due to a variety of initiatives, including revised methods of developing recruiting and advancement goals, a new recruiting reservation system, and High Year Tenure. For officer skill matches, the number of junior officer billets which must be filled by more senior officers will remain high. Except for some staff communities, training new officers is more expensive than affiliating veteran officers, making the grade imbalance cost effective. Additionally, in the aviation field, pilots do not ordinarily complete obligated service until O-4 selection/promotion.

TABLE IV-5
NAVY RESERVE TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

TOTAL NAVY RES MILITARY	FY 90		FY 91		FY 92		FY 93	
	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES								
<u>STRATEGIC</u>								
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.5	100	0.4	0.4	94
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	90.1	82.4	94.9	90.5	95	91.6	77.7	85
Land Forces								
Division Forces	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.3	100	2.6	2.6	100
Tactical Air Forces	8.5	7.9	9.3	8.5	92	12.0	6.5	55
Naval Forces	77.5	71.0	81.3	77.9	96	74.7	67.0	90
Warships and ASW	29.6	25.2	31.4	29.9	95	27.3	22.6	83
Amphibious Forces	8.8	8.0	9.3	9.0	96	9.2	8.9	96
Naval Support Forces	39.1	37.8	40.6	39.0	96	38.2	35.5	93
Mobility Forces	1.8	1.4	2.0	1.8	87	2.4	1.6	67
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	6.3	5.8	6.2	6.2	100	6.7	6.3	94
Centrally Managed Comms	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	96	1.5	1.5	100
Intelligence	4.7	4.3	4.7	4.6	98	5.2	4.8	93
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	8.9	9.6	8.9	8.6	97	8.9	8.7	98
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	0.7	1.1	0.7	0.7	100	0.8	0.5	63
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	16.4	16.2	21.3	16.7	79	13.8	13.7	99
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	100	1.0	1.0	100
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Unified Commands	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.5	100	0.7	0.7	100
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100

TOTAL NAVY RES MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MAN	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	7.4	8.2	7.6	7.4	97	7.3	7.2	99	7.3	7.1	98	
Supply Operations	3.2	3.7	3.2	3.2	100	3.0	3.0	99	3.0	2.9	97	
Maintenance Operations	3.5	3.9	3.6	3.5	98	3.4	3.3	99	3.4	3.3	98	
Logistics Support Operations	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.7	83	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100	
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	3.6	4.0	3.7	3.7	100	3.7	3.7	100	3.9	3.6	94	
Combat Commands	2.0	2.3	1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	99	1.9	1.9	92	
Support Commands	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	101	1.8	1.8	100	1.8	1.8	97	
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.0	96	
Research and Development	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	96	0.6	0.6	100	0.6	0.6	93	
Geophysical Activities	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100	
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	3.1	2.4	3.0	2.7	92	2.5	2.0	79	2.7	2.1	80	
Personnel Support	2.6	2.1	2.5	2.5	99	2.2	1.7	78	2.3	1.8	79	
Individual Training	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2	50	0.4	0.3	89	0.3	0.3	88	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	8.3	7.7	8.4	8.3	99	8.4	8.3	99	8.4	8.0	94	
Support Installations	6.5	6.0	6.5	6.5	99	6.8	6.7	98	6.8	6.4	94	
Centralized Support Act's	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	99	1.7	1.6	99	1.6	1.6	97	
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	147.4	140.1	157.2	147.3	94	146.1	130.4	89	141.9	123.1	87	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	0.6	2.5	0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6		
INDIVIDUALS	5.5	6.8	5.5	5.5		3.6	3.6		3.4	3.4		
END STRENGTH	153.4	149.4	163.3	153.4	94	150.2	134.6	90	146.0	127.1	87	

NAVY RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

NAVY RESERVE OFFICER DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90		FY 91		FY 92		FY 93	
	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV
<u>STRATEGIC</u>								
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	92
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	92
	0.0	*	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>								
Land Forces	12.7	11.4	13.0	12.4	95	13.2	11.1	84
Division Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
Tactical Air Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
Naval Forces	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	100	1.3	0.9	64
Warships and ASW	10.3	9.3	10.5	10.0	95	10.5	9.1	86
Amphibious Forces	5.9	5.0	5.9	5.7	96	6.3	5.0	79
Naval Support Forces	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.2	91	1.3	1.3	98
Mobility Forces	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.1	96	2.9	2.8	96
	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.6	83	0.9	0.7	80
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>								
Centrally Managed Comms	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	100	2.2	2.0	91
Intelligence	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	94	0.1	0.1	100
	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	100	2.1	2.1	90
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>								
	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.1	100	1.0	1.0	96
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>								
	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.2	87
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>								
	4.2	5.0	5.9	4.5	77	4.8	4.6	95
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Int'l Military Org	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	100	0.6	0.6	91
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	87
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	100	0.3	0.3	91
Joint Staff	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	94

NAVY RESERVE OFFICER DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	AUTH		INV	PROG		% INV	PROG		% INV	PROG		% INV
				RQMT*	AUTH		RQMT*	AUTH		RQMT	AUTH	
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	100	2.2	2.2	99	2.2	2.1	95
Supply Operations	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	100	1.0	1.0	99	1.0	1.0	93
Maintenance Operations	0.8	0.8	100	0.8	0.8	100	0.7	0.7	99	0.7	0.6	96
Logistics Support Operations	0.5	0.3	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2	100	2.2	2.2	99	2.2	2.1	96
Combat Commands	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	100	1.0	1.0	99	1.0	1.0	94
Support Commands	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	100	1.2	1.2	100	1.2	1.2	97
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	93	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	93
Research and Development	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	91	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.2	92
Geophysical Activities	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	81	0.6	0.4	68	0.6	0.4	68
Personnel Support	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	100	0.5	0.4	70	0.5	0.4	70
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	*	5	0.2	0.1	56	0.1	0.1	56
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.1	99	2.1	2.1	98	2.1	2.0	95
Support Installations	1.0	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	97	1.1	1.0	97	1.0	1.0	92
Centralized Support Act's	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	99	1.1	1.1	97
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	28.5	28.1	30.4	28.3	28.3	93	29.5	26.9	91	29.1	25.7	88
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6		0.2	0.2		0.1	0.1	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	29.3	28.7	31.1	29.0	29.0	93	29.9	27.2	91	29.3	25.8	88

NAVY RESERVE ENLISTED PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

NAVY RESERVE ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90			FY 91			FY 92			FY 93		
	AUTH	INV		PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.4 0.4	0.5 0.5		0.4 0.4	0.4 0.4	100 100	0.3 0.3	0.3 0.3	92 92	0.3 0.3	0.3 0.3	82 82
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Land Forces	77.4 1.9	71.0 1.7		81.6 1.9	78.1 1.9	96 100	78.4 2.1	66.6 2.1	85 100	74.4 2.1	61.6 2.1	83 100
Division Forces	1.9	1.7		1.9	1.9	100	2.1	2.1	100	2.1	2.1	100
Tactical Air Forces	7.2	6.7		8.0	7.2	90	10.6	5.7	53	10.6	5.7	53
Naval Forces	67.2	61.7		70.4	67.8	96	64.1	57.9	90	60.2	52.9	88
Warships and ASW	23.7	20.2		25.0	24.2	97	21.0	17.6	84	19.0	15.7	83
Amphibious Forces	7.5	6.9		8.0	7.7	97	7.9	7.6	96	7.8	6.9	88
Naval Support Forces	36.0	34.7		37.4	35.9	96	35.3	32.7	93	33.4	30.3	91
Mobility Forces	1.1	0.9		1.3	1.1	85	1.5	0.9	59	1.5	0.9	59
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comms	4.3 1.4	3.8 1.4		4.4 1.5	4.2 1.4	96 96	4.5 1.4	4.2 1.4	94 100	4.5 1.4	4.0 1.3	89 96
Intelligence	2.9	2.4		2.9	2.8	97	3.1	2.9	91	3.1	2.7	86
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	7.8	8.3		7.9	7.5	95	7.9	7.7	98	7.9	7.3	92
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	0.5	0.9		0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.3	51	0.5	0.3	51
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	12.2	11.1		15.4	12.2	79	9.0	9.0	100	9.0	8.7	97
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Int'l Military Org	0.4 0.1	0.5 0.1		0.4 0.1	0.4 0.1	100 100	0.4 0.1	0.4 0.1	100 100	0.4 0.1	0.4 0.1	93 95
Unified Commands	0.3	0.4		0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	92

NAVY RESERVE ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 90		FY 91		FY 92		FY 93	
	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>								
Supply Operations	5.2	6.1	5.4	5.2	96	5.1	5.0	99
Maintenance Operations	2.3	2.7	2.3	2.3	100	2.0	2.0	99
Logistics Support	2.8	3.1	2.9	2.8	96	2.7	2.7	98
Operations	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	57	0.4	0.4	100
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>								
Combat Commands	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5	99	1.5	1.5	92
Support Commands	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.9	99	0.9	0.9	90
	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	96	0.6	0.6	96
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>								
Research and Development	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	100	0.8	0.7	97
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.3	94
	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>								
Personnel Support	2.3	1.8	2.2	2.2	98	1.9	1.6	83
Individual Training	2.1	1.8	2.0	2.0	98	1.6	1.3	80
	0.2	*	0.2	0.2	93	0.3	0.3	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Support Installations	6.1	5.7	6.2	6.2	99	6.3	6.2	94
Centralized Support Act's	5.5	5.2	5.5	5.5	99	5.7	5.6	94
	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.7	99	0.6	0.6	98
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	118.8	112.0	126.7	119.1	94	116.5	103.5	89
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>								
AUGMENTEES	0.4	2.5	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>								
	4.9	6.2	4.9	4.9		3.4	3.4	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	124.1	120.7	132.0	124.4	94	120.4	107.4	89

* Programmed Requirement reflects the presence of Full-Time Support personnel (TARs) in addition to NAMOS requirements

a/ Programmed Manpower Structure (RQMT) is defined as the aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirements for all units and organizations in the program force, which is the table of organization structure (or its equivalent) for operational units, and the structure associated with full peacetime workload requirements for non-operational units. Operational units are those combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations with operational readiness reporting requirements under UNITREP.

Programmed Manning (AUTH) is defined as those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be staffed. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100 percent staffing of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; the term is synonymous with Distributable Billets.

End strength (ES) is the sum of programmed manning or individual mobilization augmentees, and the individuals account at the end of the fiscal year.

b/ Individuals refers to the transients, trainees, patients, prisoners, students in "overhead" not available for staffing programmed manning spaces, and individual mobilization augmentees.

TABLE IV-6
NAVY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS
PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in thousands)

	OVER*	BALANCED*	SHORT*	TOTAL*
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Skills	27.0	12.0	46.0	85.0
PMI	14.6	5.1	34.4	54.0
Inventory	17.7	5.1	24.4	47.3
Over/Short	+3.1	+0.1	-10.0	-6.7
<u>E5 - E9</u>				
Skills	45.0	36.0	15.0	96.0
PMI	26.1	13.2	10.3	49.6
Inventory	29.8	13.3	8.6	51.7
Over/Short	+3.7	+0.2	-1.7	+2.1
<u>E1 - E9</u>				
Skills	32.0	29.0	38.0	99.0
PMI	31.4	14.0	58.3	103.6
Inventory	36.3	14.1	46.6	99.0
Over/Short	+4.9	+1.1	9.6	-11.6
<u>CWO</u>				
Skills	3.0	5.0	21.0	29.0
PMI	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.6
Inventory	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4
Over/Short	+4.4	-0.0	-0.2	-.2
<u>01 - 03</u>				
Skills	31.0	11.0	28.0	70.0
PMI	2.7	1.7	8.2	12.5
Inventory	5.7	1.7	3.3	10.7
Over/Short	+3.0	+0.0	-4.8	-1.8
<u>04 - 06</u>				
Skills	23.0	10.0	25.0	58.0
PMI	3.6	3.5	3.0	10.9
Inventory	11.7	3.5	0.0	15.9
Over/Short	+8.1	0.0	-3.0	+5.0
<u>01 - 06</u>				
Skills	28.0	17.0	25.0	70.0
PMI	5.7	10.0	7.8	23.4

Inventory	15.0	10.1	1.5	26.6
Over/Short	+9.3	0.0	-6.3	+3.2

* See definitions in Appendix B under "Balanced".

** Does not include 3,567 enlisted and 602 officers in the Inactive Selected Reserve awaiting/performing Initial Active Duty for Training, in a non-pay status, or for which accurate skill/pay grade data was unavailable 30 September 1990.

(4) Reserve Experience. Efforts to improve the accuracy of average years of service data on both inactive Selected Reservists and Full Time Support personnel are on-going.

The FY 1990 data in Table IV-7 shows a continuing imbalance of officer inventory to requirements. Except for some staff communities, training new officers is more expensive than affiliating veteran officers making the grade imbalance cost effective.

TABLE IV-7

NAVY RESERVE EXPERIENCE
Programmed Versus Actual/Projected Inventory
 (Strength in Thousands)

FY 1990

	<u>Total People</u>	<u>People With Greater Than 4 Years of Service</u>	<u>Average Years of Services</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
PMI	54.0	*	*
Inventory	47.3	16.1	3.9
<u>E5-E9</u>			
PMI	49.3	*	*
Inventory	51.7	48.1	12.0
<u>E1-E9</u>			
PMI	103.6	*	*
Inventory	99.0	64.4	8.6
<u>WO</u>			
PMI	0.6	*	*
Inventory	0.4	0.3	23.8

01-03

PMI	12.5	*	*
Inventory	10.7	7.7	9.0

04-06

PMI	10.9	*	*
Inventory	15.9	15.6	18.6

01-06

PMI	23.4	*	*
Inventory	26.6	23.3	14.3

*YOS not programmed.

(5) Reserve Personnel Management(a) Enlisted Personnel

(1) Recruiting. The actual number of Selected Reserve Personnel recruited in FY 1990 and the accession goals for FY 1991 through FY 1993 are shown below:

Enlisted Reserve Accession Plans*

	<u>FY 1990</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1991</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 1992</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 1993</u> <u>Goal</u>
NAVET	23,749	27,659	25,928	16,772
SAM	3,968	2,615	2,913	1,120
OSVET	984	**	**	**
APG	1,963	**	**	**
TAR	3,526	2,722	3,496	2,251

* Actual accessions do not include gains from IRR for members temporarily transferred to the IRR for 90 days or less due to being not physically qualified or due to unavailability of pay billets.

** A total Veteran goal is identified as the NAVET goal. Individual goals are not established for OSVET and APG accessions.

(2) Retention. Retention for FY 1990 is shown below. The only retention goal for out years is to retain sufficient numbers of trained quality personnel to maintain R-2 or better readiness.

Enlisted Reserve Retention
(Percent)

<u>Affiliated</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>		<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1st Enlistment	88.0%	*	*	*	*
2nd Enlistment	89.0%	*	*	*	*
3rd or more Enlistment	93.6%	*	*	*	*
Overall Naval Reserve	89.5%	*	*	*	*

* Retain sufficient number of trained, quality personnel to maintain R-2 or better readiness.

(b) Officers. Actual numbers of Selected Reserve officers recruited in FY 1990 and accessions goals for FY 1991 and FY 1993 are shown below:

Officer Reserve Accession Plans*

	<u>FY 1990</u>		<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
NAVET	2816	3544	1974	2200	2200
OSAM	127	150	0	32	32
Direct Appointments	1063	1170	224	300	300
TAR	154	200	151	160	162

* Actual accessions do not include gains from IRR for members temporarily transferred to the IRR for 90 days or less due to being not physically qualified or due to unavailability of pay billets.

(6) Reserve Readiness Assessment. Personnel readiness improved in FY 1990 as the Naval Reserve made improvements in closer skill matches and attainment of training requirements. Continued improvements are anticipated.

(a) Reserve Aggregate Population Stability

Reserve Aggregate Population Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
Officer	88.6	86.6	87.8	83.4	87.4	87.0	85.3
Enlisted	81.6	70.3	79.3	76.1	78.1	79.9	79.1

(b) Reserve Unit Personnel Stability.

Reserve Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
Officer	59.7	*	*	*	47.0	50.8	42.6
Enlisted	54.5	*	*	*	47.9	49.3	42.0

*Data not available.

(7) Individual Mobilization Augmentee Programs. An IMA is an officer or enlisted person in the Selected Reserve who will fill a specific billet in the Active Force upon mobilization. Each IMA will be assigned to a mobilization billet within the active force, training in that billet during peacetime.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 1990</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Total IMAs	2,516	584	584	584

(8) Full Time Support Programs. Currently, a decrease in full-time support is programmed.

Reserve Full Time Support Programs

(End Strength in Thousands) ^{1/}

	<u>FY 1990</u> (ACTUAL)	<u>FY 1991</u> (PROJ)	<u>FY 1992</u> (PROJ)	<u>FY 1993</u> (PROJ)
Sect. 265 ^{2/}	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
TAR Officer	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
TAR Enlisted	19.2	19.6	19.0	17.9
Canvasser Recruiters	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.1

Reserve Subtotal	22.7	23.0	22.0	21.1
Active Navy	7.4	8.4	5.7	5.8
Navy Civilians	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.7
TOTAL	33.1	34.4	30.5	29.6

1/ Totals may not add due to rounding.

2/ Reserve Officers in headquarters billets in accordance with Section 265, of Title 10, U.S. Code.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)

Navy IRR is composed primarily of personnel with recent active duty experience who still have a remaining military service obligation (MSO). The FY 1986 increase in IRR end strength marked the reversal of declining IRR strength that began in 1981.

In July 1984, the eight year MSO began and in August 1984 the \$900 bonus for a three year IRR reenlistment was instituted. Current IRR bonus structure consists of a maximum \$750 bonus for a 3 year reenlistment or \$1500 bonus for a 6 year reenlistment. The increase of the MSO from six to eight years and the IRR bonus implementation should allow continued IRR growth through FY 1993. With the FY 1989 transfer of IRR personnel with a reenlistment code of RE-4 to the standby reserve, the IRR showed a slight decrease in FY 1990 with an increase in standby Reservists. The IRR may again decrease somewhat following rigorous enforcement of the requirements of DoD Directive 1200.15 concerning the 50 point minimum participation criteria for continued membership.

Decreases in enlisted strength of Volunteer Training Units (VTUs) have resulted due to implementation of high year tenure (HYT) rules for drilling Reservists. HYT and eight year MSO will increase IRR (not drilling) inventory through FY 1993.

	<u>FY 1990</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1991</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1992</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1993</u> (Projected)
<u>Drilling Without Pay (Volunteer Training Unit)</u>				
Officers	2835	2892	2950	2951
Enlisted	890	908	926	945
Total	3725	3800	3876	3896
<u>Not Drilling</u>				
Officers	16549	19850	21800	22500
Enlisted	67165	80600	88600	91250
Total	83714	100450	110400	113750
Total IRR	87439	104250	114276	117646

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve is composed of personnel who maintain their military affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve and who are liable for active duty in accordance with Title 10 USC 672 and 674. The Standby Reserve-Active (USNR-S1) includes members transferred from the Ready Reserve as a result of temporary hardship, key employees in Federal and non-Federal employment, and theological/medical/dental students. The Standby Reserve-Inactive (USNR-S2) includes members who have completed their MSO and have been transferred to an inactive status due to a variety of reasons. Starting in FY 1990, all members entering the IRR with an RE-4 reenlistment code were transferred to USNR-S2 status. This will initially increase the USNR-S2 population in FY 1989, but it will level out in FY 1993 and out.

Standby Reserve Strength

	<u>FY 1990</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1991</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1992</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1993</u> (Projected)
Active (S1)				
Officers	113	114	115	116
Enlisted	753	761	769	777
Total	866	875	884	893
Inactive (S2)				
Officers	7519	7595	7670	7750
Enlisted	3406	3575	3750	3940
Total	10925	11170	11420	11690
Total Standby Reserve	11791	12045	12304	12583

3. Retirees

This program includes regular and reserve retirees who have completed 20 years or more of active duty and, separately, reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60. Twenty-year active duty retirees (regular or reserve) are liable for recall to active duty at any time by the Secretary of the Navy in the interest of national defense, under regulation presented by the Secretary of Defense. The reserve retirees are liable for recall only in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law. Eighty percent of the Fleet Reserve, 70 percent from the Retired USN/USNR Class I and II (includes those non-disabled, under age 60, retired) and 10 percent from the retired USN/USNR Class III (includes over age 60 or disabled), are expected to respond to a call up.

Retired Strength

	<u>FY 1990</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1991</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1992</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1993</u> (Projected)
Twenty-year Active Duty Retirees (USN)				
CAT I/II (20 yr + active duty retiree)	124428	125675	126935	128200
CAT III	232091	234412	236756	239124
Other Retiree Reserves (Excluding Honorary Retirees)*				
*CAT I/II	72135	72856	73585	74321
*CAT III	57674	58239	58821	59409

*Statistical changes since last report are due to changes in data collection methods and sort criteria to more closely align with DoD retirement categories.

4. Initial Active Duty For Training

The individuals performing initial active duty for training (IADT) are non-prior service enlisted and officer personnel recruited to areas of skill shortages not able to be filled from veteran recruiting sources.

The enlisted Sea and Air Mariners (SAMs) complete recruit training and Class "A" School or Apprenticeship Training or, in the Reserve Allied Medical Program (RAMP) branch, a VOTECH course without direct compensation at a private institution to acquire certain medical skills. 456 of the FY 1992 and FY 1993 SAMs will serve in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) Innovative Naval Reserve Concepts (INRC) program.

The Officer Sea and Air Mariner (OSAM) program provides initial training at Officer Candidate School or Officer Indoctrination Course, followed by designator training and related duty station assignments for a total IADT period up to 24 months. FY 1990 accessions to the traditional OSAM program were reduced to less than 50 percent of prior years, with no OSAM accession goal for FY 1991, although many FY 1990 accessions will complete their IADT in FY 1991. The FY 1992 and FY 1993 OSAMs will be assigned to the NRF INRC program.

Officers and Enlisted Members Serving on Active Duty for Training

<u>Category</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Enlisted</u>				
Recruit and Specialized Training (Including SAM Trainees)	4196	2913	1120	1129

Officer

Flight Training (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	18	18	0	0
Professional (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	372	91	32	32
TOTAL	4586	3022	1152	1161

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of the Navy's overall resources. A majority of the civilian employees of the Department of the Navy are directly related to our readiness posture. Approximately half of the civilians work in industrial activities, which are primarily engaged in depot level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and associated equipment. Many of the civilians employed at operation and maintenance activities, such as ship repair facilities and Navy and Marine Corps air stations and bases contribute directly to operational readiness. The balance of the civilians provide essential support in functions such as training, medical care, and the engineering, development, and acquisition of weapons systems, all of which have a definite, although longer range, impact on readiness.

The FY 1992 and FY 1993 estimates each represent a decline from the previous year's estimate. Manpower levels have been structured at a level that assures responsible execution of the Department's programs given reduced resources while complying with congressional direction to reduce headquarters and acquisition personnel by four percent per year. Included in the overall year-to-year changes are a number of adjustments and realignments based on planned efficiencies and program considerations. The estimates reflect the establishment of the Defense Business Operations Fund and the consolidation of military department accounting and finance functions at the DOD level commencing in FY 1992, as well as management improvements resulting from the Defense Management Review recommendations. Decreases in industrial operations reflect workload changes at Naval Shipyards and Aviation Depots.

Budgeted levels also include several initiatives that require increases in civilian manpower beginning in FY 1991. These include the substitution of civilians for military personnel and the replacement of Contracted Advisory and Assistance Services with civilian personnel (to reduce risk of compromising the competitive acquisition process).

The FY 1992/1993 request is for 292,350 and 285,285 civilians, respectively. This request is shown by DPPC in Table IV-8.

TABLE IV-8
NAVY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Direct and Indirect Hires in Thousands)

CIVILIANS	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	ACTUALS	AUTHORIZED	AUTHORIZED	AUTHORIZED
STRATEGIC				
Offensive Strategic Forces	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.3
Surveillance Forces	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>
	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
TACTICAL/MOBILITY				
Tactical Air Force	8.7	8.9	15.6	16.8
Naval Forces	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Warships and ASW	2.9	3.0	10.0	10.0
Amphibious Forces	0.4	0.4	1.0	1.1
Naval Support Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Mobility Forces	2.4	2.5	8.9	8.7
	5.6	5.7	5.4	6.7
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL				
Intelligence	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.7
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>
	2.8	2.8	3.6	3.8
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS				
	<u>20.8</u>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>19.4</u>	<u>19.1</u>
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING				
	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>
MEDICAL SUPPORT				
	<u>9.0</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>8.8</u>
JOINT ACTIVITIES				
Int'l Military Org	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.3
OSD/Defense Agencies	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>
and Activities	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.0

CIVILIANS	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>		<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>159.8</u>	<u>153.1</u>	<u>141.3</u>	<u>135.3</u>
Supply Operations				
Other Logistics Activities	21.4	21.1	19.8	19.0
Maintenance Operations	118.3	113.1	103.4	99.1
Naval Shipyards	65.9	61.5	53.6	51.0
Ordnance Activities	22.1	21.4	20.6	19.8
Other Logistics Activities	30.3	30.2	29.2	28.3
Logistics Support Activities				
Logistic Support Activities	20.1	18.9	18.1	17.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>				
Combat Commands	<u>10.8</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>8.6</u>
Support Commands	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>
	9.8	7.9	7.8	7.7
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>				
Research and Development	<u>38.6</u>	<u>37.5</u>	<u>35.9</u>	<u>34.4</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>37.4</u>	<u>36.3</u>	<u>34.7</u>	<u>33.2</u>
	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>				
Personnel Support	<u>5.8</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>5.7</u>
Individual Training	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.4</u>
	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Support Installations	<u>53.5</u>	<u>52.3</u>	<u>42.2</u>	<u>41.8</u>
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>51.8</u>	<u>50.7</u>	<u>40.7</u>	<u>40.3</u>
	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5
<u>END STRENGTH**</u>	<u>320.5</u>	<u>309.7</u>	<u>292.4</u>	<u>285.3</u>

*Rounds to zero.

**End strength may not equal total of DPPC categories due to rounding.

2. Major Program Changes

The civilian end strength budget estimates for FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect an alignment of civilian personnel levels with workload requirements and funding adjustments associated with force and support structure reductions while complying with congressional direction. The FY 1992 and FY 1993 estimates reflect a net reduction of 10,800, 28,100 and 35,200 respectively from the FY 1990 end strength level. Significant changes in civilian end strength requirements are discussed below.

Civilian reductions are based on changes to funded program and comply with Sections 905 and 906 of the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act which direct four percent per year reductions to acquisition and headquarters personnel.

Major work force reductions are reflected in the estimates for the Naval Aviation Depots and Naval Shipyards (-8,700 in FY 1992 and an additional -3,300 in FY 1993). These reductions are based on specific workload changes (type of ship and type of work to be performed), workload reductions through consolidations, increased competition, and work force efficiencies identified by Defense Management Review Initiatives.

While civilian levels reflect reductions as a result of decreased workload, civilian support for medical programs is maintained at the FY 1990 level.

Other changes in civilian end strength levels also relate to Defense Management Review Initiatives. Further reductions have been identified related to initiatives for productivity saving at industrial operations first reflected in the FY 1991 President's Budget. Other initiatives identify savings from consolidations of supply operations, research laboratories, and aviation depot consolidations. Decreases to Navy programs result from the consolidation at the OSD level of commissary operations, financial and accounting operations and Section Six Schools (-7,300 in FY 1992 and -7,400 in FY 1993). Other initiatives produce savings but increase civilians such as civilian substitution for military billets (+3,300 in FY 1992 and +4,900 in FY 1993) and the consolidation of DOD printing services under Navy (+2,000 in FY 1992 and FY 1993).

3. Improvements and Efficiencies

The Navy estimate of civilian manpower requirements reflects a continuing commitment to increase the efficiency of the civilian work force. The majority of the Navy's efforts in this area are concentrated in the implementation of the recommendations of the Defense Management Report. The purpose of those recommendations is to streamline management, especially in the acquisition process, and to reduce costs without affecting military capability or reducing the quality of management support.

The FY 1991 President's Budget incorporated significant manpower savings based on Phase I of the Defense Management Review Initiatives which identified savings based on the transfer of NAVPROs and productivity savings at industrial funded activities. The current FY 1992/1993 budget reflects further savings based on Navy initiatives which identified

additional savings related to consolidation of aviation depot maintenance operations and associated reduction in workload, research laboratory consolidation, ADP services consolidation and supply depot and inventory control point consolidations. Civilians were added to reduce contract advisory assistance services and replace military in functions where it was more economical to do so.

Reductions are also associated with new initiatives within the Navy including the consolidation of Pay/Personnel Administrative Support Offices, closing and consolidation of NROTC units, and the consolidation of headquarters personnel organizations. Other efficiencies include reduced transportation costs.

Several initiatives result in decreases to Navy programs by the consolidation of functions at the OSD level. These functions include commissary operations, finance and accounting functions, and Section Six Schools.

Publishing and printing services for all of DOD have been consolidated under Navy, producing an increase in civilian end strength.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower

Immediately upon mobilization, Navy will experience a manpower shortfall due to casualties, peacetime active duty manning, and mobilization delays. The shortfall will be eliminated quickly with the mobilization surge and the commencement of casualties returning to duty.

Manpower shortages will persist, however, in certain designators and ratings. The pre-trained individual manpower (PIM) will not be able to meet all of the requirements because of shortfalls in certain specialties. To alleviate these shortages, stop-loss measures will be initiated and training school output will be directed toward reducing remaining shortfalls.

2. Civilian Manpower

The peacetime civilian authorizations form the baseline for civilian mobilization manpower planning. On M-Day and after, the peacetime numbers increase to reflect the growth in support required to build toward and sustain full mobilization. During mobilization, civilian positions will be created to support the buildup, and concurrently, positions will be terminated in activities that do not directly support the war effort.

Navy plans for offsetting the potential shortfall in civilian manpower after M-Day include substantive recruitment efforts using the Emergency-Indefinite appointing authority for the rapid acquisition of new personnel. Other efforts include recall of recently retired civilian personnel and cross training of on-board staff.

E. Manpower Management Improvements

1. Navy Total Force

The Navy's Total Force Advocate is a flag officer who heads the Plans, Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component manpower and units in the Navy. Potential changes in Total Force composition are evaluated by the Total Force Advocate to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime. The Total Force Advocate is also tasked with acting as an "honest broker" in resolving issues with Navy program sponsors and other agencies. He is a member of the Navy's Program Development Review Committee, a flag-level board that meets during the POM cycle to prioritize each program within the overall Navy POM and to assess the impact of recommended program changes. He and his staff will be heading the Navy's participation in the Department of Defense review of Total Force policy, force mix, and military force structure required by Section 1101 of the National Defense Authorization Act, 1990.

The expansion of Reserve participation in various mission areas since 1980 has generated additional manpower requirements for the Reserve. The Naval Reserve, combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active Navy, will ensure that the United States will prevail in any conflict at sea. However, as the active Force structure draws down, so will the Naval Reserve.

Placing much of the Navy's warfighting capability in the Reserve hinges on the availability of Reserve assets. From the equipment perspective - ships, aircraft, etc. -- availability is good. In the manpower area, the on-going Operation DESERT SHIELD allowed the Navy to test its ability to support Fleet Commander in Chief requirements by recalling Selected Reservists and Individual Ready Reservists as authorized within the 200K Presidential Call-up. Results to date have been highly favorable and demonstrate the validity of the Total Force mix for the threat they were designed to deter. Moreover, the availability of Reserve personnel to man the equipment under a recall scenario rather than a mobilization situation has been demonstrated. This was only the fifth time Naval Reservists have been involuntarily recalled to active duty since Korea in other than exercise situations.

III. NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustments in overall Navy strength.

A. Strategic

The Strategic category includes nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces having the objective of deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. The majority of Navy manpower in this category

is associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The Trident program, strategic operational headquarters, and communications and automated data processing support are also included.

Strategic
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	23.0	22.7	18.9	15.5
Reserve	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.3

1. Offensive Strategic Forces

Offensive Strategic Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	20.8	20.3	16.6	13.4
Reserve	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1

In FY 1991 active Offensive Strategic Forces decreases overall by -484. There are decrements of -762 to Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems and -422 to the Trident Program which are offset partially by +766 to Support Ships (FBMS). In FY 1992 Offensive Strategic Forces decreases overall by -3655 which include -2946 to Support Ships and -1082 to Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems. In FY 1993 Offensive Strategic Forces decreases overall by -3283 which include -1577 to Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems and -1927 to Support Ships.

There are no significant changes in Reserve manpower.

2. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.2
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

In FY 1991 active Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces increases by +262 primarily due to an increase of +295 to Relocatable Over-the-horizon Radar (ROTHR). In FY 1992 Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces decreases by -161 due to a reduction in ROTHR. In FY 1993 Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces decreases by -92.

There are no major increases or decreases in civilian end strength in FY 1991 through FY 1993.

B. Tactical and Mobility

The Tactical and Mobility manpower is associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units. The active military end strength in Tactical/Mobility forces supports the manning of ships and squadrons, all of which require full time manpower due to deployment requirements.

<u>Tactical and Mobility</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	284.9	283.9	277.1	268.2
Reserve	82.4	90.5	77.7	72.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.7	8.9	15.6	16.8

1. Land Forces

Navy Land Forces include physicians, dentists, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to the Fleet Marine Forces and Marine Corps bases.

<u>Land Forces</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.5	5.2	5.1	5.1
Reserve	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.6

In FY 1991 active Land Forces increases by +624 due to +283 Division (Marine) and +388 to Force Service Support Group (FSSG). No major changes occurred to Land Forces in FY 1992 and FY 1993.

Increased Reserve medical support of Marine Corps Reserve units in FY 1992 reflects the conversion of Active Component medical support personnel to Reserve Full Time Support personnel.

2. Tactical Air Forces

The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, strike fighter, airborne early warning and electronic warfare squadrons; attack, multipurpose aircraft carriers; and tactical air operational headquarters units.

Tactical Air Forces (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	67.4	63.9	65.5	63.2
Reserve	7.9	8.5	6.5	6.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

In FY 1991 active Tactical Air Force decreases by -3480. There are decreases of -2961 to Multi-purpose Aircraft Carriers, -765 to A-7 Squadrons and -149 to A-6 Squadrons. These decreases are partially offset by +103 to F/A-18 Squadrons and +181 to F-14 Squadrons. In FY 1992 Tactical Air Forces increases by +1526 based on +1351 to Multi-purpose Aircraft Carriers, +231 to FA-18 Squadrons, +424 to F-14 Squadrons and +232 to Shore Based EW Squadrons. These are partially offset by -600 to A-7 Squadrons. In FY 1993 Tactical Air Forces decreases by -2287 based on -619 to Multi-purpose Aircraft Carriers, -530 to A-6 Squadrons, -218 to F/A-18 Squadrons and -603 to F-14 Squadrons.

The Reserve increase in FY 1991 is caused by undermanning of various aviation augmentation programs in FY 1990. The decrease in FY 1992 results from the deletion of the squadron augmentation unit program and the deletion of funding for junior unskilled positions in aircraft carrier augmentation units, commensurate with the ability to reconstitute this capability from other sources at mobilization.

There are no major increases or decreases in civilian end strength in FY 1991 through FY 1993.

3. Naval Forces

The Naval Forces subcategory includes manpower for anti-surface warfare forces, anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces and support forces. It is the largest subcategory of active military and Selected Reserve manpower in the Navy. Naval Forces include virtually all ship manpower requirements except the fleet ballistic missile manpower in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower in Tactical Air Forces.

Naval Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	211.7	213.7	205.3	198.4
Reserve	71.0	77.9	67.0	61.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	3.0	10.0	10.0

In FY 1991 active Warships and ASW Forces decreases -6487 with decrements of -4887 to Battleships, -2156 to Missile Destroyers, -2319 to Non-Missile Frigates, -1740 to ASW Patrol Squadrons. Increments include +3236 to Cruisers, +751 to Non-Missile Destroyers, +220 to LAMPS and +801 to Submarines. In FY 1992 Warships and ASW Forces decreases by -8630 including -1428 to Missile Destroyers, -6180 to Non-Missile Frigates, -205 to ASW Patrol Squadrons and -728 to Submarines. Increments include +297 to Cruisers. In FY 1993 Warships and ASW Forces decreases by -3204 including -1140 to Non-Missile Frigates, -545 to Missile Destroyers, -521 to LAMPS, -220 to S-3 Squadrons and -180 to SH-3/SH-60F Squadrons. Increments include +539 to Cruisers.

The Reserve Warship and ASW Forces increase in FY 1991 is caused primarily by undermanning of various aviation and ship augmentation programs in FY 1990. The decreases in FY 1992 results from various force structure changes, including the deletion of one Reserve LAMPS and two Reserve Air Mine Countermeasure squadrons, the COOP program, active ship decommissionings, deletion of the squadron augmentation program, and the phased reduction of junior unskilled positions. In FY 1993, the reduction is attributed to the decommissioning of four Reserve ASW maritime patrol squadrons as well as the continued phase out of unskilled positions augmenting active component requirements, commensurate with the projected national security environment and the ability to reconstitute this capability from other sources at mobilization.

In FY 1991 active Amphibious Forces increases by +3875 with increments +3192 to Amphibious Assault Ships, +242 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units, +50 to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces and +3922 to Service Support to Special Operations. Decrements include -3428 to Ongoing Operational Activities and -232 to Training-Active. In FY 1992 Amphibious Forces decreases -52 including -328 to Amphibious Assault Ships offset by +132 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units and +162 to Service Support to Special Operations. In FY 1993 Amphibious Forces decreases by -1199 including -1405 to Amphibious Assault Ships offset by +112 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units and +143 to Service Support to Special Operations.

The Amphibious Forces increase in FY 1991 Reserve end strength reflects a combination of undermanning in some programs as well as Reserve personnel serving in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM at end of FY 1990 reported in the active component end strength figures. The decrease in FY 1993 reflects an overall reduction in augmentation for active component requirements, commensurate with the projected national security environment

and the ability to reconstitute this capability from other sources at mobilization.

In FY 1991 active Naval Support Forces increases by +4553 with increments of +2546 in Support Forces, +1527 in Underway Replenishment Ships and +1193 for Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities. Decrements include -139 for Major Fleet Support Ships, -466 Naval Construction Forces and -124 Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Depots. In FY 1992 Naval Support Forces increases +334 with increments of +1389 in Support Forces and +616 in Underway Replenishment Ships. Decrements include -555 in Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Depots, -182 in Major Fleet Support Ships, -537 in SIMA and -208 in Deep Submergence Systems. In FY 1993 Naval Support Forces decreases -2465 including -2103 in Underway Replenishment Ships and -223 in SIMA. Increments include +241 in Support Forces.

The Naval Support Forces Reserve increase in FY 1991 was caused by a combination of undermanning principally in the SIMA, Naval Construction Forces, and Direct Support Squadron Aircraft programs as well as the reporting of the Reserve personnel serving in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM at the end of FY 1990 in the active component end strength figures. The FY 1992 decrease was brought about by strength reductions in the following areas: deletion of one Reserve Mobile Construction Battalion, elimination of squadron augment unit funding, reduction of junior unskilled positions, reduced cryptologic direct support requirements, and active ship decommissionings. The FY 1993 reduction was caused by the elimination of an additional Construction Battalion, ship decommissionings, and an overall reduction in augmentation for active components requirements commensurate with the projected national security environment and the ability to reconstitute this capability from other sources at mobilization.

There are no major changes in civilian end strength in FY 1991. The civilian increase in the Naval Forces sub-category beginning in FY 1992 is due to the realignment of the Ship Repair Facilities from reimbursable end strength in the Support Installations sub-category to directly funded end strength under Naval Support Forces to better reflect the mission support and to comply with OSD direction.

4. Mobility Forces

The Mobility Forces subcategory includes Navy strength for airlift and sealift capability, plus port terminal and traffic management operations.

Mobility Forces (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.4
Reserve	1.4	1.8	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	5.6	5.7	5.4	6.7

Mobility Forces

In FY 1991 and FY 1992 there are no significant changes to active Mobility Forces. In FY 1993 Mobility Forces increases +240 primarily due to +243 in Cargo.

The Reserve decrease in FY 1992 reflects an overall reduction in end strength commensurate with the projected national security environment and the ability to reconstitute this capability from other sources at mobilization.

All changes in Mobility Forces is due to changes in the mix of ships that are civilian mariner manned in the Military Sealift Command. The increase in FY 1991 reflects civilian manning of HAYES and FURMAN, T-AGOS 19 and 20, and T-AO 194, 196, and 198. Reduction in FY 1992 is due to the FURMAN and NEPTUNE being no longer manned and the T-AO 106, 143, 145, 146, 147, and 148 going offline. The increase in civilian end strength in FY 1993 reflects civilian manning of T-AGS 45, T-AGOS 23, T-AO 199, 201, and 202, and T-AFS 4 and 5. These increases are partially offset by the T-AGS 51 and 52 being no longer civilian manned.

C. Communications/Intelligence

This category includes Manpower associated with Intelligence and Centrally Managed Communications.

Communications/Intelligence (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	15.8	16.6	15.7	15.3
Reserve	5.8	6.2	6.3	6.0
<u>Civilian</u>	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.7

1. Intelligence.

This category includes strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities within the Department of Defense.

Intelligence
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	8.9	9.2	8.9	8.9
Reserve	4.3	4.6	4.8	4.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.9

In FY 1991 active Intelligence increased +381 with increments of +260 in Cryptologic Activities and +103 in Ocean Surveillance Information. In FY 1992 Intelligence decreases -305 primarily due to -182 in Pacific Command GDIP Activities. In FY 1993 there are not major increases or decreases in this category.

The increase in FY 1992 Reserve was caused by an upward revision of Selected Reserve requirements.

There are no major changes in civilian end strength in FY 1991. The civilian end strength increase beginning in FY 1992 is primarily for cryptological activities and increases in various GDIP programs.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

This subcategory includes strength associated with the Defense Communication System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications system, communications security, and other related communications units.

Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	6.9	7.3	6.8	6.4
Reserve	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.8	2.8	3.6	3.8

In FY 1991 active Centrally Managed Communications increased +411 primarily due to +249 in Navy Communications. In FY 1992 Centrally Managed Communications decreases -535 primarily due to -456 in Navy Communications. In FY 1993 Centrally Managed Communications decreases -347 primarily due to -277 in Navy Communications.

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

There are no major changes in FY 1991. Increases in civilian end strength in FY 1992 are due to civilian substitutions for military

communication specialists and a realignment from reimbursable end strength under the Central Logistics Support sub-category to direct funding under Communications to better reflect the mission supported.

D. Combat Installations

This category includes strength associated with Base Operating Support for Combat Installations. Manpower in this category provides operation and maintenance of strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands including base communications and air traffic control.

Combat Installations (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	26.3	25.3	24.2	23.7
Reserve	9.6	8.6	8.7	8.2
<u>Civilian</u>	20.8	20.6	19.4	19.1

In FY 1991 active Combat Installations decreases -996 primarily due to -574 in Operations Fleet Support Surface and -380 in Operations Naval Air Bases. In FY 1992 Combat Installations decreases -1133 including -759 in Operations Naval Air Bases and -114 in Operations Fleet Support Surface. In FY 1993 Combat Installations decreases -495 including Operations Fleet Support Surface and -146 in Operations Naval Air Bases.

The FY 1991 decrease in the Reserve strength was caused by the combination of overmanning of various programs in FY 1990 and the lack of Full Time Support for NAS South Weymouth and NAS Detroit, which has been appropriated but not yet authorized by Congress. The FY 1993 decrease reflects a reduction of the Reserve infrastructure commensurate with the projected national security environment and the ability to reconstitute this capability from other sources at mobilization.

Reductions in the number of civilian end strength supporting Base Operations are responsible for the decrease in FY 1991. The decrease in civilian end strength in FY 1992 is due primarily to the transfer of child care and family services positions from Base Operating Support in this category to the Personnel Support category. The additional decrease in FY 1993 is related to the operations phase down of Reserve Naval Air Station South Weymouth and Naval Air Facility Detroit.

E. Force Support Training

Force Support Training manpower sustains units providing training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

Force Support Training
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	15.7	5.2	14.6	14.3
Reserve	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

In FY 1991 active Force Support Training decreases -484 including -300 in Readiness Squadrons and -163 in Fleet Support Training. In FY 1992 Force Support Training decreases -604 primarily due to -557 in Readiness Squadrons (ASW). In FY 1993 Force Support Training decreases -257 primarily due to -207 in Readiness Squadrons (ASW).

There are no significant changes to civilian manpower requirements.

F. Medical Support

Navy manpower in this category provides medical care in DoD military medical facilities.

Medical Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	26.8	26.3	26.1	26.0
Reserve	16.2	16.7	13.7	13.3
<u>Civilian</u>	9.0	9.3	8.9	8.8

In FY 1991 active Medical Support decreases -450 with increment of +174 in Station Hospital and Medical Clinics and a decrement of -688 in Care in Regional Defense Facilities. In FY 1992 Medical Support decreases -211 primarily due to -115 in Station Hospitals Medical Clinics. In FY 1993 Medical Support decreases -109 primarily due to -75 in Dental Care Activities.

The FY 1991 Reserve increase reflects the large number of Reserve medical personnel serving in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM at the end of FY 1990 reported in the active component end strength figures. The decrease in FY 1993 reflects an overall reduction in augmentation for active component requirements commensurate with the projected national security environment and the ability to reconstitute this capability from other sources at mobilization.

Changes in civilian end strength result from a combination of factors including congressional direction to sustain medical providers at the FY 1990 level and increases in clerical and medical administration support personnel to correct support deficiencies. In FY 1991, increases are due to civilian substitution, additional end strength for drug testing laboratories and additional administrative support personnel. The decrease in FY 1992 is due to the transfer of the drug testing laboratories to OSD.

G. Joint Activities

This category includes International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Federal Agency Support, Joint Staff, and OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities.

<u>Joint Activities</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.0	5.2	6.1	5.8
Reserve	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	6.4	6.1	5.7	3.3

1. International Military Organizations

<u>International Military Organizations</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4
Reserve	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

In FY 1991 active International Military Organizations increases +149 primarily due to +90 in Foreign Military Sales Support. There are not major changes to International Military Organizations in FY 1992 or FY 1993.

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

2. Unified Commands

Unified Commands (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2
Reserve	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

In FY 1991 active Unified Commands decreases -192 primarily due to -146 in Management Headquarters (SOFCOM). There are no major changes in FY 1992 through FY 1993 for Unified Commands.

The Reserve increase in FY 1992 reflects an upward revision of requirements.

There are no major civilian manpower changes in this category.

3. Federal Agency Support

Federal Agency Support (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1
Reserve	*	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

There are no major increases to active, reserve or civilian manpower for FY 1992 through FY 1993 in Federal Support Activities.

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

4. Joint Staff

Joint Staff (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

There are no major increases to active, reserve or civilian manpower for FY 1992 through FY 1993 in Joint Staff.

The Naval Reserve experienced significant no change.

5. OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities

OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.8	1.1	2.0	1.9
Reserve	*	*	*	*
<u>Civilian</u>	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.0

In FY 1991 OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities increases +247. In FY 1992 OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities increases +948 with +906 in Service Support to DECA and +374 in Defense Business Operations. Decrements include -279 in Service Support to DLA. In FY 1993 OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities decreases -152.

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

There are no major civilian manpower changes in this category.

H. Central Logistics

Manpower in this subcategory is associated with Supply, Maintenance, and Logistics Support operations. This manpower provides critical support to the fleet and directly affects readiness.

Central Logistics Manpower (End strength in thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	6.5	6.5	5.9	5.5
Reserve	8.2	7.4	7.2	7.1
<u>Civilian</u>	159.8	153.1	141.3	135.3

In FY 1991 and FY 1993 there are no major changes in Supply Operations. In FY 1992 Supply Operations decreases -500 including -298 in Supply Depots and -241 in Inventory Control Point Operations.

There are no major changes in active Maintenance Operations in FY 1991 through FY 1993.

In FY 1991 active Logistics Support Operations increases +114 primarily due to +101 in Logistics Support Activities. There are no major changes in Logistics Support Operations in FY 1992. In FY 1993 Logistics Support Operations -292 primarily due to -286 in Logistics Support Activities.

The decrease in Reserve end strength in FY 1991 is caused by over-manning in the Supply Depot/Operations program in FY 1990. The decrease in FY 1992 is the result of reduced Selected Reserve requirements in this category. The decrease in maintenance operations in Selected Reserve end strength in FY 1992 is the result of a downward revision of requirements in this category. Revised Selected Reserve requirements cause the decrease in Logistic Support Operations in FY 1992.

The decreases in civilian end strength in FY 1991 through FY 1993 reflect savings in the acquisition work force identified in Defense Management Review Initiatives and reduced workload as a result of force structure reductions. These decreases are offset some what by the conversion of some Contract Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS) personnel to in-house personnel.

The decreases in civilian personnel in FY 1991 through FY 1993 are predominantly in the Naval Shipyards (-4,400 in FY 1991, -7,000 in FY 1992 and -2,600 in FY 1993). The civilian levels reflect requirements based on shipyard workload phasing. Other decreases are related to savings resulting from Defense Management Review Initiatives including the consolidation of aviation depot maintenance and reduced workload as a result of force structure reductions.

An increase in civilian end strength (+2,000) in this category occurs beginning in FY 1992 because of the consolidation of DoD printing services under Navy. This increase is offset however by the reductions related to the decrease level of support required for design services and contract administration for facility support beginning in FY 1991.

I. Service Management Headquarters

This category includes management headquarters manpower required to support Combat and Support Commands.

Service Management Headquarters (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.5	5.3	5.2	5.1
Reserve	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.6
<u>Civilian</u>	10.8	8.8	8.7	8.6

1. Combat Commands

Combat Commands
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.6	.6	2.5	2.5
Reserve	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9

There are no major changes to active, reserve or civilian Combat Commands in FY 1991 through FY 1993.

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

There are no major changes in civilian end strength requirements for this sub-category.

2. Support Commands

Support Commands
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.7
Reserve	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	9.8	7.9	7.8	7.7

In FY 1991 active Support Commands decreases -190 primarily due to -194 in Management Headquarters (Departmental). There are no major changes in FY 1991 and FY 1993.

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

Decrease in civilian end strength in FY 1991 is due to the transfer of the accounting and finance function to OSD. Decreases in civilian manpower beginning in FY 1992 result from efficiency savings and downsizing of support functions related to reduced force structure.

J. Research and Development

Within this category fall Research and Development and Geophysical Activities.

Research and Development
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.3	7.7	7.3	7.0
Reserve	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	38.6	37.5	35.9	34.4

1. Research and Development

The Navy's Research and Development (R&D) community comprises headquarters, laboratories, Research and Development, Test and Evaluation project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. A large portion of the manpower is attached to R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations.

Research and Development
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.3	5.6	5.4	5.3
Reserve	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	37.4	36.3	34.7	33.2

In FY 1991 active Research and Development Activities increases +311 primarily due to +276 in Facilities/Installation Support. In FY 1992 Research and Development Activities decreases -187 due to -2355 in R&D Labs, offset by +2210 in Facilities/Installation Support. In FY 1992 Research and Development Activities decreases -146.

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

The civilian manpower decreases in FY 1991, FY 1992 and FY 1993 are a result of savings achieved through research laboratory consolidations and end strength requirements to support funded program.

2. Geophysical Activities

The Navy's geophysical programs include the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities throughout the world. These employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, directed by a small headquarters staff.

Geophysical Activities
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8
Reserve	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2

In FY 1991 there are no major changes in Geophysical Activities. In FY 1992 Geophysical Activities decreases -142 due to -106 in Weather Service. In FY 1993 Geophysical Activities decreases -132 due to -119 in Mapping and Charting.

The Naval Reserve experienced no significant change.

There are no changes in civilian end strength requirements in this sub-category.

K. Training and Personnel

This category includes manpower associated with Personnel Support and Individual Training.

Training and Personnel
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	36.0	38.1	36.0	35.5
Reserve	2.4	2.7	2.0	2.1
<u>Civilian</u>	5.8	5.6	5.7	5.7

1. Personnel Support

This subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy recruiting and examining, education of overseas dependents, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career-training and intern programs. The Personnel Support category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

Personnel Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.1	8.9	8.4	8.2
Reserve	2.1	2.5	1.7	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.4

In FY 1991 active Personnel Support decreases -195 with -281 in Recruiting Activities and +93 in Other Personnel Activities. In FY 1992 Personnel Support decreases -569 with -517 in Recruiting Activities. In FY 1993 Personnel Support decreases -156 including -128 in Recruiting Activities.

The decrease in FY 1992 Reserve strength reflects an overall reduction commensurate with the projected national security environment and the ability to reconstitute this capability from other sources at mobilization.

The civilian end strength requirement is affected by several factors in this sub-category. Decreases in FY 1991 relate to the general downsizing of morale, welfare and recreation and personnel support programs to parallel troop reductions. The transfer of Section Six Schools out of Navy occurs in FY 1992. While there is a small increase in the number of child care providers, the major increase in this sub-category is caused by the transfer of existing child care and family services positions out of Base Operating Support in several of the DPPCs into Personnel Support beginning in FY 1992.

2. Individual Training

This category includes manpower for formal military and technical training, as well as for professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category include recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category is dedicated to training of active Navy students and trainees and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in permanent change of station status are carried in the Individuals subcategory; those in temporary additional duty status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

Individual Training
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	26.9	29.2	27.7	27.3
Reserve	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3

In FY 1991 active Individual Training increases +2231 including +1491 in Other Flight Training, +627 in General Skill Training, and +368 in Undergraduate Pilot Training. Decrements include -235 in Recruit Training Units. In FY 1992 Individual Training decreases -1463 including -807 in Other Flight Training, -325 in General Skill Training and -130 in Recruit Training Units. In FY 1993 Individual Training decreases -360 including -345 in General Skill Training, -76 in Recruit Training Units, offset by +139 in Other Flight Training.

There are no major changes in civilian end strength requirements in this sub-category.

L. Support Activities

This category includes strength associated with Base Operating Support (BOS) for Support Installations and for Centralized Support Activities.

Support Activities
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	30.7	30.1	27.8	27.2
Reserve	7.7	8.3	8.3	8.0
<u>Civilian</u>	53.5	52.3	42.2	41.8

1. Support Installations

Support forces (BOS) includes auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

Support Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	25.1	25.1	22.9	22.3
Reserve	6.0	6.5	6.7	6.4
<u>Civilian</u>	51.8	50.7	40.7	40.3

In FY 1991 active Support Installations decreases -55 including -332 in Operations-Other Base Support, -176 Operations-Other Naval Reserve, -191 Resale Activities and -183 in Base Operations Health Care. Offsets include +124 in Operations Communications, +222 in Family Centers and +606 in Operations Training Navy. In FY 1992 Support Installations decreases -2170 including -154 in Operations Other Base Support, -883 in Resale Activities, -421 in Operations Training Navy and -129 in Base Operations Health Care. In FY 1993 Support Installations decreases -621 including -148 in Operations Other Base Support, -158 in Operation-Communications and -370 in Operations Training Navy, Increments include +240 in Information Automation.

The Reserve Support Installations increase in FY 1991 is caused by the undermanning in FY 1990 of both Full Time Support and drilling Reserve end strength in base operations units in favor of meeting higher priority requirements in Force Structure units. The Reserve base support infrastructure was reduced in FY 1993 commensurate with the overall Selected Reserve end strength reduction.

Decreases beginning in FY 1991 are the result of reductions in ship maintenance support and the decreased workload at the Navy Public Works Centers due to reduced customer funding. This is somewhat offset by the establishment of PWC Washington, D.C. in FY 1993 which transfers end strength from Base Operating Support in several DPPCs. Decreases in FY 1992 are the result of the transfer of commissary operations to OSD (-2,200). The major decrease is the result of the realignment of the Ship Repair Facilities from reimbursable end strength in this sub-category to direct funded end strength in the Naval Forces sub-category beginning in FY 1992.

2. Centralized Support Activities

This subcategory includes non-management headquarters strength for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense Agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

Centralized Support Activities
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.6	5.1	4.9	4.9
Reserve	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5

In FY 1991 active Centralized Support Activities decreases -541 including -460 in Personnel Administration and -174 in Service-wide Support. In FY 1992 Centralized Support Activities decreases -119 including -210 in Service-wide Support. There are no significant changes in FY 1993.

Selected Reserve end strength was reduced in FY 1992 to reflect a downward revision of requirements.

There are no major changes in civilian end strength requirements in this sub-category.

M. Undistributed

The Navy's internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force structure manning. Average strength for the force differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning, usually related to permanent change of station moves and accessions. These seasonal fluctuations may result in undermanning (fewer people than spaces) or overmanning (more people than spaces) in both the active and reserve force. Through proper management of the distributable force, Navy endeavors to maintain a steady active force deviation.

Undistributed
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.0	-5.8	-5.8	-5.8

N. Individuals/Individual Mobilization Augmentees

The Individuals account represents spaces to accommodate Navy's manpower not in the Force Structure due to a specific type of status described in the following subcategories.

Individuals
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	99.4	92.5	92.2	92.5
Reserve	6.8	5.5	3.6	3.4

1. Transients

Transients
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	23.4	23.5	23.8	24.1
Reserve	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7

In FY 1991 active Transients increases +172. In FY 1992 Transients increases +223 and +329 in FY 1993.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

Patients, Prisoners, and Holders
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	3.4	4.2	3.7	3.7
Reserve	0.1	**	**	**

In FY 1991 active Patients, Prisoners and Holdees increases +860. In FY 1992 PPH decreases -552 and there are no changes in FY 1993.

3. Trainees, Students, Midshipmen, and NAVCADS

Spaces for manpower completing initial entry training (trainees), manpower attending other courses of instruction in a permanent change of station status or in a temporary duty status while executing a permanent change of station move (students), students (Midshipmen) attending the United States Naval Academy, and Naval Aviation Cadets (NAVCADS).

Trainees, Students, Midshipmen, and NAVCADS (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	72.7	64.8	64.8	64.7
Reserve	3.9	3.5	1.6	1.6

In FY 1991 active Trainees and Students decreases -7828. Decrements include -3162 in Recruit Training Units, -2844 in General Skill Training, -569 in Other Professional Education, -350 Other College Commissioning Programs, -623 in Education and Training Health Care and -625 in Undergraduate Pilot Training. Increments include +270 in Readiness Squadrons, +111 in Other Flight Training, +191 in Readiness Squadrons (ASW). There are no major changes in FY 1992 and FY 1993 in Trainees and Students.

CHAPTER V

MARINE CORPS

MANPOWER PROGRAM

CHAPTER V

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General

This chapter describes Total Force Marine Corps programs for Active military, Reserve military, and Civilian manpower program; presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1992 and FY 1993; depicts manpower trends; discusses initiatives; and explains the changes from year to year. It also describes changes to provide the Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment, and greater integration with the Active Forces, in keeping with the Total Force Policy.

The Marine Corps provides our Nation a completely integrated, air-ground, force-in-readiness. As an expeditionary combined arms force, the Marine Corps is capable of responding to crises across the spectrum of conflict and provides a means of forcibly projecting and sustaining combat power in a hostile region.

Following enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 which set forth the composition and functional responsibilities of the armed forces, Congress more specifically defined the roles of the Services in 1952. The record of those hearings provides insight into the intent of Congress, as it viewed the need for a Marine Corps. Being naval in character, yet oriented in function to the land and air, such a force could operate with the Fleet around the world. This force would be able to provide the complete spectrum of response to "...minor international disturbances." The lawmakers envisioned, beyond this purpose, that such an organization would be available for other "...duties as the President may direct." For forty years, these requirements have been the blueprint for the Corps' strategic, operational, and program planning efforts.

B. Organization for Combat

The Marine Corps conducts land warfare from the sea. The Marine Corps integrates the full range of combat capabilities into a single-service, air-ground combat force possessing its own combat service support. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) provides the nation with a unique capability to project sustainable combat power from the sea. MAGTFs are task organized for rapid deployment/employment and can be task organized to contain capabilities ranging from the small Contingency MAGTFs, (as deployed and actually employed in the evacuation of non-combatants from Liberia) up to multiple Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) (as seen in Saudi Arabia) in a Corps size force. Furthermore MAGTFs are organized as reservoirs of combined arms to provide forces for peacetime contingencies such as security teams, mobile training teams, small independent action forces as well as sea based assault forces. The power and influence resident in MAGTFs can be projected and sustained deep inland against potential adversaries in support of developing nations. The Marines are an in existence crisis response force, strategically mobile, tactically flexible, and logistically sustainable.

There are four types of MAGTFs that may be formed in support of national strategy and combatant CINC crisis response requirements. These MAGTFs are the MEF, which is the most powerful MAGTF capable of prosecuting operational campaigns against the most capable potential enemy threat; the rapidly deployable and employable Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB); the routinely forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); and the small Special Purpose Forces (SPFs) formed for specific missions or contingencies.

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The MEF is the largest and most capable MAGTF. It is normally composed of a reinforced Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing, and a Force Service Support Group (FSSG). However, it may include several divisions, several aircraft wings and/or may include an augmented FSSG with a total force of 40,000 to 100,000 personnel. Integrated air-ground operations of the MEF are directed by a MAGTF commander (usually a lieutenant general) through a single command element. It can conduct a wide range of expeditionary operations, to include amphibious assault, and sustained operations ashore in any geographical environment. The MEF is self sustainable for a period of 60 days.

Marine Expeditionary Bridge (MEB). A MEB is a MAGTF composed of a reinforced infantry regiment, a Marine aircraft group, and a brigade service support group. Integrated air-ground operations of the MEB are directed by a MAGTF commander (usually a brigadier general) through a single command element. The MEB can conduct a range of expeditionary operations to include amphibious assaults of limited scope but not sustained combat operations. The MEB can be configured for deployment as an airlift contingency force (ACF), a maritime or geographical prepositioning force, or an amphibious force. A MEB may be forward-deployed afloat for an extended period to provide rapid response and normally serves as the precursor of a MEF. Its combat operations may be supported from amphibious shipping, facilities ashore, or a combination of both. A MEB will number 4,000 to 17,000 personnel and is capable of self sustained operations for 30 days.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). A MEU is composed of reinforced infantry battalion, a helicopter squadron reinforced with deployed and CONUS on-call fixed wing assets, and a MEU service support group. Integrated air-ground operations of the MEU are directed by a MAGTF commander (usually a colonel) through a single command element. A MEU is forward deployed as the immediately responsive, on-scene, sea-based Marine component of the fleet commander's amphibious and power projection forces. It is task-organized, trained and equipped to conduct a wide variety of conventional and specialized operations. Most important is the MEUs capability to conduct long-range amphibious raids from over-the-horizon without electronic emissions, during periods of darkness, and/or under adverse weather or sea conditions. For sustained operations it is the forward-deployed afloat element of a larger MAGTF. A MEU will number from 1,000 to 4,000 personnel and is capable of self sustained operations for 15 days.

Special Purpose Force (SPF). A SPF is a small task-organized MAGTF configured to accomplish missions for which the MEF, MEB, and MEU are not appropriate. SPFs can be organized, trained and equipped to conduct a wide variety of operations. SPFs can include mobile training teams, security assistance operations, and small independent action forces deployed by a variety of means, including amphibious or commercial ships, tactical or strategic airlift, or organic Marine aviation. SPFs are normally composed of Marines trained in day/night, insertion/extraction, raid, and strike operations. SPFs can possess extensive surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. This can include unmanned aerial vehicles, radio reconnaissance teams, and counterintelligence assets, as required.

C. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) data prepared in accordance with the Defense Guidance Illustrative Planning Scenario is one of the tools available for the Marine Corps to determine military and civilian manpower requirements.

Wartime Peak Demand for Trained Manpower (M+180) (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Peak Demand	399.7	399.7	*24.1	*24.1

*Excludes Foreign National Indirect Hire

D. Marine Corps Military Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan

The Marine Corps selectively mans its authorized force structure to maximize combat capability, placing top priority on manning combat forces. Except in time of emergency e.g., during wartime, the active forces are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements and are scheduled to be augmented by reassigning active component or pretrained manpower (Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Retirees). Fiscal realities preclude manning of certain units in peacetime.

The Marine Corps request for Active and Reserve military and civilian manpower for FY 1992 and FY 1993 is as follows:

Marine Corps Manpower Program (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Active Military	196.7	193.7	188.0	182.2
Marine Corps Reserve	44.5	43.9	40.9	38.9
Civilian Personnel	20.5	20.1	18.9	18.5

The difference between the peacetime manpower program and wartime demand for manpower is the requirement to man vacant FMF billets, supporting establishment (non-FMF) billet increases, and provide for casualty replacements. To meet the demand for wartime manpower, the Marine Corps will use all available assets: Active Component personnel, Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, Retirees, and non-prior service accessions.

E. Major Force Structure Changes

The Marine Corps is and will continue to be prepared to respond immediately to the Nation's call, whenever and wherever needed. The Corps of the last decade was modernized from the bottom up in order to prepare for the most probable conflicts of the 21st century. MAGTFs have been enhanced in preparation for incursions short of general war. MAGTFs are available overnight without having to recall our Reserve forces. The Reserve will remain a strategic capability and will provide those skills and functions necessary for general war through the augmentation and reinforcement of the active force. The structure changes planned for FY 1991 and beyond are designed to meet the demands of end strength reduction requirements, while maintaining the capability for the most likely low-to-medium intensity conflicts of the future.

1. Active Structure Changes

Command Element. Two Force Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific, were reduced by ten percent. However, within the Command Element of the MAGTF the Marine Corps is making adjustments to increase our command and control capabilities consistent with our view of a dynamic maneuver-oriented battlefield. Accordingly, in FY 1990 we activated the third of three programmed Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Groups (SRIGs). This unit provides a means for rapidly collecting and processing information to equip the commander with intelligence that can be integrated into his decision, action process, whether it is under joint or combined circumstances. It will substantially increase the ability of the MEF commander to gather and process tactical intelligence from a host of sources. Also, the new organization will enhance the inter-operability of the force with other Services in a joint environment. This 3d SRIG is based in III MEF on Okinawa, Japan.

Ground Combat Element. The Ground Combat element is being reduced in size, but will gain significant combat power projection capability, proportionate to the overall amphibious lift footprint. All self-propelled howitzers are on their way out of the inventory, thereby reducing the MAGTF lift requirement and eliminating costly logistics pipelines. Artillery Battalions are in the process of reorganization to produce versatile indirect fire support to the maneuver elements. As the combat forces are reduced, combat support units will be deactivated. The Truck Company of each Division is to be deactivated in FY 1990. A Reconnaissance Battalion will be deactivated in FY 1992. By the end of FY 1992, the Tank Battalions will have transitioned to the M1A1 Tank. This will result in a significant improvement in capability with a net reduction in personnel. In FY 1993 the Combat Engineer Battalion will lose heavy equipment when each of the three active duty battalions deactivate an Engineer

Support Company. Also in FY 1992, an Infantry Regiment Headquarters and an Assault Amphibian Battalion and 1st Tank Battalion will be deactivated.

Aviation Combat Element. The aviation combat forces continue to modernize: the A-6E, RF-4B, OA-4M are transitioning to the F/A-18D at the rate of one squadron per year, culminating in six F/A-18D squadrons in FY 1995. Installation of the AV-8B night attack and the KC-130 DECM capability continues. The CH-53D to CH-53E transition is ongoing, as is that of the AH-1W. Aviation force structure changes include the deactivation of medium air defense assets, a Light Anti-Air Missile Battalion in FY 1992. Additionally, two F/A-18 fighter/attack squadrons will be deactivated by the end of FY 1993.

Combat Service Support. Personnel reductions will come from the deactivation of one landing support company in FY 1991 and two landing support companies in FY 1993. An engineer company from 3D FSSG will be deactivated in FY 1993. Combat service support forces are in a dynamic transition due to significant projected structure reductions over the next five years. Several concepts for reorganization are being studied to determine the optimum organization for support of the MAGTF.

2. Reserve Structure Changes

The Marine Corps strictly adheres to the Total Force Policy and places only the force structure and manpower resources needed to meet national security requirements in the active component. The Marine Corps has structured and resourced a highly ready Selected Marine Corps Reserve that has proven its responsiveness and operational capabilities by its rapid call up and deployment in support of Operation DESERT STORM.

Due to the uncertainty in active force reductions, which are pending OSD and congressional review, significant changes in the Reserve structure have been held in abeyance. Pending completion of decisions by the Secretary of Defense on structure transformations necessitated by the changes in the international security forecast, we have maintained our current reserve force structure, even in the face of severely constrained budgetary resources. The only changes currently programmed in our Reserve Component reflect changes in equipment and modernization.

Accordingly during FY 1992 we will deactivate two Reserve fighter squadrons (A-4 squadrons) and a Reserve electronics warfare squadron. Our Reserve armor units will be subject to a major reorganization by FY 1993 as they receive the M1A1 per current fielding plans.

3. Manpower Plan

The Marine Corps Manpower Plan is given in the following tables:

Marine Corps Active Manpower Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	*	*	*	*
*STRATEGIC				
TACTICAL MOBILITY	119.8	120.1	113.6	110.6
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	9.2	8.9	8.9	8.3
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3
JOINT ACTIVITIES	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.5
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	14.4	13.6	13.5	13.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	13.0	12.5	12.5	12.4
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0.9	0.7	-0.5
INDIVIDUALS	30.5	28.0	29.2	28.8
Transients	6.3	5.4	5.6	5.3
Holdees	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
Students	23.0	21.5	22.4	22.3
** Total	196.7	193.7	188.0	182.2

* less than 50

** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Marine Corps Reserve Manpower Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Tactical/Mobility*	39.0	38.1	35.7	34.4
Support Activities	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Individuals	3.6	3.8	3.5	3.0
IMA	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.0
TOTALS	44.5	43.9	40.9	38.9

* Includes Reserve Full Time Support assigned to tactical mobility forces.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Support Activities	20.5	20.1	18.9	18.5
TOTALS	20.5	20.1	18.9	18.5

F. Key Manpower Issues

The current future-year defense plan institutes many key initiatives that are designed to keep the Marine Corps as an effective fighting force at a reduced level. The approach to the reductions in manpower have been evolutionary in nature and centered around and in support of the infantry battalion.

At current forecast levels the Marine Corps will be centered around a 24 infantry battalion force. As previously stated in Major Force Structure Changes the rest of the force will receive compensatory reductions with several aviation units moving to the reserves. This equates to a five Marine Expeditionary Brigade force with a ten operating airfield capability.

Based on our reduction strategy, the six functions of Aviation were retained with an emphasis on assault support. Changes in the Marine Corps Aviation Combat Element include fixed-wing transitions from A-4M and F-4S to F/A-18A aircraft and the growth of KC-130Ts is being accommodated. The EA-6A aircraft are scheduled for retirement during FY 1992. Rotary-wing modernization involves replacement of CH-53A with CH-53D airframes and the projected conversion of the AH-1J with the AH-1W, scheduled for completion during FY 1996. The phase III Product Improvement Program (PIP) for the Light Anti-Air Missile Battalion will be completed during FY 1993.

While making these changes to the structure of the Marine Corps, we also recognized factors affecting individual readiness. One critical element of individual warrior readiness is family readiness. The Marine Corps operates Family Service Centers at 18 major installations throughout CONUS and Japan. These centers provide an array of pre and post deployment, relocation, employment assistance, family advocacy, information and referral, exceptional family member and child development services, including family day care in the home programs. Continuing provision of quality family support programs is essential to prepare individual Marines and their families to meet the warfighting mission.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Military Manpower

1. General

Congress authorized the Marine Corps a FY 1991 end strength of 193,735. An end-strength of 188,000 is requested for FY 1992 and 182,200 for FY 1993.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

a. Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning

Total Active Force structure. Programmed manning decreases in relation to force structure and the Total Active Force Structure is manned at 90 percent.

Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 provide an overview of the changing relationship between programmed manpower structure, programmed manning, and end strength, by officer, enlisted, and total manpower.

TABLE V-1
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
AC TOTAL MILITARY												
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
* STRATEGIC	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
TACTICAL MOBILITY												
Land Forces	138.8	119.8		129.8	120.1	93	125.5	113.6	90	122.7	110.6	90
Tactical Air Forces	110.5	94.9		102.9	96.3	94	99.1	90.8	92	96.8	88.2	91
Naval Forces	27.5	24.3		26.3	23.3	89	25.7	22.3	87	25.3	21.9	87
Warships and ASW	0.8	0.6		0.6	0.5	79	0.6	0.5	79	0.6	0.5	79
Amphibious Forces	0.6	0.4		0.4	0.3	72	0.4	0.3	72	0.4	0.3	72
Naval Support Forces	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	92	0.2	0.2	92	0.2	0.2	92
	*	*		*	*	93	*	*	93	*	*	93
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL												
Intelligence	0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9	98	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100
Centrally Managed Comm	0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8	98	0.8	0.8	100	0.8	0.8	100
	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	10.5	9.2		10.2	8.9	87	10.2	8.9	87	9.7	8.3	86
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.3	3.2		3.3	3.3	100	3.3	3.3	100	3.3	3.3	100
JOINT ACTIVITIES												
Int'l Military Org	2.1	2.0		2.1	2.1	99	2.1	2.1	99	2.1	2.1	99
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	87	0.1	0.1	87	0.1	0.1	87
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
Joint Staff	1.5	1.4		1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	98	1.5	1.5	100
OSD/Defense	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	98	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	98
Agencies/Activities	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.9	0.8		0.9	0.8	94	0.9	0.7	82	0.9	0.6	70

AC TOTAL MILITARY	FY 1990		FY 1991		FY 1992		FY 1993	
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES								
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS								
Combat Commands	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.5
Support Commands	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6
	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT								
Research and Development	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9
	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL								
Personnel Support	13.9	14.4	13.9	13.6	13.9	13.5	13.7	13.3
Individual Training	4.7	5.1	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.7	4.5
	9.2	9.3	9.2	9.0	9.2	9.0	9.0	8.7
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES								
Support Installations	13.5	13.0	13.5	12.5	13.6	12.5	13.4	12.4
Centralized Support Act'y	11.1	10.8	11.1	10.5	11.1	10.5	11.0	10.4
	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.0	2.4	2.0	2.4	2.0
TOTAL PROGRAMMED	186.6	166.1	177.4	164.8	173.1	158.1	169.3	154.0
HANNING								
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0	NA	0.9	NA	0.7	NA	-0.5
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES								
INDIVIDUALS	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.0
Transients	30.5	30.5		28.0	29.2	29.2	28.8	28.8
Holdees	6.3	6.3		5.4	5.6	5.6	5.3	5.3
Students	1.2	1.2		1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
	23.0	23.0		21.5	22.4	22.4	22.3	22.3
END-STRENGTH	217.1	196.7		193.7	188.0	188.0	182.2	182.2

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive.

TABLE V-2
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC OFFICERS	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
* STRATEGIC	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
TACTICAL MOBILITY												
Land Forces	10.7	9.9		10.5	9.6	92	10.2	9.1	89	10.0	8.8	88
Tactical Air Forces	7.9	7.4		7.7	7.1	93	7.5	6.8	91	7.3	6.5	89
Naval Forces	2.7	2.4		2.6	2.3	89	2.6	2.2	86	2.6	2.1	84
Warships and ASW	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	86	0.1	0.1	86	0.1	0.1	86
Amphibious Force	0.1	0.1		0.1	*	88	0.1	*	88	0.1	*	88
Naval Support Forces	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	83	0.1	0.1	83	0.1	0.1	83
	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL												
Intelligence	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	97	0.2	0.2	96	0.2	0.2	97
Centrally Managed Comm	0.2	0.2		0.1	0.1	97	0.2	0.1	95	0.2	0.1	96
	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS												
	1.1	0.9		1.0	1.0	93	1.0	1.0	93	1.0	1.0	93
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING												
	0.5	0.4		0.5	0.5	99	0.5	0.5	99	0.5	0.5	100
JOINT ACTIVITIES												
Int'l Military Org	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	85	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	98	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
OSD/Defense	*	*		*	*	98	*	*	100	*	*	100
Agencies/Activities	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
CENTRAL LOGISTICS												
	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	98	0.2	0.2	96	0.2	0.2	94

AC OFFICERS	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>												
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	0.9	0.9		0.9	0.8	93	0.9	0.8	93	0.9	0.8	93
Combat Commands	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.2	90	0.3	0.2	90	0.3	0.2	86
Support Commands	0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6	95	0.6	0.6	95	0.6	0.6	97
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>												
Research and Development	0.4	0.4		0.5	0.4	96	0.5	0.4	96	0.4	0.4	96
	0.4	0.4		0.5	0.4	96	0.5	0.4	96	0.4	0.4	96
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>												
Personnel Support	1.9	1.9		1.9	1.9	98	1.9	1.9	98	1.9	1.8	96
Individual Training	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
	1.5	1.5		1.5	1.4	97	1.5	1.4	97	1.5	1.4	94
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Support Installations	1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3	96	1.3	1.3	96	1.3	1.3	96
Centralized Support Act'y	0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7	98	0.7	0.7	98	0.7	0.7	98
	0.6	0.6		0.7	0.6	94	0.7	0.6	94	0.7	0.6	94
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED</u>	17.8	16.5		17.5	16.4	94	17.3	16.0	92	17.0	15.4	90
<u>MANNING</u>												
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	0	0		NA	*	NA	NA	-*	NA	NA	-0.1	NA
<u>** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>												
	0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8	NA	0.7	0.7	NA	0.6	0.6	NA
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>												
Transients	3.4	3.4			3.4			3.3			3.3	
Holdees	0.4	0.4			0.5			0.5			0.5	
Students	*	*			*			*			*	
	2.9	2.9			2.8			2.8			2.7	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	21.2	20.0			19.8			19.2			18.6	

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive.

TABLE V-3
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC LISTED	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
* STRATEGIC	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
TACTICAL MOBILITY												
Land Forces	128.0	109.9		119.3	110.5	93	115.2	104.4	91	112.7	101.8	90
Tactical Air Forces	102.6	87.5		95.2	89.2	94	91.7	84.0	92	89.5	81.7	91
Naval Forces	24.6	21.9		23.6	20.9	89	23.1	20.0	87	22.7	19.7	87
Warships and ASW	0.7	0.6		0.5	0.4	77	0.5	0.4	78	0.5	0.4	78
Amphibious Forces	0.5	0.3		0.4	0.2	69	0.4	0.2	70	0.4	0.2	70
Naval Support Forces	0.2	0.2		0.1	0.1	99	0.1	0.1	99	0.1	0.1	99
	*	*		*	*	92	*	*	92	*	*	92
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL												
Intelligence	0.7	0.8		0.7	0.7	98	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100
Centrally Managed Comm	0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7	98	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100
	*	0.1		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS												
	9.4	8.3		9.2	7.9	86	9.2	7.9	86	8.6	7.3	85
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING												
	2.9	2.8		2.9	2.9	100	2.9	2.9	100	2.9	2.9	100
JOINT ACTIVITIES												
Int'l Military Org	1.6	1.5		1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	99	1.6	1.6	99
Unified Commands	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	99	0.1	0.1	100
Joint Staff	1.4	1.3		1.4	1.4	100	1.4	1.4	100	1.4	1.4	100
OSD/Defense	*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Agencies/Activities	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	97	0.1	0.1	96	*	*	91
CENTRAL LOGISTICS												
	0.7	0.7		0.7	0.6	92	0.7	0.5	78	0.7	0.4	63

AC ENLISTED	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	0.8	0.7		0.8	0.7	86	0.8	0.7	86	0.8	0.7	86
Combat Commands	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.3	76	0.4	0.3	76	0.4	0.3	76
Support Commands	0.4	0.2		0.4	0.4	95	0.4	0.4	95	0.4	0.4	96
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	95	0.5	0.5	95	0.5	0.5	95
Research and Development	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	95	0.5	0.5	95	0.5	0.5	95
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	12.0	12.5		12.0	11.7	98	12.0	11.7	97	11.8	11.5	97
Personnel Support	4.2	4.6		4.2	4.2	99	4.2	4.1	97	4.2	4.1	97
Individual Training	7.8	7.9		7.8	7.6	98	7.8	7.6	98	7.6	7.3	97
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	12.2	11.8		12.2	11.2	92	12.2	11.2	92	12.1	11.2	92
Support Installations	10.5	10.1		10.5	9.8	94	10.5	9.8	94	10.4	9.8	94
Centralized Support Act'y	1.7	1.7		1.8	1.4	81	1.7	1.4	81	1.7	1.4	82
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	168.8	149.6		159.9	148.4	93	155.8	142.2	91	152.4	138.5	90
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0		NA	0.9	NA	NA	0.8	NA	NA	-0.4	NA
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	0.5	0.6		0.6	0.6	NA	0.5	0.5	NA	0.4	0.4	
INDIVIDUALS	27.1	27.1			24.7			25.9			25.5	
Transients	5.9	5.9			4.9			5.1			4.9	
Holdees	1.2	1.2			1.1			1.1			1.1	
Students	20.0	20.0			18.6			19.7			19.6	
END-STRENGTH	195.9	176.7			174.0			168.8			163.6	

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive.

b. Operating Strength

For FY 1992 and FY 1993 the Marine Corps has programmed operating strength supply equal to programmed manning demand, forming a balanced manpower plan in the sense that if all elements of the program are executed (recruiting, training, staffing, etc.), the average operating strength population will be sufficient to staff the billets programmed for manning. Actual execution of the plan in FY 1992 and FY 1993 may deviate somewhat from the program, but these deviations have historically been minimal. However, the intensity and duration of support to Operation DESERT STORM may influence actual execution more dramatically than historical precedence.

3. Skill and Grade

Table V-4 summarizes the existing and projected inventories as they compare to programmed manning and individuals. In the aggregate, the enlisted population is believed to be sufficient to meet the programmed manning demand through FY 1992/1993. However, there will continue to be imbalances in specific military occupational specialties (MOSs). The total number of enlisted skills which remain unbalanced is projected to decrease by FY 1993. This decrease will be reflected primarily in the E5-E9 population, as the Marine Corps policy of selecting career force Marines for promotion by MOS requirements better shapes the career force inventory. A reduction in the number of unbalanced skills is also expected in the E-4-E-5 population as a result of enlisted career force control policies that preclude first term reenlistments in over strength skills. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) continues to be the most important tool for reducing career force skill imbalances in the Fleet Marine Forces. The overall trend is favorable.

Officer skill imbalances are expected to increase in the 0-1 to 0-3 grades due to the projected strength cuts which will fall heavily on new accessions. The first priority requirement to fill ground combat arms and aviation skills will cause the support skills to become increasingly short throughout the reduction period.

4. Experience

Table V-5 displays the average years of service (YOS) by grade for officer and enlisted. The enlisted force is becoming more experienced. The career force is expected to approach 72,000 by the end of FY 1993. This reflects a more mature and experienced career force, providing a stable leadership cadre in the Corps. Force draw downs based primarily on accession management would further increase careerist growth and slow promotions. Accordingly, options are being examined to pursue a more balanced approach to meeting lower end strength targets.

The officer force is moving in two directions. The 0-1 to 0-3 force will become slightly more experienced due to the reduction in accessions projected throughout the reduction years. This will be partially offset by a reduction in the promotion flow point to 0-4. The longevity of the 0-4 to 0-6 force will decrease as the effects of involuntary retirements reduce the promotion flow points.

TABLE V-4
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PHI)
(Strength in thousands)

	FY 1990				FY 1991				FY 1992				FY 1993			
	OVER++	BAL++	SHORT++	TOTAL	OVER++	BAL++	SHORT++	TOTAL	OVER++	BAL++	SHORT++	TOTAL	OVER++	BAL++	SHORT++	TOTAL
E1-24																
Number of Skills	102	47	131	280	102	75	103	280	102	102	75	103	102	102	75	103
PHI	0.0	121.3	0.0	121.3	0.0	119.2	0.0	119.2	0.0	113.9	0.0	113.9	0.0	108.6	0.0	108.6
Inventory	18.4	66.5	36.4	121.3	14.6	90.0	14.6	119.2	14.1	85.7	14.1	113.9	13.6	81.4	13.6	108.6
Over/Short	+18.4	-54.8	+36.4	0.0	+14.6	-29.2	+14.6	0.0	+14.1	-28.2	+14.1	0.0	+13.6	27.2	+13.6	0.0
E5-29																
Number of Skills	92	98	45	235	65	105	65	235	65	105	65	235	65	105	65	235
PHI	0.0	55.8	0.0	55.8	0.0	54.7	0.0	54.7	0.0	54.1	0.0	54.1	0.0	50.9	0.0	50.9
Inventory	17.8	27.3	10.3	55.4	5.0	44.7	5.0	54.7	4.5	45.1	4.5	54.1	4.0	42.9	4.0	50.9
Over/Short	+17.8	-28.5	+10.3	-0.4	+5.0	-10.0	+5.0	0.0	+4.5	-9.0	+4.5	0.0	+4.0	-8.0	+4.0	0.0
Total E1-29																
Number of Skills	120	92	121	333	116	100	117	333	116	100	117	333	116	100	117	333
PHI	0.0	177.1	0.0	177.1	0.0	174.0	0.0	174.0	0.0	168.0	0.0	168.0	0.0	159.6	0.0	159.6
Inventory	38.2	95.4	43.1	176.7	19.5	135.0	19.5	174.0	18.0	132.0	18.0	168.0	17.0	125.6	17.0	159.6
Over/Short	+38.2	-81.7	+43.1	-0.4	+19.5	-39.0	+19.5	0.0	+18.0	-36.0	+18.0	0.0	+17.0	-34.0	+17.0	0.0
E7-34																
Number of Skills	10	15	28	53	13	21	19	53	13	21	19	53	13	21	19	53
PHI	0.2	0.4	1.6	2.2	0.3	0.8	1.1	2.2	0.3	0.8	1.1	2.2	0.3	0.8	1.1	2.2
Inventory	0.3	0.4	0.9	1.6	0.4	0.8	0.7	1.8	0.4	0.8	0.7	1.8	0.4	0.8	0.7	1.8
Over/Short	0.1	0.0	-0.6	-0.5	0.1	0.0	-0.4	-0.3	0.1	0.0	-0.4	-0.3	0.1	0.0	-0.4	-0.3
O1-03																
Number of Skills	41	10	22	73	35	17	21	73	34	19	20	73	33	21	19	73
PHI	3.3	2.3	4.5	10.1	3.2	2.5	4.4	10.1	3.1	2.6	4.3	10	3.0	2.7	4.1	9.8
Inventory	4.3	2.2	3.3	9.8	4.2	2.4	3.2	9.8	4.0	2.5	3.2	9.7	3.8	2.6	3.2	9.6
Over/Short	+1.0	-0.1	-1.2	-0.3	+1.0	-0.1	-1.2	-0.3	+9	-0.1	-1.1	-0.3	+0.8	-0.1	-0.9	-0.2
O4-06																
Number of Skills	30	20	31	81	25	26	30	81	24	28	29	81	23	30	28	81
PHI	1.7	1.9	1.9	5.5	1.6	2.0	1.8	5.4	1.5	2.1	1.7	5.3	1.4	2.2	1.6	5.2
Inventory	2.5	1.8	1.1	5.4	2.3	1.9	1.2	5.4	2.1	2.0	1.2	5.3	1.9	2.1	1.2	5.2
Over/Short	+0.8	-0.1	-0.8	-0.1	+0.7	-0.1	-0.6	0.0	+0.6	-0.1	-0.5	0.0	+0.5	-0.1	-0.3	0.0
Total O1-06																
Number of Skills	36	25	20	81	33	29	19	81	32	31	18	81	31	32	18	81
PHI	5.0	4.2	6.4	15.6	4.8	4.5	6.2	15.5	4.6	4.7	6	15.3	4.4	4.9	5.7	15
Inventory	6.8	4.0	4.4	15.2	6.5	4.3	4.4	15.2	6.1	4.5	4.4	15	5.7	4.7	4.4	14.8
Over/Short	+1.8	-0.2	-2.0	-0.4	+1.7	-0.2	-1.8	-0.3	+1.5	-0.2	-1.6	-0.3	+1.3	-0.2	-1.3	-0.2

*Less than 50.
**See definitions in Appendix B.

TABLE V-5
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.
	PEOPLE	WITH >	YOS	PEOPLE	WITH >	YOS	PEOPLE	WITH >	YOS	PEOPLE	WITH >	YOS
E1-E4												
PMI*	121.3	N/A	N/A	119.2	17.9	3.0	113.9	18.2	3.0	108.6	18.5	3.0
Inventory	121.3	18.2	2.9	119.2	N/A	N/A	113.9	N/A	N/A	108.6	N/A	N/A
E5-E9												
PMI	55.8	N/A	N/A	54.7	54.2	12.6	54.1	53.6	12.6	50.9	50.4	12.6
Inventory	55.4	54.8	12.5	54.7	N/A	N/A	54.1	N/A	N/A	50.9	N/A	N/A
E1-E9												
PMI	177.1	N/A	N/A	174.0	72.1	6.0	168.0	71.8	6.0	159.6	68.1	6.0
Inventory	176.7	73.0	5.9	174.0	N/A	N/A	168.0	N/A	N/A	159.6	N/A	N/A
W1-W4												
PMI	2.1	N/A	N/A	2.1	1.8	15.0	1.4	1.8	15.1	2.1	1.8	15.3
Inventory	1.7	1.7	14.8	1.8	N/A	N/A	1.8	N/A	N/A	1.8	N/A	N/A
01-03												
PMI	13.0	N/A	N/A	12.6	9.0	6.8	12.4	8.8	6.8	12.2	8.7	6.8
Inventory	12.9	9.1	6.8	12.6	N/A	N/A	12.4	N/A	N/A	12.2	N/A	N/A
04-06												
PMI	5.5	N/A	N/A	5.5	5.5	18.1	5.5	5.4	18.1	5.3	5.3	18.1
Inventory	5.5	5.5	18.1	5.5	N/A	N/A	5.4	N/A	N/A	5.3	N/A	N/A
01-06												
PMI	18.5	N/A	N/A	18.1	14.5	10.2	17.8	14.2	10.2	17.5	14.0	10.2
Inventory	18.4	14.6	10.2	18.1	N/A	N/A	17.8	N/A	N/A	17.5	N/A	N/A

*Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. The Marine Corps achieved 100.1 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals in FY 1990. The Marine Corps recruited 355 three-year, 26,650 four-year, and 6,231 five and six-year non-prior service regular (male and female) enlistees. In FY 1991, enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of not less than 90 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions. In FY 1990, 94.3 percent of male and 99.0 percent of female non-prior service enlistees were Tier I high school graduates under the new DoD educational credential system. The recruiting goal for FY 1991 is for 95 percent of all male and female non-prior service recruits to be Tier I high school graduates.

The Marine Corps uses a "level load" accession policy, i.e., modifying the flow of recruits so that Marines are accessed more evenly throughout the year. The expected benefits are more efficient entry level training, more even separation patterns, and increased readiness.

Enlisted Accession Plans

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>					
Prior Service	370	539	720	0	0
Non-Prior Service	33,238	33,006	30,795	31,132	33,095
Male	31,472	31,272	29,195	29,532	31,495
(HSG)	(29,701)	(28,145)	(27,736)	(28,055)	(29,921)
Female	1,766	1,734	1,600	1,600	1,600
(HSDG)	(1,747)	(1,561)	(1,520)	(1,520)	(1,520)

(2) Retention. The overall FY 1990 Retention Goal was met. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) is still the most significant tool in retaining skilled and experienced career force Marines. It is a key reason why the Marine Corps is experiencing a continuation of the quality recruiting and retention trends realized in the mid to late 1980's.

Enlisted Retention Plans

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
<u>RETENTION</u>					
First Term	3,015	3,182	2,861	2,874	2,825
Career	7,548	7,205	7,592	7,625	7,495

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. Since 1980, the Marine Corps has maintained population stability. This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in service over the period of a year.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Enlisted	52.2	32.8	52.7	50.5	43.6	47.0

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The improvement in retention and the population stability has translated into greater unit stability. This unit stability provides the commander with the ability to maintain a trained, cohesive unit throughout the year. Consequently, FMF readiness increases and deployment preparation improves. This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in the same unit over the course of a year.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Enlisted	57.9	56.6	56.5	58.6	63.5	63.7

b. Officer and Warrant Officer

(1) Recruiting. Officer end strength is programmed to be 19,757 in FY 1991, 19,180 in FY 1992 and 18,591 in FY 1993. When the DOPMA grade ceilings are applied to these end strengths, however, the Marine Corps is approximately 700 field grade officers deficient of that number needed to meet validated mission requirements. Despite this serious shortcoming, as well as various promotion timing and opportunity concerns, the officer strength and distribution will continue to provide the quality of leadership necessary for the future.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objectives

<u>FY 90</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 91</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 92</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 93</u> <u>Goal</u>
1,618	1,500	1,400	1,500

(2) Retention. Overall officer retention in FY 1990 equalled the historic averages. Overall retention rates are expected to remain stable during FY 1991 and FY 1992. Pilot shortages have emerged in all fixed wing aviation communities.

Active Marine Corps Officer Retention
(Percent)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Ground Unrestricted	90.7%	91	91	91
Aviation Unrestricted	89.1%	89	89	89

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. High officer retention contributes to high population stability.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officer	91.3	91.3	92.1	92.1	90.3	90.4

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The officer community shows a steady trend in unit stability.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officer	44.8	46.8	46.5	46.8	46.8	47.0

6. Readiness Assessment

The Marine Corps FY 1992 and FY 1993 end strength requests are 188,000 and 182,200 respectively. Structure improvements reflect a modest decrease, based upon previous programmed structure decisions. Present readiness levels will be maintained or increased due to the SWA commitment. With the action of mobilization of USMCR units and stop loss, the state of readiness will increase. Once the SWA commitment is completed the Marine Corps will resume efforts to streamline its ranks by retaining level accessions in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Stability will be maintained through training pipeline flow and separation patterns.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to maintain highly trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency. The Marine Corps Reserve is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve (which consists of the selected Marine Corps Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve), the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve. The primary source of both units and individual manpower upon mobilization is the Ready Reserve, which consists of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve.

1. Ready Reserve

a. Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR)

(1) General. The SMCR units taken together form a Division, Aircraft Wing, and Force Service Support Group. These units present a balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces similar to their Active Force counterparts.

(2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

(a) Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Tables V-6, V-7, and V-8 provide an overview of the changing relationship between the programmed manpower structure, and programmed manning.

(b) Trained in Unit Strength. Table V-9 reflects trained in unit strength for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.

(3) Skill and Grade. Table V-10 summarizes the existing and projected Reserve inventory as compared to programmed manning.

(4) Experience. Table V-11 reflects the SMCR experience and grade mix.

(5) Personnel Management

(a) Recruiting. Recruiting goals and actuals for the SMCR are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
Non-prior Service	7,800	7,781	7,400	6,600	6,200
Prior Service	4,217	4,339	3,525	3,300	3,000

For FY 1990, the SMCR attained its recruiting goal. Prior Service recruiting was reduced during the final quarter in an effort not to exceed our authorized end strength. In FY 1990, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve achieved a total paid end strength of 44,530.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are essentially the same as for the Active Force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes primarily from officers leaving active duty who have not yet completed their mandatory obligated service, recently extended from six to eight years.

(b) Retention. FY 1990 turnover in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve was over two percent lower than in FY 1989. The sharpest decline was in prior service members, over 3.5 percent reduction.

TABLE V-6
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (THOUSANDS)

TOTAL MILITARY	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	MNG	%	REQT	AUTH	MNG	REQT	AUTH	%
TACTICAL/MOBILITY												
Land Forces	37.7	39.0	41.9	38.1	91	86	41.7	35.7	86	40.2	34.4	86
Tactical Air Forces	28.6	30.4	30.9	29.0	94	86	31.0	26.8	86	29.8	25.8	87
	9.1	8.6	11.0	9.1	83	83	10.7	8.9	83	10.4	8.6	83
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Central Support Activities	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	100	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	38.3	39.6	42.5	38.7	91	86	42.2	36.2	86	40.7	36.2	86
IMA's	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4			1.2	1.2		1.0	1.0	
INDIVIDUALS	4.3	3.6		3.8				3.5			3.0	
END STRENGTH	44.0	44.5	43.9	43.9			43.4	40.9		41.9	38.9	

NOTE: Tactical Air Forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect active component personnel.

TABLE V-7
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

OFFICER	FY 1990		FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>											
Land Forces	2.8	2.6	3.1	2.8	90	3.1	2.8	90	3.0	2.7	90
Tactical Air Forces	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.7	89	1.9	1.7	89	1.8	1.6	89
	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.1	90	1.2	1.1	92	1.2	1.1	92
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>											
Central Support Activities	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	2.9	2.8	3.3	2.9	88	3.3	3.0	91	3.2	2.9	91
<u>IMA's</u>	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8		0.7	0.7		0.6	0.6	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	3.7	3.6	4.1	3.8		4.0	3.7		3.8	3.5	

NOTE: Tactical Air Forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect active component personnel.

TABLE V-8
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

ENLISTED	FY 1990		FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>											
Land Forces	34.9	36.4	38.8	35.3	91	38.6	32.9	85	37.2	31.7	85
Tactical Air Forces	27.0	28.9	29.0	27.3	94	29.1	25.1	86	28.0	24.2	86
	7.9	7.5	9.8	8.0	82	9.5	7.8	82	9.2	7.5	82
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>											
Central Support Activities	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	35.4	36.8	39.2	35.7	91	38.9	33.2	85	37.5	33.2	85
<u>IMA's</u>	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6		0.5	0.5		0.4	0.4	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	4.3	3.6	N/A	3.8		N/A	3.5		N/A	3.0	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	40.3	40.9	39.8	40.1		39.3	37.2		37.9	35.4	

NOTE: Tactical Air Forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect active component personnel.

Table V-9
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE
TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH
(Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
End Strength	44.5	43.9	40.9	38.9
-Training Pipeline	3.6	3.8	3.5	3.0
-IMAs	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.0
Operating Strength	39.6	38.7	36.2	34.9
-Non Unit Personnel	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
+Unit AC Personnel	5.0	5.0	4.7	4.7
Trained Unit Strength	44.0	43.1	40.4	39.1
Structure Requirement (Wartime)	45.8	45.4	44.9	43.6
-Non-Unit Structure	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Wartime Unit Structure	45.2	44.8	44.4	43.1
% Trained in Units	97.3%	96.2%	91.0%	90.7%

NOTE: Structure requirement (wartime) and wartime unit structure numbers include active component structure in the tactical air forces.

TABLE V-10
RESERVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS
(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1990				FY 1991				FY 1992				FY 1993			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1-E4																
Number of Skills	25	32	193	250	25	85	140	250	20	95	135	250	18	100	132	250
PMI	3.0	3.8	22.8	29.5	2.9	10.0	16.4	29.3	2.2	10.6	15.1	28.0	1.9	10.8	14.3	27.0
Inventory	5.8	3.8	21.7	31.2	4.3	10.0	16.3	30.6	3.0	10.6	14.7	28.3	2.5	10.8	14.2	27.5
Over/Short	2.8	0.0	-1.1	1.7	1.4	0.0	-0.1	1.3	0.7	0.0	-0.4	0.3	0.6	0.0	-0.1	0.5
E5-E9																
Number of Skills	44	33	235	312	38	64	210	312	36	97	179	312	33	107	172	312
PMI	1.5	1.1	8.1	10.8	1.3	2.2	7.3	10.8	1.1	2.9	5.3	9.2	1.0	2.9	4.6	8.4
Inventory	2.4	1.1	6.1	9.7	1.8	2.2	5.5	9.5	1.5	2.9	4.5	8.9	1.2	2.9	3.9	7.9
Over/Short	0.9	0.0	-2.0	-1.1	0.5	0.0	-1.8	-1.3	0.5	0.0	-0.8	-0.3	0.3	0.0	-0.8	-0.5
Total E1-E9																
Number of Skills	34	76	219	329	34	76	219	329	32	99	198	329	30	114	185	329
PMI	4.2	9.3	26.8	40.3	4.1	9.3	26.7	40.1	3.6	11.2	22.4	37.2	3.2	12.3	19.9	35.4
Inventory	5.9	9.3	25.7	40.9	5.7	9.3	25.1	40.1	4.6	11.2	21.5	37.2	3.8	12.3	19.3	35.4
Over/Short	1.7	0.0	-1.1	0.6	1.6	0.0	-1.6	0.0	0.9	0.0	-0.9	0.0	0.6	0.0	-0.6	0.0
W1-W4																
Number of Skills	15	16	14	45	16	16	13	45	14	19	12	45	12	22	11	45
PMI	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.5
Inventory	0.5	0.2	-0.2	0.5	0.6	0.2	-0.3	0.5	0.5	0.2	-0.3	0.5	0.4	0.2	-0.2	0.5
Over/Short	0.4	0.0	-0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	-0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	-0.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	-0.3	0.0
01-03																
Number of Skills	6	5	58	69	6	10	53	69	5	14	50	69	5	20	44	69
PMI	0.2	0.2	2.0	2.4	0.2	0.3	1.9	2.5	0.2	0.5	1.8	2.5	0.2	0.7	1.5	2.3
Inventory	0.3	0.2	1.0	1.5	0.4	0.3	1.2	1.9	0.3	0.5	1.2	2.0	0.3	0.7	1.0	1.9
Over/Short	0.1	0.0	-1.0	-0.9	0.1	0.0	-0.7	-0.6	0.1	0.0	-0.6	-0.5	0.1	0.0	-0.5	-0.4
04-06																
Number of Skills	24	8	25	57	24	8	25	57	22	11	24	57	21	13	23	57
PMI	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.7
Inventory	1.3	0.1	0.2	1.6	1.1	0.1	0.2	1.4	0.9	0.1	0.2	1.2	0.8	0.2	0.2	1.1
Over/Short	0.9	0.0	-0.1	0.8	0.7	0.0	-0.1	0.6	0.6	0.0	-0.1	0.5	0.5	0.0	-0.1	0.4
Total 01-06																
Number of Skills	15	10	46	71	15	10	46	71	14	13	44	71	13	15	43	71
PMI	0.7	0.5	2.1	3.2	0.7	0.5	2.1	3.3	0.6	0.6	2.0	3.2	0.5	0.6	1.8	3.0
Inventory	1.0	0.5	1.6	3.1	1.1	0.5	1.8	3.3	1.0	0.6	1.6	3.2	0.9	0.6	1.8	3.0
Over/Short	0.3	0.0	-0.4	-0.1	0.4	0.0	-0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	-0.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	-0.3	0.0

NOTE: Detail may not add due to rounding

TABLE V-11
RESERVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY

	FY 1990		FY 1991		FY 1992		FY 1993	
	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVE. WITH > 4 YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVE. WITH > 4 YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVE. WITH > 4 YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVE. WITH > 4 YOS
E1-E4 PMI INVENTORY	29.5 31.2	8.7 3.0	29.3 30.6	7.0 2.9	28.0 28.3	7.0 2.9	27.0 27.5	7.0 2.9
E5-E9 PMI INVENTORY	10.8 9.7	9.7 11.7	10.8 9.5	9.5 11.5	9.2 8.9	8.9 11.2	8.4 7.9	7.9 11.2
Total E1-E9 PMI INVENTORY	40.3 40.9	18.4 5.1	40.1 40.1	16.5 4.9	37.2 37.2	15.9 4.7	35.4 35.4	14.9 4.7
W1-W4 PMI INVENTORY	0.5 0.5	0.5 22.2	0.5 0.5	0.5 22.0	0.5 0.5	0.5 21.5	0.5 0.5	0.5 21.5
01-03 PMI INVENTORY	2.4 1.5	1.5 10.7	2.5 1.9	1.8 10.5	2.5 2.0	1.8 10.5	2.3 1.9	1.8 10.3
04-06 PMI INVENTORY	0.8 1.6	1.6 20.0	0.8 1.4	1.4 19.8	0.7 1.2	1.2 19.8	0.7 1.1	1.1 19.6
Total 01-06 PMI INVENTORY	3.2 3.1	3.1 15.6	3.3 3.3	3.2 15.4	3.2 3.2	3.0 15.4	3.3 3.3	2.9 15.3
total pmi	44		43.9		40.9		38.9	
total	44.5		43.9		40.9		38.9	

(c) Inventory Stability. Aggregate population stability (both officer and enlisted) showed a slight, but insignificant decline in FY 1990. However, there was a considerable increase in the enlisted unit personnel stability. This is in spite of the fact that nearly 33 percent of the personnel are non-mandatory participants who can leave the SMCR at will.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Enlisted	68.4	71.9	74.8	77.0	77.3	77.0
Officer	84.1	78.8	83.7	82.5	81.0	77.2

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Enlisted	57.7	52.0	57.9	59.3	59.5	69.1
Officer	69.8	61.2	71.1	70.2	65.7	64.9

(d) Officer Recruiting. We are attempting to attract more company grade officers leaving active duty by contacting them 90 days prior to expiration of service, through better advertising of available officer billets, and increasing assignment of officer recruitment quotas to prior service recruiters.

(6) USMCR Readiness Assessment. From a manpower perspective, the combat capability of the SMCR has been consistently improving since 1980. As the reduction in the SMCR end strength begins, there will be an increase in the MOS match within units. Recruitment for both non-prior service and prior service Marines by MOS within each unit will continue to reduce the enlisted MOS imbalances and increase overall readiness.

(7) Other. SMCR end strength requirements are 43,900 for FY 1991, and 40,900 in FY 1992. Despite the decline in end strength, these requirements will provide sufficient personnel to ensure SMCR units report to Station of Initial Assignment with above 90 percent of their wartime manning through FY 1993, maintain a training pipeline, and maintain ancillary mobilization manpower requirements.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY's 1991 and 1992 are 42,740 and 41,150. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on initial active duty, individual mobilization augmentees and full-time active duty personnel for administration and training of reserves.

(8) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program. The IMA Program assigns pre-trained Marines to wartime billets in order to ensure the designated Marine is prepared to function in a critical duty effectively on or shortly after mobilization.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees
(In Thousands)

<u>Drills</u> ^{1/}	<u>FY 90</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 92</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 93</u> (Goal)
(48)	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.0
(24)	*	*	*	*
(32)	*	*	*	*
TOTAL	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.0

*Less than 50.

^{1/} IMAs listed in this Table serve two weeks of active duty a year plus the number of drills shown in parentheses. They are paid for all active duty and for all drills.

(9) Full Time Support Program (FTS). FTS Reservists contribute to mobilization readiness and the accomplishment of the Reserve mission in two ways. First, they are qualified Marine reservists on active duty for periods of two to four years to support the Marine Corps Reserve. Their knowledge and efforts assist the active forces with administration and understanding of reserve programs. Secondly, knowledge and expertise gained by FTS reservists on active duty are taken back to SMCR units, thereby enhancing their effectiveness.

Full-Time Support Personnel
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 92</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 93</u> (Goal)
Reserve (AGR)	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.1
Civilian	.4	.4	.4	.4
Active Duty	5.0	5.0	4.7	4.7
Total	7.7	7.8	7.3	7.2

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

The IRR consists of members of the Ready Reserve who have no mandatory training requirement. The IRR provides pre-trained Marines to fill shortfalls in Active Operating Forces and Reserve units, and also provide for the expansion of the supporting base, as necessary, to meet wartime contingency requirements.

Individual Ready Reserve
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 90</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 92</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 93</u> (Goal)
36.8	54.8	69.8	69.9

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve consists of members of the Reserve Component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment Active and Reserve Forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

Standby Reserve (In Thousands)

<u>FY 90</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 92</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 93</u> (Goal)
1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4

3. Retirees

The retired military population is composed primarily of (1) retirees, both regular and reserve, who have completed 20 years active duty; these retirees are liable for recall at any time by the Service Secretary in the interest of national defense; (2) reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60.

Retirees (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees				
Categories I and II	37.0	37.0	37.0	38.1
Category III	45.4	45.4	45.4	46.4
Other Retiree Reserves				
Categories I and II	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
Category III	5.4	5.2	5.2	5.4

4. Marine Corps Reserve Personnel on Active Duty for Training in Excess of 180 Days

The Marine Corps did not have any Reserve personnel on Active Duty for training in excess of 180 days in FY 1990, nor are any programmed for FY 1991.

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

The Marine Corps civilian manpower resources have been severely reduced since FY 1989 through the budget process. With the reductions programmed through FY 1997 our civilian work force will be stretched to its minimal level capable of completing only the most essential tasks. Further reductions will impact on our ability to provide a stable, experienced civilian establishment to support our operating forces.

The FY 1991 authorization will be 20,519 civilians. Future programmed reductions to civilian end strength will make it difficult to meet mission responsibilities while minimizing the requirement for military personnel. This request, displayed by DPPC, is shown in Table V-12.

TABLE V-12
MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(DIRECT AND INDIRECT HIRE END STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>INV</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>AUTH</u>
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	11.0	10.4	10.4	10.3	10.1
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.5
SERVICE MANAGEMENT	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4
HEADQUARTERS					
Combat Commands	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
Support Commands	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
Personnel Support	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	5.7	5.2	5.4	3.9	3.8
Support Installations	4.1	3.7	3.9	3.0	2.9
Centralized Support	1.7	1.5	1.0	0.9	0.9
Act'y					
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE	21.8	20.5	20.1	18.9	18.5
STRUCTURE					

2. Major Program Changes

There will be major program changes to the Marine Corps civilian end strength between FY 1991 - FY 1994. With the DoD consolidations and military/civilian draw downs our present end strength authorization for FY 1991 will be severely impacted between now and FY 1994. Our FY 1991 strength of 20,159 requested reflects a net decrease of 1,212 from the strength of 21,371 planned for FY 1990. The FY 1992 strength of 18,914 reflects a net decrease of 1,245 from the planned FY 1991 strength.

3. Efficiency Review

The Marine Corps has implemented an effective Position Management Program that works within the "Managing-To-Payroll" concept. Also, the Marine Corps, as directed by DoD, has combined the Efficiency Review, Position Management, and Manpower Requirements Determination Program. The Position Management Review process will assist in determining the most effective and efficient mix of number of staff and appropriate grade levels developed during the Efficiency Review process.

4. Civilian End Strength Management

Removal of statutory civilian personnel end of year number constraints permits Marine Corps activities to adjust their work force to workload fluctuations. That flexibility allowed management to increase productive output for urgent, high priority requirements while maintaining scheduled production on routine workload.

5. Recruiting

The Marine Corps has been able to fill the majority of its civilian positions without undue difficulties. Problems continue to exist, however, in recruiting personnel to fill clerical positions in some labor markets and professional engineering positions in almost all labor markets. The DoD hiring freeze has impacted on our ability to recruit and fill critical positions such as fire fighters and safety inspection officers. Commands are attempting to recruit and fill these positions with lower grade personnel and train them to the increased skill levels required.

6. Commercial Activities (CA) Program

The following information reflects the results of the CA studies completed during FY 1990:

Number of Studies Completed	End Strength Involved in Studies Completed			Number of Activities Converted to Contract	End Strength Involved in Func- ions Converted		
	Civ	Mil	Total		Civ	Mil	Total
6	76	97	173	2	1	*53	54

(* In addition to the 53 dedicated billets, 535 additional duty military work years were studied in the food service function)

The FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act included language which established time frames for completion of studies (2 years for a single function study and 4 years for a multifunction study). In view of this language, projections for FY 1991 cannot be provided until DoD interpretation of the congressional language is received.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower

The Marine Corps enjoys an acceptable amount of pre-trained manpower for mobilization. The increased Active Component and Selected Reserve end strengths are sufficient to meet initial deployment requirements. In most manpower categories the supply is adequate for the demand. Of course, the Marine Corps is seriously affected by medical manpower shortages in the Navy. A decrease in the total shortfall will result from an assumed improved medical evacuation policy and the change in the Military Service Obligation from 6 to 8 years.

A more significant concern is meeting mobilization requirements with adequate numbers of trained personnel by skill category. Major emphasis is being placed upon enhancements in the mobilization and training process to reduce mobilization time for Pretrained Individual Manpower and to quickly provide refresher training or cross-training. As a result, the Marine Corps will be able to meet its wartime shortfalls with pretrained and current service personnel more rapidly. By establishing a better match between peacetime skills and wartime requirements, the Marine Corps will ensure the availability of mobilization manpower for the needed skills.

2. Civilian Manpower

In peacetime, the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the authorized civilian work force. On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment. At M-Day, the peacetime civilian source is reduced because some civilian employees are subject to call-up as reservists or military retirees. The Marine Corps continuously identifies those individuals who hold key positions in the Federal government and who are also either members of the Ready Reserve or retired military personnel eligible for recall.

Although Marine Corps wartime civilian employee requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, our needs are concentrated in logistics support personnel.

E. Manpower Management Improvements

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. These initiatives include conversion of Western Pacific unaccompanied billets, the Unit Deployment Program, and development of automated systems and models which improve the planning and assignment process.

1. Conversion of Unaccompanied Billets

In the second quarter of FY 1990 the Marine Corps completed a comprehensive review of accompanied tours in the Western Pacific. This review resulted in the expansion of accompanied tours improving tour stability and promoting unit integrity. The current plan converts in FY 1991 - 155 billets, FY 1992 - 271 billets, FY 1993 - 270 billets and FY 1994 - 129 billets from unaccompanied to three year accompanied tours. This plan will result in a total number of accompanied tours of approximately 3,700 by the end of FY 1994. Overall cost in transients and permanent change of station (PCS) moves continues to be reduced as a result of this program.

2. Unit Deployment Program

The Marine Corps unit deployment program is designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence. It permits Marines assigned to infantry battalions and tactical aviation squadrons to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean commitments. This program reduces requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours.

Implementation of this program has proved to be highly successful. Because of Operation DESERT STORM the FY 1991 Unit Deployment Program schedule was never released and the FY 1990 schedule was canceled in September of 1990. Those UDP units deployed were extended to support the current Western Pacific Requirements or Operation DESERT STORM. An ongoing review of the force structure for the Western Pacific and the duration of Operation DESERT STORM will determine what units will continue in the Unit Deployment Program when a new UDP Schedule is published. Prior to Operation DESERT STORM and in accordance with previous force structure reduction decisions, the number of units participating in UDP was to be reduced.

3. Military Manpower Management Initiatives

The Marine Corps is continuing development of an integrated computer-based requirements determination, planning and assignment system that will enable us to provide more cost effective and equitable allocation of first-term and career Marines among all units in the active structure. Readiness will improve through the use of automated systems that permit better management of first term Marines, and in turn our career force, consistent with approved manning policies.

The Marine Corps has instituted a new computer-based system to better identify our formal training seats and their associated utilization. This system, known as By Name Assignment (BNA), allows Marines at virtually all units to determine school seat availability. Selected units have assignment capability and schools are able to determine load levels, prior to the class convening. These improvements allow the Marine Corps to better manage our limited school seat availability.

To meet the OSD(C) unit cost initiatives, the Marine Corps is modifying several computer-based personnel accounting systems to identify personnel graduating from Marine Corps formal schools. The unit cost initiative is expected to significantly change the manner in which we recruit and train Marines and others attending our schools. Unit cost is designed to capture the total costs that can be allocated to business type activities, including recruiting and training.

Despite several important unanswered questions -- such as all costs being considered as variable, statutory changes in budget allocations, and reimbursables -- OSD(C) is committed to implementing unit cost based accounting in FY 1992.

The prototype of the Woman Marine Computer Model has passed all of its initial tests as an additional manpower management tool. The model will mesh current assignment and classification policies as they relate to women with equitable promotion and Fleet Marine Force versus Supporting Establishment service opportunities and will ensure that as the Marine Corps reduces in size, reductions in the numbers of women Marines will not be arbitrary. The trial run of the model is currently being reviewed by the contractor and the program manager to work out a final design that will produce an assignment plan to complement the classification plan. Once this final review is complete the model will be integrated with the Marine Corps Manpower process and will serve as a comprehensive mechanism for arriving at a billet structure for women Marines that is in keeping within established policy and guidelines.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, models dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas and management of the career force are improving enlisted force management. The Marine Corps has begun work on other models that will support the same goals for the officer force and would extend our capabilities in the management of the mobilization force.

One of the most important Manpower initiatives is the continuing of Enlisted Career Force Controls during FY 1991. Enlisted Career Force Controls is a comprehensive Manpower Management Program designed to provide equitable promotion opportunity and tempo across all Marine Corps skills. The program involves the shaping of the grade structure in order to provide structural equitability and to control the flow of Marines into the Career Force Grade Structure. By controlling the demand (Grade Structure) and the supply (Marines with greater than 4 YOS), promotion equitability will result.

In early FY 1989, the Marine Corps undertook Enlisted Grade Structure Review II to ensure promotion equitability in the structure. On the supply side, during FY 1988 we extended promotion by MOS to the grade of Sergeant and limited retirement-eligible SNCO reenlistment to 3 years. Starting in FY 1989, the Marine Corps controlled the overall number of first term reenlistments within each MOS in order to prevent career force overages/shortages and their associated promotion problems. In addition, directed lateral movement of first termers from over skills to short skills will help balance the force, particularly the career force. An Enlisted Selection Early Retirement Board (ESERB) was approved for FY 1991 in order to assist the Marine Corps in meeting its end strength targets in the retirement eligible population. In addition to helping meet end strength targets the ESERB is expected to help improve promotion flow.

In summary, Enlisted Career Force Controls is on its way toward providing the right Marine in terms of Grade and Skill to the units, the appropriate level of experience for each grade and career equitability.

Classification and assignment of enlisted Marines are currently supported by sophisticated models that provide optimal recommendations to decision makers. The process will further improve as total integration of these models takes effect in the Precise Personnel Assignment System

(PREPAS). PREPAS integrates planning and execution in the Manpower Plan for the first term enlisted force. Recommended assignments will support the total short term assignment problems. The models make the best use of the first term force by reducing turbulence, improving tour stability and relying upon uniform staffing. Future improvements will feature more optimal training lines that make maximum use of available manpower to meet critical skills deficiencies.

A comprehensive review of our officer corps was completed by an Officer Force Management Review Panel (OFMRP) in December 1989. The first such study since 1976, the OFMRP was divided into two phases.

Phase one of the OFMRP study focused on structure management issues. These included: establishment of a general officer Occupational Field Sponsor concept; development of management procedures for maintaining the Tables of Organization (T/Os); development of a Meritorious Commissioning Program; institution of an Additional Primary MOS Program to overcome shortfalls in certain non-combat MOSs; evaluation of new aviator commissioning programs and aviator retention issues; and consideration of an Army initiative to establish the grade of CW05.

Phase two involved a thorough review and restructuring of our restricted officer force and revalidation of our unrestricted officer force. The OFMRP sought to more closely align each MOS with actual requirements while addressing two major problems: grade creep, particularly with field grade, and structure growth.

As a result of the restricted officer study, the Limited Duty Officer (LDO) program was reduced by 925 billets (62 percent) from 1486 to 561. 732 of these were converted to Warrant Officer (WO), 7 to Staff NCO, and 109 to unrestricted officer billets. Of 320 LDO field grade billets reviewed, 59 (18 percent) were either reduced to company grade or deleted. 134 LDO and WO billets were eliminated altogether.

Review of 14,620 unrestricted officer billets resulted in 116 field grade billet net reductions or deletions and 152 new validated company grade billets. The validated company grade billets in excess of the field grade reductions were largely derived from redesignations to unrestricted from within the WO and LDO force.

The OFMRP results provide us the framework for dealing with a host of challenges. The review corrected some grade creep and structure growth problems and revalidated all officer billets, both restricted and unrestricted. In addition, the study has provided the Marine Corps with a cohesive plan for the development and management of an Officer Force Management System which will meet the Marine Corps' emerging and long term needs.

Level load recruiting, first implemented in FY 1984, was designed to correct both manpower and training plan imbalances that resulted from the cyclic nature of accessions, wherein disproportionately higher accessions occur in the summer months. The Marine Corps adherence to level load goals is constrained by fiscal, marketing, and recruiting consideration along with effects from unanticipated changes in loss patterns. The goal of level load policy has been the stabilization of

readiness, reduction in the number of missed school seats, and more evenly distributed separation patterns.

F. Total Quality Leadership

Total Quality Leadership (TQL) is a strategy for continuously improving performance at every level, and in all areas of responsibility. It combines fundamental management and leadership techniques, the application of quantitative methods, and human resources into a disciplined structure focused on improving the material and services supplied to an organization, all the processes within an organization and the degree to which the needs of the customer are met. Improved performance is directed at satisfying such broad goals as cost, quality, schedule and mission need and suitability. Increased customer satisfaction is the overriding objective.

The Marine Corps is in the process of establishing goals and objectives that will provide a broad framework for the implementation of TQL. Only through the establishment of a consistent purpose and approach will TQL's full potential be realized and the required cultural change be effected.

Successful TQL implementation requires commitment, involvement, and dedication. One of the most important aspects in implementing TQL is the support from senior leadership. In that regard, the Marine Corps has initiated efforts to provide training and self-education material for our senior leadership. As our leadership becomes more knowledgeable, training will be pushed further down into our organizations. The total quality approach will eventually be understood and be a part of every Marine's and Marine Corps civilian's approach to performing their daily functions.

III. MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DPPC

A. Tactical and Mobility Forces

Marine Corps tactical and mobility forces include land forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces. About 120,000 Marines (62 percent of the Corps) will be in this category in FY 1991. Tactical and mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military personnel are included in these units.

With the exception of Reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to tactical and mobility forces.

1. Land Forces

Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting force service support groups. Additionally, this category includes land force aviation units which are the helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays land forces for FY 1989 - FY 1991.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	94.9	96.3	90.8	88.2
Reserve	30.4	29.0	26.8	25.8

The following deactivations are planned to forces in this category: FY 1991 - 8 Rifle Companies and a landing support company, FY 1992 - An Infantry Regiment Headquarters Company, an artillery battalion, a tank battalion, and an Armored Assault Battalion, FY 1993 - An engineering company and a landing support company.

2. Tactical Air Forces

Tactical air forces manpower includes air crews, and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with Reserve Component support and various command, control, and support functions.

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	24.3	23.3	22.3	21.9
Reserve	8.6	9.1	8.9	8.6

Overall manning decrease from FY 1991 through FY 1993 as a result of end strength reductions and program manning changes. An all weather attack squadron VMA(AW) and a C-130 squadron are planned for deactivation in FY 1993.

3. Naval Forces

The Marine Corps request for naval forces includes Marines assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in tactical air forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships. In FY 1991, Marine Detachments assigned to two battleships will be deactivated.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5

B. Communications and Intelligence

1. Intelligence

The manpower in the intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and at Unified and Specified Commands. The manpower program also provides for a small number of Marines who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8

Under wartime conditions, approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Expeditionary Force.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

In FY 1992 and FY 1993, 60 Marines will be in the Centrally Managed Communications category. Marines in this category support the Naval Communications Activities and the Defense Communications Agency. Marines in this category also support the Military Affiliate Radio System.

Centrally Managed Communications (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

C. Combat Installations

Marines in this category are assigned to bases and stations which provide support to the Fleet Marine Force Units assigned. The type of support provided includes maintenance, communications audiovisual, and administrative support. Civilians in this category reinforce capabilities that directly affect the readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and support safety and quality of life functions.

Combat Installations
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.2	8.9	8.9	8.3
<u>Civilian</u>	10.4	10.4	10.3	10.1

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for base operating support-combat installations using a fixed and variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the base operating support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services that are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the tactical and mobility forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to base operating support-combat installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for base operating support manpower at all combat installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to determine manpower staffing requirements. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. These manpower requirements determination reviews will improve support organizations by consolidating duplicate functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

D. Force Support Training

Force support training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps combat readiness training group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors,

maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission. This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower profile for the force support training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower

(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*	*

E. Joint Activities

Marines assigned to Joint Activities provide Marine Corps representation in the joint arena and provide fair share manning of joint billets. This ensures Marine Corps knowledge and participation in joint matters which involve the Marine Corps. Marines provide support or augmentation to four types of joint activities: international military organizations, unified commands, federal agencies, and other activities. Marines assigned to the International Military Organizations and the Unified Commands provide two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps keeps current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs stay aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations. A summary of the manpower assigned to joint activities is provided below.

1. International Military Organizations

Marines assigned to International Military Organizations are assigned to international activities such as the United Nations Truce Observer Team, Military Advisory and Assistance Groups in Venezuela and Spain and the U.S. Military Observation Group, Palestine. Marines in this category are also assigned to the management headquarters of International Commands and the Northern Air Defense Command. Finally, this category includes Marines assigned to foreign military sales activities. The following table displays the manpower assigned to the International Military Organizations.

International Military Organizations

(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

2. Unified Commands

Marines assigned to the Unified Commands are Marines assigned to the management headquarters of the U.S. Space Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Forces Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. A summary of the manpower assigned to the Unified Commands is provided.

<u>Unified Commands</u> (End-Strength in Thousands)			
<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>

Military

Active	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
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3. Federal Agency Support

Federal Agency Support refers primarily to those Marines who are assigned to the Marine Corps Security Guard program which provides security for the foreign posts of the Department of State. The number of Marines assigned to this program is based upon a signed memorandum of understanding between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of State. The last memorandum of understanding was signed on 15 December 1986. Marines in this category are also assigned to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Selective Service System.

<u>Federal Agency Support</u> (End-Strength in Thousands)			
<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>

Active	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5
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4. Defense Agencies

The Marines assigned to the Defense Agencies in this category are Marines assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Communications Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency.

5. The Joint Staff

<u>The Joint Staff</u> (End-Strength in Thousands)			
<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>

Military

Active	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
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6. Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense Agencies/Activities

The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

F. Central Logistics

The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services for Marine Corps units. Marines in this category also provide support to Navy Logistics Operations such as the Naval Ships Ports Control Center and the U.S. Naval Magazine in Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.5

G. Service Management Headquarters

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) imposed manpower ceilings to management headquarters activities.

1. Combat Commands

Manpower in this category are assigned to major Navy operational commands and Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Headquarters.

Combat Commands
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*	*

2. Support Commands

Service support commands include Navy and Marine Corps departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters.

Support Commands
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 FY 93

Military

Active	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4

H. Research and Development

Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period. It also includes the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command which performs research and development for human factors and personnel development research. A subordinate organization of the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command is the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, and it is a tenant activity at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts in this category include the development of the equipment and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force during all phases of expeditionary operations. Marines are assigned in a liaison capacity to development activities of the other services to closely monitor other research and development efforts and thus avoid duplication. Also, Marine Corps research and development includes an active evaluation of foreign developments for possible adoption.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 FY 93

Military

Active	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
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An integral part of the Marine Corps research and development system is the Marine Corps Operational, Test, and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA). Marines assigned to this activity and other R&D labs conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment.

I. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support

Marine Corps activities in this category include recruiting and examining and the Marines assigned to the Marine Corps Districts and the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C.

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.1	4.6	4.5	4.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3

2. Individual Training

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel through the use of other Service and Marine Corps schools. The following provides a summary of the manpower assigned to this category.

Marine Corps Individual Training
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.3	9.0	9.0	8.7
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

J. Support Activities

1. Support Installations

Marines assigned to support installations are primarily assigned to Marine Corps Security Forces (which provide security to naval installations); Marine Corps Logistics Bases; Real Property Maintenance Activities; Recruit Depots; the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps; and the Marine Helicopter Squadron, Quantico Virginia which provides support to the President.

Personnel are provided to the Marine Corps Security Forces based upon the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and other assigned responsibilities. Also, the determination of manpower in the support installations category is based upon analysis of the functional and work load requirements. The manpower determination process mirrors the process for determining the manpower requirements for combat installations (previously discussed in paragraph IIIC) except that the input action of the variable support element is excluded, as the bases in this category do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units.

Marine Corps Support Installations

(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	10.8	10.5	10.5	10.4
<u>Civilian</u>	3.7	3.9	3.0	2.9

2. Centralized Support Activities

The Marines in this category provide service wide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations Truce Teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, the Joint Postal Service Agency, and the Far East Network. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Administration Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records; the Marine Corps Automated Service Centers, which maintain the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System; and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the Joint Uniform Manpower Pay System for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category. Increases in the reserve program reflect support of additional aviation assets and full manning of the centralized Individual Reserve Management Organization.

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower

(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0
Reserve Components	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.0	0.9	0.9

K. Undistributed

The Marine Corps internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Average strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning or overmanning for September 30 is expressed as undistributed.

Undistributed

(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0	0.9	0.7	-0.5

L. Individuals

Marines temporarily unavailable to unit commanders are called Individuals. These Marines are vital to ensuring that sufficiently trained, usable Marines are available to fill force structure billets. The Individuals are composed of trainees/students, patients, prisoners, and transients. Trainees/students, however, account for over 76 percent of the total. Through Marine Battle Skills Training the Marine Corps thoroughly prepares all recruits for the rigors of the field. This training investment provides unit commanders with combat trained Marines ready for immediate deployment.

<u>Marine Corps Individuals Manpower</u>				
<u>(End-Strength in Thousands)</u>				
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active				
Transients	6.3	5.4	5.6	5.3
Patients/Prisoners	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
Trainees/Students	23.0	21.5	22.4	22.3
Total	30.5	28.0	29.2	28.8
Reserve				
Trainees/Students	3.6	3.8	3.5	3.0
(Category F)				

From FY 1990 to FY 1993, the Individuals decreased by 1,787 Marines. This decrease was primarily caused by reduced accessions and the corresponding drop in accession moves and entry-level training. Year-to-year fluctuations in the Individuals Account are driven by shifting accession requirements. These accessions vary with yearly end strength reductions and separation patterns.

CHAPTER VI

AIR FORCE

MANPOWER

PROGRAM

CHAPTER VI

AIR FORCE MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General.

This chapter describes the Air Force manpower requirement in terms of active military, United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR), Air National Guard (ANG), and civilian manpower components. The manpower need derives from the force structure required to accomplish Air Force missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy. In that light, the chapter identifies wartime manpower requirements, requested manpower strengths for the budget years and major changes by component.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements.

The Air Force wartime manpower requirements determination process is being re-evaluated in light of changes in East-West relations and current world events. The Air Force will need to incorporate lessons learned in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in order to create a viable wartime force structure to compare against Air Force authorized strength. Changes in the military wartime force structure will affect civilian mobilization manpower requirements as well. The Air Force is making significant gains in civilian workforce deliberate planning and real world execution capability. Lessons learned in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, such as, impact of called-up Selected and Individual Ready Reserve on civilian workforce, and the role of civilians in the build-up, both in theater and in CONUS, will also assist the Air Force in any future requirements assessments.

C. Strength Request.

The FY 1992 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower is as follows:

Air Force Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Active Military	539.2*	508.5	486.8	458.1
Selected Reserve				
ANG	117.0*	117.0	118.1	119.4
USAFR	80.6*	85.6	81.2	82.4
Civilian	248.9	239.0	222.9	220.6

*Active military end strength includes 4,029 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b. Selected Reserve end strengths have been reduced accordingly to reflect the call-up of 818 ANG and 3,211 USAFR personnel.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Requirements.

The tables below display manpower requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), showing inventory for FY 1990 and the FY 1991 - 1993 totals in the FY 1992 request (End strength in thousands).

Active Military

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Strategic	65.6	58.4	56.9	51.9
Tactical/Mobility	145.8	123.4	113.3	109.1
Communications/Intelligence	32.8	31.3	30.7	29.7
Combat Installations	101.8	104.0	98.7	87.8
Force Support Training	25.3	20.8	19.2	18.4
Medical Support	40.3	40.6	40.7	37.9
Joint Activities	7.9	14.5	15.6	16.1
Central Logistics	9.8	8.8	8.6	8.1
Service Mgt. HQs	11.9	12.1	10.7	9.7
R&D/Geophysical Act.	14.4	14.1	13.2	12.7
Training & Personnel	22.7	21.0	20.8	20.3
Support Activities	32.7	32.7	31.0	27.2
Individuals	28.1	32.9	32.9	32.2
Undistributed	0	-6.1	-5.6	-3.2
Totals*	539.2	508.5	486.8	458.1

Air National Guard

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Strategic	18.7	18.3	20.1	22.0
Tactical/Mobility	70.8	71.2	71.0	70.7
Communications/Intelligence	10.6	10.9	10.9	10.9
Combat Installations	4.5	3.8	3.8	3.8
Medical Support	4.6	5.0	5.0	5.0
Joint Activities	0	.8	.8	.8
Service Mgt. HQs	.1	.1	.1	.1
R&D/Geophysical Act.	.6	.6	.6	.6
Training & Personnel	3.9	3.7	3.1	2.9
Support Activities	1.8	1.3	1.1	1.1
Individuals	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
Totals*	117.0	117.0	118.1	119.4

U.S. Air Force Reserve**

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Strategic	2.2	2.3	3.0	3.5
Tactical/Mobility	48.0	50.5	48.6	49.1
Communications/Intelligence	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.6
Combat Installations	14.1	14.2	12.5	12.6

*Totals may not add due to rounding

U.S. Air Force Reserve
(continued)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Medical Support	5.4	5.9	5.8	5.8
Joint Activities	.4	1.6	1.6	1.6
Central Logistics	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2
Service Mgt. HQs	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
R&D/Geophysical Acty	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.0
Training and Personnel	1.5	2.0	1.9	1.9
Support Activities	2.4	2.4	1.9	1.9
Individuals	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Totals*	80.6	85.6	81.2	82.4

**The totals counted on the summary chart do not include Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) and Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) authorizations. The AGR and IMAs are included in the DDPC line entry as part of the total requirement for that DDPC. The DPPC charts for the AFR on pages 20-22 have the AGRs and IMAs extracted from DPPC columns and displayed in the appropriate category line entry.

Civilian

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Strategic	9.1	9.3	9.9	10.6
Tactical/Mobility	30.4	29.9	79.1	76.0
Communications/Intelligence	6.6	7.5	7.4	7.6
Combat Installations	45.3	44.0	40.4	42.3
Force Support Training	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1
Medical Support	10.2	10.1	9.4	9.5
Joint Activities	2.3	3.2	3.2	3.2
Central Logistics	74.3	69.6	16.7	16.0
Service Mgt. HQs	6.7	7.3	6.4	6.2
R&D/Geophysical Act.	9.6	10.4	10.5	10.2
Training & Personnel	9.9	10.0	12.1	12.0
Support Activities	42.3	35.6	25.7	24.9
Totals*	248.9	239.0	222.9	220.6

*Totals may not add due to rounding

The following sections highlight Air Force major force structure areas and include a brief rationale for participation by either the Active or Reserve Component. Specific changes in force structure are detailed in Section II, Manpower Requirements by DPPC.

1. Strategic Offensive Forces.

These forces consist of strategic bomber and tanker aircraft and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Participation by the ANG/USAFR in the strategic offensive mission is limited to air refueling operations because of the highly time-sensitive nature of bomber and

missile operations and the intensive peacetime training requirements. ANG/USAFR tanker units are operationally capable to perform the air refueling mission.

2. Strategic Defensive Forces.

These forces include aircraft and ground radars for surveillance, control, and defense. The air defense fighter interceptor mission is well suited to the Air Reserve Components (ARC) because of its in-place wartime role. For over 30 years, ANG units have performed air defense alert in the United States. The ANG will perform 100 percent of the air defense fighter interceptor mission by FY 1992.

3. Tactical Air Forces.

To meet current tactical commitments, the Air Force must have strong, flexible, in-place forces to support a forward defense. Overseas basing represents roughly one-third of our total tactical fighter forces, with another fourth providing stateside rotational and training units.* The ARC are able to provide a responsive surge of military capability during a national crisis by having 42.4 percent of the tactical air forces. The ANG/USAFR tactical fighter force is being modernized simultaneously with the active force with F-15 and F-16 aircraft. This force posture has been developed so that the rotation base supports overseas tactical force commitments. In addition, after FY 1992 the ANG will provide 100 percent of the tactical reconnaissance forces. The USAFR also contributes KC-10 associate aircrews.

Training requirements must be considered in developing the total tactical force structure. Close air support, interdiction, and counterair missions are complex and require high levels of training and, in many cases, specialized training ranges to retain proficiency. The part-time nature of the ARC and proximity of individual units are carefully assessed when assigning roles and missions that require skills that must be continually exercised to achieve and maintain essential levels of proficiency.

4. Mobility Forces.

The proper mix of active and reserve force units is necessary to maintain a non-mobilized surge and contingency support capability in addition to performing day-to-day airlift missions. Peacetime airlift augmentation and wartime surge missions are well suited to the ARC. In addition to providing strategic and tactical airlift aircraft units and associate C-5, C-9, and C-141 units in FY 1991, the ARC also provide substantial capabilities in aeromedical evacuation, rescue and recovery, aerial port operations, and weather reconnaissance.

5. Other Forces.

There are several missions which are full-time functions required for support of the combat forces, such as centralized logistics,

*The remaining is provided by the ARC.

and research and development. Because of their full-time requirement, these missions require full-time personnel. Transfer of these missions to the Air Reserve Components would not diminish the required level of support, but it would increase the number of ANG/USAFR full-time personnel, offsetting some of the intended cost savings. Other types of activities have been and will continue to be established in the ARC when the active peacetime requirements are satisfied, but the wartime requirements are not. Some examples of units of this type include ANG and USAFR communications and civil engineering units, and ANG weather units.

E. Key Manpower Issues

Military manpower end strength in the proposed FY 1992 President's Budget is 508,558 authorizations in FY 1991, 486,800 in FY 1992, and 458,100 in FY 1993. This represents a decrease of 36,442 authorizations in FY 1991, 58,200 in FY 1992, and 86,900 in FY 1993. This is based on the FY 1991 President's Budget (Amended) submission.

Advanced technology and highly trained, motivated personnel have assured an Air Force capability to attain and maintain air supremacy in the early stages of the Persian Gulf conflict. This has been accomplished with the lowest manpower level in over forty years. In FY 1991, the Air Force military end strength is programmed at 56 percent of the peak during the Vietnam conflict, dropping below 50 percent of that peak by 1995. Civilian levels are comparably as low, currently at 74 percent, dropping to 67 percent by 1995. These reductions were programmed in direct response to congressional intent, prior to the outbreak of Persian Gulf hostilities, in recognition of the changing world environment.

Reductions are comprehensive, with careful attention targeted toward preventing a hollow force. As a result, Air Force reduced unit undermanning while addressing concerns raised during the FY 1991 budget review. In FY 1992 unit undermanning is reduced to one percent and by end FY 1993 has been virtually eliminated.

Internally generated management reviews resulted in significant changes in the Air Force. Management headquarters accounts are programmed to reduce in compliance with congressional guidance. Air Force Systems Command and Air Force Logistics Command are integrating and 15 of 19 Air Divisions and all Air Reserve Component Numbered Air Forces are eliminated. Separate Operating Agencies and Direct Reporting Units were redesignated Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) and programmed for a 30 percent reduction over the next five years. General Officer levels will be reduced by one-sixth over the next five years. Overage specialties in ARC Individual Mobilization Augmentees are deleted.

Further reductions and underfunding of programmed levels will significantly undermine extensive, long-range planning and result in an expensive, specialized force structure without sufficient manning to mobilize with reasonable assurance of seizing and maintaining air superiority in future conflicts.

A dividend brought about by technologically advanced weapon systems in today's inventory is lower manpower levels. To operate and maintain these systems at high productivity levels, greater numbers of

degreed and specialized personnel, e.g. officers, are required. This impacts other areas as well, i.e., the professional arenas. Medical and legal career areas are proportionately higher in the officer category than other areas, e.g. support and force structure. Imposing artificial manpower determination processes will lead to placing underqualified personnel in key positions if the appropriate resource is not available as requirements shift. The upward shift in recent years on the officer side of the equation is exacerbated by initiatives such as Air Force support missions, previously performed inhouse by enlisted, now being performed by civilian personnel resulting from military-to-civilian conversions, or being performed by contractors. Another example is base closures. Bases are primarily force structure which, as stated before, is enlisted intensive. Mission demands should be the determining criteria for manpower requirements, not what the inventory will allow.

Notwithstanding these considerations, the Air Force is complying with congressional intent to reduce officer levels. An on-going study will review officer intensive areas for reduction and/or officer-to-enlisted conversions. The mix, as always, will be carefully monitored in future programming actions.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General.

Military manpower end strength in the proposed FY 1992 President's Budget is 508,558 authorizations in FY 1991, 486,800 in FY 1992, and 458,100 in FY 1993. This end strength is a decrease of 36,442 authorizations in FY 1991, 58,200 in FY 1992, and 86,900 in FY 1993. This is based on the FY 1991 President's Budget (Amended).

The FY 1991 manpower decrease is associated with programmatic force structure adjustments and with nonprogrammatic adjustments. The FY 1990/1991 President's Budget decisions required most of the reductions to be absorbed through actions such as undermanning the force and accessions reductions rather than force structure cuts. There is an attempt to return accessions to their required level in the outyears and to fully man the force. This is not real growth but a return to a fully manned force.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

Table VI-1 reflects Air Force Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Budget reduction decisions eliminated 25,000 authorizations in FY 1989 below the end strength originally programmed. Where possible, these reductions were related to specific programs and reductions were reflected in appropriate DPPCs. However, the lateness of the budget decisions made a complete allocation of reductions to specific programs impossible for FY 1989 and FY 1990. Budgetary timing precluded identification of personnel reductions with the proper program. Therefore, the table reflects a high programmed manning level in all DPPCs, with a large undistributed total. This undistributed total will be identified with specific DPPCs during the year of execution.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

TOTAL AC MILITARY	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993			
	DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
	AUTH	INV*	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG
STRATEGIC	65.5	65.6	58.8	58.4	99	99	57.4	56.9	99	99	52.5	51.9	99
Offensive Strat Forces	51.2	51.2	45.0	44.7	99	99	44.7	44.4	99	99	40.9	40.6	99
Defensive Strat Forces	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.1	100	95	2.2	2.1	95	95	2.1	2.0	95
Surveillance Forces	11.0	11.1	10.7	10.5	98	98	10.5	10.4	99	99	9.5	9.4	99
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	142.1	145.8***	126.6	123.4	97	97	116.4	113.3	97	97	112.3	109.1	97
Tactical Air Forces	107.6	111.4***	90.9	89.5	98	98	81.3	80.0	99	99	77.7	76.4	98
Mobility Forces	34.5	34.4	35.7	33.9	95	95	35.1	33.3	95	95	34.6	32.8	95
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	33.6	32.8	31.6	31.4	99	99	31.0	30.7	99	99	30.0	29.7	99
Centrally Managed Comm	16.5	15.7	15.0	14.8	99	99	15.0	14.8	99	99	14.5	14.3	99
Intelligence	17.1	17.1	16.6	16.5	99	99	16.0	15.9	99	99	15.5	15.4	99
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	113.2	101.8	109.6	104.0	95	95	104.3	98.7	95	95	93.5	87.8	94
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	25.3	25.3	21.1	20.8	99	99	19.5	19.2	98	98	18.7	18.4	98
MEDICAL SUPPORT	40.2	40.3	45.4	40.6	89	89	45.5	40.7	89	89	42.7	37.9	89
JOINT ACTIVITIES	7.7	7.9	14.8	14.5	98	98	15.8	15.6	99	99	16.4	16.1	98
Int'l Military Org	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	100	100	2.9	2.9	100	100	2.8	2.8	100
Unified Commands	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.1	100	100	2.1	2.1	100	100	2.1	2.1	100
Federal Support Actys	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	100	0.3	0.3	100	100	0.3	0.3	100
Joint Staff	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	100	0.4	0.4	100	100	0.4	0.4	100
OSD/Def Agencies & Actys	1.9	1.9	9.0	8.8	98	98	10.1	9.9	98	98	10.8	10.6	98
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	9.8	9.8	9.1	8.8	97	97	8.9	8.6	97	97	8.4	8.1	96
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	13.5	11.9	12.2	12.1	99	99	10.9	10.7	98	98	10.0	9.7	97
Combat Commands	8.1	6.9	7.5	7.5	100	100	6.2	6.2	100	100	5.4	5.4	100
Support Commands	5.4	5.0	4.7	4.6	98	98	4.7	4.5	96	96	4.6	4.3	93
R&D GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS	14.4	14.4	14.7	14.1	96	96	13.8	13.2	96	96	13.2	12.7	95
Research and Development	7.1	7.1	7.2	6.9	96	96	6.5	6.2	95	95	6.1	5.8	95
Geophysical Activities	7.3	7.3	7.5	7.2	96	96	7.3	7.0	96	96	7.1	6.8	96

	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV*	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	
TOTAL AC MILITARY												
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES												
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Personnel Support	22.5	22.7	21.9	21.0	96	21.8	20.8	95	21.2	20.3	96	
Individual Training	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.6	97	5.9	5.7	97	5.7	5.5	96	
	16.6	16.8	16.1	15.4	96	15.9	15.2	96	15.5	14.8	95	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	34.0	32.7	36.2	32.7	90	34.6	31.0	90	30.9	27.2	88	
Centralized Support Act	23.0	21.7	25.1	22.0	88	24.2	21.0	87	21.4	18.1	85	
	11.0	11.0	11.1	10.7	96	10.4	10.0	96	9.5	9.1	96	
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	521.8	511.0	502.0	481.8	96	479.9	459.4	96	449.8	428.9	95	
UNDISTRIBUTED	-13.2	0.0		-6.1			-5.6			-3.2		
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES**	13.4	13.3		13.6			12.0			12.0		
INDIVIDUALS	36.3	28.1	32.9	32.9		32.9	32.9		32.2	32.2		
Transients	7.7	0.0	6.9	6.9		7.2	7.2		6.6	6.6		
Patients, Prisoners & Holdees	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		
Trainees and Students	23.7	23.7	21.2	21.2		21.0	21.0		20.9	20.9		
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3		4.3	4.3		4.2	4.2		
END STRENGTH	545.0	539.2***	508.5	508.5		486.8	486.8		458.1	458.1		

Totals may not add due to rounding.

*Actuals

**Not included in end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

***Adjusted to reflect 4,029 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

OFFICERS	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV*		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DPPC												
STRATEGIC	12.2	12.2		11.4	11.2	98	11.0	10.9	99	10.2	10.1	99
Offensive Strat Forces	9.1	9.1		8.3	8.2	99	8.1	8.0	99	7.4	7.3	99
Defensive Strat Forces	0.7	0.7		0.6	0.6	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Surveillance Forces	2.4	2.4		2.5	2.4	96	2.4	2.4	100	2.3	2.3	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	17.6	18.6***		16.0	15.5	97	14.6	14.1	97	14.1	13.6	96
Tactical Air Forces	12.8	13.8***		10.8	10.7	99	9.6	9.5	99	9.2	9.1	99
Mobility Forces	4.8	4.8		5.2	4.8	92	5.0	4.6	92	4.9	4.5	92
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	4.7	4.8		4.8	4.8	100	4.7	4.7	100	4.5	4.5	100
Centrally Managed Comm	1.8	1.9		1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	100	1.8	1.8	100
Intelligence	2.9	2.9		2.9	2.9	100	2.8	2.8	100	2.7	2.7	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	6.9	7.3		6.6	6.3	95	6.6	6.3	95	6.2	5.9	95
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.1	3.1		2.7	2.6	96	2.6	2.5	96	2.5	2.4	96
MEDICAL SUPPORT	12.4	12.4		14.5	12.5	86	14.7	12.7	86	13.9	11.9	86
JOINT ACTIVITIES	4.0	4.2		5.6	5.4	96	5.9	5.7	97	6.0	5.8	97
Int'l Military Org	1.1	1.1		1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100
Unified Commands	1.1	1.2		1.0	1.0	100	1.0	1.0	100	1.0	1.0	100
Federal Support Actys	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Joint Staff	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
OSD/Def Agencies & Actys	1.3	1.4		3.0	2.8	93	3.3	3.1	94	3.4	3.2	94
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	6.5	6.5		6.0	5.8	97	5.8	5.6	97	5.5	5.3	96
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS	7.9	6.9		7.3	7.3	100	6.7	6.6	99	6.5	6.3	97
Combat Commands	4.4	3.6		4.1	4.1	100	3.4	3.4	100	3.2	3.2	100
Support Commands	3.5	3.3		3.2	3.2	100	3.3	3.2	97	3.3	3.1	94

OFFICERS	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV*		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DPPC												
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS												
Research and Development	3.9	3.9		4.3	4.1	95	3.8	3.6	95	3.7	3.5	95
Geophysical Activities	2.2	2.2		2.3	2.2	96	2.0	1.9	95	1.9	1.8	95
	1.7	1.7		2.0	1.9	95	1.8	1.7	94	1.8	1.7	94
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Personnel Support	6.6	6.6		6.6	6.4	97	6.5	6.3	97	6.4	6.2	97
Individual Training	0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6	100	0.6	0.6	100	0.6	0.6	100
	6.0	6.0		6.0	5.8	97	5.9	5.7	97	5.8	5.6	97
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	6.4	6.6		6.3	6.0	95	6.1	5.8	95	5.5	5.2	95
Centralized Support Act.	2.0	2.2		2.1	1.9	90	2.2	2.0	91	2.0	1.8	90
	4.4	4.4		4.2	4.1	98	3.9	3.8	97	3.5	3.4	97
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	92.2	93.1		92.1	87.9	95	89.0	84.8	95	85.0	80.7	95
UNDISTRIBUTED	-1.4	0.0			-1.5			-1.1			-2.2	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION												
AUGMENTEES**	8.1	7.9										
INDIVIDUALS												
Transients	9.4	7.9			8.7			8.3			8.2	
Patients, Prisoners,	1.4	0.0			1.2			1.0			1.0	
& Holdees	0.1	0.0										
Trainees & Students	7.9	7.9			7.5			7.3			7.2	
END STRENGTH	100.3	101.0***			95.0			92.0			86.6	

Totals may not add due to rounding.

*Actuals

**Not included in end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

***Adjusted to reflect 1,001 Selected Reserve officers called to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C., Section 673b.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

AC ENLISTED	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV*	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT
STRATEGIC	53.3	53.3	47.6	47.3	99	46.5	46.1	99	42.3	41.9	99	42.3
Offensive Strat Forces	42.1	42.1	36.7	36.5	99	36.6	36.4	99	33.5	33.3	99	33.5
Defensive Strat Forces	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	100	1.7	1.6	94	1.6	1.5	94	1.6
Surveillance Forces	8.6	8.6	8.3	8.2	99	8.2	8.1	99	7.2	7.1	99	7.2
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	124.5	127.3***	110.7	108.0	98	101.8	99.2	97	98.1	95.5	97	98.1
Tactical Air Forces	94.8	97.3***	80.1	78.8	98	71.6	70.4	98	68.4	67.2	98	68.4
Mobility Forces	29.7	29.7	30.6	29.2	95	30.2	28.8	95	29.7	28.3	95	29.7
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	28.9	28.0	26.8	26.5	99	26.4	26.1	99	25.5	25.2	99	25.5
Centrally Managed Comm	14.7	13.8	13.1	12.9	98	13.1	12.9	98	12.7	12.5	98	12.7
Intelligence	14.2	14.2	13.7	13.6	99	13.3	13.2	99	12.8	12.7	99	12.8
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	106.3	94.5	103.0	97.7	95	97.9	92.6	95	87.3	82.0	94	87.3
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	22.2	22.2	18.4	18.2	99	16.9	16.7	99	16.2	16.0	99	16.2
MEDICAL SUPPORT	27.8	27.8	31.0	28.2	91	30.8	28.0	91	28.8	26.0	90	28.8
JOINT ACTIVITIES	3.7	3.8	9.1	9.1	100	9.8	9.8	100	10.4	10.4	100	10.4
Int'l Military Org	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	100	1.8	1.8	100	1.8	1.8	100	1.8
Unified Commands	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	100	1.0	1.0	100	1.0	1.0	100	1.0
Federal Support Actys	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1
OSD/Def Agencies & Actys	0.6	0.6	6.0	6.0	100	6.8	6.8	100	7.4	7.4	100	7.4
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.0	97	3.0	2.9	97	2.9	2.8	97	2.9
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	5.6	5.0	4.9	4.8	98	4.1	4.0	98	3.6	3.5	97	3.6
Combat Commands	3.7	3.3	3.4	3.4	100	2.7	2.7	100	2.3	2.3	100	2.3
Support Commands	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.4	93	1.4	1.3	93	1.3	1.2	92	1.3

AC ENLISTED	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV*		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DFTC												
RSD/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS												
Research and Development	10.5	10.5		10.4	10.0	96	9.9	9.5	96	9.5	9.1	96
Geophysical Activities	4.9	4.9		4.9	4.7	96	4.5	4.3	96	4.2	4.0	95
	5.6	5.6		5.5	5.3	96	5.4	5.2	96	5.3	5.1	96
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL												
Personnel Support	15.9	16.1		15.3	14.6	95	15.3	14.6	95	14.8	14.1	95
Individual Training	5.3	5.3		5.2	5.0	96	5.3	5.1	96	5.1	4.9	96
	10.6	10.8		10.1	9.6	95	10.0	9.5	95	9.7	9.2	95
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Support Installations	27.6	26.1		30.0	26.8	89	28.7	25.4	89	25.6	22.2	87
Centralized Support Act.	21.0	19.5		23.1	20.0	87	22.2	19.0	86	19.6	16.4	84
	6.6	6.6		6.9	6.6	96	6.5	6.2	95	6.0	5.7	95
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	429.6	417.9		410.3	394.0	96	391.1	374.7	96	365.0	348.6	96
UNDISTRIBUTED	-11.8	0.0			-4.6			-4.5			-1.0	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION												
AUGMENTEES**	5.3	5.4										
INDIVIDUALS												
Transients	26.9	20.2			24.1			24.5			23.9	
	6.3	0.0			5.6			6.1			5.6	
Patients, Prisoners, & Holdees	0.4	0.0			0.4			0.4			0.4	
Trainees & Students	15.8	15.8			13.8			13.8			13.7	
Cadets	4.4	4.4			4.3			4.3			4.2	
END STRENGTH	444.7	438.2***			413.5			394.8			371.5	

Totals may not add due to rounding.

*Actuals

**Not included in end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

***Adjusted to reflect 3,028 Selected Reserve enlisted personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b.

3. Skill and Grade.

a. Enlisted.

As shown in Table VI-2, inventory imbalances existed in 57 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1990 (165 of 290 skills, E1-E9). In grades E5-E7, which are a convenient gauge of mid-grade NCO manning, inventory imbalances existed in 54 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1990 (125 of 232 skills).

b. Officer.

The mandated officer strength reduction is reflected in Table VI-2. Lag time between personnel management decisions and manpower authorization changes drive skill/grade imbalances. When force structure decisions have been finalized, we can fix many of those problems through targeted accession, crossflows, and assignments.

4. Experience.

As shown in Table VI-3, experience levels, as measured by average years of service, both overall and within each grade, have shown relatively little change over the past several years. This results from the combined effect of improved retention of experienced personnel, and decreased accessions to support the lower end strength.

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting. The Air Force attained its non-prior service (NPS) and prior service (PS) objectives for FY 1990. The Air Force measures NPS accession quality using a combination of high school diploma graduate (HSDG) rates, upper AFQT category (CAT I&II) and lowest acceptable AFQT category (CAT IV) scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). In FY 1990, 99.2 percent of our NPS accessions were HSDGs and 53.1 percent were in the top two AFQT categories. However, 36,000 accessions in FY 1990 were the lowest in Air Force history, a decrease largely due to budget reductions. Due to a significant budget reduction in FY 1991, we will be forced to reduce accessions to 30,000, setting a new Air Force low.

Recruiting Results

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
HSDG	43,073 (99.1%)	35,919 (99.2%)
CAT I&II	22,939 (52.8%)	19,100 (53.1%)
CAT IV	83 (0.2%)	60 (0.2%)
Objective	43,450	36,000
Attained	43,450	36,000

TABLE VI-2
ACTIVE AIR FORCE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

FY 1990

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL*</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	33	46	136	215
PMI**	7.9	30.5	181.2	219.6
Inventory	9.5	49.5	151.7	210.7
Over/Short	1.6	19.0	-29.5	-8.9
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	61	107	64	232
PMI**	63.3	94.2	49.4	206.9
Inventory	69.1	94.1	43.1	206.3
Over/Short	5.8	-0.1	-6.3	-0.6
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	43	66	70	179
PMI**	1.9	5.8	6.1	13.8
Inventory	2.4	6.6	4.8	13.8
Over/Short	0.5	0.8	-1.3	0.0
<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	32	125	133	290
PMI**	5.9	132.8	301.6	440.3
Inventory	6.9	150.1	273.8	430.8
Over/Short	1.0	17.3	-27.8	-9.5
<u>01 - 03</u>				
Number of Skills	14	20	9	43
PMI**	10.8	26.5	27.0	64.4
Inventory	12.5	26.4	24.1	63.0
Over/Short	1.6	-0.1	-2.9	-1.3
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	8	15	29	52
PMI**	12.7	4.1	20.4	37.2
Inventory	15.9	4.0	16.8	36.70
Over/Short	3.2	-0.1	-3.7	-0.57
<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	0	39	13	52
PMI**	0	77.6	24.0	101.6
Inventory	0	77.6	22.1	99.7
Over/Short	0	0.1	-2.0	-1.9

*For definitions see Appendix B

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

TABLE VI-3
ACTIVE AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORIES *
(in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991			PROGRAMMED FY 1992			PROGRAMMED FY 1993		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
E1 - E4												
PMI**	219.6	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	-
Inventry	210.7	75.3	4.0	194.0	74.5	3.9	183.5	71.9	4.0	167.3	65.2	4.0
E5 - E7												
PMI	206.9	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	-
Inventry	206.3	206.0	14.0	201.5	201.2	13.8	195.2	194.9	13.7	189.0	188.7	13.7
E1 - E9												
PMI	440.3	-	-	407.6	-	-	390.5	-	-	367.3	-	-
Inventry	430.8	295.1	8.1	407.6	301.2	8.0	390.5	296.6	8.1	367.3	285.3	8.2
01 - 03												
PMI	64.4	-	-	61.3	-	-	58.8	-	-	55.8	-	-
Inventry	63.0	42.2	6.9	61.7	41.2	7.0	57.8	38.8	7.1	53.6	36.3	7.1
04 - 06												
PMI	37.2	-	-	34.8	-	-	33.9	-	-	32.7	-	-
Inventry	36.7	36.3	17.4	34.7	34.2	17.5	33.9	33.0	17.5	32.7	31.8	17.6
01 - 06												
PMI	101.6	-	-	96.0	-	-	92.7	-	-	88.5	-	-
Inventry	99.7	78.5	10.8	96.3	75.4	10.8	91.7	71.8	10.9	86.3	68.0	11.0

*Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

(2) Retention. Excellent retention continued as a result of increased emphasis on leadership and military values, efforts to protect institutional programs, improved professional education, adequate recognition, and a reasonable quality of life for the Air Force member and his or her family.

REENLISTMENT RATES
(Percent)

Reenlistment rates (*) are presented for the following:

	<u>Fiscal Year</u>					
	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>
First-term	54.0	57.9	61.6	50.2	59.3	51.4
Second-term	78.1	77.4	75.9	74.9	77.1	69.2
Career	96.0	96.3	96.5	96.1	96.3	94.1

*Reenlistment Rate: Percent of reenlistments based on the number of airmen who were eligible to reenlist. Reenlistment rate measures the reenlistments out of the total separation pool (including separations for the purpose of reenlistment) who were eligible to reenlist.

Note: Reenlistment rates for FY 1987-1989 were adjusted from FY 1991 DMRR due to a database error. This chart reflects corrected rates.

Retention successes this decade rebuilt experience levels and brought about a significant shift in the enlisted force structure. In FY 1980, our first-term airmen comprised 52 percent of the enlisted force; today that figure is 34 percent. Excellent retention and end strength limitations forced lower non-prior service accessions and reduced the first-term airmen reenlistment eligible population. Larger year group populations are starting to build in the career force as a result of good second-term airmen retention and light retirement activity. Having moved into a reduced strength environment, this shift in structure will require new approaches for working retention.

In the past, our challenge during periods of conflict and force expansion was to influence retention as much as possible. Large numbers were brought in, served one term, and most separated. Now, first-termers are more inclined to enter the career force and career airmen are not retiring as early in their career. But without force expansion to accompany this increase in retention, factors such as diminished promotion opportunities, quality losses through early release programs and the filling of a lower grade manning position with a more senior member could have a negative effect on career decisions.

Managing retention, which includes many influencing factors both internal and external, presents a unique challenge. The Air Force's reputation for first-class technical training in highly marketable skills is recognized by the private sector, especially in the airline maintenance and electronics/communications career fields. Current airline expansion and an aging civilian maintenance force will place a large demand

for highly skilled and qualified aircraft mechanics. Airlines require Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) licenses prior to being hired. Our mechanics under Rivet Work Force will become valuable resources to both the Air Force and the airlines. Growing demand from the private sector for educated, trained, and motivated young people could seriously challenge our ability to retain the best airmen, especially first-termers, in the coming years. While we could sustain losses for the short-term in our career force, any significant loss of our first-term airmen would impact our readiness in the 1990s. This competition requires us to continue to target retention efforts and emphasizes the need for a viable selective reenlistment bonus program.

Future concerns include the effects of continued promotion slowdowns and reduced promotion opportunities. Additionally, fewer bonus dollars, out-of-pocket PCS expenses, dwindling morale, welfare and recreation funds, and the widening pay gap, make the potential for increased losses a reality.

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. This personnel retention factor continues at a very high level.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officer	92.6	93.5	93.5	92.3	91.7	91.5	91.3
Enlisted	88.8	87.6	88.7	89.6	86.4	90.4	85.9

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. This indicator combines retention with a personnel stability factor. The indicator is a measure of how many personnel assigned to a unit at the beginning of a fiscal year are still there at the end of that fiscal year.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officer	52.9	55.1	55.3	57.9	55.8	51.4	57.2
Enlisted	52.8	58.9	57.9	59.9	59.0	61.4	59.3

b. Officer.

(1) Accessions. The officer recruiting program supports line officer requirements and the broad spectrum of Health Professionals. Within the line officer requirements are flight training (pilot and navigator), scientific, engineering, and other skills necessary to sustain Air Force capabilities. Health Professionals include physicians and nurses.

Line officer accession requirements have remained constrained to levels at or below those in FY 1990 due to the continued build down of the armed forces. The constrained levels of accessions has added another quality criteria which has ensured that those selected for active duty remain of the highest caliber. Shortages continue in the physician and nurse specialists, affecting both our ability to treat combat casualties and the overall well-being of our members and their families. Still to be determined is what impact Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM will have on the force.

(2) Retention. Officer retention is reported as a Cumulative Continuation Rate (CCR). CCR is the percent of officers ending their initial service obligation who would complete their eleventh year of service if current retention rates continue. For pilots and navigators the 6-11 year group's rate is reported, while the 4-11 year group's rate is used for engineers, nonrated operations officers (NRO) and mission support officers (Msn Spt). After reaching a critically low point in FY 1979, officer retention reached record high levels in FY 1983. Officer retention rates have since decreased. Although navigator, NRO and Msn Spt retention rates remain relatively healthy, pilot retention remains a concern. Pilot rates decreased from a CCR high of 78 percent in FY 1983 to 34 percent in FY 1990. Below is a summary of officer CCR data.

OFFICER RETENTION
(CCR)

	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>
PILOT	78	72	59	56	48	43	36	34
NAVIGATOR	76	75	78	74	75	71	75	68
NONRATED OPS	69	68	68	72	62	60	69	59
MISSION SPT	62	61	61	57	55	54	56	54
ENGINEER	58	65	62	54	47	46	52	48

There are several factors contributing to our pilot retention problem. The strength of the economy, expansion of the airline industry, and the mandatory retirements of large numbers of commercial pilots, have combined to create the high pilot hiring levels. Since 1984, 39,000 hirings occurred. This trend is projected to continue well into the 1990s with anywhere from 4,000 to 8,000 hires per year. The Air Force pilot force has been susceptible to recruitment.

Through numerous information gathering tools, we've been able to identify some of these retention related problems. Sources include surveys of both career and separating pilots, conferences and symposiums, and Major Air Command feedback. We've found that pilots have concerns about assignment policies, pay and entitlements, leadership and communications, additional duties, family issues, and job security.

The Air Force has instituted a number of initiatives to address these concerns. At the forefront of the Air Force's plan is Officer Professional Development (OPD) which reemphasizes job performance as the basis for maturing the officer corps. In conjunction with OPD, the Air Force has changed its officer evaluation system to highlight performance. Efforts to deal with perceived communication and leadership problems were evident as well. Direct chain of command involvement in assignments and performance evaluation should help. Also, through increased use of policy letters, news releases, briefing, seminars, and symposiums, the "word" is getting out to field units. Furthermore, in July 1988, a Pilot Retention Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) was created to keep pilots informed in a timely manner about personnel issues which affect them. The response to the EBB continues to be outstanding. Another initiative the Air Force has implemented is to increase the Active Duty Service Commitment (ADSC) for Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) to 8 years. A 10-year

ADSC will become effective for anyone entering UPT on/after 1 Oct 91, with some exceptions.

The Aviation Career Improvement Act was approved on 29 Nov 89. It provided authority to extend the pilot bonus to 30 Sep 91 while raising the maximum flight pay from \$400/month to \$650/month. Another important feature of the law calls for the identification of the pilot shortage as a national problem. The law calls for the formation of a Presidential Commission to study the pilot issue.

The flight pay increase, our first since 1981, indicates a long term commitment and sends a positive message to our rated aircrews. On the other hand the extended bonus authority allows us to continue with an immediate short term attempt to influence our younger pilots who are within the most retention critical part of their careers. Although we are hopeful these efforts will be productive, the lucrative draw from the airline industry caused by a national shortage of pilots is likely to continue to aggravate our pilot retention dilemma.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve.

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR).

(a) General. The USAFR programmed end strength will decrease by 4391 between FY 1991 and 1992. This reduction was driven by the following: 7 Aerial Port Squadrons (-836 drill) and 10 Civil Engineering Flights (-1277 drill) were eliminated; the KC-10 maintenance was reduced (-168); the Air Force Reserve Numbered Air Forces (-330 drill) were eliminated by the Defense Management Review (DMR) organization streamlining initiatives and realigned their mission under HQ AFRES; and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) were cut due to reduced requirements and IMA overages in many selected wartime skills (-1700).

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End Strength. Table VI-4 displays by DPPC category the USAFR programmed manpower structure, programmed manning and end strength. The USAFR structure decreases by 4379 drill and 12 full-time support spaces between FY 1991 and FY 1992.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table VI-5 displays Air Force Reserve end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units. The results show the Air Force Reserve is growing, yet maintaining a high percentage of trained personnel.

(d) Skill and Grade. Table VI-6 compares actual inventory to programmed manning plus individuals for USAFR personnel.

(e) Experience. Table VI-7 compares programmed manning plus individuals to actual inventory. Trends show that the

TABLE VI-4
U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*

TOTAL AFR MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**	RQMT	AUTH	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strat Forces	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	100	3.0	2.9	97	3.7	3.5	95
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Tactical Air Forces	51.6	48.0****	52.4	51.6	51.6	99	50.3	49.7	99	50.3	50.3	100
Mobility Forces	13.0	9.4****	12.7	12.5	12.5	98	12.8	12.5	99	12.0	12.4	103
	38.6	38.6	39.5	39.1	39.1	99	37.5	37.2	99	38.3	37.9	99
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>												
	11.4	10.9	11.3	11.0	11.0	97	10.0	9.8	98	10.0	9.9	99
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>												
	4.0	3.5	4.3	4.1	4.1	109	4.3	4.1	95	4.3	4.1	95
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>												
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>												
Individual Training	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Centralized Support Act.	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	83	.2	.1	50	.2	***	0
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING****</u>	70.0	65.3	71.0	69.7	69.7	98	68.1	66.9	98	68.8	68.1	99
<u>AGR</u>												
		.7		.7				.6			.6	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>												
AUGMENTEES		13.3		13.6				12.0			12.0	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)</u>												
		1.3		1.7				1.7			1.7	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>												
		80.6		85.6				81.2			82.4	

*Numbers may not total due to rounding

**Actuals

***Less than 50

****See page VI-3

*****Adjusted to reflect 3,211 Selected Reserves called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b
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TABLE VI-4
U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*

AFR OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strat Forces	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.3	95	0.5	0.5	100	0.6	0.6	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Tactical Air Forces	7.1	6.4*****		7.4	7.1	96	7.0	6.8	97	7.1	6.8	96
Mobility Forces	1.6	.8*****		1.6	1.5	94	1.5	1.4	93	1.4	1.4	100
	5.5	5.6		5.8	5.6	97	5.5	5.4	98	5.7	5.4	95
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	***	***		***	***	100	***	***	100	***	***	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>												
	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.4	80	0.5	0.5	100
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>												
	1.0	0.8		1.0	1.0	100	1.0	1.1	110	1.0	1.0	100
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>												
Geophysical Activities	***	***		***	***	100	***	***	100	***	***	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>												
Individual Training	***	***		***	***	100	***	***	100	***	***	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Centralized Support Act.	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100	0.1	***	62	0.1	***	28
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING***</u>	9.2	8.3		9.5	9.2	97	9.1	8.9	98	9.3	8.9	96
<u>AGR</u>		0.2			0.2			0.2			0.2	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>												
AUGMENTEES		7.9			8.1			6.9			6.9	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>		16.4*****			17.5			15.9			16.0	

*Numbers may not total due to rounding

**Actuals

***Less than 50

****See page VI-3

*****Adjusted to reflect 799 Selected Reserve officers called to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C., Section 673b

TABLE VI-4
U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*

AFR ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strat Forces	1.9	1.8		1.9	1.8	95	2.5	2.4	96	3.1	2.9	97
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Tactical Air Forces	44.5	41.6*****		45.0	44.6	100	43.3	42.8	99	43.2	43.5	99
Mobility Forces	11.4	8.6*****		11.3	11.1	98	11.3	11.0	97	10.6	11.0	104
	33.1	33.0		33.7	33.5	99	32.0	31.8	99	32.6	32.5	99
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	.1	.1		.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>												
	10.9	10.4		10.6	10.5	99	9.4	9.4	100	9.4	9.4	100
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>												
	3.0	2.7		3.3	3.0	91	3.3	3.0	91	3.3	3.0	83
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>												
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1		.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>												
Individual Training	.1	.1		.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Centralized Support Act.	.3	.3		.3	.2	76	.1	.1	100	.1	***	***
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING****</u>	60.7	57.1		61.4	60.4	99	58.9	58.0	99	59.4	59.1	99
<u>AGR</u>		.5			.5			.5			.5	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>												
AUGMENTEES		5.4			5.5			5.1			5.1	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees</u>												
& Students)		1.3			1.7			1.7			1.7	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>		64.3*****			68.1			65.3			66.4	

*Numbers may not total due to rounding

**Actuals

***Less than 50

****This does not include AGR and IMA authorizations in the Inventory/Authorized column by DPPC line entry. The AGR and IMA authorizations are counted below.

*****Adjusted to reflect 2,412 Selected Reserve enlisted called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b

average enlisted grade was relatively constant while the level of experience increased. The average grade and experience of the USAFR officer corps remained stable.

TABLE VI-5

USAFR TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH
(in thousands)

USAFR	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
End Strength	83.8	85.6	81.2	82.4
-Training Pipeline*	1.3	1.7	1.7	1.7
-IMAs	13.3	13.6	12.0	12.0
Operating Strength				
-Non Unit AGR	.7	.6	.6	.6
+Unit AC Personnel	.5	.6	.7	.7
Trained Unit Strength	69.0	70.3	67.6	68.8
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	70.0	71.0	68.1	68.8
% Trained in Units	99	99	99	100

* Includes categories F and P

TABLE VI-6

USAFR SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

FY 1990

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	45	1	36	82
PMI**	2.9	**	17.4	20.3
Inventory	4.1	**	9.4	13.5
Over/Short	1.2	**	-7.9	-6.7
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	55	2	33	90
PMI**	29.7	.1	8.3	38.1
Inventory	37.2	.1	7.4	44.7
Over/Short	7.5	***	-.9	6.6
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	18	12	41	71
PMI**	.4	.1	2.5	3.0
Inventory	.4	.1	1.9	2.4
Over/Short	.1	***	-.6	-.6

<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	118	15	110	243
PMI**	33.0	.2	28.2	61.4
Inventory	41.7	.2	18.7	60.6
Over/Short	8.7	**	-9.5	-.8
 <u>01 - 03</u>				
Number of Skills	49	2	49	100
PMI**	.7	***	4.4	5.1
Inventory	1.3	***	3.1	4.4
Over/Short	+1.6	***	-1.3	-.7
 <u>04 - 06</u>				
Number of Skills	50	14	59	123
PMI**	1.9	.2	2.2	4.3
Inventory	3.1	.2	1.5	4.8
Over/Short	+1.2	***	-.7	+1.5
 <u>Total 01 - 06</u>				
Number of Skills	99	16	108	223
PMI**	2.6	.2	6.6	9.4
Inventory	4.4	.2	4.6	9.2
Over/Short	1.8	***	-2.0	-.2

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

***Less than 50

TABLE VI-7

USAFR EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED vs ACTUAL INVENTORY
(in thousands)

FY 1990

	<u>Total People</u>	<u>People with Greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG- YOS</u>	<u>FY 91** Total People</u>	<u>FY 92** Total People</u>	<u>FY 93** Total People</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>						
PMI*	20.3	-	-	20.2	19.9	19.8
Inventory	13.5	4.2	3.3	14.8	14.0	13.9
 <u>E5 - E7</u>						
PMI	38.1	-	-	39.7	37.6	38.4
Inventory	44.7	41.8	12.9	44.9	43.0	44.0
 <u>E8 - E9</u>						
PMI	3.0	-	-	3.0	3.0	3.0
Inventory	2.4	2.4	25.3	2.4	2.7	2.9
 <u>E1 - E9***</u>						
PMI	61.4	-	-	62.9	60.5	61.2
Inventory	60.6	48.4	11.3	62.1	59.7	60.8

<u>01 - 03</u>						
PMI*	5.1	-	-	5.0	4.8	4.8
Inventory	4.4	3.3	9.2	4.1	4.2	4.2
<u>04 - 06</u>						
PMI*	4.1	-	-	4.1	4.1	4.1
Inventory	4.9	4.8	19.9	4.8	4.8	4.7
<u>01 - 06***</u>						
PMI*	9.2	-	-	9.1	8.9	8.9
Inventory	9.3	8.1	15.0	9.0	9.0	8.9

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

**Estimates

***Numbers may not add due to rounding

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Enlisted.

[a] Recruiting. The USAFR placed emphasis on matching accessions to critical skills and programmed structure requirements, while closely controlling its FY 1990 adjusted goals for both prior and non-prior service personnel. The actual numbers of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1990 and the accession goals for FY 1991 thru FY 1993 are shown below:

USAFR Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
<u>Accessions</u>					
Prior Service	8,815	9,514	8,915	8,988	8,988
HSDG	-	9,490	-	-	-
Non-Prior Service	3,187	2,338	3,600	3,112	3,112
Male	1,975	1,616	2,477	2,141	2,141
Female	975	722	1,123	971	971
HSDG	-	2,308	-	-	-

The above data shows that 99 percent of prior service accessions and 98 percent of non-prior service accessions were high school diploma graduates. In addition, 90 percent of prior service accessions and over 99 percent of non-prior service accessions were in the top three AFQT categories. This data shows the continued high quality of USAFR accessions.

[b] Reenlistment. Reenlistment rates for the USAFR enlisted force for FY 1990 and goals for FY 1991 through FY 1993 are shown below:

USAFR Retention Rates
(percent)

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
<u>Retention</u>					
First Term	80	85.45	80	80	80
Career	85	91.92	85	85	85

The FY 1990 enlisted reenlistment rates continued to show favorable results.

[c] Aggregate Population Stability. Since aggregate population stability is a measure of retention, it is logical that this factor should remain at a very high level.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Enlisted	83.6	86.8	87.7	84.8	92.2	86.1	87.0
Officer	90.9	90.6	90.0	95.3	91.2	91.9	90.6

[d] Unit Personnel Stability. This category is also impacted by the strong retention statistics.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Enlisted	78.6	77.0	76.2	73.0	76.9	77.3	76.5
Officer	82.3	81.0	80.0	67.2	77.3	81.2	79.2

[2] Officer.

[a] Accessions. The U.S. Air Force Reserve receives officers separated from the active force, other reserve components, and from the non-extended active duty commissioning program for qualified enlisted personnel who hold needed skills and are presently participating in reserve activities. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1990 and the estimated requirement for FY 1991 through FY 1993 are shown below:

USAFR Officer Strength Plan

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Est Req</u>
Accessions	2,138	1,999	2,216	1,505	2,123

[b] Retention. Retention has not been a problem in the USAFR. Manning levels historically exceed the 90 percent level; therefore, no specific goals have been established.

(g) Readiness Assessment. The readiness of the U.S. Air Force Reserve is a function of unit staffing, stability, occupational imbalances, and the level of experience. Improvement can be documented in

three of these four areas. If the existing skill imbalances do not worsen substantially, the personnel readiness posture should remain unchanged or improve slightly through FY 1992.

(h) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Programs. The purpose of the IMA program is to provide highly skilled individuals who augment active units during wartime or emergency situations. All IMA positions are reviewed as part of the Wartime Manpower Planning Exercise (MANREQ) and justified solely on the basis of wartime or contingency requirements for which the active forces are insufficient. An IMA is not authorized based on peacetime tasks or peacetime manning shortages. IMA requirements were reduced by 1700 positions in FY 1992 due to overages in many wartime required skills.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
Total	13,450	13,315	13,647	11,981	11,980
48 Drill	750	791	729	729	729
24 Drill	12,400	12,218	12,597	10,931	10,930
Other	300	306	321	321	321

(i) Full-Time Support Programs. Statutory Tour personnel are Reservists on active duty for periods in excess of 179 days who provide full-time support to the Reserve Component and are paid from Reserve personnel appropriations. They serve on the staff of active component headquarters organizations responsible for Reserve component management, policy, planning, programming, and training; assist in developing and implementing Reserve Forces policies, procedures, and programs; and assist in organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the Reserve component.

In the USAFR, Statutory Tour personnel are not assigned to unit level. Full time support at the combat and combat support unit level is comprised of Air Reserve Technicians (ARTs) serving in dual status. As Civil Service civilians they provide full time day-to-day support to a Reserve unit. As members of the Air Force Reserve, they are integral members of their reserve unit and participate in all military training and duty in their unit. As members of the Air Force Reserve, they are also available to enter active duty should their unit be mobilized. Because actual assigned strength is used in FY 1990, not all programmed growth between FY 1990 and FY 1991 is real growth. Actual assigned strength is often less than programmed due to recruiting and hiring difficulties.

Growth in Air Reserve Technicians (ARTs) between FY 1990 and FY 1993 is mainly attributed to the growth in Special Operations personnel. In FY 1990, personnel were transferred to Special Operations manpower accounts, however in FY 1991 the manpower was returned to the Air Force Reserve. A more detailed accounting of technician growth can be found in Section III.

USAFR Full Time Support
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY90*</u>	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>
Statutory Tour	.7	.7	.6	.6
Air Reserve Technician	9.6	10.3	10.3	10.4
Civilians	4.5	4.4	4.8	5.2
Active Component	.5	.6	.7	.7
Total	15.3	16.0	16.4	16.9

*Actuals

(2) Air National Guard.

(a) General. The Air National Guard (ANG) has a programmed increase of 100 between FY 1990 and FY 1991. This includes an increase of 149 drilling guardsmen offset by a decrease of 49 full time active guard/reserve (AGR) personnel. Revised strength supports additional security, intelligence, and chemical/biological manpower offset by decreases generated by force structure changes.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End Strength. Table VI-8 displays ANG programmed manning and operating strength by DPPC category. The Air National Guard programmed end strength of 116,200 in FY 1990 will allow for an overall manning level of 95 percent when compared to the total requirements line.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table VI-9 displays Air National Guard end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units.

(d) Skill and Grade. ANG skill and grade imbalances are depicted in Tables VI-10 and VI-11. The overall enlisted skill and grade overages in the ANG are caused by several factors: low number of authorizations for grades E-1 to E-4, unit conversions/new missions, the required time lag to realign or attrit resources, and filling some projected authorizations up to one year in advance. Overall enlisted shortages are mainly caused by the inability of the ANG as a reserve component to reassign overages in one geographical location to fill shortages in another geographical area.

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

TOTAL ANG MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	18.3	18.7***	19.5	18.3	94		21.0	20.1	96	22.8	22.0	96
Offensive Strat Forces	8.9	8.7***	9.6	8.9	93		11.1	10.9	98	12.9	12.7	98
Defensive Strat Forces	8.8	9.5	9.4	8.8	94		9.4	8.7	93	9.4	8.7	93
Surveillance Forces	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100		0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	71.5	70.8***	72.7	71.1	98		74.7	71.0	95	71.9	70.7	98
Tactical Air Forces	52.3	52.4	52.8	51.4	97		54.5	51.2	94	51.7	50.3	97
Mobility Forces	19.2	18.4***	19.9	19.7	99		20.2	19.8	98	20.2	20.3	100
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	12.2	10.6	11.2	10.9	97		11.2	10.9	97	11.2	10.9	97
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	2.5	4.5	4.6	3.8	83		4.6	3.8	83	4.6	3.8	83
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	5.0	4.6	5.0	5.0	100		5.0	5.0	100	5.0	5.0	100
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	100		0.8	0.8	100	0.8	0.8	100
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>												
Geophysical Activities	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	100		0.6	0.6	100	0.6	0.6	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	3.4	3.9	4.5	3.7	81		4.4	3.1	69	4.2	2.9	69
Personnel Support	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	83		0.6	0.5	83	0.6	0.5	83
Individual Training	2.9	3.3	3.6	3.2	80		3.6	2.6	67	3.3	2.4	67
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Centralized Support Act.	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.3	71		1.6	1.1	69	1.6	1.1	69

TOTAL ANG MILITARY	FY 1990		FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES											
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING***	115.0	115.6	120.5	115.4	96	123.8	116.5	94	122.5	117.8	96
INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)	1.2	1.4		1.4			1.4			1.4	
END STRENGTH****	116.2	117.0***	120.5	117.0	97	123.8	118.1	95	122.5	119.4	97

* Less than 50

Actuals

*** Adjusted to reflect 818 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b

*** Numbers may not add due to rounding

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

ANG OFFICERS	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>												
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strat Forces	2.4	2.4***	96	2.4	2.3	96	2.6	2.5	96	2.9	2.8	97
Defensive Strat Forces	1.3	1.3***	92	1.3	1.2	92	1.5	1.5	100	1.8	1.8	100
Surveillance Forces	1.0	1.0	100	1.0	1.0	100	1.0	0.9	90	1.0	1.0	100
	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Tactical Air Forces	8.1	7.9***	98	8.1	8.0	98	8.0	7.9	99	7.7	7.8	101
Mobility Forces	5.1	5.1***	99	5.0	4.9	99	4.8	4.8	100	4.6	4.7	102
	3.0	2.8	100	3.1	3.1	100	3.2	3.0	94	3.1	3.1	100
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	.8	.6	100	.7	.7	100	.7	.7	100	.7	.7	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>												
	.2	.2	100	.2	.2	100	.2	.2	100	.2	.2	100
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>												
	1.6	1.4	100	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>												
	0.0	0.0	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>												
	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>												
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>												
Personnel Support	.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100	.3	.3	100
Individual Training	.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100	.3	.3	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Centralized Support Act.	.8	.9	89	.9	.8	89	.9	.7	78	.9	.7	77

*Less than 50

ANG OFFICERS	FY 1990		FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES											
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING***	14.4	14.0	14.4	14.4	100	14.5	14.4	91	14.5	14.6	101
END STRENGTH***	14.4	14.0	14.4	14.4	100	14.5	14.4	91	14.5	14.6	101

*Less than 50

**Actuals

***Adjusted to reflect 202 Selected Reserve officers called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b

****Totals may not add due to rounding.

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

ANG ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	16.1	16.4***		17.1	15.9	93	18.4	17.6	96	19.9	19.1	96
Offensive Strat Forces	7.7	7.5***		8.3	7.7	93	9.6	9.4	98	11.1	10.9	98
Defensive Strat Forces	7.9	8.4		8.4	7.8	93	8.4	7.8	93	8.4	7.8	93
Surveillance Forces	.5	.5		.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	63.4	62.9***		64.6	63.1	98	66.8	63.1	94	64.2	62.8	98
Tactical Air Forces	47.2	47.3		47.8	46.5	96	49.8	46.4	93	47.2	45.6	97
Mobility Forces	16.2	15.6***		16.8	16.6	99	17.0	16.7	98	17.0	17.2	101
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	11.5	10.0		10.5	10.2	97	10.5	10.2	97	10.5	10.2	97
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	2.2	4.3		4.4	3.6	82	4.4	3.6	82	4.4	3.6	82
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	3.5	3.2		3.5	3.5	100	3.5	3.5	100	3.5	3.5	100
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	0.0	0.0		.7	.7	100	.7	.7	100	.7	.7	100
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>	.5	.4		.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
Geophysical Activities												
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	3.0	3.4		4.0	3.2	79	4.1	2.7	66	3.8	2.6	67
Personnel Support	.5	.5		.6	.5	83	.6	.5	83	.6	.5	83
Individual Training	2.5	2.9		3.2	2.5	78	3.2	2.0	62	3.0	1.9	63
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Centralized Support Act.	.5	.8		.9	.5	56	.8	.4	50	.8	.4	50

ANG ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1990		FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV**	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING***</u>	<u>100.6</u>	<u>101.6</u>	<u>106.0</u>	<u>101.0</u>	<u>94.0</u>	<u>109.4</u>	<u>102.1</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>108.1</u>	<u>103.2</u>	<u>95</u>
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)</u>	1.2	1.4		1.4			1.4			1.4	
<u>END STRENGTH***</u>	<u>101.8</u>	<u>103.0</u>	<u>106.0</u>	<u>102.6</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>109.4</u>	<u>103.7</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>108.1</u>	<u>104.8</u>	<u>97</u>

*Less than 50

**Actuals

***Adjust to reflect 616 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b

****Numbers may not add due to rounding

TABLE VI-9

ANG TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH
(in thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
End Strength	117.0	117.0	118.1	119.4
-Training Pipeline*	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6
Operating Strength	114.5	114.4	115.3	116.8
-Non Unit AGR	.5	.5	.5	.5
+Unit AC Personnel	.6	.6	.6	.6
Trained Unit Strength	114.6	114.5	115.6	116.9
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	120.9	120.5	123.8	122.5
-Non-Unit Structure**	.5	.5	.5	.5
Wartime Unit Structure	120.4	120.0	123.3	122.0
% Trained in Units	95	100	100	100

* Includes categories F and P.

** AGR in Management Headquarters, ANG Support Center, and ANG State Headquarters.

TABLE VI-10

ANG SKILL AND GRADE

ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>			
	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	29	10	25	64
PMI**	7.0	4.8	17.0	28.9
Inventory	9.8	4.8	12.6	27.2
Over/Short	2.8	0.0	-4.4	-1.7
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	12	36	50	98
PMI	11.5	34.8	24.4	70.8
Inventory	13.3	34.3	19.2	66.8
Over/Short	1.8	-0.5	-5.2	-4.0
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	8	17	54	79
PMI	0.1	0.8	5.3	6.3
Inventory	0.2	0.8	3.9	4.9
Over/Short	0.1	0.0	-1.4	-1.4

Total E1 - E9

Number of Skills	3	56	44	103
PMI	2.2	44.9	58.7	105.9
Inventory	2.8	44.1	53.0	99.8
Over/Short	0.6	-0.8	-5.7	-6.1

01 - 03

Number of Skills	20	7	4	31
PMI	1.5	2.8	0.7	5.1
Inventory	2.5	2.8	0.6	5.9
Over/Short	1.0	0.0	-0.1	0.8

04 - 06

Number of Skills	3	5	33	41
PMI	1.0	2.1	6.1	9.2
Inventory	1.0	2.1	4.3	7.4
Over/Short	0.0	0.0	-1.8	-1.8

Total 01 - 06

Number of Skills	1	23	17	41
PMI	0.8	8.4	5.1	14.3
Inventory	1.1	8.1	4.5	13.8
Over/Short	0.3	-0.3	-0.6	-0.5

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals.

(e) Experience.TABLE VI-11

ANG EXPERIENCE
ACTUAL/PROGRAMMED INVENTORY
(in thousands)

FY 1990

	<u>Total People</u>	<u>People with Greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>			
PMI*	28.8	-	-
Inventory	31.5	15.7	3.9
<u>E5 - E7</u>			
PMI	70.8	-	-
Inventory	67.1	66.9	14.7
<u>E8 - E9</u>			
PMI	6.3	-	-
Inventory	4.9	4.9	27.3

<u>E1 - E9</u>				
PMI	105.9	-	-	
Inventory	103.4	87.5	12.0	
<u>W0 (Total Number)</u>				
PMI	0	-	-	
Inventory	0	0	38	
<u>01 - 03</u>				
PMI	5.1	-	-	
Inventory	6.3	5.5	9.8	
<u>04 - 06</u>				
PMI	9.2	-	-	
Inventory	7.4	7.4	20.7	
<u>01 - 06</u>				
PMI	14.3	-	-	
Inventory	13.8	13.1	15.9	

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Enlisted.

[a] Recruiting. The actual number of ANG enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1990 and the accession goals for FY 1991 through FY 1993 are shown below:

ANG Enlisted Plan

	<u>FY 90</u>			<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual*</u>	<u>HSDG</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Non-Prior Service (NPS)	4,066	4,173	3,595	3,904	3,840	3,480
Male	3,050	2,142	2,688	2,929	2,888	2,880
Female	1,016	1,031	907	975	960	960
Prior-Service (PS)	6,811	8,150	8,131	6,610	9,017	9,239
Male	5,857	6,978	6,958	5,685	7,755	7,946
Female	954	1,177	1,173	925	1,262	1,293

[b] Retention. Retention rates for the ANG enlisted forces for FY 1990 - FY 1993 are shown below:

ANG Reenlistment Rates
(Percent)

	<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	75	83	83	83	83
Mid Career	80	77	81	81	81

Career	85	97	96	96	96
Overall	90	91	90	90	90

First Term, Career and Overall Retention Effectiveness Rates met or exceeded established goals for FY 1989.

[c] Aggregate Population Stability. The Air National Guard continues to maintain a stable force as reflected below:

<u>Aggregate Population Stability</u> (Percent)							
	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officer	94.5	94.6	94.3	95.5	93.9	94.0	93.1
Enlisted	90.0	91.3	90.7	92.7	91.9	91.1	91.2

[d] Unit Personnel Stability. The Air National Guard unit personnel stability since FY 1984.

<u>Unit Personnel Stability</u> (Percent)							
	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Officer	80.5	81.1	81.6	79.7	81.7	81.5	77.4
Enlisted	91.0	91.0	80.8	79.5	81.5	80.5	80.1

[2] Officer Accessions. The actual number of ANG officers recruited in FY 1990 and accession goals for FY 1991 through FY 1993 are shown below:

ANG Officer Accession Plan

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1,292	1,292	1,502	1,117	1,130

(g) Readiness Assessment. A continued high level of programmed manning, greater stability (particularly at the unit level), and an increasing level of experience will maintain the Air National Guard's overall readiness posture.

(h) Full-Time Support Program. Full-time support manpower represents an essential element for mission accomplishment and readiness of Air National Guard units. Full-time manpower consisting of military technicians, active Guard and Reserve (AGR), Active Component and civil service personnel perform the day-to-day duties necessary for mission accomplishment and readiness objectives. Adequate full-time manning is a

key factor in mission readiness. Half of the full-time manpower available to the ANG is dedicated to equipment maintenance. The remainder is dedicated to training, logistics, administration and other support functions. The elements of full-time manpower programmed for the ANG are as follows:

	<u>ANG Full-Time Support</u>			
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Military Technicians*	24,119	24,460	24,639	25,422
Civilians	1,867	2,030	1,886	1,887
Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR)	8,643	8,468	9,081	9,072
Active Air Force with ANG	569	616	627	630
Total	35,198	35,579	36,233	37,011

*Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR).

The IRR consists of people who have recently served in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have remaining a period of obligated service. They are subject to being called to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress.

Individual Ready Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
68.7	65.3	65.7	67.0

2. Standby Reserve.

The Standby Reserve consists of people who have completed their statutory military obligation and have chosen to maintain a reserve status, or who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship disability. They are not in a pay status and do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs, but are liable for active duty in time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress.

Standby Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
15.4	17.0	17.0	17.0

3. Retirees.

Retirees
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees (AC/RC)				
Categories I and II	256.5	257.0	257.5	257.5

Category III	266.7	266.9*	267.2*	267.2
Other Retiree Reserves				
Categories I and II	19.8	20.0	20.1	20.1
Category III	46.7	46.9	47.1	47.1

* Includes estimated 55,000 Disability Retirees (Honorary retirees not included.)

4. Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty

The following charts depict the numbers of officers and enlisted members serving on active duty for training as of the last day of FY 1990 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days and an estimate for FY 1991 of the number that will be ordered to such duty.

Air National Guard

	FY 1990*		FY 1991	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	275	-	288
Flight Training	309	207	309	207
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	26	-	26	-
Officer Acquisition Training	-	-		

*Does not include Selected Reserves called to active duty for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Air Force Reserve

	FY 1990*		FY 1991	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	1,079	-	905
Flight Training	53	-	53	-
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	34	-	35	-
Officer Acquisition Training	-		-	

*Does not include Selected Reserves called to active duty for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

C. Civilian Force Management

1. General

Air Force civilians comprise approximately one third of the Total Force. Civilian end strength includes Air Force Reserve military technicians, who serve their units as civilians during peacetime, and as uniformed members upon mobilization. The civilian work force supports the Air Force mission in numerous capacities. Their largest concentrations are in Air Force Logistics Command, where they perform depot level maintenance on major weapons systems, as well as materiel management and distribution; and in Air Force Systems Command, where they perform basic scientific research, technology development, and contract management functions. However, all of our major commands and organizations depend on the contributions of civilian employees to accomplish their mission, with civilians assigned to virtually every Air Force installation worldwide.

2. Major Program Changes

Air Force civilian manpower strength for FY 1990 reflect the effects of both Air Force and DoD hiring restrictions, and is well below the FY 1990 President's Budget (Amended) (PB(A)). With significant changes occurring in the world, and in the Air Force programs required to perform the Air Force mission, the level of civilian personnel resources required is also changing. Reductions are anticipated to continue in future years as programmatic changes occur and as available funding is reduced. Many reductions will be accomplished through attrition, although involuntary separations will occur as missions are resized and installations closed. Also occurring are military to civilian conversions which will add to the challenge of resizing and restructuring, while maintaining the necessary skills balance within the work force.

3. Management Improvements

The Air Force will continue its efforts to effectively and efficiently manage civilian personnel resources. PALACE COMPETE, our manage-to-budget test will begin to move toward full implementation. PALACE COMPETE utilizes Air Force-developed CIVCOST software which provides detailed work force and payroll information for managers to use in exercising increased flexibility to make employment and classification decisions. The software also has projection capabilities which are especially useful in the dynamic environment of the 1990s.

Another project moving from the test phase to full implementation is PALACE AUTOMATE. This project provides managers and employees with a computer generated personnel document and one-stop for supervisors to create a position description and its accompanying job analysis and performance plan. This effort is designed to simplify and streamline a complex process, while providing supervisors with a more accurate and timely document.

Another major personnel management initiative known as PACER SHARE continues at McClellan, AFB to test the viability of productivity gain sharing and modifications to the personnel system. Total savings for FY 1990 were \$824,853, with 50 percent distributed to employees. PACER SHARE will be going through transition due to consolidation of Bay Area supply activities beginning in April 1991.

A new initiative is PALACE CAPRS - Civilian Automated Personnel Records System. This project converts virtually all personnel records and documents from paper files to an optical disk-based automated records system. Not only will paper records be stored optically, PDS-C (Personnel Data System - Civilian) will automatically flow personnel actions to an optical disk. When implemented, this system will eliminate filing and maintenance of paper documents and enhance access to records. It will also allow electronic transmission of personnel files.

4. Civilian Employment

The absence of statutory ceilings on our stateside work force has provided the Air Force a welcome opportunity to manage its work force requirements from a resource perspective. However, civilian workyear ceilings on overseas employment have been imposed in recent fiscal years. The Air Force continues to press for the elimination of these ceilings because they reduce flexibility for programmatic manpower adjustments. The civilian workyear ceiling, coupled with congressionally-imposed overseas troop strength ceilings, continues to impact on the readiness and sustainability of Air Force units overseas.

D. Mobilization Manpower.

1. Military.

As expressed in paragraph I.B., Air Force wartime manpower requirements are being re-evaluated. Lessons learned in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM will assist Air Force determine viable wartime force structure to compare against authorized end strength.

2. Civilian.

Changes in military wartime force structure will affect civilian mobilization manpower requirements. As stated in paragraph I.B., the Air Force is making significant gains in civilian workforce deliberate planning and real world execution capability. Lessons learned in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, such as, impact on civilian workforce of call-up of Selected and Individual Ready Reserve, and the role of civilians in the build-up, both in theater and in CONUS, will also assist the Air Force in any future requirements assessments.

TABLE VI-12
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

CIVILIAN	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV*		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>DPPC</u>												
<u>STRATEGIC</u>												
Offensive Strat Forces	9.2	9.1		9.4	9.3	99	10.0	9.9	99	10.6	10.6	100
Defensive Strat Forces	4.0	3.8		4.1	4.1	100	4.7	4.7	100	5.4	5.4	100
Surveillance Forces	3.8	3.9		3.7	3.7	100	3.5	3.5	100	3.5	3.5	100
	1.4	1.4		1.6	1.5	94	1.8	1.7	94	1.7	1.7	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>												
Tactical Air Forces	30.9	30.4		30.0	29.9	100	79.2	79.1	100	76.2	76.0	100
Mobility Forces	15.7	15.7		15.1	15.0	99	15.2	15.1	99	15.1	15.0	99
	15.2	14.7		14.9	14.9	100	64.0	64.0	100	61.1	61.1	100
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>												
Centrally Managed Comm	7.6	6.6		7.5	7.5	100	7.4	7.4	100	7.6	7.6	100
Intelligence	5.2	4.3		5.1	5.1	100	4.9	4.9	100	5.2	5.2	100
	2.4	2.3		2.4	2.4	100	2.5	2.5	100	2.4	2.4	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>												
	50.4	45.3		46.4	44.0	95	42.4	40.4	95	44.3	42.3	95
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>												
	2.2	2.2		2.2	2.1	95	2.2	2.1	95	2.2	2.1	95
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>												
	10.1	10.2		10.8	10.1	94	10.1	9.4	93	10.2	9.5	93
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Int'l Military Org	2.2	2.3		3.3	3.2	97	3.4	3.2	97	3.3	3.2	95
Unified Commands	1.7	1.7		1.8	1.7	94	1.6	1.5	94	1.5	1.4	94
Federal Support Actys	0.4	0.5		0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
OSD/Def Agencies & Actys	**	**		**	**		**	**		**	**	
	**	**		1.1	1.1	100	1.4	1.4	100	1.4	1.4	
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>												
	81.1	74.3		77.1	69.6	90	24.3	16.7	69	23.8	16.0	89
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>												
Combat Commands	8.0	6.7		7.3	7.3	99	6.6	6.4	98	6.4	6.2	97
Support Commands	2.7	2.3		2.5	2.5	100	2.2	2.2	100	1.9	1.9	100
	5.3	4.4		4.8	4.7	98	4.4	4.3	98	4.5	4.3	96

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CIVILIAN	FY 1990			FY 1991			FY 1992			FY 1993		
	AUTH	INV*		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>DPPC</u>												
<u>RED/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>												
Research and Development	9.7	9.6		11.1	10.4	94	11.2	10.5	94	10.9	10.2	93
Geophysical Activities	8.5	8.6		9.1	8.5	93	9.3	8.7	94	9.0	8.3	92
	1.2	1.0		2.0	1.9	95	1.9	1.8	95	1.9	1.8	95
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>												
Personnel Support	9.8	9.9		10.7	10.0	93	13.0	12.1	93	12.8	12.0	93
Individual Training	2.8	2.9		4.1	3.5	85	6.5	5.7	88	6.2	5.4	87
	7.0	7.0		6.6	6.5	98	6.5	6.4	98	6.6	6.5	99
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>												
Support Installations	40.7	42.3		40.5	35.6	88	30.6	25.7	84	29.9	24.9	82
Centralized Support Act.	31.7	32.7		34.2	29.6	87	24.5	19.9	81	23.9	19.2	79
	9.0	9.6		6.3	6.0	95	6.1	5.8	95	6.0	5.7	95
<u>END STRENGTH***</u>	261.9	248.9		256.4	239.0	93	240.4	222.9	93	238.2	220.6	93

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Actual

** Less than 50

*** Numbers may not add due to rounding

III. AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPFC).

A. Strategic.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

<u>Active Force</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Bombers</u>				
B-52	187	171	158	117
FB-111	24	0	0	0
B-1B	90	90	84	84
B-2	0	0	0	3
<u>Tankers</u>				
KC-135	446	436	392	358
<u>Missiles</u>				
Minuteman	950	950	870	792
Peacekeeper	50	50	50	50
<u>Reserve Forces</u>				
<u>Tankers</u>				
ANG KC-135	118	128	148	172
AFR KC-135	30	30	40	50

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1991, we have 12 B-52 squadrons, six B-1 squadrons, 29 active force and 16 smaller Air Reserve Component KC-135 tanker squadrons, 6 KC-10 squadrons, 3 KC-10 associated squadrons, 19 Minuteman squadrons, and one Peacekeeper squadron with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	51.2	44.7	44.4	40.6
Selected Reserve				
ANG	8.7*	8.9	10.9	12.7
AFR	2.1	2.2	2.9	3.5
<u>Civilian</u>	3.8	4.1	4.7	5.4

*Adjusted to reflect Select Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b.

FY 1991 active military manpower decreases are due to retirement of 29 B-52G aircraft (-3034, -815 of which represents end strength associated with -14 B-52G conventional PAA implemented as an undistributed reduction in FY 1990), B-1B security change (-275), KC-135 savings due to Pease AFB closure (-346), transfer of 10 KC-135s to ANG (-190), early transfer of FB-111s to the TAF (-1489), aircraft maintenance streamlining (-456), productivity initiatives (-532), and operational headquarters reduction (-103).

FY 1992 active military manpower decreases result from transfer of 30 KC-135s to the ANG and AFR (-480), conversion of 14 KC-135s to BAI status (-252), elimination of KC-135 wing overhead (-220), conversion of 6 B-1Bs to BAI status (-155), initial retirement of Minuteman II ICBMs (-100), and a reduction of operational headquarters (-121). These were partially offset by military increases in B-52 aircraft maintenance (+359), Advanced Cruise Missile (+100), B-1B crew ratio adjustment (+81), and preparation for the first operation B-2 wing (+410).

FY 1993 active military manpower decrease results from retirement of 41 B-52Gs (-3145), transfer of 34 KC-135s to the ANG and AFR (-707), continued retirement of Minuteman II ICBMs (-274), and a reduction in operational headquarters (-138). There is an increase in military to support the first three operational B-2 aircraft (+413).

The Air National Guard air refueling capability in FY 1992 increases with five KC-135 units robusting (+551) and increasing the number of units and PAA (+1475). A portion of the manpower required for this robust was denied in the FY 1991 authorization act, reducing end strength (-125). Air Force base closure increases the ANG (+114) for base support. During FY 1993 the ANG increases units and PAA (+1772).

Air Force Reserve added 20 additional KC-135 E/R tanker aircraft in FY 1992-1993 with plus (+746) (+242 civilians) in FY 1992 and plus (+595) (+169 civilians) in FY 1993.

Civilian increases in FY 1992 accompanied transfer of Peacekeeper Depot Maintenance (+108) and an increase in 30 KC-135s in the ANG and AFR (+523).

Increases in civilian manpower for FY 1993 accompany 34 KC-135s transferred to the ANG and AFR (+686). This is partially offset by civilian manpower decreases due to retirement of B-52Gs (-41) and reductions to operational headquarters (-10).

2. Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Active Force</u>				
F-15	18	18	0	0

Reserve Forces

ANG F-4	18	0	0	0
ANG F-16	162	180	180	180
ANG F-15	36	36	36	36

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard, and ground radars of Pacific Air Forces for atmospheric tactical warning/attack assessment, airspace control and limited defense.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Force Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	3.3	3.1	2.1	2.0
Selected Reserve				
ANG	9.5	8.8	8.7	8.7
AFR(IMAs)	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.5

The FY 1992 decrease in active military manpower is attributed to a reduction in fighter interceptors (-650) and Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radar (-400).

The decrease in Air National Guard manpower in FY 1991 reflects the conversion of one F-4 unit to F-15 (-54). Further on overexecution of the FY 1990 program causes a disconnect with the FY 1991 end strength levels (-665).

The FY 1992 decrease in civilians can be attributed to mothballing/delaying OTH-B (-55) and a civilian reduction (-115).

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

In FY 1991, Control and Surveillance Forces include 27 PAA EC-135 Post Attack Command and Control System aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers. Three PAA E-3B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft serve as the most survivable part of the National Military Command System. Our ground surveillance assets include the Distant Early Warning line, North Warning System, and Joint Surveillance System (47 FAA radars, aerostats, ground system connectivity, and Region Operational Control Centers/Sector Operational Control Centers). Additionally, the ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, CO; the Consolidated Space Operations Center at Falcon AFB, CO; three ballistic missile early warning sites; six Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile detection and warning sites;

six SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; and space-based Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (Defense Support Program) and its associated ground and mobile support system.

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	11.1	10.5	10.4	9.4
Selected Reserve				
ANG	.5	.5	.5	.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.7

The active military decrease in FY 1991 results from AFCC O&M restructure (-200), AFCC program review (-115), productivity initiatives (-65), notional base closures (-45), and management structure reductions (-60).

The FY 1992 military decrease results from the modification of Looking Glass Alert (-87) and military-to-civilian conversions (-70) partially offset by increases for Cheyenne Mountain upgrades (+17) and the strategic warfare review (+41).

The FY 1993 military decrease results from the Airborne National Command Post (ABNCP) restructure (-830), notional base closures (-90), management structure reductions (-20), military-to-civilian conversions (-55) and modification of Looking Glass Alert (-90).

The civilian increase in FY 1992 results from the AFCC O&M restructure (+25), military-to-civilian conversions (+70), Cheyenne Mountain upgrades (+75), and the transfer of the WWMCCS Information system (AFWIS) from AFSC to AFCC (+25).

B. Tactical/Mobility.

1. Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Active Force</u>				
Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents	23.8	21.7	17.1	16.1
Tactical Fighter Aircraft	1713	1560	1230	1158
Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C and TR-1)	54	18	18	18
Special Operations Force Aircraft	82	89		
Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (E-3)	29	29	29	29
Airborne TACS Aircraft (OV-10, OA-37, OA-10)	73	61	58	64
Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (KC-10)	57	57		
Electronic Combat Aircraft 1/	48	48	45	45
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles	112	0	0	0

Reserve Forces

ARF TAC Fighter Wing Equivalents	11.9	11.8	11.9	11.3
ANG Fighter Aircraft	636	624	636	612
AFR Fighter Aircraft	222	222	222	204
ANG Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C)	108	108	108	72
AFR Special Operations Aircraft	14	14	14	14
AFR TACS Aircraft (OA-10)	0	0	0	18
ANG Airborne TACS Aircraft (OA-37, OV-10, OA-10)	54	54	24	30
ANG Special Operations Aircraft (EC-130)	6	6	6	6
ANG Electronic Combat Aircraft 1/ Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10)	0	0	0	25
(AFR-Assoc) 2/	3	3	3	3

1/ Includes EF-111A and EC-130H (Compass Call) squadrons.

2/ Associate squadrons currently provide one-half of the wartime required aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft (for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance), tanker/cargo aircraft, the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, GLCM missile operations crews, weapon systems security, and GLCM and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering RED HORSE (Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer) squadrons and tactical intelligence squadrons.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	111.4*	89.5	80.0	76.4
Selected Reserve				
ANG	52.4*	51.4	51.2	50.3
AFR (Includes IMAs)	9.4*	11.4	11.3	11.2
<u>Civilian</u>	15.7	15.0	15.1	15.0

*Adjusted to reflect Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 673b.

The active military decrease in FY 1991 results from changes to the tactical force structure (-8960), REDHORSE squadrons (-399), War Readiness Materiel (WRM) (-737), Tactical Air Control (-1511), and realignment of service support to special operations forces (SOF) (-6338) (See OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities this chapter), Operation DESERT SHIELD (-4000).

The FY 1992 military decrease is associated with further reductions in force structure (-9431), WRM (-193), and a military-to-civilian conversion (-69), and selected reserve unit draw down (-4,029).

The FY 1993 military reduction is a result of further decreases in force structure (-2897), REDHORSE squadrons (-140), WRM (-398), and the military-to-civilian conversions (-91).

The decrease in Air National Guard manpower in FY 1991 reflects the conversion of one F-4 unit to F-15 (-54). Further on overexecution of the FY 1990 program causes a disconnect with the FY 1991 end strength levels (-665).

The decrease in FY 1992 of tactical force structure results from continued modernization. Units convert from the A-7 (-4538), the F-4 (-1630), and the OA-37 (-929) to the F-16 (+5092), the A-10 weapon system (+789), and the F-15 (+750). Two units convert from tactical to strategic offensive missions. Tactical air control system (ground) units receive an increase in maintenance manpower for modular control equipment (+266).

In FY 1993 the tactical force structure again decreases due to continued force modernization. Units with A-7 aircraft (-3684) and A-10 aircraft (-2292) convert to the F-16 (+5565) and other missions (+1206). The tactical air support force increases PAA (+116). Reconnaissance units convert (-1655) to other tactical aircraft and to the strategic offensive mission.

In FY 1991 Operation DESERT SHIELD spaces revert to USAFR (+3200) and service support to Special Operations transferred to USSOCCOM (see Joint) (-1191).

In FY 1993, one A-10 wing (18 PAA) was drawn down, one wing was converted to F-16s, and 18 OA-10s were added to existing wings (-159) (85 civ) in USAFR.

Air Force Reserve phases out its last F-4 Phantoms in FY 1991 and converts to F-16 (-292 drill) (-10 civilians). In FY 1993, one A-10 wing (18 PAA) was drawn down, one wing was converted to F-16s, and 18 OA-10s were added to existing wings (-159 drill) (85 civilians).

The decrease in civilians in FY 1991 is caused by the realignment of service support to SOF (-630).

The civilian increase in FY 1992 results from military-to-civilian conversions (+69) and increased ANG civilian technicians for force structure (+180). These increases are partially offset by an ANG civilian technical decrease for Tactical Air Control (-177).

The FY 1993 civilian decrease is associated with changes in civilian technicians for ANG and AFR force structure (-183). This is offset by the military-to-civilian conversion (+91).

2. Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Active Force</u>				
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	170	170	164	164
Strategic Airlift Aircraft	288	288	282	267
Aeromedical Aircraft*	18	18	18	18
<u>Reserve Forces</u>				
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	290	292	265	256
ANG Tactical Airlift Aircraft	174	176	173	172
AFR Tactical Airlift Aircraft	120	120	104	96
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	18	16
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1	1
Strategic Airlift (AFR-unit equipped)	36	36	40	52
Strategic Airlift (ANG-unit equipped)	19	19	23	27
ANG Rescue Aircraft	22	24	24	24

*Manpower to support Aeromedical activities is counted in the Medical DPPC.

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5 squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons in FY 1990 through 1993. The AFR adds a C-17 associated squadron in FY 1992, then loses 2 squadrons with the closure of Norton AFB, CA, in FY 1993.

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command and the ARC. Manpower supporting these forces includes crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations, Air Force special airlift missions, and administrative airlift.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	34.4	33.9	33.3	32.8
Selected Reserve				
ANG	18.4	19.7	19.8	20.3
AFR (Includes IMAs)	38.6	39.1	37.2	37.9
<u>Civilian</u>	14.7	14.9	64.0	61.1

The decrease in active military in FY 1991 results from the elimination of 16 C-23s (-280), decreased C-5 maintenance and security requirements (-250).

The decrease in active military in FY 1992 results from the following: -8 C-141 (-370), +2 C-17s and initial maintenance (+200), +7 MH-60s (+150), -6 C-130s (-200), decreased C-5 maintenance and security (-100), decreased MAC Command and Control (-130), and reduction to classified programs (-200).

The decrease in active military in FY 1993 results from the retirement of 20 C-141s (-830), an increase of 5 C-17s (+170) and an increase of 8 MH-60s (+125).

The FY 1991 ANG increase includes manpower to support the conversion of one C-130 unit (-601) to one C-141 unit (+809). It also includes increased manning for rescue units (+211); for the C-5 unit (+163); for aerial port units (+167); for aeromedical evacuation units (+341) and for support aircraft (+5). These increases are offset by a decrease in the C-130 program due to overexecution in FY 1990 (-422). Further, 630 (89 in the C141 units, 132 in the C-5 unit and 409 in the C-130) were participating in DESERT SHIELD on 30 September 1990 and were not included in the FY 1990 end strength. They are included in FY 1991.

The FY 1993 increase in ANG mobility force manpower results from increasing airlift PAA and a percent of manning increase (+535).

Air Force Reserve bolstered Aero Med Evacuation (+620) in FY 1991 and (+47) in FY 1992 by zero balance transfers. The Reserve lost one C-5A(UE) (-152) due to an accident in 1992 and trimmed 6 Aerial Port units (-876) in FY 1992. In FY 1992, one C-130 unit converts to C-141s and one C-130 unit is scheduled to convert to a 10 PAA KC-135R tanker unit (-677). In FY 1993, a third unit converts from C-130s to C-141UEs and one unit converts from C-141 Associate to C-17 Associate (+578).

The increase in FY 1992 civilians results from an increase in ANG C-5 (+160), transfer of the industrial fund manpower to the Defense Operating Business Fund (DOBF) (+49094) partially offset by decreases for modernization and reduction of ANG and AFR C-130s (-56) and a decrease of 8 C-141s (-45).

AFLC restructuring and implementation of management improvement initiatives (-2874) in the DOBF account.

A FY 1990 congressional reduction to the industrial fund (-102) has only been programmed for FY 1990 creating an increase in FY 1991 (+102). Anticipated future budgetary actions will extend this reduction through the program.

C. Communications/Intelligence

1. Centrally Managed Communications.

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	15.7	14.8	14.8	14.3
Selected Reserve				
ANG	10.6	10.9	10.9	10.9
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.3	5.1	4.9	5.2

The active military decrease in FY 1991 results from improved manning levels (+800), military-to-civilian conversions (-211), Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) program realignments (-662), operability and productivity enhancements (-601), and productivity initiatives (-166).

The active military decrease in FY 1993 is due to notional base closures (-134), military-to-civilian conversions (-143), European drawdown (-98), and engineering and installation restructure (-113).

The civilian increase in FY 1991 reflects improved manning levels (+990), military-to-civilian conversions (+229), operability and productivity enhancements (-86), and the congressionally directed civilian reduction (-288).

The civilian decrease in FY 1992 reflects a civilian reduction (-293), the military-to-civilian conversion (+148), and engineering and installation restructure (-18).

The civilian increase in FY 1993 reflects civilian funding level adjustments (+182) and the military-to-civilian conversions (+159).

2. Intelligence.

This category includes manpower for selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs and other Air Force intelligence related activities. The Air Force Intelligence Agency and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	17.1	16.5	15.9	15.4
Selected Reserve				
AFR (IMAs)	1.8	1.9	1.5	1.5
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.4

The active military decreases in FYs 1991-93 result from programmatic reductions in classified programs. The FY 1992 change includes the transfer of 200 spaces from classified programs to unclassified programs not included in this category.

In FY 1992 AFR decreased IMAs due to reduced requirements and overages in many selected wartime skills (-367).

The civilian increases in FY 1991 and 1992 result from increases to classified programs. The decrease in FY 1993 results from a decrease to a separate classified program.

D. Combat Installations.

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as air traffic control operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Air Force - Combat Installations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	101.8	104.0	98.7	87.8
Selected Reserve				
ANG	4.5	3.8	3.8	3.8
AFR (Includes IMAs and AGR)	14.1	14.2	12.5	12.6
<u>Civilian</u>	45.3	44.0	40.4	42.3

The increase in active military in FY 1991 reflects increased manning levels (+11376). This increase is partially offset by productivity initiatives (-1912), military-to-civilian conversion (-818), GLCM drawdown (-1963), base closure (-980), realignment of medical spaces to the Medical DPPC for improved primary care access (-704), notional base closure actions (-2263), data automation and Defense Management Review (DMR) initiatives (-526).

The active military decrease in FY 1992 results from notional base closure actions (-2292), DMR initiatives (-1409), military-to-civilian conversion (-909), force structure adjustments (-536) realignment of child development/family support centers to the Personnel Support DPPC (-106).

The active military decrease in FY 1993 stems from notional base closure actions (-6169), military-to-civilian conversions (-996), DMR initiatives (-1795), force structure changes (-1644) and reductions to management headquarters (-263).

The FY 1991 ANG decrease addresses a realignment of the Base Communication Program Element Code (-795) offset by an increase of +63 in base operations and +7 for RPMA.

In FY 1992, the AFR reduced the number of civil engineering flights (-1184, -21 civilians) and reduced IMAs by 516 positions because of reduced requirements.

In FY 1993, air base ground defense training was added (+66) to USAFR.

The civilian decrease in FY 1991 is a result of congressionally directed civilian reductions (-7012), and Commercial Activities (A-76) adjustments (-100). This decrease is offset by increased manning levels (+5007) and military-to-civilian conversion (+818).

The civilian decrease in FY 1992 is attributed to a civilian reduction (-2426), notional base closure actions (-606), DMR initiatives (-470), force structure adjustments (-281) and program realignment of child development/family support centers to the Personnel Support DPPC (-747). These decreases are partially offset by increases resulting from the military-to-civilian conversion (+922).

The civilian increase in FY 1993 is attributed to a civilian adjustment (+1767), military-to-civilian conversion (+987), commercial activity (A-76) adjustments (+82), stock funding of depot level repairables (+497) and DMR initiatives (+47). This is partially offset by decreases due to notional base closure actions (-1271), force structure changes (-159) and management headquarters reduction (-63).

E. Force Support Training.

Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct strategic, tactical, and mobility support training. Also included are tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	25.3	20.8	19.2	18.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1

The decrease in active military and civilian spaces in FY 1991 is due to a decrease in Tactical Air Forces training force structure (-2700), a reduction in the aggressor force throughout the TAF (-1171), transfer of RF-4C training to the ANG (-132), and savings resulting from a change in the Manpower Availability Factor (-455).

The FY 1992-93 military decreases are due to further reductions in TAF/Strategic/Airlift training requirements (FY 1992 -1450; FY 1993 -600) and military-to-civilian conversions (FY 1992 -105; FY 1993 -120).

F. Medical Support

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and AFR medical service units.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	40.3	40.6	40.7	37.9
Selected Reserve				
ANG	4.6	5.0	5.0	5.0
AFR (Includes IMAs)	5.4	5.9	5.8	5.8
<u>Civilian</u>	10.2	10.1	9.4	9.5

The active military increase in FY 1992 is the net effect of adding manpower (+1000) to improve active duty access to primary care partially offset by programmatic decreases for approved/notional base closures and force structure reductions (-400), and the military-to-civilian conversion (-500).

The decrease in FY 1993 active military is primarily caused by further military-to-civilian conversions (-535), and further programmatic reductions for notional base closures and force structure decreases (-2300). USAF reduced USAFR IMAs (-82) caused by decreased requirements in selected wartime skills.

The decrease in FY 1992 civilians is primarily due to the dissolution of the San Antonio Joint Military Medical Command and the subsequent transfer of 1179 civilians from the Air Force back to the Army. Civilians have also decreased due to savings resulting from notional base closures and force structure actions (-100). This decrease in civilians was partially offset by the military-to-civilian conversion (+500).

The growth in FY 1993 results from further military-to-civilian conversions (+535) which are partially offset by programmatic reductions for approved and notional base closure actions (-330).

G. Joint Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support of activities outside the Air Force. It includes support to international military organizations, unified commands, and other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis. Manpower supporting OSD,

JCS, foreign military sales, counterintelligence activities, and special operations forces is also included.

Air Force Joint Activities Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.9	14.5	15.6	16.1
ANG	0	.8	.8	.8
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.4	1.6	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	3.2	3.2	3.2

The military increase in FY 1991 was caused by realigning service support for Special Operations Forces (SOF) (+6,338) (See United States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] section in Chapter VII for specifics) and the transfer of AFSC's Contract Management Division to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (+289) (See DLA section in Chapter VII for specifics).

The military increase in FY 1992 is attributable to the realignment of service support for SOF (+1192) (See USSOCOM section in Chapter VII for specifics). There were offsetting decreases: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program Review (-25), Defense Management Review Adjustments (DMR) (-30), military-to-civilian conversions (-47), Defense Agencies adjustment (-25) and SOF adjustment (-35).

The military change in FY 1993 resulted from the combined effect of increases resulting from service support of SOF (+738) (See USSOCOM section in Chapter VII for specifics) and reductions driven by consolidation of Defense Mapping Agency Combat Support Center and two depots (-95), FMS Program Review (-41) and contingency Forces Europe (-35).

The FY 1991 ANG increase is due to realignment of service support for SOF (+789).

The FY 1991 USAFR increase is due to realignment of service support to SOF (+1150).

The FY 1991 civilian increase is attributable to realigning responsibility of service support for SOF (+1,099) (See USSOCOM section in Chapter VII). Offsetting this transfer is an action which transferred budget accountability for USSOCOM civilians from AF to USSOCOM (-140).

The civilian increase in FY 1992 includes the USSOCOM transfer (+232) and offset by reductions from the FMS Program review (-110) and DMR adjustments (-100).

H. Central Logistics

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily in the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC).

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.8	8.8	8.6	8.1
Selected Reserve				
AFR (IMAs)	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2
<u>Civilian</u>	74.3	69.6	16.7	16.0

Military reductions in FY 1991 were due to the restructuring of AFSC (-130), military-to-civilian conversions (-249), transfer of Contract Management Division to DLA (-350), management structure streamlining (-80), and productivity initiatives (-210).

Military reductions in FY 1992 were due to the conversion of military spaces to civilian spaces (-114), AFSC and AFLC streamlining (-347), peacekeeper rail garrison program cancellation (-42). These decreases were partially offset by an internal AFSC total program review (+316).

The military reductions in FY 1993 were caused by an AFSC streamlining initiative (-273) and the conversion of military end strength to civilian end strength (-175).

In FY 1992, IMAs in USAFR were reduced because of decreases in selected wartime skills (-200).

The civilian decrease in FY 1991 was caused primarily by civilian reductions (-1257), AFLC and AFSC streamlining initiatives (-3936), transfer of the Contract Management Division to DLA (-2883), AFLC program adjustments (-308), competition advocacy (-200), Depot maintenance (-240), space launch from AFSC to AFSPACECOM (-300), the GLCM drawdown (-100) and transfer to the Support Installations DPPC (-2685). These reductions were partially offset by actuals of (+6916) and civilian conversions of (+249).

Several actions drove reductions in civilian end strength in FY 1992. Both AFLC and AFSC restructured and streamlined their commands (-702), civilian reduction (-839), competition advocacy (-200), transfer of Contract Management Division to DLA (-213), reducing supply system costs (-1,175), Depot Maintenance efficiency review (-825) and transfer of stock/industrial fund to the Defense Business Operation Fund (-49,100). The reductions were partially offset by a military-to-civilian conversion (+114).

Major actions which reduced the civilian end strength in FY 1993 included AFLC restructuring initiatives (-1595). These decreases were partially offset by military-to-civilian conversions (+175), AFLC program adjustments (+390), and AFSC program adjustments (+330).

I. Service Management Headquarters.

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters, including the Department Headquarters (Secretariat and Air Staff [including the National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve]), Departmental Support Activities, major command headquarters and their Numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, Air Force Systems Command's product divisions, Air Force District of Washington, and Air Force Program Executive Office.

Air Force Manpower in Service Management Headquarters (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	11.9	12.1	10.7	9.7
Selected Reserve				
ANG	.1	.1	.1	.1
AFR (IMAs and AGR)	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	6.7	7.3	6.4	6.2

Active military decreases in FY 1992 are due to reductions in management structure review streamlining (-992); USAFE reduction (-273); and realignment of special operations end strength accountability to USSOCOM (-135).

FY 1993 reductions are a result of management structure review streamlining (-925).

AFR reduced IMA's positions because of decreased requirements in selected wartime skills (-103).

An initial full hiring freeze in FY 1990, which was later modified to a hiring restriction, resulted in a net of 1200 civilian positions unfilled as of 30 September 90. Some of these key requirements remain while others were eliminated as a result of: Management structure review streamlining (-188); AFCC restructuring (-253); AFSC restructuring (-100); and an AFLC/AFSC restructure into Air Force Materiel Command savings (-169).

Civilian decreases in FY 1992 are attributed to reductions resulting from the management structure review streamlining (-414), USAFE reduction (-70), AFSC restructuring (-134), and civilian reductions (-131).

FY 1993 civilian reductions are due to the combined effect of management structure review streamlining (-382) and a civilian adjustment (+87).

From 1973 to 1990, the Air Force has reduced management headquarters by approximately 20,000. The effect of these actions has been a cumulative reduction of 49 percent in management headquarters manning compared to a total Air Force end strength reduction of 20 percent during the same period.

J. Research and Development/Geophysical Activities

1. Research and Development.

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

Air Force Research and Development Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.1	6.9	6.2	5.8
Selected Reserve				
AFR (IMAs)	1.1	1.1	.9	.9
<u>Civilian</u>	8.6	8.5	8.7	8.3

The active military decrease in FY 1992 results primarily from the AFSC restructure (-453), the military-to-civilian conversion (-155), Acquisition/Operations & Maintenance transfer (-43), and test aircraft maintenance (-50).

The active military decrease in FY 1993 is due to the AFSC restructure (-295) and the military-to-civilian conversion (-126).

In FY 1992 USAFR cut IMAs due to reduced requirements in selected wartime skills (-200).

The civilian increase in FY 1992 stems mainly from the military-to-civilian conversion (+155).

The civilian decrease in FY 1993 results from the AFSC restructure (-486) which is partially offset by the military-to-civilian conversion (+126).

2. Geophysical Activities.

The manpower in this category supports active and Reserve weather service activities, meteorological, navigational satellite, and space programs.

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.3	7.2	7.0	6.8
Selected Reserve				
ANG	.6	.6	.6	.6
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.9	1.8	1.8

The active military decrease in FY 1992 is primarily due to Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) operability and productivity enhancements (-135) and shuttle operations adjustments (-45).

The active military decrease in FY 1993 is due to notional base closures (-112) and AFCC operability and productivity enhancements (-99).

The civilian increase in FY 1991 is due primarily to the transfer of space launch operations mission from Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) to Air Force Space Command (+864).

The civilian decrease in FY 1992 is due primarily to satellite control network realignments (-88).

K. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support.

Included in this category is manpower to support all recruiting activities (recruiting, examining, and personnel processing), American Forces Information Service, honor guards, and other activities such as drug and alcohol training, equal opportunity race relations training, and civilian education/training development.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.9	5.6	5.7	5.5
Selected Reserve				
ANG	.5	.5	.5	.5
AFR (IMAs and AGR)	.4	.4	.4	.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	3.5	5.7	5.4

The active military increase in FY 1992 is primarily due to transfer of Family Support Center spaces from Combat and Support Installation DPPCs (+140) activities resulting from decreased accession requirements, equipment enhancements, and a recruiting activities restructure (-95).

In FY 1993, recruiting activities decrease further (-45), American Forces Radio/TV network decrease as part of an organizational streamlining action (-50), and education services reduce with notional base closure actions and commercial activities study initiatives (-40).

The civilian increase in FY 1991 is primarily due to the add of end strength (+1000) to account for the Palace Acquire program. This was partially offset by the transfer of the DoDD Section VI school manpower to DoD (-271) and a civilian reduction (-165).

The increase in FY 1992 results from the transfer of Child Development and Family Support Center spaces from the Combat and Support Installations DPPCs and growth to comply with congressional direction (+2400). This increase was partially offset by a decrease in the Palace Acquire programs (-125).

In FY 1993, Palace Acquire further decreases (-125) and civilian training requirements decrease (-62).

2. Individual Training.

Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees, Students, and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	16.8	15.4	15.2	14.8
Selected Reserve				
ANG	3.3	3.2	2.6	2.4
AFR (Includes IMAs)	1.1	1.6	1.5	1.5
<u>Civilian</u>	7.0	6.5	6.4	6.5

The active duty military decrease in FY 1991 is primarily due to reduced training requirements driven by lowered accession levels (-650) and flying training production (-200). Additional reductions result from the OSD directed military-to-civilian conversions (-100), and savings achieved through increased manpower availability (-435).

In FY 1992, the military decrease is caused by military-to-civilian conversions (-170).

The FY 1993 decrease is created by a military-to-civilian conversion (-270) and a skill training adjustment (-50).

For the ANG drill manpower positions were reduced (-553) during FY 1992. In FY 1993 a reduction of PAA results in a decrease of military manpower (-107).

Unit undermanning in FY 1990 accounts for the growth of 500 in FY 1991.

In FY 1992, USAFR IMAs were cut due to reduced requirements in selected wartime skills (-140).

The civilian decrease in FY 1991 results from the congressional direction to reduce civilians (-300) and two aircraft maintenance activities being contracted following an A-76 commercial activities study (-260). This is partially offset by the military-to-civilian conversion (+100).

In FY 1992 the civilian decrease is due to ANG training aircraft program changes (-260) and an active duty flying training maintenance reduction (-50). These civilian decreases are offset by further military-to-civilian conversions (+170).

There is more civilian growth in FY 1993 from military-to-civilian conversions (+270) and adjustments to the ANG aircraft training program (+70). FY 1993 gains in civilian are partially offset by a civilian reduction (-140).

L. Support Activities.

Support Activities are subdivided into Support Installations and Centralized Support Activities.

Accounting for Base Operating Support (BOS) manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the BOS category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. The Air Force also includes all manpower providing food, transportation and supply type services in the BOS category and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These accounting differences between Services preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

1. Support Installations.

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as laundries and commissaries.

Air Force Support Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	21.7	22.0	21.0	18.1
Selected Reserve				
AFR (IMAs)	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	32.7	29.6	19.9	19.2

The FY 1992 military decrease resulted from military-to-civilian conversions (-314), Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRDs) (-417), and OSD directed reductions (-263).

The FY 1993 military decrease resulted from base closure (-1341), notional base closures (-544), DMRDs (-573), OSD directed reductions (-306), and military-to-civilian conversions (-200).

The FY 1991 civilian decrease results from reduced manning levels (-962), civilian reductions (-4713), the transfer of end strength to the Personnel Support DPPC to account for the Palace Acquire Program (-685) and commercial activity (A-76) adjustments (-314). This reduction is partially offset by a military-to-civilian conversion (+440), improved MWR manning (+400) and transfer of spaces from the Central Logistics DPPC (+2685).

The FY 1992 civilian decrease results from transfer of service commissaries to the Defense Commissary Agency (-7864), civilian reduction (-379), base closure actions (-96), implementation of DMRD initiatives (-344), transfers of Child Development/Family Support Center spaces to the Personnel Support DPPC (-218), AFLC restructure (-786), and transfer of Defense Business Operating Fund spaces to the Mobility Forces DPPC (-320). These reductions were partially offset by the military-to-civilian conversion (+314).

In FY 1993 civilian decreases were a result of base closures (-921), notional base closures (-542), DMRDs (-410). This was partially offset by civilian adjustments (+977) and military-to-civilian conversions (+200).

2. Centralized Support Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. It includes manpower supporting readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various ARC activities.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	11.0	10.7	10.0	9.1
Selected Reserve				
ANG	1.8	1.3	1.1	1.1
AFR (Includes IMAs)	1.1	1.0	.6	.6
<u>Civilian</u>	9.6	6.0	5.8	5.7

The active military decrease in FY 1992 is due to Test Range program realignments (-200), military-to-civilian conversions (-219), and reductions to Separate Operating Agencies (SOAs), Direct Reporting Units (DRUs), and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs)(-281).

The active military decrease in FY 1993 results primarily from the Defense Financial and Accounting Service consolidation (-24), military-to-civilian conversions (-131), and reductions to SOAs, DRUs and FOAs (-709).

The FY 1991 ANG strength decreases because of a manpower reduction being imposed at state headquarters locations (-480).

During FY 1992 ANG drill manpower end strength in the Comptroller function was reduced (-182).

In FY 1992 USAFR eliminated Number Air Forces and transferred functional responsibility to HQAFRES (-330).

The civilian decrease in FY 1991 results primarily from the Defense Financial and Accounting Service consolidation (-2053), Space Launch Operations realignments (-625), reduced manning levels (-607) and civilian reduction (-434). This is partially offset by the military-to-civilian conversions (+101).

The civilian decrease in FY 1992 stems mainly from Test Range program realignments (-28), the Defense Financial and Accounting Service consolidation (-188), reductions to SOAs (-123), and elimination of AFRES Numbered Air Forces (-103). This decrease is partially offset by the military-to-civilian conversions (+219).

The decrease in civilians in FY 1993 is caused by the elimination of AFRES Numbered Air Forces (-56) and a civilian reduction (-59).

M. Undistributed.

The manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units as opposed to the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a

given DPPC, differs from the actual in-place strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. Historically, the number of transients tend to be higher in the summer than on average due to seasonal variations in PCS moves; hence there are fewer numbers of people in operating units at the end of the fiscal year. The Air Force accounts for this by projecting year end vacancies in field units in a separate, undistributed manpower program element or account.

Fiscal constraints implemented in the FY 1991 President's Budget resulted in significant arbitrary budget reductions being imposed in addition to those programmed. These reductions resulted in decisions to eliminate more than 21,000 in FY 1991, almost 18,000 in FY 1992, and more than 13,000 in FY 1993 below those originally programmed. Specific programming actions were taken to implement the majority of these reductions in the FY 1992 PB. For that portion of the arbitrary reduction not yet specified, the Undistributed account was decremented to maintain the proper end strength level. Actual allocation of this reduction to the appropriate DPPC's will occur during execution of the FY 1991 and FY 1992 budgets.

Undistributed
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0	-6.1	-5.6	-3.2

N. Individuals.

The Individuals account contains manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets. The manpower in the Individuals account is based primarily on end strengths required for training military people and moving them to and between duty assignments. Many years are also included to cover unit personnel losses due to prolonged sickness, criminal confinement, and holding while processing out for disciplinary separation.

1. Transients.

Air Force manpower in this category accounts for personnel in travel, leave, or proceed status while under PCS orders.

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0	6.9	7.2	6.6

Active military increases in FY 1991 reflect improved unit manning (+6852).

Military growth in FY 1992 is primarily due to increases in the PCS program projected levels resulting from force drawdowns from overseas and force structure changes (+301).

In FY 1993 the decreased overseas moves and officer accession moves reduce transient end strength (-521).

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees.

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining, patients in a hospital for over 90 days, and personnel awaiting discharge for disciplinary reasons.

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0	.4	.4	.4

Active military increases in FY 1991 reflect improved unit manning (+450).

3. Trainees and Students.

This category accounts for people undergoing basic military and initial skills training, and all other formal training in courses at least 20 weeks long.

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	23.7	21.2	21.0	20.9
Selected Reserve				
ANG	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4
AFR	.9	.9	.9	.9

The decrease in FY 1991 to student/trainee end strength is due to decreased officer and enlisted accessions (-2025), flying training production (-325), and operational training (-340) partially offset by an increase in acquisition training requirements (+150).

In FYs 1992 and 1993, end strength decreases result from further reductions in officer accessions and flying training requirements (-340 and -60 respectively). However, the FY 1992 reduction was partially offset by further adds for acquisition training (+75).

4. Cadets.

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

Air Force Cadet Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.2

Cadet decreases reflect implementation of congressional direction and intent to reduce cadets in concert with total end strength reductions.

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

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DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1958, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to integrate as a separate organizational entity, "any supply or service activity common to more than one military department, whenever (he) determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency". Since that time, the Secretary has utilized that authority several times to create most of the organizations contained within this chapter. Those organizations that did not receive their charters from the Secretary of Defense were created by Public Law. The missions of Defense Agencies vary widely, ranging from communications, mapping, intelligence, education, logistics, and other support to the Military Services and other parts of the federal government. Functional consolidations increase the Department's efficiency and permit the Services to devote a greater portion of their resources to their primary military missions. The Secretary continues to use this management philosophy to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Defense operations.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), assisted by the Joint Staff (JS), oversees, assigns responsibilities, and periodically evaluates the organizational effectiveness of Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and other organizational entities that exist outside of the Military Departments.

II. MISSIONS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The missions and associated manpower requirements of 30 different Defense components that exist outside of the Military Services, are discussed within this chapter, including:

- A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD);
- B. Joint Staff (JS);
- C. 14 Defense Agencies;
- D. 7 DoD Field Activities; and
- E. 7 Other Defense-Related Organizations and Activities.

The manpower data depicted reflects the actual end strength assigned on the last day of FY 1990, the end strength programmed for FY 1991, and the end strength levels requested for FY 1992 and FY 1993. The military strength figures represent active component manpower allocations to organizations outside of the Services, and are also reflected in the active component strength levels of the respective Military Departments. It is appropriate to display the military personnel strength contribution to these organizations since this manpower represents an essential component of each organization's total resource requirement. The manpower data, displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), is portrayed at the end of this chapter.

DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS
CONSOLIDATED MANPOWER
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	9,961	36,479	39,416	40,373
Officer	(6,271)	(11,450)	(11,490)	(11,570)
Enlisted	(3,674)	(25,029)	(27,926)	(28,803)
Civilian	<u>102,521</u>	<u>119,727</u>	<u>139,358</u>	<u>136,535</u>
Total	<u>112,482</u>	<u>156,206</u>	<u>178,774</u>	<u>176,908</u>

Defense Agency manpower, as a whole, is projected to increase by 13.3 percent (or 20,702 spaces) between FY 1991 and FY 1993. The aggregate increase includes civilian manpower increases of 14 percent (or 16,808 spaces) and military end strength increases of 10.7 percent (or 3,894 billets).

The net increase in Defense Agency manpower, as a whole, is primarily the result of numerous Defense Management Review (DMR) initiatives which have resulted in the transfer and DoD-wide consolidation of certain functions previously performed by the Military Services. These include implementation of prior year DMR initiatives associated with the consolidation of supply depots, inventory control functions, accounting and finance operations, ADP operations and design centers, and commissary operations. In addition, new DMR initiatives associated with the consolidation of dependents education, DoD printing operations, implementation of an electronic data interchange system and consolidation of DoD counter-drug activities also account for the increases in Defense Agency manpower.

The increases in Defense Agency end strength have been offset by decreases due to reduced levels of program funding, projected work load declines, military force structure reductions, and other DMR initiatives associated with funding special operations manpower and achieving reductions in Defense Agency operating costs of 10 percent by FY 1992 and 15 percent by FY 1993. The manpower estimates provided for Defense Agencies also reflect the civilianization of over 500 military billets between FY 1991 and FY 1993.

An explanation of the changes in each Component's operating strength levels between FY 1991 and the FY 1992/1993 budget years is provided below.

A. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)

OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary, responsible for overall policy development, planning, resource management, and program evaluation.

OSD Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	671	764	581	561
Officer	(568)	(609)	(488)	(473)
Enlisted	(103)	(155)	(93)	(88)
Civilian	<u>1,471</u>	<u>1,397</u>	<u>1,393</u>	<u>1,393</u>
Total	2,142	2,161	1,974	1,954

The decline in OSD manpower between FY 1991 and FY 1993 reflects implementation of a DMR initiative aimed at achieving reductions in Defense Agency operating costs of 10 percent by FY 1992 and 15 percent by FY 1993. The reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from organizational streamlining, management headquarters reductions, and automation and management information improvements. OSD's manpower estimates also reflect projected military-to-civilian substitutions and OSD's share of Military Service force structure reductions.

B. JOINT STAFF (JS)

The Joint Chiefs are the principal military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Members of the staff, other than the Chairman, include senior military officers from each Service.

JS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	1,383	1,311	1,264	1,244
Officer	(973)	(922)	(899)	(885)
Enlisted	(410)	(389)	(365)	(359)
Civilian	<u>274</u>	<u>275</u>	<u>272</u>	<u>258</u>
Total	1,657	1,586	1,536	1,502

The decline in the Joint Staff's manpower between FY 1991 and FY 1993 reflects implementation of a DMR initiative aimed at achieving reductions in Defense Agency operating costs of 10 percent by FY 1992 and 15 percent by FY 1993. The reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from organizational streamlining, management headquarters reductions, automation and management information improvements, and functional consolidations.

C. DEFENSE AGENCIES:

There are currently 15 Defense Agencies. However, the National Security Agency is exempted from this submission in accordance with Public Law 98-36. The Defense Commissary Agency and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, established in November 1990, represent the Secretary's most recent Defense Agency creations.

1. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages and directs advanced basic research and development projects which involve high risk and high payoff technologies.

DARPA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	30	27	26	25
Officer	(28)	(24)	(23)	(22)
Enlisted	(2)	(3)	(3)	(3)
Civilian	116	139	132	126
Total	146	166	158	151

The decline in DARPA's manpower between FY 1991 and FY 1993 reflects implementation of a DMR initiative aimed at achieving reductions in Defense Agency operating costs of 10 percent by FY 1992 and 15 percent by FY 1993. Specifically, the civilian manpower reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from consolidation of functions and support-type contracts. In addition, DARPA's military end strength declines as a result of civilianizing 2 officer billets between FY 1991 and FY 1993.

2. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA is responsible for planning, developing and supporting command, control, communications (C3), and information systems that serve the needs of the National Command Authorities under all conditions of peace and war.

3. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The mission of DIA is to satisfy the military foreign intelligence requirements of DoD and other authorized recipients, and to provide the military intelligence contribution to national intelligence. DIA's manpower requirements are not specifically identified in this chapter.

Communications/Intelligence Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	4,226	4,543	4,403	4,378
Officer	(2,142)	(2,370)	(2,087)	(2,075)
Enlisted	(2,084)	(2,173)	(2,316)	(2,303)
Civilian	6,274	6,519	6,632	6,609
Total	10,500	11,062	11,035	10,987

Defense Agency manpower dedicated to intelligence activities is projected to decline by 5.5 percent between FY 1991 and FY 1993. The

manpower reductions reflect the programming levels that have been agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

DCA's manpower level is projected to increase by over 8 percent between FY 1991 and FY 1993. The primary reasons for the increased staff includes additional support to the White House Communications Agency and a DMR tasking that DCA provide technical support to DoD's consolidation of ADP operations and design centers. These increases have been offset by reductions to DCA's civilian manpower achieved from consolidating and/or closing various field activities and computer facilities. DCA's military reductions represent civilianization and their share of Military Service force structure reductions.

4. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

DCAA is the Department's "contract" auditor, responsible for providing audit and financial advisory services to DoD Components involved in procurement and contract administration operations.

DCAA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Civilian	6,601	6,225	5,500	5,500

The decline in DCAA's manpower between FY 1991 and FY 1993 reflects reduced levels of program funding associated with projected declines in contract funding and implementation of a DMR initiative aimed at achieving reductions in Defense Agency operating costs of 10 percent by FY 1992 and 15 percent by FY 1993. Specifically, the DCAA reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from automation efforts and increased reliance on contractor self-governance initiatives.

5. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS is DoD's law enforcement, personnel investigative, and industrial security arm. DIS also provides industrial security services to over twenty Federal civilian agencies.

DIS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Civilian	3,986	3,620	3,315	3,139

The decline in DIS's manpower level between FY 1991 and FY 1993 reflects reduced levels of program funding and the outyear impact of continuing the FY 1990 civilian hiring freeze through FY 1993. The reduced end strength levels are predicated upon projected declines in personnel security investigative workload (due to reductions in DoD

military and civilian end strength) and projected declines in industrial security requirements (due to reductions in DoD contract funding).

6. Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)

DLSA provides centralized legal advice, services, and support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and all of the other organizational entities that exist outside of the Military Departments.

DLSA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	7	4	8	7
Officer	(1)	(0)	(1)	(0)
Enlisted	(6)	(4)	(7)	(7)
Civilian	75	74	74	75
Total	82	78	82	82

The manpower levels for DLSA in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect the civilianization of 1 enlisted billet by FY 1993.

7. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common support supplies and worldwide logistic services across DoD and to other federal agencies and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence, medical goods, industrial and construction material, general and electronic supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services include contract administration and management, surplus personal property reutilization and disposal, documentation services to the Research and Development (R&D) community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	978	1,449	1,449	1,414
Officer	(801)	(1,168)	(1,154)	(1,130)
Enlisted	(177)	(281)	(295)	(284)
Civilian	56,914	58,981	55,956	53,128
Total	57,892	60,430	57,405	54,542

DLA's manpower is projected to decline by almost 5,900 spaces between FY 1991 and FY 1993. The projected decline is the result of several DMR initiatives designed to achieve reductions in Defense Agency operating costs of 10 percent by FY 1992 and 15 percent by FY 1993. DLA's plans to achieve this particular reduction include efficiencies resulting from consolidating financial operations, regionalizing computer operations, discontinuing retail sales of DoD excess property, streamlining depot return procedures, and continuing to modernize/automate materials handling,

warehousing/storage, and cataloging processes. The manpower reduction is also predicated upon a projected decline in contract administration and management workload (due to anticipated reductions to DoD's procurement funding). In addition, the reduced manpower level represents several functional transfers, including DLA's accounting and finance operations, ADP activities and design centers, and print operations by the end of FY 1993. The decline in DLA's military end strength represents projected civilian conversions and their share of Military force structure reductions.

8. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA provides mapping, charting, and geodetic (MC&G) services in support of the Department's strategic and tactical military operations and weapon systems. DMA also compiles general aeronautical and marine navigation data.

DMA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	468	456	428	324
Officer	(200)	(200)	(187)	(163)
Enlisted	(268)	(256)	(241)	(161)
Civilian	<u>7,859</u>	<u>7,904</u>	<u>7,588</u>	<u>7,658</u>
Total	8,327	8,360	8,016	7,982

The primary reason for the decline in DMA's manpower between FY 1991 and FY 1993 is the transfer of approximately 400 civilian positions from DMA to a newly-created centralized account designed to reflect the total DoD resources required to implement the President's National Drug Control Strategy. In addition, DMA's military end strength declines as a result of two DMR initiatives that will convert more than 25 percent of DMA's military billets to civilian spaces by FY 1993 and DMA absorbing their share of Military Service force structure reductions.

9. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA acts as the principal staff advisor on matters concerning nuclear weapons, acquisitions, effects on weapon systems and forces, land-based storage facilities, and arms control verification, compliance, development, testing, and evaluation.

DNA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	549	543	516	498
Officer	(353)	(350)	(339)	(327)
Enlisted	(196)	(193)	(177)	(171)
Civilian	793	860	863	865
Total	<u>1,342</u>	<u>1,403</u>	<u>1,379</u>	<u>1,363</u>

The net increase in DNA's civilian strength between FY 1991 and FY 1993 reflects additional support for arms control compliance and verification functions. The increase is offset by a loss in civilians reduced under the FY 1990 hiring freeze and a functional transfer of certain administrative functions to the On-Site Inspection Agency. The decline in military end strength reflects civilianization and DNA's share of Military Service force structure reductions.

10. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for the management of DoD's Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.

DSAA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	27	27	27	27
Officer	(24)	(24)	(24)	(24)
Enlisted	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
Civilian	100	120	120	120
Total	<u>127</u>	<u>147</u>	<u>147</u>	<u>147</u>

No changes in DSAA's manpower levels are projected for FY 1992 and FY 1993.

11. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)

SDIO was organized in FY 1984 as a research activity designed to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles, and to increase the contribution of defense systems to U.S. and allied security.

SDIO Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	165	126	121	117
Officer	(152)	(114)	(110)	(106)
Enlisted	(13)	(12)	(11)	(11)
Civilian	<u>115</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>141</u>	<u>145</u>
Total	280	263	262	262

No changes in SDIO's manpower levels are projected for FY 1992 and FY 1993. However, SDIO's manpower mix does reflect the civilianization of approximately 7 percent of their military billets between FY 1991 and FY 1993.

12. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

OSIA was created in 1988 as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. OSIA is responsible for all on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, all escort duties for Soviet teams visiting the United States, and operation of the Soviet Union Portal Monitoring facility.

OSIA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	155	658	688	705
Officer	(70)	(286)	(299)	(307)
Enlisted	(85)	(372)	(389)	(398)
Civilian	<u>86</u>	<u>338</u>	<u>357</u>	<u>360</u>
Total	241	996	1,045	1,065

OSIA's FY 1991 manpower level has been adjusted to reflect increased workload resulting from the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations, Chemical Weapons Agreements, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and Nuclear Testing Talks. The additional strength provided in FY 1991 and requested in FY 1992 and FY 1993 is required by OSIA to carry out its inspection and escort duties associated with an increasing number of arms control treaties and agreements.

13. Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA)

DeCA was created in November 1990 to provide a more efficient and effective worldwide resale system of groceries and household supplies to members of the Military Services, their families, and other authorized patrons. DeCA also provides a peacetime training environment for food supply logisticians needed in wartime and troop issue subsistence support to military dining facilities.

DeCA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	---	---	2,042	1,974
Officer	(---)	(---)	(115)	(112)
Enlisted	(---)	(---)	(1,927)	(1,862)
Civilian	---	---	<u>21,050</u>	<u>20,750</u>
Total	---	---	23,092	22,724

The manpower resources associated with DoD commissary operations for FY 1990 and FY 1991 are reflected in the end strength levels of the respective Military Services. The FY 1992 manpower level represents the resources that have been identified by the Military Services to support this new organizational structure in FY 1992. The decline in DeCA's manpower level projected in FY 1993 represents savings to be achieved as a result of consolidating and streamlining commissary overhead functions.

14. Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)

DFAS was created in November 1990 in order to consolidate, standardize, and integrate finance and accounting requirements, functions, procedures, operations, and systems across DoD and ensure their proper relationship with other functional areas.

DFAS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	---	500	450	400
Officer	(---)	(135)	(123)	(109)
Enlisted	(---)	(365)	(327)	(291)
Civilian	---	<u>9,240</u>	<u>10,415</u>	<u>11,240</u>
Total	---	9,740	10,865	11,640

The manpower level identified to DFAS in FY 1991 represents the initial step toward DoD standardization by consolidating Military Service, OSD, and WHS finance centers, associated functions, and resources into DFAS. The increase in DFAS's manpower levels in FY 1992 and FY 1993 represent the continuation and completion of this consolidation effort, to include DCA, by the end of FY 1993. The increase in civilian manpower represents the functional transfer and merger of DLA's accounting and finance centers into the Columbus, Ohio field activity. The decline in military personnel strength reflects a concerted effort by DFAS to convert approximately 50 percent of their military billets to civilian spaces by the end of FY 1997.

D. DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES:

DoD Field Activities perform designated DoD-wide services which are more limited in scope than those of a Defense Agency. Seven of these organizations currently exist, including the following:

1. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support (including space management, budget and accounting, personnel, and security) to OSD and to various other DoD Components, as assigned.

WHS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	144	107	162	157
Officer	(52)	(44)	(73)	(71)
Enlisted	(92)	(63)	(89)	(86)
Civilian	<u>1,586</u>	<u>1,735</u>	<u>1,757</u>	<u>1,761</u>
Total	1,730	1,842	1,919	1,918

The increase in WHS's manpower between FY 1991 and FY 1993 provides for a functional transfer of the Directorate for Systems and Services from OSD and for the oversight of a newly-created Defense Resources Management Education Center.

2. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the operation and management of DoD's Armed Forces Information Program and its Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.

AFIS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	62	40	60	57
Officer	(19)	(11)	(17)	(16)
Enlisted	(43)	(29)	(43)	(41)
Civilian	<u>152</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>171</u>
Total	214	196	229	228

The manpower levels for AFIS in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect restoration of positions reduced in FY 1991 as a result of congressional reductions to Defense Agency Operation and Maintenance accounts and the civilianization of 3 military billets by FY 1993.

3. The Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) administers civilian health and medical care programs for retirees, dependents, and survivors of active duty, retired, and decreased Service members. OCHAMPUS also administers a similar program for selected beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration.

OCHAMPUS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	11	7	9	9
Officer	(10)	(7)	(8)	(8)
Enlisted	(1)	(0)	(1)	(1)
Civilian	<u>220</u>	<u>223</u>	<u>224</u>	<u>224</u>
Total	<u>231</u>	<u>230</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>233</u>

The manpower levels for OCHAMPUS in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect the civilianization of 1 officer billet in FY 1992.

4. The Defense Medical Support Activity (DMSA) is responsible for all aspects of DoD information systems used to support military health care and medical facility construction projects.

DMSA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	41	30	47	45
Officer	(38)	(28)	(44)	(42)
Enlisted	(3)	(2)	(3)	(3)
Civilian	<u>78</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>85</u>
Total	<u>119</u>	<u>113</u>	<u>131</u>	<u>130</u>

The manpower levels for DMSA in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect the civilianization of 4 military billets by FY 1993.

5. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) provides economic advice and assistance to communities significantly affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, or substantial Defense-oriented growth.

OEA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	5	3	4	4
Officer	(4)	(2)	(3)	(3)
Enlisted	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Civilian	<u>30</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>
Total	<u>35</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>37</u>

The manpower levels for OEA in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect restoration of positions reduced in FY 1991 as a result of congressional reductions to Defense Agency Operation and Maintenance accounts.

6. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas. DoDDS also operates a junior college in Panama.

DoDDS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Civilian	13,520	18,835	17,682	17,238

The FY 1991 DoDDS manpower level reflects the functional transfer of the Section 6 school operation from the Military Services. Section 6 schools operate in CONUS and Puerto Rico where state and local school systems are unable to either accommodate military dependents or provide a comparable public education. The DoDD's manpower level decreases in FY 1992 and FY 1993 due to a projected 14 percent decline in student load as a result of DoD's overseas troop strength withdrawals.

7. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) administers the DoD technology security program including processing export license applications.

DTSA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	48	21	42	40
Officer	(24)	(6)	(19)	(18)
Enlisted	(24)	(15)	(23)	(22)
Civilian	82	89	90	92
Total	130	110	132	132

The manpower levels for DTSA in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect the civilianization of 3 military billets by FY 1993.

E. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS:

1. Inspector General (IG) serves as an independent and objective official within the Department of Defense responsible for the prevention and detection of fraud, waste and abuse.

DoD Inspector General Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	36	36	35	33
Officer	(36)	(36)	(35)	(33)
Enlisted	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Civilian	<u>1,480</u>	<u>1,449</u>	<u>1,540</u>	<u>1,516</u>
Total	1,516	1,485	1,575	1,549

The increase in the IG's manpower level between FY 1991 and FY 1993 results from the Chief Financial Officer Act of 1990 which requires the IG to audit and complete annual financial statements on DoD general fund accounts. In addition, the IG's military end strength declines as a result of civilian substitutions.

2. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) is a fully accredited four year School of Medicine whose primary mission is to select, educate, and train qualified applicants to become "military" physicians. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees in basic medical sciences and public health.

USUHS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	955	833	809	809
Officer	(776)	(752)	(732)	(736)
Enlisted	(179)	(81)	(77)	(73)
Civilian	<u>673</u>	<u>791</u>	<u>819</u>	<u>835</u>
Total	1,628	1,624	1,628	1,644

The net increase in USUHS's civilian manpower between FY 1991 and FY 1993 results from projected military-to-civilian conversions coupled with increases to USUHS's reimbursably-funded medical research program. These increases have been offset by incorporating the outyear impact of reductions achieved under DoD's FY 1990 civilian hiring freeze.

3. U.S. Court of Military Appeals (USCMA) serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

USCMA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Civilian	36	59	59	59

An increase to the Court's personnel strength was authorized by Congress in Title 13, Sec. 1301 of P.L. 101-189 in FY 1991. No additional manpower changes are requested for the Courts in FY 1992 and FY 1993.

4. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified command with worldwide responsibilities to train, maintain, and provide Special Operations Forces (SOF) in support of DoD contingency plans developed by its five regionally-oriented unified commands. Beginning in FY 1991, USSOCOM became the only DoD operational command directly responsible for determining its own force structure and requirements for unique material, equipment, and training. Such responsibility makes the Commander-in-Chief, SOCOM, also responsible for presenting, programming, budgeting, and defending the SOF program to Congress. USSOCOM also reimburses the Military Services for the cost of approximately 2,700 civilian end strength involved in special operation activities.

In addition to the active military end strength reflected below, SOCOM has programmed approximately 18,000 and 21,000 Reserve end strength for FY 1992 and FY 1993, respectively.

USSOCOM Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Military	---	24,983	26,234	27,534
Officer	(---)	(4,352)	(4,700)	(4,900)
Enlisted	(---)	(20,631)	(21,534)	(22,634)

SOCOM's active manpower component is projected to increase by 10 percent between FY 1991 and FY 1993. Approximately 76 percent of the increase represents additional Air Force resources required to support Joint Special Operations Command, selected communications and combat control units, conversion to Major Air Command status, improved Wings/Tactics Squadron readiness. The balance of the growth includes increases to support Theater Army Special Operation Support Command, Naval contributions to the World-wide Military Command and Control System, and classified program growth. The 16 percent increase in SOCOM's Reserve Component end strength includes increased drill strength support to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations Command, and Reserve Headquarters. Additional Air Force reservists were programmed to support growth in primary authorized aircraft and to prepare for AC-130A conversions.

5. Management Support Activities (MSAs) perform specialized technical services that support DoD-wide initiatives such as product engineering, contract review, spare parts, and weapon system support improvement. This account aggregates approximately 15 different Management Support Activities under the operational control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel). The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides administrative support to these organizations. Although MSAs are programmatically responsible to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),

they are operating activities, not policy-making bodies. They include such offices as the Defense Manpower Data Center, the Defense Priority Placement Program, the Office of Industrial Base Assessment, and the Defense Environment Support Office. Heretofore, the manpower associated with these organizations was reflected in DLA's operating strength. Beginning in FY 1991, the Department decided to identify the aggregate manpower associated with these organizations as separate and distinct from DLA. However, DLA will continue to provide administrative support to OSD MSAs in the current and budget years.

MSAs Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Civilian	---	362	362	362

No changes in the manpower levels of these organizations are projected in FY 1992 and FY 1993.

6. Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities (DICA) represents a newly-created centralized Defense Agency account designed to reflect the total DoD resources required to implement the President's National Drug Control Strategy. DoD acts as the single lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The "budgeted" manpower resources represent the total civilian end strength that is required by the various DoD Components to execute this program in FY 1992 and FY 1993. DoD Components contributing to this effort include the Military Services and selected Defense Agencies. Recently, the Military Services were tasked by OSD Reserve Affairs to identify the aggregate military personnel strength required to support this effort in FY 1992 and FY 1993 as well. The Services were unable to provide this data in time for this year's DMRR publication. However, OSD Reserve Affairs does plan to display the total DoD military and civilian personnel strength dedicated to counter-narcotics activities in their FY 1992/1993 congressional justification request.

DICA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Civilian	---	---	2,646	2,708

7. Corporate Information Management (CIM) Taskgroup was organized as a result of a DMR initiative designed to make more effective use of DoD information systems. The CIM taskgroup will enhance the availability and standardization of information by providing for the development of integrated management information systems. The goals of the taskgroup are to reduce DoD operation and maintenance costs while at the same time improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of Defense operations. The end strength reflected below represents the full time permanent staff

dedicated to this overall effort in FY 1991 through FY 1993. In addition, the Department has "detailed" additional temporary staff from the Military Services and various Defense Agencies to participate on functional working subgroups, which include contract payment, financial operations, civilian personnel, and materiel management.

CIM Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>
Civilian	---	85	85	85

No changes in the manpower level of CIM are projected in the FY 1992/1993 budget years.

III. MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC)

The following tables portray military and civilian manpower of the Defense Agencies and related organizations by DPPC.

TABLE VII-1
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>STRATEGIC</u>				
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.4
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>				
Land Forces	--	21.7	22.5	23.7
Tactical Air Forces	--	10.9	10.7	11.1
Naval Forces	--	7.4	8.2	8.9
		3.4	3.6	3.7
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>				
Centrally Managed Communications	9.2	10.2	10.3	10.3
Intelligence	3.1	3.2	3.7	3.6
	6.1	7.0	6.6	6.7
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>				
	--	1.3	1.4	1.4
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>				
	.3	.3	.3	.3
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Unified Commands	5.6	6.4	8.9	8.9
Joint Staff	--	.3	.3	.3
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2
	4.2	4.8	7.3	7.4

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>				
Supply Operations	46.4	48.3	69.0	66.5
Logistics Support Operations	19.7	20.5	42.6	41.3
	26.7	27.8	26.4	25.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS</u>				
Combat Commands	--	.7	1.0	1.0
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>				
Research and Development Activities	9.2	9.5	9.1	9.0
Geophysical Activities	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3
	8.1	8.2	7.8	7.7
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>				
Individual Training	14.9	20.2	19.0	18.5
Personnel Support	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4
	13.4	18.7	17.6	17.1
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Support Installations	25.5	36.1	35.9	35.9
Centralized Support Activities	11.6	12.1	11.5	10.9
	13.9	24.0	24.4	25.0
<u>TOTAL END STRENGTH</u>	112.5	156.2	178.8	176.9
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2

TABLE VII-2
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET	
		FY 1991	FY 1992
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.7	.6	.6
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>			
Centrally Managed Communications	5.4	5.7	5.9
Intelligence	1.5	1.5	1.8
	3.9	4.2	4.1
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	.3	.3	.2
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Joint Staff	3.5	4.0	6.6
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	.3	.3	.3
	3.2	3.7	6.4

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET	
		FY 1991	FY 1992
CENTRAL LOGISTICS			
Supply Operations	46.2	46.9	65.6
Logistics Support Operations	19.3	20.0	40.1
	25.9	26.9	25.5
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES			
Research and Development Activities	8.4	8.6	8.3
Geophysical Activities	.7	.9	.9
	7.7	7.7	7.4
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL			
Individual Training	13.9	19.3	18.2
Personnel Support	.5	.6	.6
	13.4	18.7	17.6
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES			
Support Installations	25.1	34.3	33.9
Centralized Support Activities	11.4	11.8	11.2
	13.7	22.5	22.7
TOTAL END STRENGTH	102.5	119.7	139.4
			136.5

TABLE VII-3
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>STRATEGIC</u>				
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.7	.8	.8	.8
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>				
Land Forces	--	21.7	22.5	23.7
Tactical Air Forces	--	10.9	10.7	11.1
Naval Forces	--	7.4	8.2	8.9
	--	3.4	3.6	3.7
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>				
Centrally Managed Communications	3.8	4.5	4.4	4.4
Intelligence	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.8
	2.2	2.8	2.5	2.6
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>				
	--	1.3	1.4	1.4
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Unified Commands	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.2
Joint Staff	--	.3	.3	.3
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0
	1.1	1.2	1.0	.9

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET	
		FY 1991	FY 1992
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	1.0	1.4	3.4
Supply Operations	.3	.5	2.5
Logistics Support Operations	.7	.9	.9
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS	--	.7	1.0
Combat Commands			
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES	.9	.9	.8
Research and Development Activities	.4	.4	.4
Geophysical Activities	.5	.5	.4
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	1.0	.8	.8
Individual Training			
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	.4	1.9	2.0
Support Installations	.2	.3	.3
Centralized Support Activities	.2	1.6	1.7
TOTAL END STRENGTH	10.0	36.5	39.4
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	1.0	1.2	1.2

TABLE VII-4
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE OFFICER MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>STRATEGIC</u>				
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.3	.4	.3	.3
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>				
Land Forces	--	3.2	3.4	3.6
Tactical Air Forces	--	1.6	1.6	1.7
Naval Forces	--	1.1	1.3	1.4
	--	.5	.5	.5
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>				
Centrally Managed Communications	1.9	2.3	2.0	2.0
Intelligence	.5	.5	.5	.5
	1.4	1.8	1.5	1.5
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>				
	--	.3	.3	.3
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Unified Commands	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.6
Joint Staff	--	.2	.2	.1
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	.8	.8	.8	.8
	.8	.8	.8	.7

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPEC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
CENTRAL LOGISTICS				
Supply Operations	.9	1.1	1.2	1.2
Logistics Support Operations	.3	.4	.5	.5
	.6	.7	.7	.7
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS				
Combat Commands	--	.4	.6	.5
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES				
Research and Development Activities	.5	.5	.5	.5
Geophysical Activities	.3	.3	.3	.3
	.2	.2	.2	.2
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL				
Individual Training	.8	.8	.7	.7
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES				
Support Installations	.3	.7	.7	.7
Centralized Support Activities	.2	.2	.2	.2
	.1	.5	.5	.5
TOTAL END STRENGTH	6.3	11.5	11.5	11.6
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	.9	1.1	1.1	1.1

TABLE VII-5
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE ENLISTED MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>STRATEGIC</u>				
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.4	.4	.4	.4
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>				
Land Forces	--	18.3	19.1	20.1
Tactical Air Forces	--	9.2	9.1	9.4
Naval Forces	--	6.2	6.9	7.5
		2.9	3.1	3.2
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>				
Centrally Managed Communications	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.3
Intelligence	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3
	.7	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>				
	--	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Unified Commands	.6	.7	.7	.7
Joint Staff	--	.2	.2	.2
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	.3	.2	.2	.2
	.3	.3	.3	.3

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>				
Supply Operations	.2	.3	2.2	2.2
Logistics Support Operations	.1	.1	2.0	2.0
	.1	.2	.2	.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS</u>				
Combat Commands	--	.3	.4	.4
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>				
Research and Development Activities	.4	.4	.3	.3
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1	.1	.1
	.3	.3	.2	.2
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>				
Individual Training	.2	.1	.1	.1
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Support Installations	.1	1.2	1.3	1.2
Centralized Support Activities	--	--	.1	.1
	.1	1.2	1.2	1.1
<u>TOTAL END STRENGTH</u>	3.7	25.0	27.9	28.8
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>				
	.1	.1	.1	.1

TABLE VII-6
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY MANPOWER ^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>				
Land Forces	--	17.3	17.2	19.9
Tactical Air Forces	--	13.4	13.2	15.9
Naval Forces	--	2.6	2.7	2.7
		1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Unified Commands	--	0.2	0.4	0.4
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS</u>				
Combat Commands	--	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>TOTAL END STRENGTH</u>	<u>2/</u>	<u>17.7</u>	<u>17.8</u>	<u>20.5</u>

1/Includes Reserve and National Guard personnel.

2/Included in the Military Department's end strength in FY 1990.

TABLE VII-7
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SELECTED RESERVE OFFICER MANPOWER ^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>				
Land Forces	--	4.2	4.2	4.5
Tactical Air Forces	--	3.2	3.2	3.5
Naval Forces	--	0.7	0.7	0.7
		0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Unified Commands	--	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS</u>				
Combat Commands	--	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>TOTAL END STRENGTH</u>	2/	4.4	4.5	4.7

1/Includes Reserve and National Guard personnel.

2/Included in the Military Department's end strength in FY 1990.

TABLE VII-8
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SELECTED RESERVE ENLISTED MANPOWER ^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1990	BUDGET		
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>				
Land Forces	--	13.1	13.0	15.5
Tactical Air Forces	--	10.1	10.0	12.4
Naval Forces	--	1.9	1.9	2.0
		1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Unified Commands	--	0.1	0.2	0.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS:</u>				
Combat Commands	--	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>TOTAL END STRENGTH</u>	<u>2/</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>15.8</u>

^{1/}Includes Reserve and National Guard personnel.

^{2/}Included in the Military Department's end strength in FY 1990.

CHAPTER VIII

COST

OF

MANPOWER

CHAPTER VIII

COST OF MANPOWER

I. INTRODUCTION.

This chapter discusses the DoD manpower program from a fiscal perspective. Under the congressional funding process, manpower costs are included in appropriations for many purposes. This chapter is a recapitulation of cost information from various DoD budget documents. It provides a concise statement of the Department's FY 1992 and FY 1993 cost of manpower.

The remainder of the chapter is organized into three sections.

Section II Summary costs and trends.

Section III Detailed Manpower Costs

- FY 1990
- FY 1991
- FY 1992
- FY 1993

Section IV Pay tables for military and civilian employees.

II. SUMMARY COSTS AND TRENDS.

Table VIII-1 shows the aggregate trend of manpower costs as a proportion of total Defense outlays. This table shows dollar outlays in order to consistently present cost trends. It should be noted that the more detailed budget year data in Section III (Tables VIII-3 and VIII-4) show obligational authority which is not precisely the same as the FY 1992 and FY 1993 outlays shown in Table VIII-1. Table VIII-2, Percentage Pay Raises, presents a historical display of pay raises for each year since 1974 for the military, general schedule and wage board pay structures. Definitions of the summary cost categories are at the end of this section.

TABLE VIII-1
DEFENSE MANPOWER COST^a
(Outlays, \$ Billion)

	BUDGET											
	Actual											
	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85
TOTAL DEFENSE	77.6	103.0	132.8	205.0	245.4	265.6	274.0	281.9	294.9	289.8	287.5	279.1
<u>Direct Manpower Costs</u>												
Military Personnel	22.1	25.1	33.3	41.0	60.3	63.1	63.8	67.6	71.6	66.5	69.4	68.4
Appropriations	5.1	9.2	13.7	15.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Military Retired Pay	1.6	2.0	3.0	4.5	7.5	8.4	8.2	8.7	9.1	9.1	9.5	8.9
Reserve and Guard	14.1	18.9	22.3	27.8	31.4	32.2	34.1	36.1	37.5	38.9	38.7	38.8
Civilian Costs	.7	1.1	1.6	2.1	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.3	3.6
Family Housing Costs ^d												
Subtotal-Direct Costs	43.7	56.0	73.9	91.3	101.8	101.5	109.8	115.4	121.4	118.0	120.9	119.7
<u>Personnel Support Costs^e</u>	2.9	4.2	5.3	8.9	11.8	12.9	13.8	13.9	14.6	15.8	16.6	16.8
TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS	46.6	60.2	79.1	100.2	113.6	119.4	122.8	129.3	136.0	133.8	137.5	136.5
END STRENGTHS (000's)												
	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85
Active Military ^f	2,161	2,061	2,040	2,123	2,151	2,169	2,174	2,138	2,130	2,069	1,974	1,795
Selected Reserve	925	788	869	1,005	1,088	1,130	1,151	1,158	1,171	1,128	1,176	988
Civilian Direct Hire	1,016	935	916	980	1,043	1,027	1,049	1,010	1,037	997	979	913
Civilian Indirect Hire	94	81	75	84	87	85	85	80	80	76	73	63
Total Civilians	1,110	1,016	991	1,064	1,130	1,112	1,133	1,090	1,117	1,073	1,052	976
Retired Military	1,012	1,243	1,330	1,480	1,419	1,506	1,535	1,567	1,601	1,634	1,668	1,736

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

- a/ Data exclude civil functions, NSA, and special programs for disadvantaged youths.
b/ For those already retired. Future retirement costs for current members were not reflected in the budget prior to 1985. After FY 1985, payments into the retirement fund are included in the military personnel appropriations.
c/ The cost of civilians is budgeted under the functional appropriations--e.g., operations and maintenance, family housing, ROTC.
d/ Excludes civilian pay portion of family housing which is included under civilian costs.
e/ Includes costs of individual training, medical support, recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, half of base operating support, and other miscellaneous support costs. Excludes the pay of military and civilian personnel, since they are accounted for separately.
f/ Includes National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also counted as civilian employees. Includes all people attending paid drills or receiving initial training. From 1980 on, the reserve data also included officers on statutory tours and other reservists on full-time duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces.

TABLE VIII-2
PERCENTAGE PAY RAISES^{a/}

<u>FY</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u>
74	4.8	4.8	10.2 ^{b/}
75	5.5	5.5	8.9
76	5.0	5.0	9.0
77	4.8	4.8	8.3
78	7.1	7.1	7.9
79	5.5	5.5	5.3
80	7.0	7.0	6.4
81	11.7	9.1	9.1
82	14.3 ^{c/}	4.8	4.8
83	4.0	4.0	4.0
84	4.0	3.5	3.5
85	4.0	3.5	3.5
86	3.0	0.0	0.0
87	3.0	3.0	3.0
88	2.0	2.0	2.0
89	4.1	4.1	4.1
90	3.6	3.6	3.6
91	4.1	4.1	4.1
92	4.2	4.2	4.2
93	4.7	4.7	4.7

a/ This table expresses percentage increases over the previous year's pay scale. General Schedule and Wage Board percents are for base salary only. The military figures are the overall average percentage increase in basic pay, basic allowance for quarters, and basic allowance for subsistence.

b/ Includes approximately 4 percent catch-up increase upon the release from economic controls effective the first pay period after April 30, 1974.

c/ Enlisted basic pay raises for FY 1982 ranged from 10 percent for pay grade E-1 to 17 percent for E-7 through E-9. All warrant officers and commissioned officers received a 14.3 percent increase.

III. DETAILED MANPOWER COSTS.

The costs in this section are derived from detailed budget exhibits submitted to Congress and, therefore, are stated as total obligational authority (TOA). Since these estimates are expressed as TOA, they will not agree with the cost data (outlays) provided in Table VIII-1 of this chapter.

Tables VIII-3 through VIII-6 provide details of manpower costs by DoD Component. Key elements are indexed in the margin of these tables and defined below.

Definition of Cost Categories

The manpower cost categories discussed in this section are described below:

1. Military Personnel Appropriations.

There is one appropriation for each Service which funds active component military pay, cash allowances, matching Social Security contributions (FICA), enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, permanent change of station travel expenses, the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind), the cost of individual clothing and retired pay accrual costs. Beginning in FY 1991, subsistence-in-kind costs will be funded in the Operation and Maintenance appropriation rather than the Military Personnel appropriation based on a realignment of funding responsibility reflective in the FY 1991 budget.

2. Military Retired Pay.

Prior to FY 1985, military retired pay was funded by the Military Retired Pay appropriation. This appropriation, managed by DoD, provided funds for the compensation of military personnel retired from previous service. Commencing in FY 1985, DoD implemented a new accrual accounting system for military retired pay. Under this concept, accrual costs are budgeted in the Military Personnel accounts (Active and Reserve Components) and subsequently transferred to a new Military Retirement Trust Fund. Retired pay is paid from the trust fund. Beginning in FY 1987, separate accrual calculations are made for members on active duty and members of the Ready reserve who serve in a part-time status. Unfunded liability for retired pay will be liquidated over a period of time to be determined by the DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries. This Board of Actuaries also determines an amortization schedule for the transfer of funds from the general fund of the Treasury to the new DoD Military Retirement Trust Fund. Retirement accrual costs are further reduced by the significant revision to the Military Retirement system in 1986 for new entrants on or after August 1, 1986. This revision reduced retirement benefits in comparison to the pre-existing system thereby reducing accrual costs.

3. Reserve and Guard Personnel Military Appropriations.

There is one appropriation for each of the six Reserve Components which funds inactive duty drills; active duty for training;

ROTC; full-time guard members and reservists for organization, administration, training, maintenance and other logistical support; educational and bonus programs; training; the Health Professions Scholarship Program; and management and training of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

4. Civilian Costs.

Unlike military personnel costs, which are funded by specific appropriations, civilian costs are spread among several appropriations according to the function performed. Civilian costs include compensation for both direct and indirect hire employees. Also included are DoD contributions to retirement and to health and life insurance for civilian employees. Nearly 90 percent of DoD civilian costs are paid from the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations or from industrially-funded activities largely financed by O&M funds. Much smaller percentages of civilian costs are paid from the RDT&E, Military Construction, and Family Housing appropriations.

5. Family Housing Costs.

These are costs incurred to lease, construct, and maintain family housing for military personnel. This category excludes funds to pay civilians who operate and maintain family housing since they are already included in other cost categories.

6. Personnel Support Costs.

Personnel Support Costs include individual training, medical support (including CHAMPUS), recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, 50 percent of all Base Operating Support costs, and other miscellaneous personnel support. Direct personnel costs are not included in personnel support costs since they are already included in other cost categories.

Definition of Cost Categories (by Index Number)

The manpower cost categories discussed in this section are described below (keyed to the index numbers in Tables VIII-3 through VIII-6).

1. Active Component Basic Pay is the only element of compensation received in cash by every active duty military member. The amount of basic pay a member receives is a function of pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total cost of basic pay is determined by the number of manyears distributed across grade and length of service.

2. Active Component Retired Pay Accrual provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to fund the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 USC Chapter 74. Under the accrual concept, each Service budgets for retired pay in the Military Personnel account and transfers funds on a monthly basis to the new Military Retirement Trust fund from which payments are made to retirees.

3. Active Component Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing or when the government housing occupied is declared inadequate. There are two BAQ rates for each military grade: one for members without dependents and another for members with dependents. Members without dependents who are provided government quarters, or who are assigned to field or sea duty, receive a partial BAQ payment. BAQ costs are a function of overall strength, the grade and dependency status distribution of the force, and the numbers and condition of units of government housing.

4. Active Component Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) is paid to military members receiving BAQ who reside in areas of the United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) where housing costs exceed 80 percent of the national median housing cost or who are assigned overseas, but whose dependents reside in those areas qualifying for VHA. The cost of VHA is a function of the number of military members, by grade and dependency status, or their dependents, residing in the VHA qualifying areas.

5. Active Component Subsistence represents both the cost of food for military personnel eating in military messes and cash payments to military members in lieu of food (called Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS)). All officers receive BAS at the same rate. Enlisted members receive either "subsistence-in-kind" in military messes or BAS at one of three rates applicable to the following conditions: when on leave or authorized to mess separately, when a mess is not available, or when assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no U.S. messing facilities are available.

6. Incentive Pay, Hazardous Duty, and Aviation Career Incentive Pay provide incentive for service in aviation and certain hazardous duties. Included are aviation career incentive pays for rated and nonrated crew members, parachute jump pay, and demolition pay.

7. Special Pays include bonuses provided to certain medical and selected other occupations as further inducement for continued service. Also included in this category are Enlistment Bonuses, Overseas Extension Pay, Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay, Overseas Extension Pay, and Special Duty Assignment Pay. Special Duty Assignment Pay is authorized for enlisted personnel who have been assigned to demanding duties or duties requiring an unusual degree of responsibility. The Secretaries of the Military Departments designate the skill areas that meet these criteria.

8. Active Component Other Allowances include uniform allowances, overseas station allowances, and family separation allowances.

9. Separation Payments provide disability and non-disability Separation Pay, Terminal Leave Pay, Lump-sum Readjustment Pay, and Donations which may be given to enlisted members involuntarily discharged.

10. Active Component FICA Contributions are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law.

11. Active Component PCS Travel is the cost of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move for training, leave the Service, are reassigned to a new duty station, or are part of a unit movement to a new duty location. Tables VIII-3b and VIII-4b show detailed PCS costs by type and Service.

12. Cadet Pay and Allowances includes the pay and allowances of those cadets and midshipmen attending the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, and Naval Aviation Cadets.

13. Miscellaneous Costs include death gratuities, unemployment compensation, survivor benefits, Montgomery GI Bill education (MGIB) benefit costs, adoptions expense reimbursement, and apprehension of deserters. Death gratuities are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. Funds for apprehension of deserters cover the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control. Unemployment compensation is for payment to eligible ex-service personnel. Survivor benefits provides funds for payment of benefits provided by the Veteran's Administration to spouses and children of deceased service members. MGIB costs reflect future costs for benefits budgeted on an accrual basis. Adoption expense costs reflect reimbursement of a military member for qualifying expenses.

14. Reserve Component Basic Pay includes drill pay, pay for periods of active duty for training of reserve component people, and the pay of reserve component full-time support personnel. Tables VIII-4c and VIII-5c shows detailed pay costs by type and Service.

15. Reserve Component Retired Pay Accrual provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to fund the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 U.S.C. 74, the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94). Under the accrual concept, each Service budgets for retired pay in the Reserve and National Guard Personnel accounts and transfers funds on a monthly basis to the Military Retirement Trust Fund from which payments are made to retirees.

16. Reserve Component Allowances and Benefits include BAQ, subsistence, other allowances including special and incentive pays, and FICA payments; monthly student stipends (ROTC, Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarships, Branch Officers Basic Course, and Platoon Leader Class); Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) educational benefits; disability and hospitalization benefits; death gratuities; administrative duty pay; adoption expense reimbursement; and management and training costs for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

17. Reserve Component Clothing includes both cash allowances and in-kind clothing issued to recruits.

18. Reserve Component Travel includes the cost of travel and transportation of reserve component personnel.

19. Family Housing Appropriation (Non-Pay) funds leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The total appropriation includes funds for paying civilians, which are counted in this report under civilian costs. To avoid double counting, this civilian pay has been excluded from the Defense Family Housing cost category.

20. Civilian Salaries are the direct monetary compensation paid to civilian employees including basic pay, overtime, holiday, incentive, and special pays.

21. Civilian Benefits includes the government share of the DoD Civilian Health and Life Insurance programs, FICA, Retirement programs (Civil Service Retirement System and Federal Employees Retirement System), severance pay, disability compensation, and other such payments.

22. Personnel Support Costs include individual training, medical support (including CHAMPUS), recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, 50 percent of all Base Operating Support costs, and other miscellaneous personnel support costs. Direct personnel costs are not included in this category since they are already included in other cost categories.

TABLE VIII-3
FY 1990 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
(In TOA - \$ M)

INDEX	COST CATEGORIES	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	DEFENSE AGENCIES	DOD WIDE	TOTAL DOD	INDEX
MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS									
1	Basic Pay	12,268	9,314	2,905	10,078			34,565	1
2	Retired Pay Accrual	5,385	4,086	1,275	4,397			15,143	2
3	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,552	1,374	364	1,373			4,663	3
4	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	218	492	132	260			1,102	4
5	Subsistence Allowance	1,431	1,018	352	1,110			3,911	5
6	(In-Kind and Cash Allowance)								
6	Incentive Pays	130	258	37	263			688	6
7	Special Pays	390	832	89	218			1,529	7
8	Other Allowances	838	379	137	559			1,913	8
9	Separation Pays	188	124	43	98			453	9
10	FICA	1,146	858	271	942			3,217	10
11	PCS Travel	1,108	590	197	847			2,742	11
12	Cadets	35	40		36			111	12
13	Miscellaneous	85	41	15	38			179	13
	SUBTOTAL	24,774	19,406	5,817	20,219			70,216	
	Less Reimbursables	(144)	(124)	(18)	(172)			(458)	
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	24,630	19,282	5,799	20,047			69,758	
RESERVE AND GUARD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS									
14	Basic Pay	3,601	868	179	1,037			5,685	14
15	Retired Pay Accrual	695	234	36	207			1,172	15
16	Other Allowances & Benefits	720	307	61	325			1,413	16
17	Clothing	168	23	11	27			229	17
18	Travel	311	140	27	130			608	18
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	5,495	1,572	314	1,726			9,107	

TABLE VIII-3 (Continued)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>a</u> <u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u> <u>CORPS</u>	<u>AIR</u> <u>FORCE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u> <u>AGENCIES</u>	<u>DOD</u> <u>WIDE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>DOD</u>	<u>INDEX</u>
19	Family Housing Appropriation (non-pay)	1,734	804		943	18	2	3,501	19
	<u>CIVILIAN COSTS</u> ^b								
20	Compensation	10,737	10,782		7,379	4,072	3	32,973	20
21	Benefits	1,819	1,901		1,352	815	-	5,887	21
	<u>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</u>	<u>12,556</u>	<u>12,683</u>		<u>8,731</u>	<u>4,887</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>38,860</u>	
22	<u>PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS</u>	6,309	4,001	382	3,972	1,075	61	15,800	22
	<u>TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS</u>	50,724	38,342	6,495	35,419	5,980	66	137,026	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

a/ Navy civilian costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.

b/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Military Court of Appeals and Military Assistance accounts.

TABLE VIII-3a

FY 1990 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
 (\$ MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	107	62	27	42	238
Training travel	76	63	6	40	185
Operational travel	71	138	42	100	351
Rotational travel	645	210	76	496	1,427
Separation travel	156	80	41	121	398
Travel of Organized Units	18	19	1	5	43
Non-Temporary Storage	29	10	3	24	66
Temporary Lodging Expense	6	8	1	19	34
Total Obligations	1,108	590	197	847	2,742
Less Reimbursements	3	1	2	1	7
Total Direct Obligations	1,105	589	195	846	2,735

TABLE VIII-3b

FY 1990 RESERVE COMPONENTS PAY COSTS
 (\$ MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>		<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
	<u>National</u>				<u>National</u>	
	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Guard</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Guard</u>
Pay Group A	969	1,553	635	127	352	513
Pay Group B	29		3	10	57	
Pay Group F	161	200	42	56	16	26
Pay Group P	3	8		*	0	2
Mob Training	36		6	3	1	
School Training	105	186	11	8	45	67
Special Training	102	147	39	18	102	79
Admin & Spt	643	1,172	793	81	42	366
Education Benefits	22	28	9	5	10	12
Senior ROTC	44		17		15	
Junior ROTC	5		3	2	4	
Reserve Officer Cand			*			
BOBC	61					
HPSP	17		14		17	
Chaplain Candidates	2					
Plt Ldrs School				4		
Total	2,199	3,295	1,572	314	662	1,064

*. less than \$500

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE VIII-4
FY 1991 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
(In TOA - \$ M)

INDEX	COST CATEGORIES	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	DEFENSE AGENCIES	DOD WIDE	TOTAL DOD	INDEX
MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS									
1	Basic Pay	12,295	9,537	3,018	10,013			34,863	1
2	Retired Pay Accrual	5,324	4,125	1,306	4,336			15,091	2
3	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,513	1,407	373	1,367			4,660	3
4	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	232	529	140	282			1,183	4
5	Subsistence Allowance	984	691	235	979			2,889	5
	(Cash Allowance)								
6	Incentive Pays	133	263	40	287			723	6
7	Special Pays	368	848	90	243			1,549	7
8	Other Allowances	927	471	162	635			2,195	8
9	Separation Pays	161	152	60	112			485	9
10	FICA	1,096	850	271	911			3,128	10
11	PCS Travel	1,176	606	205	954			2,941	11
12	Cadets	37	42		37			116	12
13	Miscellaneous	87	40	16	40			183	13
	SUBTOTAL	24,333	19,561	5,916	20,196			70,006	
	Less Reimbursables	(114)	(315)	(4)	(181)			(614)	
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	24,219	19,246	5,912	20,015			69,392	
RESERVE AND GUARD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS									
14	Basic Pay	3,855	902	188	1,083			6,028	14
15	Retired Pay Accrual	715	244	39	209			1,207	15
16	Other Allowances & Benefits	810	333	66	363			1,572	16
17	Clothing	100	29	16	26			171	17
18	Travel	355	140	28	127			650	18
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	5,835	1,648	337	1,808			9,628	

TABLE VIII-4 (Continued)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u> ^a	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>DEFENSE AGENCIES</u>	<u>DOD WIDE</u>	<u>TOTAL DOD</u>	<u>INDEX</u>
19	Family Housing Appropriation (non-pay)	1,570	838		909	18	1	3,336	19
	<u>CIVILIAN COSTS</u> ^b								
20	Compensation	10,732	10,828		7,513	3,598	3	32,647	20
21	Benefits	1,814	2,002		1,443	731	-	5,990	21
	<u>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</u>	<u>12,546</u>	<u>12,830</u>		<u>8,956</u>	<u>4,329</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>38,664</u>	
22	<u>PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS</u>	6,616	4,233	392	4,154	1,145	60	16,600	22
	<u>TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS</u>	50,786	38,795	6,641	35,842	5,492	64	137,620	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

a/ Navy civilian costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.

b/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Military Court of Appeals and Military Assistance accounts.

TABLE VIII-4a

FY 1991 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
(\$ IN MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	102	61	26	39	228
Training travel	75	65	7	55	202
Operational travel	92	136	45	119	392
Rotational travel	700	211	80	528	1,519
Separation travel	152	88	42	107	389
Travel of Organized Units	20	27	1	58	106
Non-Temporary Storage	29	11	3	25	68
Temporary Lodging Expense	6	8	1	23	38
Total Obligations	1,176	607	205	954	2,942
Less Reimbursements	3	2	2	2	9
Total Direct Obligations	1,173	605	203	952	2,933

TABLE VIII-4b

FY 1991 RESERVE COMPONENTS PAY COSTS
(\$ IN MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>		<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
	<u>National</u>				<u>National</u>	
	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Guard</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Guard</u>
Pay Group A	1,005	1,597	643	129	372	533
Pay Group B	33		1	10	60	
Pay Group F	181	210	51	60	15	24
Pay Group P	2	8		*		2
Mob Training	38		6	4	3	
School Training	133	210	15	9	47	64
Special Training	114	200	33	17	99	91
Admin & Spt	682	1,206	855	95	47	396
Education Benefits	35	34	8	9	6	10
Senior ROTC	41		17		18	
Junior ROTC	6		4	1	4	
Reserve Officer Cand			*			
BOBC	77					
HPSP	20		16		18	
Chaplain Candidates	2					
Plt Ldrs School				5		
Total	2,369	3,467	1,648	337	689	1,119

* less than \$500

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE VIII-5
FY 1992 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
(In TOA - \$ M)

INDEX	COST CATEGORIES	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	DEFENSE AGENCIES	DOD WIDE	TOTAL DOD	INDEX
MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS									
1	Basic Pay	12,155	9,761	3,116	10,046			35,078	1
2	Retired Pay Accrual	5,190	4,166	1,326	4,287			14,969	2
3	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,545	1,422	381	1,322			4,670	3
4	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	253	544	143	280			1,220	4
5	Subsistence Allowance	978	707	243	960			2,888	5
(In-Kind and Cash Allowance)									
6	Incentive Pays	130	261	36	273			700	6
7	Special Pays	366	845	80	242			1,533	7
8	Other Allowances	873	465	171	586			2,095	8
9	Separation Pays	446	159	84	200			889	9
10	FICA	1,100	864	277	904			3,145	10
11	PCS Travel	1,185	638	214	939			2,976	11
12	Cadets	38	42		38			118	12
13	Miscellaneous	94	44	17	41			196	13
	SUBTOTAL	24,353	19,918	6,088	20,118			70,477	
	Less Reimbursables	(127)	(321)	(21)	(1,213)			(1,682)	
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	24,226	19,597	6,067	18,905			68,795	

RESERVE AND GUARD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS									
14	Basic Pay	3,579	904	184	1,120			5,787	14
15	Retired Pay Accrual	680	251	38	217			1,186	15
16	Other Allowances & Benefits	741	339	67	359			1,506	16
17	Clothing	91	25	12	27			155	17
18	Travel	304	130	26	128			588	18
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	5,395	1,649	327	1,851			9,222	

TABLE VIII-5 (Continued)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>a</u> <u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u> <u>CORPS</u>	<u>AIR</u> <u>FORCE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u> <u>AGENCIES</u>	<u>DOD</u> <u>WIDE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>DOD</u>	<u>INDEX</u>
19	Family Housing Appropriation (non-pay)	1,506	867		1,011	23	13	3,420	19
	<u>CIVILIAN COSTS</u> ^b								
20	Compensation	10,714	10,893		7,559	3,602	3	32,771	20
21	Benefits	1,815	1,920		1,385	721	-	5,841	21
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	12,529	12,813		8,944	4,323	3	38,612	-
22	<u>PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS</u>	6,703	4,284	403	4,200	1,150	60	16,800	22
	TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS	50,359	39,210	6,797	34,911	5,496	76	136,849	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

a/ Navy civilian costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.

b/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Military Court of Appeals and Military Assistance accounts.

TABLE VIII-5a

FY 1992 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
(\$ IN MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	105	54	28	39	226
Training travel	77	67	7	45	196
Operational travel	91	145	45	155	436
Rotational travel	682	233	80	525	1,520
Separation travel	167	89	50	102	408
Travel of Organized Units	31	31	0	27	89
Non-Temporary Storage	26	12	3	24	65
Temporary Lodging Expense	6	8	1	22	37
Total Obligations	1,185	639	214	939	2,977
Less Reimbursements	3	2	2	2	9
Total Direct Obligations	1,182	637	212	937	2,968

TABLE VIII-5b

FY 1992 RESERVE COMPONENTS PAY COSTS
(\$ IN MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>		<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>National Guard</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>National Guard</u>
Pay Group A	992	1,541	618	131	373	577
Pay Group B	32		1	10	56	
Pay Group F	162	163	37	55	16	25
Pay Group P	1	7	*	*	0	2
Mob Training	21		7	3	5	
School Training	90	195	13	8	48	66
Special Training	59	108	22	15	108	70
Admin & Spt	696	1,162	905	93	50	423
Education Benefits	23	25	8	6	6	10
Senior ROTC	39		16		18	
Junior ROTC	6		4	1	4	
Reserve Officer Cand			*			
BOBC	50					
HPSP	20		18		22	
Chaplain Candidates	2					
Plt Ldrs School				4		
Total	2,193	3,202	1,649	326	705	1,146

* less than \$500

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE VIII-6
FY 1993 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
(In TOA - \$ M)

INDEX	COST CATEGORIES	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	DEFENSE AGENCIES	DOD WIDE	TOTAL DOD	INDEX
MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS									
1	Basic Pay	12,020	9,974	3,158	9,999			35,151	1
2	Retired Pay Accrual	5,072	4,204	1,329	4,220			14,825	2
3	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,522	1,438	382	1,320			4,662	3
4	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	252	547	141	265			1,205	4
5	Subsistence Allowance	955	716	246	951			2,868	5
(In-Kind and Cash Allowance)									
6	Incentive Pays	129	260	33	252			674	6
7	Special Pays	362	845	75	231			1,513	7
8	Other Allowances	803	464	174	569			2,010	8
9	Separation Pays	473	168	75	222			938	9
10	FICA	1,093	881	281	901			3,156	10
11	PCS Travel	1,141	656	211	983			2,991	11
12	Cadets	39	43		39			121	12
13	Miscellaneous	97	45	17	42			201	13
	SUBTOTAL	23,958	20,241	6,122	19,994			70,315	
	Less Reimbursables	(146)	(348)	(21)	(1,255)			(1,770)	
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	23,812	19,893	6,101	18,739			68,545	
RESERVE AND GUARD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS									
14	Basic Pay	3,385	879	186	1,169			6,619	14
15	Retired Pay Accrual	645	244	38	226			1,153	15
16	Other Allowances & Benefits	706	331	68	371			1,476	16
17	Clothing	89	25	12	28			154	17
18	Travel	289	123	26	128			566	18
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	5,114	1,602	330	1,922			8,968	

TABLE VIII-6 (Continued)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>a</u> <u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u> <u>CORPS</u>	<u>AIR</u> <u>FORCE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u> <u>AGENCIES</u>	<u>DOD</u> <u>WIDE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>DOD</u>	<u>INDEX</u>
19	Family Housing Appropriation (non-pay)	1,505	915		1,127	24	44	3,615	19
	<u>CIVILIAN COSTS</u> ^b								
20	Compensation	11,067	11,275		8,004	2,469	3	32,818	20
21	Benefits	1,870	2,085		1,536	501	0	5,992	21
	<u>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</u>	<u>12,937</u>	<u>13,360</u>		<u>9,540</u>	<u>2,970</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>38,810</u>	—
22	<u>PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS</u>	6,703	4,284	403	4,200	1,150	60	16,800	22
	<u>TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS</u>	50,071	40,054	6,834	35,528	4,144	107	136,738	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

a/ Navy civilian costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.

b/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Military Court of Appeals and Military Assistance accounts.

TABLE VIII-6a

FY 1993 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
(\$ IN MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	106	57	27	37	227
Training travel	77	69	7	47	200
Operational travel	92	150	47	165	454
Rotational travel	623	246	77	504	1,450
Separation travel	180	88	49	114	431
Travel of Organized Units	33	27	0	68	128
Non-Temporary Storage	25	12	3	25	65
Temporary Lodging Expense	5	8	1	23	37
Total Obligations	1,141	657	211	983	2,992
Less Reimbursements	3	2	2	2	9
Total Direct Obligations	1,138	655	209	981	2,983

TABLE VIII-6b

FY 1993 RESERVE COMPONENTS PAY COSTS
(\$ IN MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>		<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
	<u>National</u>				<u>National</u>	
	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Guard</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Guard</u>
Pay Group A	949	1,487	597	132	388	575
Pay Group B	33		1	8	56	
Pay Group F	141	129	16	55	16	26
Pay Group P	1	6		*	0	2
Mob Training	19		7	3	5	
School Training	70	192	13	8	51	60
Special Training	53	106	22	15	107	66
Admin & Spt	671	1,101	897	96	51	457
Education Benefits	22	17	7	6	6	16
Senior ROTC	40		17		19	
Junior ROTC	6		4	2	4	
Reserve Officer Cand			*			
BOBC	48					
HPSP	21		19		23	
Chaplain Candidates	2					
Plt Ldrs School				5		
Total	2,076	3,039	1,602	330	727	1,195

* less than \$500

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

IV. CURRENT PAY TABLES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES (As of January 1, 1990)

Active component military pay rates are shown in Table VIII-7.

Pay per training weekend for military reserve personnel is shown in Table VIII-8. A training weekend is defined as four 4-hour training periods. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills, which varies by individual according to his level of authorized participation.

Current civilian pay rates are shown in Tables VIII-9 (General Schedule), VIII-10 (Wage Board-Appropriated Fund), and VIII-11 (Wage Board-Non-appropriated Fund). Note that the Wage Board pay table entries are national averages. Each wage area has its own distinct pay table.

TABLE VIII-7

MILITARY BASIC PAY (MONTHLY)
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1991

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	UNDER 2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS													
O-10	6159.00	6375.60	6375.60	6375.60	6375.60	6620.10	6987.00	6987.00	7486.80	7486.80	7988.10	7988.10	8485.80
O-9	5458.50	5601.30	5720.70	5720.70	5866.20	5866.20	6110.40	6110.40	6620.10	6620.10	6987.00	6987.00	7486.80
O-8	4944.00	5092.20	5212.80	5212.80	5601.30	5601.30	5866.20	5866.20	6110.40	6110.40	6620.10	6620.10	7183.30
O-7	4107.90	4387.20	4387.20	4387.20	4584.00	4584.00	4849.80	4849.80	5092.20	5092.20	5586.80	5586.80	5986.80
O-6	3045.00	3345.30	3564.60	3564.60	3564.60	3564.60	3564.60	3564.60	3695.50	3695.50	4026.80	4026.80	4291.50
O-5	2435.10	2859.30	3057.00	3057.00	3057.00	3057.00	3149.40	3149.40	3541.50	3541.50	3806.70	3806.70	4291.50
O-4	2052.60	2499.60	2666.40	2666.40	2715.90	2835.60	3029.10	3029.10	3199.20	3199.20	3492.00	3492.00	3588.60
O-3	1907.40	2132.70	2280.00	2280.00	2378.10	2499.60	2666.40	2666.40	2835.60	2835.60	3029.10	3029.10	3103.50
O-2	1663.20	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50	1816.50
O-1	1444.20	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30	1503.30
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER													
O-3E	0.00	0.00	0.00	2522.70	2643.30	2738.10	2886.30	3029.10	3149.40	3149.40	3149.40	3149.40	3149.40
O-2E	0.00	0.00	0.00	2255.70	2302.80	2375.70	2499.60	2595.30	2666.40	2666.40	2666.40	2666.40	2666.40
O-1E	0.00	0.00	0.00	1816.50	1940.70	2012.10	2085.00	2157.60	2255.70	2255.70	2255.70	2255.70	2255.70
WARRANT OFFICERS													
W-4	1943.40	2085.00	2085.00	2132.70	2229.60	2328.00	2425.50	2595.30	2715.90	2886.30	2979.60	3079.20	3318.90
W-3	1766.40	1916.10	1916.10	1940.70	1963.20	2106.90	2229.60	2302.80	2375.70	2446.50	2620.80	2715.90	2811.00
W-2	1546.80	1673.70	1673.70	1722.60	1816.50	1916.10	1988.70	2061.60	2132.70	2207.70	2280.00	2352.00	2446.50
W-1	1288.80	1477.80	1477.80	1601.10	1673.70	1745.70	1816.50	1891.50	1963.20	2036.40	2106.90	2182.50	2182.50
ENLISTED MEMBERS													
E-9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2260.80	2311.50	2364.00	2418.00	2472.30	2520.30	2910.60
E-8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1896.00	1950.00	2001.60	2053.50	2107.80	2156.10	2209.20	2599.20
E-7	1323.60	1428.90	1482.00	1533.60	1585.80	1636.50	1689.00	1741.50	1820.40	1872.00	1924.20	1949.10	2338.80
E-6	1139.10	1241.10	1293.00	1347.90	1398.30	1448.70	1502.10	1579.50	1629.00	1681.80	1707.30	1707.30	2107.30
E-5	999.30	1087.80	1140.60	1190.10	1268.40	1320.00	1372.50	1422.90	1448.70	1448.70	1448.70	1448.70	1448.70
E-4	932.10	984.30	1042.20	1122.90	1167.30	1167.30	1167.30	1167.30	1167.30	1167.30	1167.30	1167.30	1167.30
E-3	878.10	926.40	963.30	1001.40	1001.40	1001.40	1001.40	1001.40	1001.40	1001.40	1001.40	1001.40	1001.40
E-2	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10	845.10
E-1>4	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90	753.90
E-1<4	697.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
C/S	9363.30	H/S	3537.90										

NOTE--BASIC PAY IS LIMITED TO \$8,441.70
BY LEVEL V OF THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE
OASD(FM&P)M&PP(C)

FY 1991 4.1% PAY RAISE INCREASE

VIII-22

TABLE VIII-7 (Continued)

MONTHLY BAQ RATE
BAQ91BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE
FY 1991

PAY GRADE	SINGLE FULL RATE	PARTIAL RATE*	MARRIED FULL RATE	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEMBERS	E-1<4MONTHS ENLISTED	ALL OTHER ENLISTED	CASH/IN KIND
0-10	661.50	\$50.70	813.90					129.00/MONTH
0-9	661.50	50.70	813.90					
0-8	661.50	50.70	813.90					
0-7	661.50	50.70	813.90					
0-6	606.90	39.60	733.20					
0-5	584.40	33.00	706.50					
0-4	541.50	26.70	623.10					
0-3	434.10	22.20	515.70					
0-2	344.40	17.70	440.10					
0-1	289.80	13.20	393.30					
				When on leave or authorized to mess separately:		5.68/DAY	6.15/DAY	
0-3E	468.60	22.20	553.80					
0-2E	398.40	17.70	499.80					
0-1E	342.60	13.20	461.70					
				When rations in-kind are not available		6.41/DAY	6.94/DAY	
W-4	488.70	25.20	551.10					
W-3	410.70	20.70	505.20					
W-2	364.50	15.90	464.70					
W-1	305.40	13.80	402.00					
				When assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no messing facilities of the United States are available:		8.50/DAY	9.20/DAY	
E-9	401.40	18.60	528.90					
E-8	368.70	15.30	487.50					
E-7	314.70	12.00	453.00					
E-6	284.70	9.90	418.50					
E-5	262.50	8.70	376.20					
E-4	228.60	8.10	327.30					

OASD(FM&P)(MM&PP)C
1 JANUARY 1991 4.1%

TABLE VIII-7 (Continued)

PAY GRADE	SINGLE FULL RATE	PARTIAL RATE*	MARRIED FULL RATE
E-3	224.40	7.80	304.50
E-2	182.40	7.20	289.80
E-1>4	162.00	6.90	289.80
E-1<4	162.00	6.90	289.80

Service Academy Cadet Pay is \$543.90, effective on January 1, 1990, as per section 203(c)(1) of Title 37, United States Code.

Service Academy Cadet Pay is \$543.90, effective on January 1, 1990,
as per section 203(c)(1) of Title 37, United States Code.

Note:

* Payment of the partial rate of BAQ at these rates to members of the uniformed services without dependents who, under Title 37 U.S.C. 403(b) or (c) are not entitled to the full rate of BAQ, is authorized by Title 37 U.S.C. 1009(c)(2) and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

TABLE VIII-8

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL PAY PER TRAINING WEEKEND

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	UNDER <2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS														
O-10	205.30	212.52	212.52	212.52	212.52	220.67	220.67	232.90	232.90	249.56	249.56	266.27	266.27	282.86
O-9	181.95	186.71	190.69	190.69	190.69	195.54	195.54	203.68	203.68	220.67	220.67	232.90	232.90	249.56
O-8	164.80	169.74	173.76	173.76	173.76	186.71	186.71	195.54	195.54	203.68	203.68	220.67	220.67	226.11
O-7	136.93	146.24	146.24	146.24	146.24	152.80	152.80	161.66	161.66	169.74	169.74	186.71	186.71	199.56
O-6	101.50	111.51	118.82	118.82	118.82	118.82	118.82	118.82	122.85	142.27	149.54	152.80	161.66	175.33
O-5	81.17	95.31	101.90	101.90	101.90	101.90	101.90	106.64	111.51	116.40	119.62	122.85	132.80	143.05
O-4	68.42	83.32	88.88	88.88	88.88	94.52	94.52	100.97	106.64	111.51	116.40	119.62	122.85	132.80
O-3	63.58	71.09	76.00	76.00	76.00	84.09	84.09	88.88	94.52	100.97	106.64	111.51	116.40	119.62
O-2	55.44	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55
O-1	48.14	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11	50.11
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER														
O-3E	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	84.09	84.09	84.09	84.09	84.09	84.09	84.09	84.09	84.09
O-2E	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	75.19	75.19	75.19	75.19	75.19	75.19	75.19	75.19	75.19
O-1E	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55	60.55
WARRANT OFFICERS														
W-4	64.78	69.50	69.50	71.09	74.32	77.60	80.85	86.51	90.53	93.70	96.21	99.32	102.64	110.63
W-3	58.88	63.87	63.87	64.69	65.44	70.23	74.32	76.76	79.19	81.55	84.09	87.36	90.53	93.70
W-2	51.56	55.79	55.79	57.42	60.55	63.87	66.29	68.72	71.09	73.59	76.00	78.40	81.55	84.09
W-1	42.96	49.26	49.26	53.37	55.79	58.19	60.55	63.05	65.44	67.88	70.23	72.75	75.19	77.66
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
E-9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	75.36	77.05	78.80	80.60	82.41	84.01	88.42	97.02
E-8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	63.20	65.00	66.72	68.45	70.26	71.87	73.64	77.96	86.64
E-7	44.12	47.63	49.40	51.12	52.86	54.55	56.30	58.05	60.68	62.40	64.14	66.97	69.33	77.96
E-6	37.97	41.37	43.10	44.93	46.61	48.29	50.07	52.65	54.30	56.06	57.91	59.91	62.91	66.91
E-5	33.31	36.26	38.02	39.67	42.28	44.00	45.75	47.43	48.29	48.29	48.29	48.29	48.29	48.29
E-4	31.07	32.81	34.74	37.43	38.91	38.91	38.91	38.91	38.91	38.91	38.91	38.91	38.91	38.91
E-3	29.27	30.88	32.11	33.38	33.38	33.38	33.38	33.38	33.38	33.38	33.38	33.38	33.38	33.38
E-2	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17	28.17
E-1>4	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13	25.13
E-1<4	23.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

NOTE--BASIC PAY IS LIMITED TO \$281.39
BY LEVEL V OF THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE
OASD(FM&P)HMSPP(C)

TABLE VIII-9

ANNUAL GENERAL SCHEDULE (GS) PAY RATES

(AS OF JANUARY 1, 1991)

STEP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$11,015	\$11,383	\$11,749	\$12,114	\$12,482	\$12,697	\$13,058	\$13,422	\$13,439	\$13,776
2	12,385	12,679	13,090	13,439	13,590	13,990	14,390	14,790	15,190	15,590
3	13,515	13,966	14,417	14,868	15,319	15,770	16,221	16,672	17,123	17,574
4	15,171	15,677	16,183	16,689	17,195	17,701	18,207	18,713	19,219	19,725
5	16,973	17,539	18,105	18,671	19,237	19,803	20,369	20,935	21,501	22,067
6	18,919	19,550	20,181	20,812	21,443	22,074	22,705	23,336	23,967	24,598
7	21,023	21,724	22,425	23,126	23,827	24,528	25,229	25,930	26,631	27,332
8	23,284	24,060	24,836	25,612	26,388	27,164	27,940	28,716	29,492	30,268
9	25,717	26,574	27,431	28,288	29,145	30,002	30,859	31,716	32,573	33,430
10	28,322	29,266	30,210	31,154	32,098	33,042	33,986	34,930	35,874	36,818
11	31,116	32,153	33,190	34,227	35,264	36,301	37,338	38,375	39,412	40,449
12	37,294	38,537	39,780	41,023	42,266	43,509	44,752	45,995	47,238	48,481
13	44,348	45,826	47,304	48,782	50,260	51,738	53,216	54,694	56,172	57,650
14	52,406	54,153	55,900	57,647	59,394	61,141	62,888	64,635	66,382	68,129
15	61,643	63,698	65,753	67,808	69,863	71,918	73,973	76,028	78,083	80,138
16	72,298	74,708	77,118	79,528	81,936	82,697	85,060	87,424	89,787	
17	83,032	85,800	88,568	91,336	94,104					
18	97,317									

Regular Wage Schedules for U.S. Citizen Wage Employees in Foreign Areas (Nonappropriated Fund)

[illegible]

Effective Date: First day of the first pay period which begins on or after April 1, 1990.

Supersedes schedule effective April 1, 1989.

APPENDIX A

MANPOWER

DATA

STRUCTURE

A

APPENDIX A

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

I. Introduction

This appendix provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1991.

II. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower, but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions that alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1991 DMRR, by component, are included in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM (DPPC)	TO (DPPC)	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992
ARMY								
HUA/DEV TRF	CEN MANAGED COMM	THEATER FORCES	0	0	0	0	.1	0
HUA/DEV TRF	CEN MANAGED COMM	FORCE SPT TNG	0	0	0	0	.1	0
HUA/DEV TRF	SPT INSTALLATIONS	CBT INSTALLATIONS	0	*	0	0	1.0	0
HUA/DEV TRF	SPT INSTALLATIONS	CEN SPT ACTIVITIES	0	0	0	0	*	0
HUA/DEV TRF	THEATER FORCES	FORCE SPT TNG	0	*	0	0	0	0
HUA/DEV TRF	INDIVIDUAL TNG	CEN MANAGED COMM	0	*	0	0	0	0
HUA/DEV TRF	SPT INSTALLATIONS	CBT INSTALLATIONS	0	*	0	0	0	0
LOGISTICS	SPT ACT/SPT INSTALL	LOGISTICS SPT OPNS	0	0	0	.3	0	0
COMMISSARIES	SPT ACT/SPT INSTALL	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	0	.2	0	.3	8.1
FINANCE OPERATIONS	SPT ACT/SPT INSTALL	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	.1	.1	0	3.5	3.6
PRINTING & PUBS	SPT ACT/SPT INSTALL	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	0	.2	0	0	1.4
SPT TO OSIA (Treaty Verification)	SPT ACTIVITIES	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	0	.2	0	0	0
SPT FOR DCA (White House Comm)	SPT ACT/SPT INSTALL	DEFENSE AGENCY (White House Comm)	0	.1	.1	0	0	0
ARMY STOCK FUND	LOGISTICS SPT OPNS/ MAINTENANCE OPNS	CENTRAL LOGISTICS SUPPLY OPNS	0	.4	.4	0	9.2	8.6

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM (DPPC)	TO (DPPC)	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992
ARMY								
ARMY STOCK FUND	CENTRAL LOGISTICS SUPPLY OPNS	LOGISTICS SUPPORT OPNS/MAINT	0	0	.1	0	0	0
NEW CUMBERLAND ARMY DEPOT	CENTRAL LOGISTICS SUPPLY OPNS	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	*	*	0	1.7	1.5
NEW CUMBERLAND ARMY DEPOT	SPT ACT/SPT INSTALL	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	*	*	0	.5	.5
NEW CUMBERLAND ARMY DEPOT	MAINTENANCE OPNS	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	*	*	0	*	*
SHARPE ARMY DEPOT	CEN LOG SUP OPNS	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	*	0	0	.7	.6
SHARPE ARMY DEPOT	SPT ACT/SPT INSTALL	DEFENSE AGENCY	0	*	*	0	.2	.3
CBT DEVELOPMENTS	CENTRALIZED SPT ACTIVITIES	RESEARCH & DEV	0	0	0	0	0	.3

*Less than 50.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			
			FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>MARINE CORPS</u>						
Defense Commissary Activity	Support Activities - Support Installations	OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	0	0	*	*
Defense Financing and Accounting Service	Support Activities - Control Support Activities	OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	0	*	*	*
Child Development	Combat Installations	Training Personnel - Personnel Support	*	*	*	*
Family Centers	Combat Installations	Training Personnel - Personnel Support	.1	.1	.1	.1

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			
			FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993
<u>NAVY</u>						
Support to OSIA	Support Activities Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Defense Agencies	*	*	*	*
Support to DSPO	Support Activities Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Defense Agencies	*	*	*	*

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>
			<u>MILITARY</u>				<u>CIVILIAN</u>			
<u>AIR FORCE</u>										
Svc Spt to Spec Ops	Tactical	Joint	0.0	6.3	7.5	8.3		1.1	1.3	1.3
<u>AIR NATIONAL GUARD</u>										
Svc Spt to Spec Ops	Tactical	Joint	0.0	.8	.8	.8		0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE</u>										
Svc Spt to Spec Ops	Tactical	Joint	0.00	1.2	1.2	1.2		0.0	0.0	0.0

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

OF

TERMS

B

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<u>AC:</u>	Active Component								
<u>AFR:</u>	Air Force Reserve of the Air Force								
<u>ARF:</u>	Air Reserve Components of the Air Force. Includes Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.								
<u>Authorized (Manpower):</u>	Synonymous with programmed manning.								
<u>Authorized Strength Report:</u>	A Marine Corps term synonymous with programmed manning.								
<u>Balanced Occupation:</u>	An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meets the following criteria: (See overage and shortage occupations also)								
	<table><tr><th><u>Skills with PMI of</u></th><th><u>% of PMI filled</u></th></tr><tr><td>500 or more people</td><td>> 95% and < 105%</td></tr><tr><td>100-499 people</td><td>> 90% and < 110%</td></tr><tr><td>less than 100 people</td><td>> 85% and < 115%</td></tr></table>	<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>	500 or more people	> 95% and < 105%	100-499 people	> 90% and < 110%	less than 100 people	> 85% and < 115%
<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>								
500 or more people	> 95% and < 105%								
100-499 people	> 90% and < 110%								
less than 100 people	> 85% and < 115%								
<u>Billet:</u>	A programmed manpower structure space that defines by grade and occupation a job to be performed which is associated with a specific unit or organization (see position).								
<u>Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM):</u>	Military personnel assigned to tactical units who are actually employed in civilian positions in support activities. BMM usually occurs when civilian position requirements have been identified, but no civilian personnel are authorized due to budget or end strength ceiling constraints.								
<u>Careerist:</u>	A service member with more than four years of completed Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS). (see First-Termer)								
<u>Critical Occupation:</u>	An occupation in which the inventory is equal to or less than 85 percent of the desired population for the fiscal year.								
<u>Distributable Billets:</u>	A Navy term synonymous with programmed manning.								
<u>End Strength:</u>	Manpower strength as of the last day of the fiscal year. The term may be further defined								

in combination with other terms but always indicates personnel strength as of September 30th, e.g.,

Actual end strength:	Prior fiscal year(s) personnel inventory.
Budgeted end strength:	As contained in a Service or DoD budget.
Programmed end strength:	As contained within the DoD Future Years Defense Program.

First-Termer: An enlisted service member who has completed four years or less Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS). (see Careerist)

Force Structure: The numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings.

Force Structure Allowance: An Army term synonymous with active component programmed manning.

Force Structure Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with active component programmed manning.

Force Structure Deviation: A manpower accounting convention which allows Programmed Manning for the Programmed Force Structure and the Individuals accounts to be depicted within programmed and budgeted end strength. Force Structure Deviation appears as "Undistributed" in Active Component Defense Planning and Programming Category tables. Positive values indicate temporary overmanning; negative values indicate temporary undermanning projected for the last day of a fiscal year (DoD Handbook 7045.7-H and DoDI 1120.11).

Funded Peacetime Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with programmed manning.

Grade: The pay grade requirement of a billet or the pay grade possessed by a service member.

Individuals: Transients, trainees (includes Reserve Component training pipeline for the Reserve Component), patients, prisoners, holdees, cadets and students -- personnel not filling programmed manpower structure spaces. This "overhead" is required to maintain the programmed structure at one hundred percent of programmed manning.

Individual Mobiliza-
tion Augmentee (IMA):

Individuals carried in the Selected Reserve programmed manning who fill Active Component billets upon mobilization. IMA billets are not included in Active Component Programmed Manpower Structure in the DMRR.

Inventory

Synonymous with Actual End Strength. The Actual personnel strength for a prior year.

Lateral Movement:

A reclassification action resulting in a change of a service member's primary occupation.

Manning Level:

Synonymous with programmed manning.

Occupation:

The specialty skill requirement of a billet, and the skill qualifications of personnel. Occupations are defined according to the following coding systems.

Army: SSI (officer), MOS (Enlisted)
Navy: NOBC (officer), Rating/NEC (enlisted)
USAF: AFSC (officer & enlisted)
USMC: MOS (officer & enlisted)

Occupational Field:

An aggregation of discrete occupations.

Operating Strength:

An Army personnel management term identifying the number of people (or projected strengths for future periods) in units. The term is synonymous with the following:

Navy: distributable strength
USAF: assigned strength
USMC: chargeable strength

Overage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meet the following criteria: (see balanced and shortage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	> 105%
100-499 people	> 110%
less than 100 people	> 115%

Position:

Same as Billet above.

Programmed Force
Structure:

The set of units and organizations that exists in the current year, and which is planned to exist in each future year of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

Programmed Manpower Structure:

The aggregation of billets describing the full manpower requirement for units and organizations in the programmed force structure. This does not include IMAs or Individuals.

Programmed Manning:

Those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be filled. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100 percent fill of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and personnel constraints. For the active components the term "programmed manning" is synonymous with:

Army: Force Structure Allowance
Navy: Distributable billets
USAF: Force Structure Authorizations, and
Funded Peacetime Authorizations
USMC: Authorized Strength Report

RC:

Reserve Component; the Air Force also uses the term Air Reserve Components (ARC).

Required (Manpower):

Synonymous with programmed manpower structure.

Round out:

An Army term wherein Reserve Component units are assigned to Active Component divisions to make up the difference between the number of Active Component units required in a standard division configuration and the number of Active Component units actually assigned. These Reserve Component units are scheduled to deploy with the Active Component division, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Round Up:

An Army term wherein Reserve Component units are assigned to Active Component divisions to augment the division structure. These Reserve Component units are scheduled to deploy with Active Component divisions, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Shortage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory, when compared to Programmed Manning plus Individuals (PMI), meets the following criteria: (see balanced and overage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	< 95%
100-499 people	< 90%
less than 100 people	< 85%

Skill:

Same as occupation.

Stability:

Aggregate: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the Service continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.

Unit: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the same unit continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.

Staffing:

The process of distributing personnel to fill programmed manning targets in accordance with assignment policies, tour length constraints, and projections of the trained operating strength population.

Training and
Administration of
Reserves (TARS):

A Navy term referring to full-time manpower support to the Navy Reserve. This manpower is budgeted and accounted for within the Selected Reserve.

Training Pipeline:

Reserve component military personnel in training status, including training/pay categories F, L, P, Q, S, T, and X.

Trained Strength in
Units:

The number of personnel in Selected Reserve unit(s) who have completed 12 weeks of basic military training (or its equivalent) and are eligible for deployment overseas, on land, when mobilized under proper authorities. Excludes personnel in non-deployable accounts. The reserve component manpower category functionally equivalent to active component programmed manning.

APPENDIX C

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

APPENDIX C

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

1. STRATEGIC. The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies.

a. Offensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships, long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft, strategic cruise missiles, and operational headquarters for these forces.

b. Defensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command, control, and surveillance and warning systems.

c. Strategic Control and Surveillance. This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY. The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy). Special operations forces are imbedded in this DPPC.

a. Land Forces. This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

(1) Division Forces. This category contains program elements for Army and Marine divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces; and for Marine Corps combat and combat support units (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine war reserve materiel, for Army resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) are also included in this category.

(2) Theater Forces. This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Berlin and Panama; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other Services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units (Special operations forces); and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar reinforcing units in Army Forces Command.

b. Tactical Air Forces. This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and weapon system security units; multi-purpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems and ground launched cruise missiles; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Force direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force command control facilities and systems in Europe and the Pacific, Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC), war reserve materiel, and the Air Force Component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

c. Naval Forces. The DPPCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

(1) Warships and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Forces. This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, battleships, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and tactically supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

(2) Amphibious Forces. This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, Navy special warfare forces, the Navy component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

(3) Naval Support Forces. This category contains program elements for forward logistical supporting forces, carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, intermediate maintenance activities, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the Navy component of the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) program.

d. Mobility Forces. This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift; sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships; and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

3. COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. This category contains program elements for the centrally managed communications and intelligence gathering activities.

a. Centrally Managed Communications. This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications Systems, the military

Service's communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical, or WWMCCS missions, and management headquarters.

b. Intelligence. This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

4. COMBAT INSTALLATIONS. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Programs 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

5. FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING. This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant, surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training at fleet training centers, submarine schools and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps unit and force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, and Air Force combat crew training squadrons.

6. MEDICAL SUPPORT. This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD regional medical facilities, including medical centers and laboratories; and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research, medical equipment and systems, and health care in station hospitals and medical clinics.

7. JOINT ACTIVITIES. This category contains program elements for those source manpower billets which are outside of service control. They include manning requirements of such organization as the Joint Staff, and the like.

a. International Military Organizations. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Example is NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

b. Unified Commands. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, etc.

c. Federal Support Activities. This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

d. Joint Staff. This category contains the program element codes for the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities. This category contains the program element codes for the Staffs of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Agencies and Activities.

8. CENTRAL LOGISTICS. This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

a. Supply Operations. This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, centralized procurement offices. It also includes resources for POL pipeline and storage operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operation and corresponding reserve component program elements.

b. Maintenance Operations. This category contains elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities and logistic centers.

c. Logistics Support Operations. This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance.

9. SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS. This category contains the program elements for the service combat and support commands.

a. Combat Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the military Service combat commands, i.e., those in Major Defense Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: U.S. Army, Europe; U.S. Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

b. Support Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of military Service support commands, i.e., those in Major Defense Programs 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

10. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES. This category also includes program elements for major defense wide activities conducted under centralized OSD control.

a. Research and Development Activities. This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) projection and for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other program elements not in Program 6, but containing research and development resources.

b. Geophysical Activities. This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

11. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL.

a. Individual Training. This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of Service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

b. Personnel Support. This category contains program elements for provision of varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, Section 6 schools, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the American Forces Information Program, civilian career training and intern programs, and the VEAP program. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

12. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for support installations and centralized activities.

a. Support Installations. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, and administrative commands (Programs 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

b. Centralized Support Activities. This category contains miscellaneous Service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for combat developments, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, audiovisual activities, claims, service-wide support, and other miscellaneous support.

13. INDIVIDUALS. The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not considered force structure manpower. They are transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets/midshipmen.

a. Transients. This category contains only the Transient program element, which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees. This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element that consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an

operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

c. Trainees, Students, and Cadets/Midshipmen. This category contains active service officer students, active enlisted students, active enlisted trainees, Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen, active officer accession students, and the Reserve Components training pipeline personnel.

14. MISCELLANEOUS. This group consists of three DPPCs: Retired Pay, International Support Funds, and Undistributed. The Undistributed category includes the program element Forces Structure Deviation, which reflects the under or over manning of the force units (see the Defense Manpower Requirement Report for an explanation of accounting technique). International Support Funds include the program element for Defense support of the Olympic Games. The Retired Pay category contains only the one program element for Retired Pay.